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Abstract  
 
 
The study of externally-led democratisation in conflict-affected societies 
has expanded over the last two decades. The introduction of democracy from the 
outside has attracted extensive scholarly interest in accordance with the 
increasing engagement of the United Nations and other international agents in 
attempting to build long-lasting domestic, regional and international peace 
through promoting democratic forms of government in the post-Cold War era. 
The studies conducted to investigate democratisation in post-conflict societies 
have focused on the construction of government institutions and transferring 
necessary institutional competencies due to the fact that externally-driven 
democratisation policies target the state rather than the nation. In this respect, 
some studies undertaken to examine the process of democratisation in post-
conflict societies pointed to the need for sequencing of tasks such as establishing 
security, law and order and building strong and capable government institutions 
in the first place. Their focus, however, has still remained on the state rather than 
the nation. Through examining two case studies, this thesis emphasises two 
significant points: 1) achieving successful democratic transformation in conflict-
affected societies requires not only the construction of functioning central state 
institutions but also the creation of a shared sense of national community; and 2) 
sequencing of post-conflict reconstruction tasks therefore should also involve 
building a sense of national cohesion through promoting social communication, 
participation and inclusion in political, institutional and social processes while 
postponing the competitive or potentially conflictual aspects of democracy. 
The need to integrate the creation of a sense of shared national 
community into studies of democracy promotion in societies emerging from 
conflict stems from the fact that the reconstruction of post-conflict societies 
involves two separate but complementary and interacting processes. These 
processes were examined under two headings: state-building and nation-building. 
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The construction of well-functioning, effective government institutions and the 
achievement of a sense of national community were found to be vital, inter-
connected factors to consolidate democratic rule promoted by external actors. 
The lack of or a weak sense of social cohesion has an undermining effect on the 
capacity of state institutions to exercise authority and effectively and 
democratically perform their roles and duties. Failing to deliver their functions to 
the public and exercise political authority throughout the entire territory, weak 
state institutions, in return, do not provide a suitable environment for 
consolidating democratic rule, which requires the execution of the rule of law 
and protection and guaranteeing of citizens’ political rights.    
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Chapter One 
      Introduction 
  
 
1.1. Setting of the Research 
Since the demise of the bipolar world system, promoting liberal democratic 
governance has become an integral component of the United Nations’ (UN) 
engagement in establishing long-lasting domestic and international peace. From 
Namibia and Mozambique in southern Africa and Afghanistan in Central Asia to 
Cambodia and East Timor in Southeast Asia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Kosovo in Southeast Europe, the UN, along with other international governmental 
and non-governmental agencies, has undertaken democratisation programmes with a 
view to preventing the recurrence of violent domestic conflicts in societies 
fragmented along ethnic, religious, cultural, regional or other lines. The 
transformation of conflict-torn societies into democratic polities through external 
intervention and assistance was based on the conviction that the democracy deficit 
underlies internal violent conflict. The introduction of democracy, in this context, is 
expected to help heal ethnic, religious and other lines of divisions; it therefore would 
break the ‘cycle of violence’ and establish durable peace.   
The allocation and employment of large amounts of economic, military and 
financial resources by international agencies and individual states for democratic 
development assistance and the growth of a body of literature on international 
democracy promotion in post-conflict societies,1 reflect an increasing, albeit 
11 
 
                                                 
1 See, among others, for example, Simon Chesterman, You, the People: the United Nations, 
Transitional Administration, and State-Building, first paperback edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); Idem, The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa 
Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburg, PA: 2005); Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance 
and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004); Larry 
Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States – Lessons and  Challenges”, 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 2:2 (December 2006), pp. 93-116; Michael Ignatieff, “Intervention 
and State Failure”, Dissent, 49:1 (Winter 2002), pp. 115-123; Marina Ottaway, “Nation-Building”, 
12 
 
                                                                                                                                         
selective, commitment of international actors to building institutional, normative and 
social foundations for democratic governance in conflict-affected societies. This 
interest in democracy promotion of the international community, i.e., a group of 
militarily, economically and industrially advanced states and multi-lateral regional 
and international agencies dominated by these states,2 was influenced by the 
emergence of a new threat and security perception in the post-Cold War era. Intra-
state violence caused by or resulting in the breakdown of formal government 
institutions, law and order, and societal coherence3 has come to be regarded as the 
biggest threat to international peace and security. 
The eruption in different parts of the world in the immediate post-Cold War 
era of a number of violent intra-state conflicts, associated with the breakdown of 
governmental institutional structures, shifted the focus from inter-state wars to 
internal characteristics of the states. The weakness or absence of efficient, legitimate 
and democratic government institutions came to be seen as the root cause of internal 
conflicts with repercussions for international peace and security. The international 
community’s involvement in promoting liberal democratic principles and institutions 
in societies emerging from internal violence era derived from the revival of the 
perceived link between peace and liberal democracy: the liberal democratic peace 
premise, meaning ‘democracies do not wage war against each other’.4 Stemming 
 
Foreign Policy, 132 (September-October 2002a), pp. 16-24; Idem, “Rebuilding Institutions in 
Collapsed States”, Development and Change, 33:5 (November 2002b), pp. 1001-1023; Roland Paris, 
At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”, The Washington 
Quarterly 25:3 (Summer 2002a), pp. 85-96; Idem, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of 
Terror (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Idem, When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); John J. Hamre and Gordon R. 
Sullivan, “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction”, The Washington Quarterly, 25:4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 
85–96; Susan E. Rice, “The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States”, Brookings 
Policy Brief 116 (February 2003). 
2 This definition of the term “international community” derives from Ottaway, 2002b, p. 1001. 
3 I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse”, I. William Zartman (ed.), 
Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995a), pp. 5-6; Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States”, 
Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-3), pp. 3-20; K. J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
4 For further information on liberal democratic peace thesis, see, among others, Michael W. Doyle, 
“Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:3 (Summer 1983), pp. 
205-235; Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, “From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and 
Conflict in the International System”, Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies II (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). For a discussion of the scholarly development of liberal 
13 
 
                                                                                                                                         
from the view that lack of democracy or deficiencies in establishing and maintaining 
democratic rule underlies violent domestic conflicts with a potential to threaten 
regional and international security and stability,5 democracy promotion has come to 
be seen as a solution to address internal conflicts and create a functional government.   
The UN and other regional and international agencies, including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as individual states increasingly 
engaged in the post-Cold War era in building a stable, long-lasting peace through 
establishing functioning, democratic public institutions and social structures. This 
engagement can be grouped into the following categories: 
1. Rapid democratisation through providing electoral assistance: 
With the aim of breaking with the violent past and transforming 
conflict-torn societies into a peaceful, democratic future after years 
of internal strife and turmoil, the UN has provided electoral 
assistance to a number of countries. The forms of UN electoral 
assistance activities ranged from the supervision of elections such 
as in Namibia6 and the verification of elections such as in 
Nicaragua,7 Angola,8 Mozambique9 and El Salvador,10 to the co-
 
democratic peace thesis, see Paris, 2004, pp. 40-51.  
5 See, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-
making, and Peace-keeping”, UN Document A/47/277 - S/24111, (17 June 1992), 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html [accessed 14 March 2006]; Idem, “Supplement to an 
Agenda for Peace”, UN Document, A/50/60-S/1995/1, (3 January 1995), 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html [accessed 14 March 2006]; Idem, An Agenda for 
Democratization,  (New York: United Nations, 1996); United Nations, An Inventory of Post-Conflict 
Peace-Building Activities, (New York: United Nations, 1996), 
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Document2.pdf [accessed 15 March 2006]; Kofi Annan, “The 
Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Peace in Africa”,  Report of 
the Secretary-General to the Security Council, UN Document S/1998/318, (16 April 1998) 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html [accessed 22 April 2006]; Idem, 
“Why Democracy Is an International Issue”, Cyril Foster Lecture by Secretary-General at Oxford 
University, UN Press Release, SG/SM/7850, (19 June 2001) 
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_search_full.asp?statID=11 [accessed 22 April 
2006]. For a discussion of the impact of the revived liberal democratic peace thesis in the post-Cold 
War era on the changing nature and goal of UN peace operations from peacekeeping to peace-
building, i.e. shifting from the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed peacekeeping forces to 
monitor a cease-fire agreement concluded between belligerents towards building sustainable peace 
through undertaking rapid democratisation and liberalisation programmes, see Paris, 2004, pp. 13-39.  
6 UN/Doc. S/RES/632 (1989). 
7 UN/Doc. S/RES/637 (1989). 
8 UN/Doc. S/RES/696 (1991). 
9 UN/Doc. S/RES/797 (1992). 
10 UN/Doc. S/RES/832 (1993). 
14 
 
                                                
ordination and provision of support to international observers 
requested by governments such as in Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and providing technical assistance to a 
number of countries in such electoral areas as the preparation of an 
electoral budget, drafting of electoral laws, organisation of training 
and civic education programmes, and the design and 
implementation of logistical plans.11 The organisation of elections 
in post-conflict countries was seen symbolising the development 
of multiparty democratic politics that would supposedly prevent 
political exclusion, violence and human rights violations and thus 
serve to establish long-lasting peace.12 
2. Supervising post-war transition to democracy through temporarily 
assuming administrative functions and civilian authority in a 
member state: Through exercising “direct control” in key areas of 
foreign affairs, defence, security, finance and information, the UN 
assumed a transitional government role in Cambodia in the early-
1990s leading to the organisation of free and fair parliamentary 
elections and handover of governmental powers and 
responsibilities to the elected Cambodian government.13 The UN’s 
transitional role aimed to facilitate the implementation of the peace 
agreement negotiated by the former warring Cambodian factions 
to end the decades-old civil war and transform the country from 
conflict to peace and democracy.14 
3. Member or partner state-building as a democracy promotion 
 
11 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation”, UN 
Document, A/49/1, (2 September 1994), para. 775; Idem, “Support by the United Nations System of 
the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored”, Report of the Secretary-
General, A/51/512, (18 October 1996), paras. 17-23, Annex I. 
12 Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 1994, 1996. 
13 UN/Doc. S/RES/745 (1992). 
14 For further information on the Cambodian peace process, see the Paris Peace Accords of 1991, 
comprised of four important documents: the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict, the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, the Agreement Concerning the 
Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of 
Cambodia and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Steven R. Ratner, 
“The Cambodia Settlement Agreements”, American Journal of International Law 87:1, (January 1993), 
pp. 1- 41.  
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strategy: Through integrating the governmental and institutional 
capacity to guarantee political participation, respect for minority 
rights, freedom of expression and the rule of law into the 
membership requirements, known as the Copenhagen criteria, and 
through providing political and financial assistance for democratic 
development within Europe and other parts of the world, the EU 
has promoted democracy in the countries that are either willing to 
be part of the EU or European regional partnership initiatives in 
the post-Cold War era.15  
4. Creating protectorates in the aftermath of a civil war: The 
international community represented by the UN, European Union 
(EU), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 
individual European states which contributed to the NATO-led 
multinational security force (Stabilisation Force – SFOR) were 
involved in democracy promotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina where a 
coalition of local groups was brought to power at the end of more 
than three years of bloody civil war in December 1995. Political 
intervention was since then maintained through the Office of High 
Representative (OHR) equipped with extensive executive powers 
to oversee the implementation of the peace process and the 
country’s democratic political development through ensuring the 
exercise of political and civil rights by members of all ethnic 
groups and preventing the return of the old, defeated repressive 
political regime, and political instability, lawlessness and civil 
war.16  
 
15 For a review of the EU’s involvement in democracy promotion in the post-Cold War era, see for 
example, Paul Kubicek (ed.), The European Union and Democratization, (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2003). 
16 This definition of protectorate derives from Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 76. For further information on the Bosnian governmental 
and political institutional structures created in Dayton, Ohio, in late-1995, see “The General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, [Dayton Peace Agreement], (14 
December 1995), available at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 [accessed 8 July 
2008]. 
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5. Establishing trusteeships following military interventions, 
undertaken to end gross human rights violations committed by 
repressive nominal governments in power: In Kosovo and East 
Timor, which were “rescued” from a deteriorating humanitarian 
emergency situation characterised by massive human rights 
violations, internal displacement and refugee flows into 
neighbouring countries, the UN was mandated to act “in trust for 
the inhabitants” of these two territories through assuming complex 
and large-scale government functions and powers with a view to 
“establish[ing] a stable and more or less consensual politics”.17  
6. Assuming a limited role in democratic governance promotion 
following a military operation: The UN’s involvement in 
Afghanistan where it assumed a “light expatriate footprint” 
approach was characterised by a behind-the-scenes role for support 
and assistance with democratic political and economic 
development rather than formal and wide-ranging government 
functions and powers.18  
7. Forced democratisation through military occupation: Influenced by 
the German and Japanese examples in the past, the engagement of 
the US and UK-led “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, where they 
initially bypassed the UN to undertake a military operation to 
topple Saddam Hussein from power but later appealed to it to 
share the burden in achieving a political and social transformation 
and legitimising the political process amidst the growing Iraqi 
resistance and other political problems,19 fits in this form of 
democracy promotion undertaken in the post-Cold War era. 
 
 
17 Walzer, 2004, p. 76. 
18 “Rebuilding Societies Emerging from Confect: A Shared Responsibility”, Speech of the SRSG 
Lakhdar Brahimi at the Opening of 55th Annual DPI/NGO Conference, (New York, 9 September 
2002), available at http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_statement/SRSG/2002/02sep09.htm [accessed 12 
June 2008]; United Nations, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International 
Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General”, General Assembly and Security Council 
Document, A/56/875–S/2002/278, (18 March 2002); UN/Doc. S/RES/1401(2002). 
19 UN/Doc. S/RES/1483(2003). 
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All these cases listed above under different headings show the growing 
involvement of a wide and diverse range of international organisations and actors in 
the post-Cold War era in democracy promotion in varying degrees and different 
forms.  
 
1.2. The Intended Aim of the Thesis 
The growing literature on the democratisation of conflict-affected territories 
produced in the post-Cold War has centred on the ‘state’ rather than the ‘society’ or 
‘nation’ level because the international community’s post-conflict reconstruction 
policies aim to transform conflict-ridden territories into democratic polities through 
establishing the institutional background of democratic rule rather than to create a 
political and cultural identity. Although the focus of the international community-led 
post-conflict democratisation efforts and policies undertaken usually under UN 
leadership in post-conflict situations is not on the nation but the state, the terms 
‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ have interchangeably been applied to refer to 
efforts to construct liberal democratic government institutions and develop the local 
competence needed to run these institutions.20 Some commentators,21 in this context, 
pointed to the problem with the interchangeable use of the terms ‘state-building’ and 
‘nation-building’ and suggested distinguishing the terms from each other on the basis 
of the target of the international community-led post-conflict democratisation 
policies and/or the means pursued by international agents to achieve a liberal 
democratic transformation in societies with little or no such prior experience. Some 
observers22 emphasised that the focus of the international community’s policies has 
been on the state rather than the nation, and concentrated on the construction of 
liberal democratic state institutions and development of the capacity needed to run 
these institutions but preferred the term nation-building. Some others23 used the term 
state-building to describe such activities. Underlining the difference between 
engaging in establishing the institutions of governance and developing a sense of the 
 
20 See, for example, Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror”, Foreign Affairs 81:4 (July 
/ August 2002b), pp. 127-140. 
21 See for example, Chesterman, 2005; Dobbins et al., 2005; Fukuyama, 2004; Ottaway, 2002a.  
22 Such as Ottaway, 2002a; Dobbins et al., 2005.  
23 Chesterman, 2005; Fukuyama, 2004. 
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nation, the latter either did not investigate the process leading to the creation of a 
sense of national community and the development of societal and cultural bonds,24 or 
sometimes interchangeably applied the two terms to the construction of public 
institutions and institutional capacity development.25  
This thesis argues that in post-conflict situations there are two separate but 
interacting processes involved: re-building the state, including creating bureaucratic 
and political institutions and stabilising the economy; and re-building the nation, 
including easing inter-ethnic or inter-groups tensions and beginning to create a 
coherent and inclusive collective identity that can unite the people who may have 
been in conflict with each other. Much of the literature, however, has treated post-
conflict reconstruction as a single process and overlooked the potential 
contradictions between the two very different tasks. It is suggested in this study that 
the analysis of externally-led democratisation of post-conflict societies requires an 
investigation of both the development of capacity and institutions of the state26 and 
creation of a sense of national cohesion.27 These two factors, which constitute the 
end-points of the above two interacting processes, affect the establishment and 
consolidation of democratic peace that the UN and other members of the 
international community pursue. 
Based on “inclusiveness” and “public contestation”, democracy encompasses 
two contradictory dynamics.28 The former denotes the right to be a part of the 
process of political decision-making and policy-making. It entails not only the 
inclusion and political representation of all adult citizens in political and institutional 
 
24 Chesterman, 2005; Fukuyama, 2004. 
25 Fukuyama, 2004.  
26 Paris, 2004; Guillermo O’Donnell, “On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual 
Problems: A Latin American view with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries”, Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), pp. 133–157; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 
“Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War”, International Organisation, 56: 2 (Spring 
2002), pp. 297-337; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: 
Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia”, Daedalus, 121:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 123-139; Idem, 
“Toward Consolidated Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, 7:2 (1996a), pp. 14-33; Idem, Problems 
of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996b).  
27 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative 
Politics 2:3 (April 1970), pp. 337-363; Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), pp. 193-209.  
28 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1971). 
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processes but also their participation in these processes. The latter is about opposing 
the conduct of government and competing for public office and political power.29 
Although its “inclusive” elements offer institutional mechanisms to foster 
compromise, consensus and peaceful settlement of differences, its “competitive” 
aspect may accentuate divisions or generate new tensions and conflict. Peaceful 
political contestation through electoral competition, as Dahl suggests, requires the 
existence of social and institutional mechanisms needed to assure the mutual security 
of government and opposition.30 In this respect, studies of democratic transition 
suggest that states undergoing a rapid change from authoritarian to democratic 
government are more likely to get involved in armed inter-state conflict and have a 
greater propensity for civil strife than stable democracies and autocracies due to the 
destabilising effects of democratic transition on political institutions, and the 
tendency of political elites in democratising states to employ aggressive nationalism 
to strengthen their popular support base.31  
Many researchers, who have contributed to the growing literature on 
transition to democracy, therefore, point to the importance of the presence of an 
effective state system before undertaking a political liberalisation process.32 An 
effective state system, in this context, denotes the existence of competent, 
professional and impartial administrative, institutional and bureaucratic structures, 
capable of monopolising the legitimate use of force, executing the rule of law 
throughout its entire territory and mobilising financial resources from the population 
to pursue national objectives.  In other words, the tackling of what Linz and Stepan 
termed ‘the stateness problem’33 through developing necessary institutional and 
constitutional mechanisms and enhancing coercive, regulatory and extractive 
 
29 Ibid., p. 4. 
30 Dahl, 1971, pp. 15-16. 
31 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”, International 
Security, 20:1 (Summer 1995a), pp. 5-38; Idem, “Democratization and War”, Foreign Affairs, 74:3 
(May / June 1995b), pp.79-97; Idem,  “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War”, 
International Organisation, 56:2 (2002), pp. 297-337;  Diane F. Orentlicher, “Separation Anxiety: 
International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims”, Yale Journal of International Law, 23:1 (1998), 
pp. 1-78; Jack Snyder,  From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New 
York: Norton, 2000). 
32 Mansfield and Snyder 1995a, 1995b, 2002, Idem, “The Sequencing ‘Fallacy’”, Journal of 
Democracy, 18:3 (July 2007), pp. 5-9; Linz and Stepan, 1992, 1996a, 1996b; O’Donnell, 1999; Paris, 
2004; Francis Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’ First”, Journal of Democracy, 16: 1 (January 2005), pp. 84-88.  
33 Linz and Stepan, 1992, 1996a, 1996b. 
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capacity of the state34 has come to be regarded in the literature as a more feasible 
option rather than rapid democratisation.35 Roland Paris, for example, has strongly 
argued for “institutionalisation before liberalisation”, i.e., postponing democracy 
until the necessary political and institutional background of democratic governance 
has been put in place by the international community so as to neutralise potential 
destabilising effects of political and economic liberalisation reforms undertaken in 
conflict-torn societies.36 
What is not much discussed in this “sequentialist” approach to 
democratisation of post-conflict societies is, however, the need to address the other 
significant aspect of the post-conflict democratic peace-building process: resolving 
the ‘nationness problem’ or creating the notion of the nation.37 As Holsti, who 
derives his views on “state strength” from Barry Buzan, rightly points out, a high 
degree of institutionalisation itself, which is the case in totalitarian regimes such as 
the former Soviet Union, is not on its own an indication of “state strength”.38 State 
strength derives from legitimacy, which has two dimensions: “vertical” and 
“horizontal”.39 The former denotes the link between the state and society and is 
based on “the belief in the rightfulness of the state, in its authority to issue 
commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, 
but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority”.40 The latter 
refers to the degree to which individuals and groups within the polity recognise and 
tolerate each other and the extent to which they are included in political and social 
processes.41 In other words, although the capacity of states to extract resources, 
deliver services and exercise autonomy are important, state strength is determined by 
the attitudes, beliefs and ideas about the state and the nation of the population over 
 
34 See for example, Mansfield and Snyder 2002; Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2005. 
35 For a critic of “sequentialism”, see Thomas Carothers, “How Democracies Emerge: The 
‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”, Journal of Democracy, 18:1 (January 2007), pp. 12-27; Sheri Berman, “How 
Democracies Emerge: Lessons from Europe”, Journal of Democracy, 18:1 (January 2007), pp. 28-41. 
36 Paris, 2004. 
37 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-
Cold War Era, second edition, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1991), pp. 45-49. 
38 K. J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 84.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., p.  87, citing Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 11. 
41 Holsti, 1996, pp. 87-89, 93. 
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whom rule is exercised.42 As witnessed in many former colonies in Asia and Africa 
where the sense of unified nationhood was weak, leaders of nationalist movements, 
who came to power in the post-independence period, either restricted or totally 
banned opposition and dissent to protect the territorial integrity of the state.43 
Inhibiting democratisation, the lack of or a weak sense of nationhood both weakened 
the capacity and legitimacy of the state and its institutions and fuelled separatist 
tendencies and movements.  
The capacity of state institutions and structures is, therefore, to a great extent, 
affected by the degree to which consensus on national identity and national cohesion 
is accomplished.44 This requires achieving a general consensus on the definition of 
the character of the demos (nation or socio-cultural unit) and the polis (state or 
political community) and the relationship between the two, which involves the 
settlement of the question regarding who is entitled to have membership of the 
political community, i.e. agreement on the citizenship in the state.45 Only when a 
vast majority of the population within a territory “have no doubt or mental 
reservations as to which political community they belong”,46 Rustow suggested more 
than three decades ago, does it then become possible to undertake a democratic 
transition process. In other words, democratisation, first and foremost, requires 
national unity, which entails the presence of “a prior sense of community, preferably 
a sense of community quietly taken for granted that is above mere opinion and mere 
agreement”.47 The lack of or a weak sense of national cohesion in places where the 
society is divided by ethnic, cultural or ideological differences and/or some segments 
of the society are denied the right to membership to the political community, has an 
undermining effect on the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions, which, as 
noted above, is critical for undertaking a successful democratisation process.  
In this context, it is important to note that the congruence between the demos 
and the polis facilitates the creation of a democratic nation-state because conflicts or 
disputes over policies regarding the definition of the cultural and symbolic 
 
42 Ibid., p. 84; Buzan, 1991, pp. 44-53. 
43 Dahl, 1971, p. 44. 
44 Rustow, 1970, pp. 350-2; Dahl, 1989, pp. 193-209. 
45 Linz and Stepan, 1996b, pp. 27-28. 
46 Rustow, 1970, p. 350. 
47 Ibid., p. 363. 
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characteristics of the state and nation and citizenship rights “are reduced when 
empirically almost all the residents of a state identify with one subjective idea of the 
nation, and that nation is virtually contiguous with the state”.48 The more the 
population is divided along linguistic, ethnic, religious or cultural cleavages, the 
more challenging it becomes to reach an agreement on the fundamentals of 
democracy.49 If a significant proportion of the population do not accept the existing 
state as an appropriate entity that can make legitimate claims on their obedience 
because they do not wish to be part of this political unit, territorial boundaries of the 
state are contested. This situation, in return, presents serious problems with 
democratic transition and consolidation.50  
In this respect, O’Donnell and Schmitter propose the conclusion of a series of 
negotiated “pacts” as a solution for undertaking a peaceful process of transition to 
democratic government.51 Referring to agreements on rules governing the exercise of 
power by relevant political actors, pacts may help to regulate or reduce group 
competition and conflict through creating interdependence and extending mutual 
security guarantees.52 In the same vein, Arend Lijphart suggests power-sharing 
among political elites of different segments to promote political stability, cultural 
pluralism and democracy in societies divided by ethnic or other cleavages.53 He 
coined the term “consociational” democracy to denote a political structure which 
deviates from the majoritarian model of democracy, based on a winner-takes-all 
approach.54 Aiming to prevent the exclusion and discrimination of minority groups 
through resolving political differences on the basis of consensus rather than majority 
rule, “consociational” forms of government have four defining elements: (1) a grand 
coalition of political elites representing all major ethnic or other social groupings; (2) 
a high degree of segmental autonomy; (3) proportional allocation and distribution of 
 
48 Linz and Stepan, 1996b, p. 25. 
49 Ibid., p. 29. 
50 Linz and Stepan, 1996b, p. 27; 1992, p. 124. 
51 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 37-39. 
52 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
53 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, World Politics, 21:2 (January 1969), pp. 207-225; 
Idem, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1977); Idem, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, Journal of Democracy, 15:2 
(2004), pp. 96-109. 
54 Ibid., 1969, p. 211-215. 
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civil-service positions, resources and legislative posts to guarantee the fair 
representation of minority groups; and (4) mutual veto in decision-making.55 The 
functioning of this model of government, aiming to turn fragmented societies into 
stable democracies through counter-balancing disintegrative elements, rests on elite 
cooperation. That is, the “consociational” model of democratic government is highly 
dependent on the ability of political elites to accommodate the divergent interests and 
demands of relevant ethnic or cultural groups; their capacity to transcend cleavages 
and collaborate with the elites of rival groups; and their commitment to maintaining 
the system.56 Lijphart argued that three factors may facilitate inter-elite cooperation 
in fragmented societies: existence of external threats, balance of power among the 
segments, and a relatively low load on the decision-making apparatus or small 
territory / population size.57  
In post-conflict societies, where formal government institutions have fallen 
apart or been polarised and the population is divided along ethnic, religious, 
linguistic or other lines of divide, creating a sense of identification with the political 
and social unit, which is a necessary condition for a successful and peaceful 
transition to democracy, becomes an even more challenging task. As noted earlier, 
based on participation and public contestation, democracy requires the achievement 
of some degree of national unity and creation of an effective state system. The 
immediate adoption of competitive democratic structures and electoral politics in 
post-conflict societies, divided along ethnic or other lines, can make majorities and 
minorities permanent.58 Accentuating divisions and tension, this situation may 
trigger violence. Negotiated pacts at elite level, suggested by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, or Lijphart’s power-sharing or “consociational” model, in this context, can 
be implemented as an interim governance solution in post-conflict settings to provide 
stability through promoting a sense of inclusion within the political process. The 
engineering of political institutions along consociational lines may help to reduce the 
fear of domination of ethnic minorities by the majority. However, as noted earlier, 
the survival of consociational political systems is dependent on elite cooperation and 
 
55 Idem, 1977, pp. 25-52. 
56 Idem, 1969, p. 216. 
57 Ibid., pp. 217-219. 
58 Holsti, 1996, p. 184. 
24 
 
their commitment to the political restructuring process. 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature on post-conflict reconstruction 
by separately examining the institutional development and identity construction 
processes in two conflict-affected territories – Kosovo and East Timor (now Timor-
Leste). It is an attempt to take the ongoing academic debates and approaches to the 
international community’s engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, which focuses 
on the construction of institutions and capacities of the state, one step further. It aims 
to achieve this by (1) investigating a significant but understudied aspect of the 
international community-led democratic transition in post-conflict societies, and (2) 
suggesting a new approach to post-conflict reconstruction. It explores the interaction 
between the construction of competent government structures (state-building) and 
development of a sense of national community (nation-building) and its implications 
for democratisation. It emphasises the importance of “inclusive” and “participatory” 
strategies to address the questions of building functioning state institutions and 
creating the idea of the nation in post-conflict societies.  
 To this aim, the following hypothesis will be evaluated in the next chapters 
focusing on the reconstruction of Kosovo and East Timor: 
 
Hypothesis: Conflict-affected societies, where formal government institutions have 
fallen apart and the population is divided or polarised along ethnic, religious, 
linguistic, regional or other lines of divide, undergo two separate but interacting 
processes following the cessation of armed conflict: construction of competent 
government institutions (state-building) and achievement of a sense of national 
community (nation-building). Undergoing these two processes, conflict-torn 
societies, divided by ethnic, religious or other cleavages, have the least favourable 
conditions for transition to democracy, which is based on the participation of citizens 
in the political process and public contestation. The construction of institutional and 
bureaucratic structures with the capacity to deliver public services and produce 
solutions in response to social problems, needs and demands, and the creation of a 
shared sense of national community, I argue, should therefore precede 
democratisation. In this context, the achievement of national cohesion is of special 
importance because the lack of or a weak sense of national community is likely to 
undermine the capacity and legitimacy of government institutions and structures. 
Concentrating on building a sense of national cohesion and developing functioning 
government institutions is, however, not to suggest that a top-down, non-
participatory approach or an authoritarian mandate should be adopted and followed 
by international and local actors during the transitional period. It is rather to propose 
putting off the competitive aspects of democracy while implementing its “inclusive” 
and “participatory” elements. The adoption and promotion of such an “inclusive” and 
“participatory” approach by the international community may facilitate generating 
channels of social communication and encouraging cooperation among local parties; 
achieve a sense of “local ownership” of the process at the end of the transitional 
period; and enable the UN and other members of the international community to set a 
good model for implementing democratic principles, particularly accountability, 
transparency and non-violent resolution of differences in places where democratic 
rule was not practised before and/or democracy is associated with tension and 
conflict. 
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Nation-building:  
Creation of a sense of unified 
community and achievement of 
consensus on national identity 
through pursuing an inclusive 
approach 
State-building:  
Construction of well-
functioning, efficient 
government structures on the 
basis of an inclusive, 
participatory approach Creation of a political 
community with well-defined, 
stable and competent 
institutions and a cohesive 
social unit  
Democracy-building: transition 
to sustainable democratic rule 
and consolidation of 
democratic institutions 
Figure 1.1. Aspects of the “inclusive” reconstruction approach: first the creation of a functioning state 
structure and formation of a shared collective identity and then promoting transition to democratic 
rule.  
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1.3. The Scope of the Thesis 
This thesis is an attempt to investigate the international community’s 
engagement in turning conflict-torn territories into self-sustaining, peaceful 
democratic entities through undertaking a detailed study of the international 
territorial administrations established under the auspices of the UN in Kosovo and 
East Timor. The two-fold focus of the thesis, put on the state and the nation, aims to 
analyse the outcome of the externally-guided democratisation processes in Kosovo 
and East Timor where the UN was entrusted with the responsibility of government to 
build democratic peace in the aftermath of violent conflict. It investigates the 
following points:  
(1) construction of self-governing institutions and development of local 
capacity by the international community to establish sustainable peace and stability 
in Kosovo and East Timor in the aftermath of violent internal conflict; 
(2) the process of creating a sense of community through healing the wounds 
of the past, achieving reconciliation and developing an inclusive collective identity; 
and, 
(3) the interaction between these two processes and its implications for 
democratisation in the post-armed conflict period.  
 
1.4. Research Design and Methodology 
 
This thesis adopts the case study method, which aims to explain “how” and/or 
“why” questions about a set of contemporary events, over which the researcher has 
no control, and focuses on the analysis of “up-to-date information” collected from 
contemporary documentation, observing and interviewing.59 Case study research, 
which requires the collection of data from multiple sources, is based on the 
development of a theoretical framework to use for analysis and empirical testing.60 
The case study process involves (1) formulating good research questions; (2) 
interpreting answers to these questions; (3) building a theoretical framework; (4) 
selecting cases; (5) applying theoretical principles and ideas to cases chosen through 
 
59 David E. Gray, Doing Research in the Real World, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 124-125. 
60 Ibid., p. 124. 
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analysing the data gathered from document analysis, interviews and field 
observations and (6) drawing and analysing conclusions.61  
Based on this research approach, this thesis seeks to analyse how the UN’s 
approach to conflict resolution has been shaped in the post-Cold War period: 
promoting democratic government institutions and structures in conflict-torn 
societies. It also intends to explore the aspects of the question of why the UN has 
pursued this policy approach: endorsing a secure and stable international system 
through preventing the recurrence of violent internal conflict, which is seen arising 
from the absence or weakness of democratic government structures.  
As noted earlier, there are two separate but interacting processes involved in 
the post-conflict period: nation-building and state-building. The study of the 
reconstruction of conflict-torn societies by the UN therefore requires a two-level 
analytical framework; focusing on the state and the nation. These two interacting 
processes affect the prospect of the UN-led democratisation process undertaken in 
societies emerging from conflict. It is important to note that this is not to suggest that 
the UN and other external actors involved in the process of post-conflict 
restructuring should impose a common political or cultural collective identity on 
deeply-divided, conflict-torn societies. In fact, such an engagement is neither within 
the jurisdiction nor the capacity of the UN and other international agents. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, it is within the jurisdiction and capacity of local actors. 
The UN, however, can facilitate this process by taking some measures such as 
initiating a reconciliation programme, creating channels of dialogue and 
communication at individual and group level, and providing a forum for the 
discussion and resolution of certain sensitive issues regarding the definition of the 
character of the nation and the state e.g., the adoption of a national language and 
recognition of cultural rights for minority groups.  
Two conflict-torn territories, Kosovo and East Timor, where the UN assumed 
the responsibility of government and sovereign powers on a temporary basis to build 
democratic self-government institutions, were chosen as case studies to address the 
above “how” and “why” questions by examining aspects of the processes of nation-
 
61 Ibid., pp. 125-129. 
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building and state-building. The UN transitional administrations in Kosovo and East 
Timor were established in 1999 following external military interventions, justified as 
actions to stop violence and end systematic human rights violations. Kosovo and East 
Timor, where the UN was mandated to build stable, long-lasting peace through 
creating functioning, democratic public institutions, became experimental 
laboratories for externally-guided democratisation policies and initiatives developed 
and implemented by the international community under the umbrella of the UN. This 
makes Kosovo and East Timor important cases to analyse “how” the UN’s approach 
to post-conflict peace-building evolved. Kosovo and East Timor, where the UN 
assumed the responsibility of government in the post-military intervention period, 
also represent two significant and useful case studies to explore the UN’s approach to 
avoiding potential or actual constraints on building long-lasting peace through 
establishing democratic institutions.  
With a view to addressing these points, a theoretical discussion of nation-
building (construction of a sense of unified national community) and state-building 
(development of efficient government institutions) is provided in the following 
chapters. The theoretical analysis is followed by detailed case studies to test 
theoretical principles with empirical evidence on the ground. This is conducted 
through (1) collecting and analysing information on the processes of state-building 
and nation-building in Kosovo and East Timor from UN documents and reports and 
other relevant materials produced by other international agencies, as well as 
academic works and journalistic pieces; and (2) undertaking short field trips to 
Timor-Leste and Kosovo to collect information from interviews and observations. 
This research approach based on a two-level analytical framework to study 
two contemporary cases, where the UN more or less at the same time assumed 
complex and ambitious mandates and felt similar pressures and challenges, also has 
explanatory power for several other important issues, raised in the Report of the 
Panel on UN Peace Operations or commonly known as the “Brahimi Report” after 
the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi.62 A detailed study of 
 
62 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations” [Brahimi Report], A/55/305-S/2000/809, (21 August 2000), 
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations [accessed 27 March 2005]. 
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the UN’s engagement in Kosovo and East Timor may address a very significant issue 
raised in this report, which assessed the planning and conduct of UN peace 
operations in the post-Cold War era: Does the UN have the institutional capacity and 
resources to establish sustainable peace in conflict-affected societies?  
 
This thesis seeks to address the following questions: 
 
(1) What has been the outcome of the international administrations established under 
UN auspices in the aftermath of military interventions in Kosovo and East Timor in 
terms of creating democratic self-governing institutions and a shared sense of 
political and cultural community? 
 
(2) To what extent, have the international transitional / interim administrations 
established in Kosovo and East Timor contributed to laying the foundations for 
democratic rule and sustainable peace? 
 
It is important to note that this thesis does not aim to produce a ‘template’ or 
offer a magical ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula to apply to other countries which have 
become the target of the international community-driven democratisation policies in 
the post-Cold War era such as Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, 
Afghanistan or Iraq. This study aims to address the above research questions by 
carrying out an in-depth, detailed study and comparing findings, drawn from cross-
case studies, with a set of theoretical principles.63 Only two contemporary cases, 
Kosovo and East Timor, were chosen by the author, because it allows both the 
conduct of in-depth study of the same phenomenon in two places and comparison of 
results: establishment of the institutional and societal background of democratic 
government by the UN in conflict-torn societies where it assumed the responsibility 
of government and sovereign powers on a temporary basis. This two-case approach 
was adopted by the author to better understand and analyse in-depth local social and 
cultural dynamics and factors and their impact on the UN-led political and 
 
63 Ibid., p. 127. 
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institutional processes while also avoiding the danger of losing the focus and falling 
into the ‘template trap’.  
This, however, is not to suggest that the findings and conclusions drawn in 
this study cannot be used to compare and contrast the UN’s and other international 
agencies’ engagement in democracy promotion in different parts of the world. It 
should once again be pointed out that several important factors should be born in 
mind: Firstly, there is no magical formula that can be applied for succeeding in 
turning conflict-affected territories into peaceful, stable polities. Secondly, each of 
the above cases has its own peculiar dynamics and characteristics that are different 
from Kosovo and East Timor. Thirdly, in each case, the UN operates in different, 
complex cultural environments, which affects the outcome of policy instruments 
developed and used by the UN. Fourthly, the UN has had a varying degree of 
involvement in achieving a liberal democratic transformation in territories recovering 
from conflict. And, lastly, different policy instruments and democracy promotion 
strategies have been implemented by the UN and other members of the international 
community in the post-Cold War era.  
As noted earlier, the UN, along with other international agencies, individual 
states and NGOs, has heavily been involved in democracy promotion in the post-
Cold War era with a view to preventing the recurrence of violent internal conflicts 
and endorsing international peace and security.  Initially, the UN was mostly 
engaged in providing electoral assistance to supervise a democratic transition process 
in countries severely affected by violent conflict such as Namibia, Mozambique, 
Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua.64 In Cambodia, where the UN was vested with 
extensive civilian administration functions to oversee the country’s transition to 
democratic rule after three decades of devastating civil war, its transitional 
government mandate was still limited to the conduct of elections and handover of 
 
64 For a further discussion of the UN’s role in providing electoral assistance to post-conflict societies, 
see Christopher C. Joyner, “The United Nations and Democracy”, Global Governance, 5 (1999), pp. 
333-357; Benjamin Reilly, “Elections in Post-Conflict Elections”, Edward Newman and Roland Rich 
(eds.), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality, (Tokyo; New York; Paris: 
United Nations University Press), pp. 113-134; Terrence Lyons, “The Role of Post-Settlement 
Elections”, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.), Ending Civil 
Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 215-
236; Paris, 2004, pp. 63-78, 112-148; Dobbins et al., 2005, pp. 29-67, 93-106. 
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administrative powers to the elected local government.65  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was created as an independent, decentralised 
state with two autonomous entities (Muslim-Croat Federation and Bosnian-Serb 
Republic, Republika Srpska) by the Dayton Agreement, the UN was involved in 
consolidating the democratisation process and strengthening the capacity of the weak 
Bosnian central government institutions in the post-war period. Having said this, it is 
important to note that although the UN established a mission in the country (United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNMIBH), its role was limited to law 
enforcement and training of the Bosnian police service,66 and ensuring the safe 
return and repatriation of refugees and the displaced persons through the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).67 The European regional 
organisations were assigned major roles in supervising the country’s post-war 
democratic development. The OSCE, which was recognised as the lead agency for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s democratic development, was given the responsibilities of (1) 
supervising and organising elections; (2) establishing the foundations for 
representative government;68 (3) monitoring and protection of human rights;69 (4) 
taking measures for regional stability and arms control; and (5) facilitating the 
democratic control of the armed forces.70 An international military force under the 
authority of NATO was stationed to carry out the military aspects of the Dayton 
Agreement, which included establishing a durable cessation of hostilities, ensuring 
force protection, and establishing lasting security and arms control measures.71 
NATO handed over its peacekeeping duties to a European Union-led force (EUFOR) 
in December 2004.  
In this context, it is important to note that the international community’s 
involvement in democratisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the post-war period 
represents a reversed trend in democratic self-government, which can be seen in the 
degree of external interference exercised by the international community through the 
 
65 Paris, 2004, pp. 79-96; Dobbins et. al., 2003, pp. 69-91. 
66 UN/Doc. S/RES/1035 (1995). 
67 “The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Annex 7, Articles II 
and III. 
68 Ibid., Annex 3, Articles II and III. 
69 Ibid., Annex 6, Article XIII. 
70 Ibid., Annex 1B, Article II. 
71 Ibid., Annex IA, Article I. 
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Office of High Representative (OHR), installed to oversee the implementation of the 
political aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The OHR, which was put in place to 
“facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilise and, as appropriate, coordinate the 
activities of the organisations and agencies”,72 had a limited mandate and authority at 
the beginning of the peace process. The High Representative was accorded with 
wide-ranging authority in late-1997 by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an 
ad hoc body of 55 countries established in 1995 to guide and support the peace 
implementation process. At its meeting in Bonn in December 1997, the PIC 
authorised the High Representative to impose binding decisions if Bosnian 
legislative bodies fail to do so and remove from office elected public officials who 
violate their legal commitments under the Dayton Agreement or obstruct its 
implementation.73  
In Afghanistan, which has become another target country for externally-
driven democratic development in the post-Cold War era, as noted earlier, rather than 
exercising extensive powers, the UN assumed a limited role characterised by a small 
international presence providing support and assistance in democratic governance 
and economic development to local Afghan staff. In Iraq, where the UN was initially 
bypassed from the process leading to the occupation of the country by the US-led 
“coalition of the willing”, the UN assumed some small responsibilities and powers in 
the post-war reconstruction period. Sergio Vieira de Mello of Brazil, who had served 
as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo and East Timor, 
was appointed as Special Representative for Iraq in May 2003. His mandate include 
(1) assisting in the delivery of humanitarian relief; (2) promoting the protection of 
human rights, reconstruction of physical infrastructure, and (3) facilitating a process 
leading to the creation a representative government of Iraq through “working 
intensively with the [Coalition Provisional] Authority, the people of Iraq, and others 
concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions 
for representative governance”.74 The killing of the Special Representative along 
 
72 Ibid., Annex 10, Article I. 
73 Peace Implementation Council (PIC), “PIC Bonn Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-
sustaining Structures”, (10 December 1997), Article XI, para. 2., available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 [accessed 12 June 2008]. 
74 UN/Doc. S/RES/1483(2003). 
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with 21 members of his staff in a massive bomb attack on the UN headquarters in 
Baghdad in August 2003 led the UN to pull out of Iraq. The incident also led former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who would describe the Bush administration’s 
decision to go to war against Iraq as “illegal”,75 to distance the world body as much 
as possible from the US demands for a greater UN involvement in the country. 
In East Timor and Kosovo, on the other hand, the UN assumed a complex 
mandate following military interventions justified in humanitarian terms. The scope 
of powers and responsibilities the UN assumed in these two territories represents the 
expansion of the world body’s involvement in establishing long-lasting peace 
through promoting democratic government in the post-Cold war. Entrusted with 
wide-ranging powers, the UN was mandated in Kosovo and East Timor to construct 
democratically and efficiently functioning government institutions in order to prevent 
the recurrence of violent conflict. The UN’s engagement in democracy promotion, as 
noted earlier, was affected by the view that the lack of or weakness of democratic 
institutions and channels such as deficiencies in political inclusion and opposition, 
respect for human rights, political accountability and transparency constitutes the 
root cause of violent conflict. The questions of whether or not the UN has the 
capacity to promote democratic government and whether or not democracy can be 
introduced by external actors from the outside can be best addressed and evaluated in 
cases where the UN had fewest restrictions to achieve such an ambitious and 
complex mandate. 
An analysis of the UN-guided political reconstruction processes in Kosovo 
and East Timor, where the world body assumed an extensive degree of 
interventionist role through exercising all legislative, executive and judicial powers is 
also important to address another significant question: Can the notion of democratic 
government be nurtured by an external, intervening power without the tackling and 
resolution of the issue of “nationness” by local stakeholders in places torn by years 
of repression, internal strife and armed conflict?  
The following factors are also worth noting to explain why Kosovo and East 
Timor were chosen as two cases to study in this thesis: 
 
75 BBC News Online, “Excerpts: Annan Interview,” (16 September 2004), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661640.stm [accessed 12 June 2008]. 
34 
 
(1) Throughout their history, the fate of both territories was affected by external 
developments and shaped from the outside; 
(2) Both Kosovo and East Timor were peripheral parts of empires, i.e. the 
Ottoman and Portuguese Empires, and local social structures remained intact; 
(3) Both Albanian and East Timorese nationalisms as a political movement with 
national-self-determination claims came as a belated development; 
(4) Both Kosovo Albanian and East Timorese nationalist leaderships  sought 
external support to exercise the right to political independence; 
(5) Neither Kosovo Albanians nor East Timorese were ever integrated into the 
central state structures of former Yugoslavia and Indonesia, to which they 
were forced to belong following the collapse of the above Empires; 
(6) Albanian and East Timorese national identities developed in opposition to 
foreign rule and based on a sense of collective victimhood or common 
suffering under foreign rule;  
(7) Both territories were the least developed parts of the states to which they 
were forcefully attached; 
(8) Both the people of Kosovo and East Timor lacked prior experience of 
democratic governance; 
(9) Neglected by the international community for decades, both Kosovo and East 
Timor came on the UN’s agenda following gross human rights violations and 
the outbreak of violent armed conflicts in the late-1990s;  
(10) The escalation of violence and deteriorating humanitarian catastrophe 
in Kosovo and East Timor was followed by military interventions undertaken 
by NATO (with no explicit UN Security Council mandate) in the former and 
an Australian-led multi-national force in the latter;  
(11) Kosovo and East Timor served as laboratories or test-cases in terms of 
the viability of democratisation programmes formulated in New York or 
Brussels, and showing the capacity of the UN and other international 
agencies to promote democratic development in societies with no prior 
experience of liberal democratic nation-state tradition; and 
(12) The international transitional administration set up by the UN in East 
Timor in October 1999 to prepare the territory for independence was largely 
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modelled on the mission set up in Kosovo in June 1999. 
 
Having identified the above similarities between the two cases, it is important 
to note that Kosovo and East Timor are not identical cases. In fact, they differ in 
several important aspects that will be further elaborated on in the following chapters 
discussing the UN’s approach to achieving a liberal democratic political 
transformation. The main differences between the two cases include the root cause of 
conflict, situation of institutional structures and intra-societal relations following the 
withdrawal of repressive, nominal governments in power, and the identification of 
clear political end-points to achieve at the end of the transitional period. These 
differences affected the prospect and success of policies designed and implemented 
by the UN to create efficient democratic self-government institutions (such as 
parliaments and independent judicial structures and mechanisms) and nurture 
democratic practices (such as the organisation of free and fair elections, freedom of 
expression, opposition, contestation for public offices etc.) because these differences 
influenced the way these externally-driven democratic self-government policy 
initiatives were perceived by the local populace.  
With regard to the scope of time-frame for the study of the ongoing state and 
nation building process in East Timor, it is limited to the period between October 
1999 when the territory was put under UN transitional administration and May 2006 
when large-scale violence, which nearly brought the country to the brink of civil war, 
broke out. In accordance with the aim of this thesis, i.e. exploring the impact of 
international administrations on democratisation in societies emerging from conflict, 
the specific focus of state-building in East Timor will be on the period over 1999-
2002, during which the territory was administered by the UN transitional 
administration. The study of policies and efforts to develop democratic self-
government institutions and a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo covers the period 
between June 1999 when an interim international administration under UN auspices 
was set up and February 2007 when the special envoy of the Secretary-General 
offered the UN-run province independence to be supervised by the international 
community.  
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1.5. Definition of Certain Commonly Used Concepts in the Thesis 
As noted earlier, this thesis is an attempt to investigate the UN’s engagement 
in establishing democratic public institutions and consolidating democratic practices 
Kosovo and East Timor torn by violent conflict with a view to building sustainable 
peace in the post-conflict period. The term “violent conflict” is used in the sense of 
competing interests and goals over resources, power, identity and status held by 
individuals, groups or communities, and the use of coercive and violent means by 
these parties to achieve their ends through damaging their adversaries’ ability to 
pursue their objectives.76 The term “post-conflict”, in this regard, is used to denote 
the cessation of violence and armed struggle rather than the end of hostilities and the 
conclusion of conflict in the interest of parties. “Sustainable peace” is used in the 
sense of stable, long-lasting peace characterised by not only the absence of physical 
or personal violence (which Galtung puts as “negative peace”) but also the absence 
of structural violence (or “positive peace”)77 which does not require external 
intervention and assistance. 
With regard to the term “democracy”, it is used in the sense of a political and 
institutional system characterised by the restriction of powers exercised by rulers to 
protect social and political liberties, and the peaceful change of government by the 
ruled.78 It is judged, as Robert Dahl suggests, by the degree to which it is responsive 
to the preferences of its citizens and it allows the inclusion, participation and 
contestation of its citizens in the civic life.79 In this thesis the term “contestation”, as 
Dahl defines”, is used to denote the availability of “unimpaired opportunities” to 
individuals to “formulate their preferences”, “signify their preferences to their fellow 
citizens and the government by individual and collective action” and to “have their 
preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government’’.80 Dahl defines the 
term “inclusiveness” in terms of the “proportion of the population entitled to 
 
76 Michael Lund, Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners, 
(Washington, DC: Creative Associates International, 1997). 
77 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, Journal of Peace Research, 6:3 (1969), pp. 
167-191.  
78 K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1, fifth edition, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 122-127. 
79 Dahl, 1971, pp. 2-4. 
80 Ibid., p. 2. 
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participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of 
the government’’.81 In this thesis, the terms “inclusiveness” and “participation” are 
distinguished on the basis of the involvement of individuals in social and political 
processes that affect themselves and society. Inclusiveness is used as a multi-
dimensional concept to refer to (1) the acceptance and understanding of the diversity 
of society; (2) availability of mechanisms and opportunities for the representation 
and involvement of individuals coming from diverse political, economic, social and 
cultural backgrounds in every aspect of life – political, governmental, institutional, 
societal, economic and cultural; (3) creating a sense of belonging through promoting 
peaceful co-existence, interactive and cooperative relationships and communication. 
Inclusion entails participation, which refers to the degree to which individuals 
coming from diverse backgrounds have a say and influence on the course of political, 
governmental, social, economic and cultural processes, issues and decisions that 
affect their existence, current and future status, preferences and interests. The term 
“democratisation”, in this context, is used in the sense of a political and social 
process aiming to transform the political system from authoritarian rule to democracy 
as described above in which power changes hands peacefully, individuals are 
involved in political and social processes, and institutional and societal structures are 
in place to allow this to happen. Democratic consolidation, which is about the 
“sustainability of democratic institutions”,82 refers to a political and social situation 
in which democratic norms and principles have become internalised and accepted by 
all relevant political actors as the only legitimate framework to seek power and 
resolve disputes.83  
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 Ibid., p. 4. 
82 Christophe Solioz, “Prospects for Balkan Stability: Ownership, Transitional Process and Regional 
Integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, PSIO Occasional Paper, (Geneva: November 2000), p. 13. 
83 Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 5-6. See also, Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-
Jürgen Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative 
Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
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1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The next chapter explores the theoretical aspects of nation-building and 
examines the development of the contemporary literature on nation-building. It 
suggests a definition of the term nation-building and a framework to apply for the 
analysis of the cases chosen. The third chapter discussing the international 
community’s engagement in developing liberal democratic structures in societies 
torn by violent conflicts in the post-Cold War era examines the theoretical 
dimensions of state-building and provides a framework to use for analysing the 
process of state-building in East Timor and Kosovo. The fourth chapter discusses the 
process of national identity construction in East Timor in the post-Indonesian period. 
The fifth chapter investigates the development of democratic state institutions and 
structures established by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor. The sixth chapter deals with the process of creating a multi-ethnic society in 
Kosovo since mid-1999, which, since the establishment of United Nations Interim 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the members of the international community have 
frequently reiterated as their primary objective to build sustainable process. The 
seventh chapter reviews the international community’s engagement in constructing 
and developing provisional democratic self-governing institutions in Kosovo and 
explores the interaction between state-building and nation-building. The final chapter 
draws conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Building the ‘Nation’ in the Post-
Armed Conflict Period 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction        
 39
    
This chapter reviews a popular but contested term of nation-building, which 
is frequently cited in the context of the construction of democratic and effective 
government institutions by external actors with the aim of preventing the recurrence 
of violent internal conflict associated with governmental ‘weakness / failure / 
collapse’. The term ‘nation-building’, fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s amongst a 
group of American political scientists, known as the ‘modernisation school’ theorists, 
was originally developed to describe the evolution of the modern nation-state system 
in the Western world. It was used in the post-colonial context to describe the path or 
process that political leadership in the newly-independent states in Africa and Asia 
would need to follow in order to achieve political and economic development, which 
Western countries had supposedly gone through in the past, and to integrate different 
ethnic or tribal groups within their boundaries through the advances in technological 
infrastructure and mass communication that would make them viable nation-states.  
More recently, often used interchangeably with state-building, nation-
building is employed to describe the international engagement, usually under the 
umbrella of the UN, in democracy promotion through building up institutional 
structures and developing the local capacity required to run democratic self-
governing institutions in the aftermath of military interventions. The international 
community-led democratisation efforts and policies undertaken in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq are often referred to as 
nation-building.  
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The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part provides a 
discussion of the ‘state failure / collapse’ phenomenon treated as an ‘unexpected’ 
threat to international peace, security and stability in the post-Cold War era. The 
second part reviews the term nation-building and investigates its meaning since it 
was first formulated by the modernisation school theorists in the 1950s. The last part 
elaborates on the aspects of nation-building and offers an analytical framework to 
follow when exploring the process of nation-building in Kosovo and East Timor in 
the post-armed conflict period. 
 
2.2. ‘State Weakness / Failure / Collapse’: Changing Perceptions of Threat and 
Security in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
The fall of the Berlin wall symbolising the demise of the bipolar world 
system encouraged some Western political leaders, such as then US President 
George H. W. Bush, to announce the beginning of a new era, the so-called ‘New 
World Order’. Reflecting the revival of the Wilsonian system of human rights, 
democracy, liberalisation and collective security, the Bush administration’s ‘new 
world order’ was based on the commitment of the world’s states to achieve global 
cooperation and political, economic and cultural integration aiming to promote 
international peace and security in the absence of a superpower rivalry and 
ideological divide.1 The collapse of Eastern European socialist regimes led some 
others to declare Western liberal democracy as the “end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the 
final form of human government”, marking “the end of history”.2  
However, this euphoria and optimism with the emergence of a new 
international political environment, in which the principles of peace, security, justice, 
global integration, and the rule of law rather than the “rule of the jungle”3 would 
prevail, did not last long following the outbreak of a number of violent domestic 
 
1 George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis”, 
(Washington DC, 11 September 1990).    
2 See, Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, National Interest 16 (1989), pp. 3-18. See also 
Idem, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, Ontario: Maxwell Macmillan 
Canada, Inc.: 1992); and Jeffrey Friedman, “The New Consensus: I. The Fukuyama Thesis”, Critical 
Review 3:3-4 (1989), pp. 373-410. 
3 Bush, 1990. 
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conflicts in different parts of the world. It was replaced with a growing concern over 
a ‘new’ and very serious threat to international peace and security supposedly 
coming from states where public authority has disintegrated, and violence and chaos 
has prevailed – the so-called ‘failed states’.  
Since first conceptualised by Helman and Ratner as “utterly incapable of 
sustaining itself as a member of the international community” in the early 1990s,4 the 
‘failed state’ phenomenon has gained currency despite the lack of a general 
agreement on its definition and causes.5 Providing a rationalisation for external 
intervention to cope with and neutralise its negative effects on domestic political and 
economic development and international security and stability, the ‘failed / 
collapsed’ state image has become a complex issue especially given the question of 
whether or not the international community has the jurisdiction and capacity to 
prevent or reverse it.  
The term ‘failed state’ was coined to describe countries like Somalia, Haiti, 
Sudan, Congo DR, Liberia, Cambodia, Afghanistan and former Yugoslavia, where 
central government structures have disintegrated or cannot exercise sovereign control 
over territory; cannot monopolise the means of violence;6 and can no longer perform 
the basic public functions, which then pass into the hands of warlords, clan chiefs or 
other local individuals or groups.7 State failure, which Zartman defines as a “long-
term degenerative disease”,8 is associated with civil unrest and conflict,9 resulting in 
 
4 Helman and Ratner , 1992-3, p. 3.  
5 It is important to acknowledge that although the term ‘failed state’ became popular following its 
conceptualisation by Helman and Ratner in Foreign Policy in its 1992-3 issue, which attracted a 
growing scholarly interest, there were other scholars who long before Helman and Ratner wrote on the 
lack of governmental and institutional competence of African states to meet the “empirical 
requirements of modern statehood”, i.e. the capacity to provide their citizens with coercive and non-
coercive services, and termed these states as ‘pseudo’ or ‘quasi’ states. See, for example, Hedley Bull 
and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon 
Press; New York: Oxford University Press), 1984; Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, 
and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World”, International 
Organisation 41:4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 519-549.  
6 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3; pp. 3-5; Ali Mazrui, “The African State as a Political Refugee,” D. 
Smock and C. Crocker (eds.), African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p. 11; Susan L. Woodward, “Failed States: 
Warlordism and ‘Tribal’ Warfare”, Naval War College Review, 52:2 (Spring 1999), pp. 56, 59-60; 
Robert H. Jackson, “Surrogate Sovereignty? Great Power Responsibility and ‘Failed States’”, Institute 
of International Relations The University of British Columbia Working Paper, No. 25, (November 
1998); pp.2-3; Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”, Atlantic Monthly 273:2 (February 1994), 
pp. 46-52, 72-74. 
7 Zartman, 1995a, p. 5, 8, 10; Gros, 1996, 456-8; Holsti 1996, p. 119.  
8 Zartman, 1995a, p. 8. 
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the disruption of essential governmental services, destruction of food supplies and 
distribution networks, and economic standstill.10 Deep ethnic divides, corruption, 
environmental degradation, poverty, scarce resources, militarism, political 
authoritarianism,11 legacy of colonialism and withdrawal of foreign assistance in the 
post-Cold War era12 are among the often-cited factors precipitating ‘state failure / 
collapse’.  
Identified with the full or partial collapse of central government authority, 
chaos, disorder and violence, the ‘failed state’ phenomenon was largely seen as a 
humanitarian and regional security problem during the early 1990s.13 Helman and 
Ratner, for example, emphasised the “spillover” effects of ‘state failure’ on 
neighbouring countries, which may be destabilised by “illicit arms traffic, solidarity 
activities by related ethnic groups, and armed bandits seeking to establish a safe 
haven”.14 Observers often called on the international community to take military 
action to restore collapsed governmental and civil structures and avert local and 
regional humanitarian consequences of ‘state failure’.15 Some commentators 
proposed the establishment of trusteeship administrations to restore state capacity in 
‘failed states’.16 
During this period, the UN’s approach to addressing humanitarian and 
regional effects of ‘state failure’, associated with internal conflict, was characterised 
by a three-pronged policy: (1) deploying peacekeeping forces to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian relief by aid agencies to conflict-affected populations 
 
9 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999).  
10 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3, pp. 4-5.  
11 Gros, 1996, pp. 461-5; Holsti, 1996, pp. 120-1; Zartman, 1995a, pp. 2-7; Kaplan, 1994, p. 46; Jack 
A. Goldstone et al., State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings (McLean, VA: Science 
Applications International Conference (SAIC), 30 September 2000), 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/publication.asp?pubType=paper&id=9 [accessed 25 April 
2005]. 
12 Holsti, 1996, pp. 73-81; Jackson, 1990, p.3; Helman and Ratner, 1992-3, pp. 3-4; Woodward, 1999, 
pp. 58-59, Robert H. Dorff, “Democratization, Failed States and Peace Operations: The Challenge of 
Ungovernability”, American Diplomacy, 1:2 (1996).  
13 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3, p. 8; Kaplan, 1994, p. 46, 73; Dorff, 1996. 
14 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3, p. 8. 
15 See for example, Francis Mading Deng, “State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the United 
Nations”, I. William Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 207-219; Woodward, pp. 55-67. 
16 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3; Ali Mazrui, “Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonisation”, 
International Herald Tribune, (4 August 1994); William Pfaff, “A New Colonialism? Europe Must 
Go Back into Africa”, Foreign Affairs, 74:1 (January / February 1995), pp. 1-6. 
 43
                                                
within their home countries, even under war conditions, and preventing large-scale 
population movements fleeing into neighbouring countries;17 (2) negotiating with the 
warring parties on the diplomatic front to end the violence and find a democratic 
solution to the conflict;18 and (3) democratisation19 through organising elections 
within the “shortest possible time” following the conclusion of a peace agreement.20 
In Somalia, for example, where the civil war and famine led to the death of at least 
300,000 Somalis and one million refugees since November 1991,21 a peacekeeping 
mission (United Nations Operation in Somalia I, UNOSOM I) was established in 
April 1992 to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.22 In the meantime, 
Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, was 
holding negotiations with the leaders of the warring factions to find a diplomatic 
solution to the conflict.  
The same approach was followed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) was mandated to deliver 
humanitarian assistance,23 establish a “no-fly” zone,24 and create “safe areas” for the 
displaced persons.25 In Rwanda, UN peacekeepers (United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR) were deployed to facilitate the implementation of the 
Arusha Accords of 1993, which aimed to establish a transitional power-sharing 
government by the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government and the Tutsi-dominated 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). UNAMIR’s mandate included monitoring the 
security situation in the capital Kigali, assisting with the delivery of humanitarian 
relief, facilitating the repatriation of refugees, and organising elections at the end of 
the transitional period.26  
 
 
17 Mark Duffield, “NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards An Analysis of The New Aid Paradigm”, 
Third World Quarterly, 18:3 (1997), pp. 530-537; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised 
Violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 113. 
18 Kaldor, 1999, pp. 119-121. 
19 Duffield, 2001, p. 530. 
20 Ottaway, 2002b, p. 1002; Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”, 
International Security, 22:2 (Autumn 1997), pp. 54-55; Holsti, 1996, pp. 183-184. 
21 United Nations, “Somalia - UNOSOM I: Background”, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom1backgr2.html [accessed 14 July 2008]. 
22 UN/Doc. S/RES/751 (1992). 
23 UN/Doc. S/RES/770 (1992); UN/Doc. S/RES/776 (1992). 
24 UN/Doc. S/RES/781 (1992). 
25 UN/Doc. S/RES/819 (1993); UN/Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); UN/Doc. S/RES/836 (1993). 
26 UN/Doc. S/RES/872(1993). 
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Lacking the necessary logistical and human resources and enforcement 
powers to implement the above mandates, the UN missions failed to fulfil their stated 
objectives in these three countries. In Somalia, aid convoys were raided by local 
militias, twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers were killed while trying to disarm 
militias loyal to the Somali warlord Farah Aidid and the UN mission was pulled out 
of the country following the killing of eighteen American soldiers in the hunt for 
Aidid.27 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the delivery of humanitarian supplies was 
obstructed by the Serbs and the “safe areas” could not be protected. In Srebrenica, 
where the UNPROFOR Commander once had assured the refugees that “they were 
under United Nations protection and that he would not abandon them”,28 
approximately 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed within days in July 
1995 by the Bosnian Serb forces while the international community was negotiating 
with their military leaders.29 The Dutch peacekeepers, who were assigned to protect 
the “safe area”, withdrew from the camp after it fell to the Serbs. Authorised to use 
force only to defend themselves, the Dutch peacekeepers did not have the means, 
support and mandate to fulfil the task of protecting the camp.30 In Rwanda, the UN 
failed to prevent the genocide and “stop the killings once the genocide had begun”31 
and subsequently evacuated from the country following the killing of ten Belgian 
peacekeepers by Hutu extremists.  
Coordination problems, inadequate logistic and human resources, lack of 
enforcement powers to implement the complex mandates assumed, and lack of 
political will by UN member states to address the difficulties encountered on the 
ground, where there was no peace to keep, contributed to the failure in Somalia, 
Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina.32 The failure in these three operations and the 
difficulties encountered on the ground led to a retreat from peacekeeping in the mid-
1990s. This was followed by the formulation of a new, more comprehensive, multi-
 
27 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2004), pp. 158-159. 
28 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: 
The Fall of Srebrenica”, General Assembly Document, A/54/549, (15 November 1999d), para. 38. 
29 Ibid., paras. 318-393. 
30 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004, p. 84 
31 Independent Inquiry, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations 
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”, UN Document, S/1999/1257, (15 December 1999), p. 3.  
32 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004, 135-140; pp. 158-159; Kaldor, 1999, p. 113, 127; United 
Nations, 1999d; Independent Inquiry, 1999. 
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dimensional conflict resolution strategy towards the end of the 1990s to effectively 
address violent internal conflict, seen as being tied to governmental and institutional 
weaknesses, and mitigate its adverse effects on regional and international peace and 
stability.33 The new policy was based on the integration of military intervention and 
post-war reconstruction into conflict resolution,34 and the incorporation of a number 
of actors into post-conflict reconstruction.35 These actors included regional military 
and political organisations such as NATO, EU, OSCE, ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African States), OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and OAS 
(Organisation of American States), pivotal states (such as Australia in the Pacific 
region and Nigeria in Africa), national and international development agencies (IMF, 
World Bank, UNDP, USAID etc.), and civilian, non-governmental and private 
agencies. The new strategy also included an expansion in powers and functions 
assumed by the UN such as policing, institutional capacity-building, infrastructure 
reconstruction and reconciliation in the post-armed conflict period.36  
Referred to as “new humanitarianism”,37 “new interventionism”,38 “liberal 
internationalism”,39 “new military humanism”,40 or “imposition of the liberal 
peace”41 in the literature, this new strategy was based on the exercise of an 
increasing level of interference by external actors in every aspect of governmental 
affairs in the post-military intervention period. It was claimed that sovereignty42 and 
non-intervention43 would in no way pose a challenge to external intervention because 
sovereignty was no longer as absolute as in the past: 
 
33 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004, pp, 84-85. 
34 Alexandros Yannis, “State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction”, 
Development and Change, 33:5 (November 2002), p. 826; Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the 
New Wars (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001), p. 11.  
35 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004, pp, 41-44; 84-88; Paris, 2004, pp. 28-34; Duffield, 2001, pp. 
53-71. 
36 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004, pp, 165-173. 
37 Duffield, 2001, p. 11.  
38 Yannis, 2004, p. 826. 
39 Paris, 1997, 2004. 
40 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, (London: Pluto Press), 1999. 
41 David Chandler, “The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’”, International 
Peacekeeping, 11:1 (Spring 2004), pp. 59-81. 
42 Article 2(1) of the UN Charter states that the UN system “is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members”. 
43 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter maintains that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter”. 
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State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of 
globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be 
instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual 
sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the 
charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties- has been enhanced by a renewed and 
spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more 
than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those 
who abuse them.44 
 
In fact, responding to ‘state failure’ and humanitarian crisis situations was 
asserted to be falling under the international community’s “responsibility to protect” 
when states fail to save their populations “from avoidable catastrophe – from mass 
murder and rape, from starvation”:45 
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, 
the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.46 
  
Aiming to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict rather than ending 
clashes between belligerents and alleviating its humanitarian consequences on 
civilian populations, this new conflict resolution strategy was based on the 
restructuring of conflict-affected societies and creation of “the enabling conditions 
for a functioning peacetime society”.47 This entailed the use of developmental tools 
and initiatives48 and rebuilding the state and its institutions along liberal democratic 
lines.49 This new policy was tested in Kosovo and East Timor. The optimism in the 
capacity of liberal democracy to break the cycle of violence50 was influenced by four 
 
44 Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, The Economist, 352, (18 September 1999), p. 49.  
45 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to 
Protect”, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (December 
2001), p. viii, available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf [accessed 12 October 
2005]. 
46 Ibid., p. xi. 
47 World Bank, Post-Conflict Reconstruction The Role of the World Bank, (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1998), p. 4.  
48 Duffield, 2001, p. 11-17. 
49 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004, pp. 237-240; Kirsti Samuels and Sebastian von Einsiedel, 
“The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq”, 
International Peace Academy Policy Report, (New York, 14-16 November 2003), pp. 3-4; 
Chesterman, 2005 [2004], p. 5. 
50 See, among others, Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 1996; Kofi Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the 
Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”, Report of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council, S/1998/318 (16 April 1998); Idem, “Support by the United Nations 
System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies”, 
Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, A/53/554, (29 October 1998); Idem, 
“Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate 
New or Restored Democracies”, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, A/55/489, 
(13 October 2000); Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, “Report of the Panel on United 
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main factors. These were (1) the perceived ‘positive relationship’ between 
democracy and development;51 (2) the rise of the democratic peace thesis (i.e., 
democratic states do not wage war against each other),52 leading to the view that 
spread of liberal democracies will contribute to international peace and security and 
foster sustainable global trade relations and economic prosperity;53 (3) the 
proposition that democratic societies are internally more peaceful than authoritarian 
countries because democracy offers institutional mechanisms such as protest, voting 
and negotiation that facilitate peaceful resolution of social conflicts;54 and (4) the 
notion that Western liberal democracy became “the only model of government with 
any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal in the world”55 following the demise of 
socialist regimes in Eastern European countries.  
The September 11 attacks brought the ‘failed state’ issue back to the centre of 
international politics and the US security agenda.56 Since the Somalia debacle, the 
US was pursuing a selective humanitarian intervention policy towards ‘failed states’. 
 
Nations Peace Operations” [Brahimi Report], A/55/305-S/2000/809, (21 August 2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations [accessed on 27 March 2005]. For an excellent 
discussion of UN peace operations undertaken in the post-Cold War era to transform societies with a 
recent experience of violent domestic conflict into liberal democratic polities, see, for example, 
Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
51 The Noble Prize Winner Economist Amartya Sen, for example, asserted that “no substantial famine 
has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press” because 
“facing elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers” democratic 
governments have the incentive to take necessary measures to prevent famines and cope with the 
humanitarian, economic and social effects of other disasters. Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a 
Universal Value’, Journal of Democracy 10:3 (July 1999), pp. 7-8.  See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali et 
al., The Interaction between Democracy and Development (Paris: United Nations Education, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 2002), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128283e.pdf [accessed 21 May 2005]; 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “Democracy and Development: Cruel Dilemma or Symbiotic Relationship?”, 
Review of Development Economics 6:2 (June 2002), pp. 151-162. 
52  See, for example, Doyle (1983).  
53 William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995-1996, 
(Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc.: 1995). 
54 Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, (Washington DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), Chapter 3; Idem, “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane”, 
Foreign Affairs, 79:3 (May / June 2000), pp. 52-64; Boutros-Ghali, 1996; R. J. Rummel, Democracy, 
Power, “Genocide, and Mass Murder”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:1 (March 1995), pp. 3-
26; Idem, Death by Government, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 1994). 
55 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: 
Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Africa, (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner; London: 
Adamantine Press, 1990), vol. 2, p. x. For a further discussion of liberal democracy as a ‘universal 
value’, see also Sen, 1999. 
56 Yannis, 2002, pp. 818, 827; Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Failed State Index”, 
Foreign Policy 149 (July / August 2005), p. 57. 
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As Daalder and O’Hanlon point out, since 1993, the US intervened “only when 
humanitarian crises occurred near US territory or in Europe, only when extremely 
few US casualties were expected, and only when the president’s [Bill Clinton] own 
rhetoric had essentially forced the administration to do so”.57 This argument can be 
seen to explain the US inaction in Rwanda but its involvement in Haiti (1994), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and Kosovo (1999).58   
Although George Bush had stated during the 2000 presidential elections that 
Africa was not one of the “top priorities” on his security agenda,59 he called his 
European allies to promote “liberty, peace and growing prosperity” in the continent 
and “strengthen Africa’s fragile states” in the post-September 11 period because 
‘state failure’ is a global security problem:  
[T]he events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as 
great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people 
into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak 
states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.60 
 
Often used in the context of the ‘war against terrorism’ argument, the term 
‘failed state’ in the post-September 11 period has increasingly been associated with 
the emergence within a disintegrated state of warlords, gangs and other non-state 
actors, pursuing hostile policies to “the fundamental values and interests of the 
international society such as peace, stability, rule of law, freedom and democracy”.61 
These states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Liberia, where central governmental 
authority has collapsed and territory is ‘captured’ by non-state actors, are now 
frequently cited as the source of all ‘evil’ from drug production and trafficking and 
international terrorism to weapons proliferation and global pandemics.62  
 
57 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo”, Foreign Policy, 
116 (Autumn 1999), p. 139. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Commission on Presidential Debates, “The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate”, (11 October 
2000), available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.html [accessed 12 July 2007]. 
60 George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, (September 
2002), p. 10, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [accessed 16 April 2005]. 
61 Yannis, 2002, p. 819; Foreign Policy, 2005, p. 57. 
62 Yannis, 2002, p. 819; Foreign Policy, 2005, p. 57.Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failing States”, 
Foreign Affairs 82:5 (September / October 2003), 32–44; Rotberg, 2002a, pp. 86-90; Idem, “Nation-
State Failure: a Recurring Phenomenon?”, Discussion Paper, (6 November 2003), pp. 1-4; Fukuyama 
2004, pp. ix-xi, 92-4; Rice 2003, p. 2. 2; Commission on Weak States and US National Security, On 
the Brink: Weak States and US National Security, (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 
2004); Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States”, 
Foreign Affairs, 84:1 (January / February 2005), p. 137. 
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The categorisation of ‘failed states’ has also expanded in the post-September 
11 period. Some observers such as senior British diplomat Robert Cooper have 
divided the world into three zones occupied by “pre-modern” states (former colonies 
which turned into ‘failed states’), “traditional modern” states (such as India and 
China) and “post-modern” states (Western European states).63 Some others have 
tested the institutional and functional aspects of “stateness” in terms of their capacity 
to perform security, representation and welfare functions.64 This approach represents 
not only the disregard of the historical context within which the modern Western and 
post-colonial states have emerged but also a tendency to assign a set of “ideal criteria 
and functions” to the state and measure statehood on the basis of the extent to which 
these criteria are satisfied.65  
The result of this approach has been the placement of the world’s states on an 
imaginary scale starting with ‘successful’ or ‘strong’ states and ending with the 
‘weak’, ‘fragile’, ‘dysfunctional’, ‘failing’, ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’.66 Different 
‘evaluators’ produced different numbers and varying degrees of ‘weakness’ / 
‘fragility’ / ‘failure’. The British Department for International Development (DFID), 
for example, ranked 46 countries as ‘fragile’ in 200567 while the World Bank listed 
some 30 countries as “low income countries under stress”.68 Foreign Policy 
“indexed” 76 countries, of which 33 were classified as “alerting” and 43 as 
“warning” countries in the same year.69 Those standing on the far end of the 
‘stateness scale’, most of which are former African and Asian colonies, are said to 
have failed to meet the criteria of the modern state and claimed to be in need of 
 
63 See, for example, Robert Cooper, “The New Liberal Imperialism”, Observer (7 April 2002), 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,680095,00.html [accessed 2 June 2005]; 
Straw, 2002.  
64 Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, “State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction: 
Concepts, Lessons and Strategies”, Development and Change 33:5 (November 2002), p. 753. 
65 Ibid., pp. 754-762. 
66 See for example, Rotberg, 2004; Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Failed State Index”, 
Foreign Policy 149 (July / August 2005), pp. 56-65; Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The 
Failed State Index”, Foreign Policy 149 (July / August 2005), pp. 56-65; Idem, “The Failed State 
Index”, 154 (May / June 2006), pp. 50-58; Idem, “The Failed States Index 2007”, Foreign Policy 161 
(July / August 2007), pp. 54-63; World Bank, “Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS)”, 
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus06_map.html [accessed 29 November 2006]. 
67 DFID, 2005, pp. 27-8. 
68 The list of LICUS countries can be found at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/docs/appendix_b.pdf [accessed 2 November 2006]. 
69 An electronic version of the list can be viewed at 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2005.php [accessed 29 April 2006]. 
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urgent international engagement and support,70 including through recolonisation in 
the form of “new liberal imperialism”71 or “empire lite” if necessary.72 
 
Failed State Index by Foreign Policy  Severe LICUS by World Bank 
Côte d'Ivoire Afghanistan 
Congo DR Angola 
Sudan Central African Republic 
Iraq Haiti  
Somalia Liberia 
Sierra Leone Myanmar 
Chad Solomon Islands 
Yemen Somalia 
Liberia Sudan 
Haiti Zimbabwe 
Table 2.1. Two different lists of ‘ten weakest or least successful states’ released in 2005 (Adapted from, World 
Bank, “Which Countries are LICUS?”, http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus05_map.html; “The Failed States 
Index”, Foreign Policy, 149, July / August 2005).  
 
The classifications of states under such headings, based on broad as well as 
subjectively-defined sets of criteria used to distinguish their degree of ‘success’ or 
‘strength’, have provided a rationalisation or justification for external intervention. 
Intervention is justified in terms of the urgency of taking preventive actions to 
strengthen ‘weak’ states before they ‘fail’. It aimed to avert the effects of ‘state 
weakness / failure’ on global security and its humanitarian impact on the lives of the 
populations living in these states.73 The rationale is that because ‘failed states’ pose a 
great danger to their citizens and the international system, they cannot be left to on 
their devices. In other words, intervention is “imperative”.74 As Jack Straw, former 
British Secretary of State, put it in the following way: 
As members of an international community, we cannot but be concerned at the implications 
for the human rights and freedoms of those who are forced to live in such anarchic and 
chaotic conditions. Yet the events of September 11 devastatingly illustrated a more particular 
and direct reason for our concern. For it dramatically showed how a state’s disintegration can 
impact on the lives of people many thousands of miles away, even at the heart of the most 
powerful democracy in the world. In these circumstances turning a blind eye to the 
breakdown of order in any part of the world, however distant, invites direct threats to our 
national security and wellbeing. I believe therefore that preventing states from failing and 
resuscitating those that fail is one of the strategic imperatives of our times.75 
 
                                                 
70 British Department for International Development (DFID), Why We Need to Work More Effectively 
in Fragile States (London: DFID, January 2005); Rotberg, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004; Fukuyama, 
2004; Ignatieff, 2002. 
71 Cooper, 2002. 
72 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation Building in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, (Toronto: Penguin 
Canada, 2003). 
73 Rotberg, 2002a, pp. 94-96. 
74 Ibid., p. 96. 
75 Jack Straw, “Failed and Failing States”, Speech at the European University of Birmingham, UK, (6 
Septemer 2002), http://www.eri.bham.ac.uk/events/jstraw060902.pdf [28 May 2005]. 
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However, the international community’s commitment to addressing ‘state 
failure’ and humanitarian emergency situations in respect to its “responsibility to 
protect” has continued to be selective in the post-September 11 period, as in the 
1990s. While there has been no decisive intervention in Sudan or Congo DR, which 
have often been ranked as the most ‘vulnerable’ states, the Western governments 
intervened in Iraq, although it was not exactly a ‘failed state’, if it is defined in terms 
of the exercise of sovereign capacity to control territory and provide public security. 
Congo DR, where, as of April 2007, 5.4 million people died since 1998 as a result of 
the fighting, hunger and disease,76 has hardly been covered in the media, remaining a 
forgotten conflict. In Sudan, the fighting between the pro-government Arab 
Janjaweed militias and African rebel groups in the Darfur region cost the lives of at 
least 200,000 people since 2003 and led to the displacement of 2 million Sudanese.77 
The international community’s inadequate commitment to implementing the 
“responsibility to protect”, in turn, has given rise to strong criticisms78 and fuelled 
doubts about the intent of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion. 
 
2.3. Review of the Literature on Nation-Building  
 
The literature on nation-building can be reviewed on the basis of two time 
frames: the early nation-building theories of the 1950s and 1960s and the more recent 
literature that flourished in the post-Cold War era.  
The participation in the ‘community of states’ of former colonies in Asia and 
Africa as ‘new’ states in the 1950s and 1960s, sparked a growing intellectual interest 
among American political scientists in studying the process of national integration 
leading to the emergence of the modern Western nation-state system.79 Based on 
 
76 International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing 
Crisis, (2007), p. ii., available at http://www.theirc.org/resources/2007/2006-
7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf [accessed 14 July 2008]. 
77 International Crisis Group, “Darfur: The Failure to Protect”, Africa Report, 89, (8 March 2005, p. 3. 
78 See for example, Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the 
Crisis in Darfur”, Security Dialogue, 36:1 (2005), pp. 27-47; Nsongurua J. Udombana, “When 
Neutrality Is A Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 27:4 (2005), pp. 1149-1199. 
79 Examples to some of these works are Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr, Comparative 
Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966); Gabriel 
A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: 
The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1967); Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, (Boston and Toronto: 
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Western states’ experience of ‘modernisation’, these scholars prescribed a ‘success 
formula’ for national development to be followed by the newly independent nations. 
Treating Western European and North American countries’ road to political, 
industrial, economic and social development as a ‘universal’ experience, the 
modernisation school theorists of the 1950s and 60s assumed an evolutionary path 
that the newly independent African and Asian states would / should follow in the 
same way. 
The term nation-building was first introduced and conceptualised by Karl 
Deutsch, well known exponent of the “communication approach” variant of the 
modernisation school, to describe the process of assimilation of different cultural and 
linguistic groups into nations, in other words, political, economic and social 
integration along national lines. Nation-building denoted (1) the formation of group 
consciousness, cohesion and identity around shared interests and common cultural 
characteristics, e.g. the land inhabited, language and some other shared cultural 
characteristics, and (2) the development of a government apparatus and political 
authority, and (3) absorption of cultural groups into nations.80 
Deutsch explained nation-building in terms of the assimilation of cultural 
minorities into the larger, dominant social unit and formation of a new identity at the 
national level as an outcome of two types of process; one planned and the other 
unplanned. The former refers to deliberate policies and strategies, such as education 
and language policies, pursued by political elites to bring isolated, peripheral ethnic, 
tribal or cultural groups with central state structures and integrate them into a bigger 
whole – the nation. The latter, which he called ‘social mobilisation’, refers to a 
process in which individuals gradually become uprooted from their kinship relations, 
local cultures and traditions and become available for new patterns of 
communication. It denotes the movement of individuals, coming from diverse ethnic, 
tribal, cultural, linguistic, regional or other backgrounds, to urban centres, where they 
would be exposed to new social, economic and cultural relations and behaviour. 
 
Little, Brown and Company, 1966). 
80 See for example, Karl W. Deutsch, “Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for 
Political Research”, Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, (eds.), Nation-building, (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1963), p. 3; Karl Friedrich, “Nation-Building?”, Ibid., p. 32; Joseph Strayer, “The 
Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe”, Ibid., p. 25-26; Hermann Weilenmann, “The 
Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure”, Ibid., pp. 40-42; David A. Wilson, “Nation-
Building and Revolutionary War”, Ibid., p. 84. 
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Increasing levels of social communication and economic intercourse, Deutsch 
suggested, would result in national integration, defined in terms of the disappearance 
of ethnic, tribal or cultural peculiarities and assimilation of small ethnic, cultural or 
tribal groups into the dominant group.81   
Deutsch argued that the establishment of “new and inescapable contacts” in 
urban centres and spread of modern communication facilities in the newly 
independent nations would weaken kinship relations and links, local customs, 
cultures and dialects. He suggested that this would lead to the ‘absorption’ of smaller 
groups into larger national units and socio-cultural homogenisation as happened in 
Western Europe in the past.82 He criticised the view that tribes in Asia and Africa 
were fixed and unlikely to change in a significant way and argued that the 
‘absorption’ of the tribes in African and Asian states was possible: 
Tribes, we know from European history, can change their language and culture; they can 
absorb other tribes; and large tribes came into existence through federation or mergers of 
smaller tribes or through their conquest and absorption by a larger one…Yet in contemporary 
Asia and Africa, the rates of cultural and ethnic change, still low, are likely to be faster than 
they were in early medieval Europe…Research is needed to establish more reliable figures, 
but it seems likely from the experience of ethnic minorities in other parts of the world that the 
process of partial modernisation will draw many of the most gifted and energetic individuals 
into the cities or the growing sectors of the economy away from their former minority or 
tribal groups, leaving these traditional groups weaker, more stagnant, and easier to govern.83 
 
Deutsch specified four main stages by which national integration would take 
place: (1) Open or covert resistance to political amalgamation into a common 
national state; (2) minimal integration to the point of passive compliance with the 
orders of such an amalgamated government; (3) deeper political integration to the 
point of active support for such a common state but with continuing ethnic or cultural 
group cohesion and diversity; and (4) the coincidence of political amalgamation and 
integration with the assimilation of all groups to a common language and culture.84 
The formation of national identities and their adoption by diverse ethnic / tribal 
groups as a common, integrative identity that would at least serve to reduce the 
salience of, and eventually eliminate, centuries-old ethnic / tribal peculiarities in Asia 
 
81 Deutsch, 1963, pp. 5-9; Idem, Nationalism and Its Alternatives, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1969), pp. 3-27; Idem, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Nationality, (New York: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons; London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1953), 70-126. 
82 Deutsch, 1953, pp. 97-126;  
83 Idem, 1963, pp. 4-5. 
84 Deutsch, 1963, pp. 7-8. 
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and Africa, which he considered mainly in linguistic terms, would be a long process. 
On the other hand, he was optimistic. Arguing that linguistic assimilation in 
medieval Europe took between one hundred and four hundred years, Deutsch 
suggested that modern immigrant populations in cities tended to assimilate much 
faster, within twenty to fifty years, especially where there are social, economic and 
cultural incentives.85 
 Rupert Emerson, another well-known theorist of the modernisation school, 
argued that forging a national identity and achieving the people’s loyalty to the state 
would be a difficult, if not an unrealistic, task to achieve, depending on the capacity 
of post-colonial states to fulfil a set of conditions.86 Reiterating the importance of 
transportation and communication means and social mobilisation in the growth of 
nations, Emerson suggested the below roadmap to build a sense of national 
community in the newly emerged independent states in Africa:  
1. development of a nation-state as the source of good and desirable things and 
shared interests, its operation in a similar fashion to all its people, and its 
capacity to set the law under which they live; 
2. economic planning employed as a means to achieve social mobilisation – 
peoples’ movement from the place and community into which they were born 
to new ones and their exposure to new social and economic relationships and 
contacts;   
3. economic and social development accompanied by improvement in 
transportation and communication means, resulting in the emergence of a 
national economy that would not only bind individuals and groups to the 
existing order but also would create a stimulus or stake in the maintenance of 
national strength and unity due to the fact that those once tied to local clan 
structures would be given the opportunity to exercise national mobility and 
enter into a money economy.87 
In this process of national integration, Emerson attached a special role to 
formal education systems and international actors. Emerson suggested that the school 
 
85 Ibid., p. 9. 
86 Rupert Emerson, “Nation-Building in Africa”, Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, (eds.), 
Nation-Building, (New York:: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 95-111.    
87 Emerson, 1963, pp. 115-116. 
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system would enable the political elites of the newly independent states to 
“indoctrinate” a national culture and generate “like-minded” individuals, which he 
argued, as “the foundation of a nation”.88 He also argued that the US and its Western 
capitalist allies had the responsibility to promote the Western model of government 
as a “desirable” pattern of political, economic and social development in the newborn 
states of Asia and Africa in order to “offset the appeal of communism” in the 
developing world. Emerson outlined three major roles for the capitalist members of 
the international community; supervising the process of decolonisation, maintaining 
peace and security in post-colonial states, and providing financial and political 
assistance to achieve economic growth and social development in these states.89 
The early literature, in other words, treated nation-building as a strategy to 
achieve political and economic development in post-colonial states. It was based on 
the view that if the newly developed African and Asian states would adopt the same 
political, economic and social structures, they would achieve the same political, 
economic and social development that Western European and North American states 
had. It had two main components: 1) construction of a functioning government and 
differentiated political institutions as the leading agents of achieving a profound 
societal, political and economic transformation through scientific, technological and 
industrial development; and 2) creation of a common identity in terms of the 
assimilation of diverse ethnic, linguistic, tribal or cultural groups into a bigger 
congruent as a result of increasing urbanisation, schooling and advances in 
communication and transportation facilities.  
The term nation-building has been associated in the post-Cold War literature 
with a process of coercive democratisation in societies facing the threat or actuality 
of ‘state failure’. In two RAND publications and a study produced by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, for example, nation-building is defined in terms 
of the use of force by individual states and international organisations and their 
involvement in restoring and strengthening state capacities in foreign societies along 
democratic lines with the intent of forming the basis of a fundamental societal 
 
88 Ibid., pp. 110-112. 
89 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 407-419.  
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transformation in the post-military intervention period.90  
The use of military power has been treated as the factor distinguishing  the 
term nation-building from state-building, Dobbins et al, for example, argued that 
state-building – reforming and strengthening government institutions – does not 
“normally or necessarily” entail the use of force by outside powers.91 According to 
Dobbins et al, nation-building does not denote the “suppression or homogenisation 
of distinct cultures within a given society”92 but the use of military force to promote 
a process of transformation to democracy.93 In the same vein, Ottaway suggested that 
nation-building does not intend to construct the nation through imposing a common 
identity on deeply fragmented peoples,94  but “to organise states that can administer 
their territories and allow people to live together despite differences”.95 
However, adding military intervention to the definition of external actors’ 
engagement in achieving political transformation in foreign territories does not affect 
the nature or focus of the task at hand: construction or modification of the state along 
liberal democratic lines. Therefore, it should still be called state-building. An 
analysis of the international community-led democratic transition in post-conflict 
societies requires differentiating nation-building from state-building in terms of the 
target and scope of actions and policy initiatives undertaken by international and 
domestic actors: achieving a sense of community and belonging among individuals at 
the national level and forming a political authority with the capacity to monopolise 
the use of legitimate force and exercise sovereignty throughout the entire territory. 
Such a two-level analytical approach is necessary to study the reconstruction of 
conflict-affected societies, because as argued in Chapter 1, these societies undergo 
two separate but interacting processes in the post-armed conflict period and the 
interaction between these processes affects the international community-guided 
democratisation.  
 
 
90 Dobbins et al., 2003, 2005; Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American 
Record on Nation-Building”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Review, (24 May 
2003), p. 1.  It can be found at www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/Policybrief24.pdf [accessed 24 
July 2005]. 
91 Dobbins et al., 2005, p. 2.   
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 1.  
94 Ottaway, 2002a, p. 17. 
95 Ibid. 
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Having clarified this point, it is important to note that the literature on nation-
building produced in the post-Cold War era reflects diverging views on coercive 
democratisation following military intervention justified either in humanitarian terms 
or within the context of the ‘war against terror’ argument. These diverging 
approaches can be classified under the following headings: 
 
1. Basing the conduct of intervention on a set of universal principles: As noted 
earlier, the international community’s commitment to democracy promotion and 
responding to ‘state failure’ and its humanitarian consequences has been selective in 
the post-Cold War era. In some cases, such as in northern Iraq (1991), Somalia 
(1992), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999) and East Timor (1999), military 
interventions for human rights protection purposes have taken place with or without 
Security Council authorisation. In some other cases such as in Afghanistan (2001) 
and Iraq (2003), the conduct of military interventions was justified on the basis of an 
array of security, political and humanitarian concerns. In many other cases, such as 
in Rwanda, Sudan and Congo DR, where the scale of human rights violations 
amounted to a humanitarian emergency situation, the international community, 
however, has been unwilling to take a decisive action.   
Pointing to the dangers of this selective approach on the international legal 
and political order, some commentators stressed the need for formulating a legal and 
political framework or a doctrine of intervention to prevent a pretext for abusive 
intervention.96 Towards this aim, a number of scholars and international agencies 
proposed a set of criteria, based on a mixture of cosmopolitan and solidarist 
conceptions of international relations:97 that is, a) regardless of national, religious, 
cultural, racial, gender and other differences, all individuals are bound together as a 
single moral community with shared values, rights and obligations that transcend 
                                                 
96 Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects, 
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), pp. 103-104; Bartram S. Brown, 
“Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads”, William and Mary Law Review, 41 (1999-2000), pp. 
1709-1711; Ove Bring, “Should NATO Take the Lead in Formulating a Doctrine on Humanitarian 
Intervention?”, NATO Review, 47(3), Autumn 1999, pp. 24-27. 
97 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bartram S. Brown, “Humanitarian Intervention 
at a Crossroads”, William and Mary Law Review, 41 (1999-2000), pp. 1722-1739; Michael Walzer, 
“The Argument About Humanitarian Intervention”, Dissent, 49 (Winter 2002), pp. 29-37; Kaldor, 
1999; Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999; ICISS, 2005. 
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“the morally parochial world of the sovereign state”;98 b) therefore, in the event of 
the violations their fundamental rights and liberties by their rulers, other members of 
this “universal community of humankind” have a moral duty and right to take action 
to restore these rights and create the necessary conditions to ensure their exercise.99  
Democracy, in this context, is seen representing a universal value or a right 
that guarantees individual autonomy within moral community. David Held, for 
example, argued that there is a duty to “work towards the establishment of an 
international community of democratic states and societies committed to upholding 
democratic public law both within and across boundaries” in order to achieve 
“freedom and autonomy for each and all”.100 Although seen as a universal right, 
democracy, it is argued, is difficult to institute, requiring external engagement and 
assistance: 
The establishment of a cosmopolitan model of democracy is a way of seeking to strengthen 
democracy “within” communities and civil associations by elaborating and reinforcing 
democracy from “outside” through a network of regional and international agencies and 
assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales.101  
  
In this individual-focused rather than state-centred conception of world 
politics, individuals are treated as the subjects of international law. Therefore, the 
principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention are no longer considered as a 
barrier or a shield that protects oppressive governments from external intervention. 
In fact, sovereignty, which is asserted to have eroded in a rapidly globalised world, is 
now being equated with the state’s capacity to deliver justice and ensure the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. That is, sovereignty is not absolute 
but conditional. This is argued to make international intervention for human 
protection purposes not only a legitimate action but also legally permissible. In this 
respect, Fernando Tesón, who is one of the most well-known proponents of 
humanitarian intervention, suggests the following:102  
 
98 Andrew Linklater, “Cosmopolitan Citizenship”, Citizenship Studies, 2:1 (1998), p. 26. 
99 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate”, J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane 
(eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 25-26, citing Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1925). See also Wheeler, 2000. 
100 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 229. 
101 Ibid., p. 237. 
102 Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, second edition, 
(New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1997), pp. 173-174. 
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The human rights imperative underlies the concept of state and government and the precepts that 
are designed to protect them, most prominently article 2(4). The rights of states recognised by 
international law are meaningful only on the assumption that those states minimally observe 
individual rights. The United Nations purpose of promoting and protecting human rights found in 
article 1(3), and by reference in article 2(4) as a qualifying clause to the prohibition of war, has a 
necessary primacy over the respect for state sovereignty. Force used in defence of fundamental 
human rights is therefore not a use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
 
Therefore, when a state oppresses and violates the autonomy and human 
rights of its citizens, it loses its “moral claim to full sovereignty”.103 In this respect, 
individuals’ right to exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in a 
number of international conventions and agreements accepted by the states “should 
be recognised as the highest principle of world order” and state sovereignty should 
be seen as a conditional norm.104 When a state “egregiously” violates human rights 
of its citizens, other members of the society of states, in other words, “are not obliged 
to ‘respect the sovereignty’” of that state and have the right to intervene.105  
The proposals that were put forward towards setting some objective criteria 
for protecting individuals from a humanitarian catastrophe and creating the 
conditions for democratic government that will guarantee their fundamental rights 
and freedoms embody the following aspects:106 
a) Circumstances That Require International Action: Presence of a 
“humanitarian necessity”107 or a “supreme humanitarian emergency” 
situation108 or “extreme cases of gross and massive violations of human 
rights o international humanitarian law”109 that “shock the conscience of 
mankind”:110 
i. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with 
genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of 
deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or 
a failed / weak state situation; or 
 
103 Michael J. Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues”, Joel H. 
Rosenthal (ed.), Ethics and International Affairs, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1999), p. 289. See also, ICISS, 2005. 
104 Smith, 1999, p. 289. 
105 Ibid., p. 291. 
106 This framework derives from Walzer, 2002. 
107 Brown, 1999-2000, pp. 1726-1727. 
108 Wheeler, 2000, pp. 33-34. 
109 Danish Institute Report, 1999, p. 106. 
110 Walzer, 2002, p. 29; ICISS, 2005, p. xiii, 2, 31, 33. 
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ii. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror or rape.111  
b) Means and Limits of Engagement: All political and diplomatic remedies 
for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis should 
be exhausted and the use of military force should be the “last resort”.112 
The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action should be 
“proportionate” to the harm that it is intended to prevent or stop.113 
c) Agencies of Intervention: The UN Security Council should be the “right 
authority” to decide on any matter relating to the use of force for human 
protection purposes. If it fails to act in the face of a threatened veto by 
permanent members, the General Assembly can consider the matter under 
the “Uniting for Peace” procedure.114 Regional or sub-regional agencies 
can undertake collective enforcement actions to stop the humanitarian 
crisis provided that they seek authorisation from the Security Council and 
report to the Security Council.115  
d) Ends of Intervention: The primary purpose of the use of military force 
must be to halt or avert human suffering.116 Military intervention can be 
justified if there is a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting 
human suffering.117 The intervening powers should withdraw after the 
humanitarian goal has been attained118 and support the economic and 
social recovery of the target state.119  
 
 
111 ICISS, 2005, p. 12, 33; Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999, pp. 106-107. 
112 ICISS, 2005, pp. 36-37; Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999, p. 109; Walzer, 2002, p. 
33; Wheeler, p. 34; Jonathan Charney, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo”, 
American Journal of International Law, 93, (1999), p. 838; Richard A. Falk, “Kosovo, World Order, 
and the Future of International Law”, American Journal of International Law, 93, (1999), p. 855. 
113 ICISS, 2005, p. 37; Brown, 1999-2000, pp. 1729-1730; Wheeler, 2000, p. 34; Falk, 1999, p. 856; 
Christine Chinkin, “Kosovo: A ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ War”, American Journal of International Law, 93 
(1999), p. 844. 
114 As per General Assembly Resolution 377A (V) of 3 November 1950, the General Assembly has a 
subsidiary role in deciding on issues relating to international peace and security if “the Security 
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the Permanent Members, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears 
to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”. 
115 ICISS, 2005, pp. 49-55; Danish Institute Report, 1999, p. 108; Charney, 1999, pp. 838-839. 
116 ICISS, 2005, pp. 35-36; Danish Institute Report, 1999, pp. 109-110; Charney, 1999, p. 839. 
117 ICISS, 2005, p. xii, 37; Brown, 1999-2000, pp. 1731-1937; Wheeler, 2000, pp. 34-37. 
118 Danish Institute Report, 1999, p. 110; ICISS, 2005, p. 35.  
119 ICISS, 2005, pp. 39-43; Brown, 1999-2000, pp. 1737-1739. 
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The aforementioned criteria, which were incorporated by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) into the concept of the 
“Responsibility to Protect”, may serve as guidelines for the legitimate conduct of 
intervention in states facing the threat or actuality of ‘state failure’. However, as 
discussed earlier, the international community’s commitment to responding to 
humanitarian crisis situations, resulting from or leading to ‘state failure’, has been 
selective. While in some cases military intervention have taken place, in many others 
they have not. Influenced by a mixture of political, economic, military, strategic and 
logistical factors and concerns, states are unwilling to develop, adopt and implement 
a legally binding mechanism for international intervention. The main reason for their 
reluctance, as Adam Roberts points out, is two-fold: While major powers do not want 
to commit themselves to undertaking military intervention in every possible case of 
humanitarian crisis, small states fear that a legal doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention might be used against them in the future.120  
 
2. Benevolent re-colonisation: Another solution that scholars suggested to cope with 
‘state failure’ is benevolent re-colonisation.121 Mazrui, for example, put forward the 
idea of “benign colonisation” while Pfaff called for a “Euro-African trust 
organisation” to reverse the process of ‘state failure’ in Africa. Helman and Ratner, 
who argued that state sovereignty is “consistent” with the idea of guardianship or 
trusteeship, proposed a three-level UN “conservatorship” system as a temporary but 
necessary condition to “enable the state to resume responsibility for itself”:122 a) 
providing governance assistance in states with the risk of ‘failure’ such as Georgia 
and Congo DR (then Zaire); b) delegation of certain governmental functions to the 
UN in already ‘failed’ states such as Cambodia; c) establishing a direct trusteeship 
under the auspices of the UN in extreme cases of ‘state failure’; states where there is 
no visible central government authority such as Somalia.123  
                                                 
120 Adam Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo, Survival¸ 41:3 (Autumn 1999), p. 
120. 
121 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3; Ali Mazrui, “Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonisation”, 
International Herald Tribune, (4 August 1994); William Pfaff, “A New Colonialism? Europe Must 
Go Back into Africa”, Foreign Affairs, 74:1 (January / February 1995), pp. 1-6; Cooper, 2002; 
Ignatieff, 2003. 
122 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3, p. 17. 
123 Ibid., pp. 13-16. 
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The most radical policy option to address the issue of ‘state failure’ came 
from British Diplomat Robert Cooper, who served as policy advisor to Tony Blair: a 
“new kind of imperialism” albeit “one acceptable to a world of human rights and 
cosmopolitan values”.124 According to Cooper, Western states, which formed a sort 
of “cooperative empire”, characterised by peace, security, freedom, interdependence 
and integration, face two kinds of threat, coming from “old fashioned states” and 
‘failed states’.125 In dealing with these states, Cooper argued, Western states do not 
need to observe international law.126 That is, Western states can recourse to military 
action, rely on global financial institutions for interference, replace non-democratic 
regimes and establish protectorates.127 
 
3. Partition or secession: Instead of engaging in reconstituting state power and 
putting collapsed governmental and societal structures back together in societies torn 
by conflict,128 some scholars proposed territorial division or secession as an 
alternative strategy for building sustainable peace.129 Kaufmann, for example, 
suggests that reconciliation of groups involved in ethnic wars is almost impossible 
because ethnic mobilisation and massacres “harden ethnic identities to the point that 
cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be 
heard”.130 He also notes that “intermingled settlement patterns create real security 
dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic “cleansing,” and prevent de-
escalation unless the groups are separated”.131 That is, the breakdown of central 
government structures in societies emerging from civil war produces the same effect 
that the lack of central authority in international politics does: uncertainty and self-
                                                 
124 Cooper, 2002. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 For a discussion of the argument that statehood must be reconstituted in collapsed states, see for 
example, I. William Zartman, “Putting Things Back Together”, I. William Zartman (ed.), Collapsed 
States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 
1995b), pp. 267-273. 
129 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”, International 
Security, 20:4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, “Hateful 
Neighbors”, New York Times, (24 September 1996); Idem, “Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing”, New 
York Times, (19 April 1999). 
130 Kaufmann, 1996, p. 137. 
131 Ibid. 
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help.132 One ethnic group’s efforts to increase its own security by taking military and 
other measures is, in other words, perceived by other ethnic groups as a threat.133 
Fuelling ethnic fears and hostilities, hardened by war, this situation makes it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish multi-ethnic civil politics.134 Under 
these circumstances, stable resolution of ethnic civil wars becomes possible “only 
when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves”, 
which reduces the risk of violence.135 Taking these factors into account, 
Mearsheimer and Van Evera suggested that the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 
two independent countries as the Serb Republic and Muslim-Croat Federation is the 
only way to ensure sustainable peace, security and stability in the Balkan region
 In a similar fashion, Jeffrey Herbst proposed the idea of “let them fail” as an 
alternative approach to responding to ‘failed’ states where government structures 
have fallen apart and society has been divided.137 He notes that despite the continued 
international involvement in promoting good governance through strengthening the 
capacity of governmental and institutional structures in many African states, which 
face the threat or actuality of ‘state failure’, little has been achieved towards this aim. 
This, Herbst suggests, results from the international community’s misguided 
approach to ‘state strength’, characterised by a tendency of equating sovereign power 
with control of the capital.138 He notes that in several African states, where the 
central government controls only the capital, there emerged alternative units and 
sources of power, which exercise sovereign authority and provide governmental 
services in varying degrees and forms.   
Menkhaus, for example, notes that the people in Somalia have enjoyed 
varying “systems of governance” and in some places exercised “exceptionally high 
levels of peace, reconciliation, security, and lawfulness”, provided by administrative 
 
132 Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival, 35:1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-
47. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Kaufmann, 1996, p. 139. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Mearsheimer and Van Evera, 1996, 1999. 
137 Jeffrey Herbst, Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice – Implications for Policy, 
Robert I Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), pp. 302-318.  
138 Ibid., pp. 302-303. 
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units, established since the collapse of the central government in 1991.139 These 
administrative units have included regional and trans-regional entities such as 
Somaliland and Puntland and a number of local polities consisting of coalitions of 
clan elders, businessmen and Muslim clergy, involved in the administration of 
financial services and sharia courts.140   
In this context, Herbst suggests that instead of engaging in reinstating the old 
dysfunctional or collapsed state structures, the international community should 
develop alternative policies geared towards enhancing “the congruence between the 
way that power is actually exercised and the design of units”.141 This entails the 
recognition of the right to secession. Towards this aim, Herbst proposes a two-step 
policy: a) “decertifying” states which cannot fulfil their sovereign responsibilities of 
enforcing law and providing basic services in large parts of their territory; and b) 
developing a set of objective criteria for recognising and legitimating newly emerged 
alternative administrative units and power structures as ‘new’ states. This approach, 
Herbst argues, would encourage local rulers to aspire to international norms such as 
human rights and democracy and integrate into the international economy.142  
 
4. Critical views on liberal peace: David Chandler143 and Noam Chomsky144 who 
have extensively written on the engagement of the UN and other members of the 
international community in promoting human rights and democratic government in 
conflict-affected societies the post-Cold War era, have interpreted international 
democracy promotion as the imposition of the will of the powerful on the weak or 
the continued efforts of Western states for reproducing power imbalances. The 
involvement of international governmental and non-governmental agencies in 
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142 Ibid., pp. 312-316. 
143 David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Idem, 
From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention, (London: Pluto Press, 2002); 
Idem, 2004; Idem, “Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting 
Democracy”, Review of International Studies, 32 (2006a), pp. 475-494; Idem, Empire in 
Denial: The Politics of State-building, (London: Pluto Press, 2006b). 
144 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, (London: Pluto Press 1999); 
Idem, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance, (New York: Henry 
Holt, 2004). 
 65
                                                
internal conflicts in non-Western societies in the form of providing humanitarian and 
development aid and promoting democratic government institutions, practices and 
principles, in other words, represented the perpetuation of Western imperialism in the 
developing world.145 International intervention through providing humanitarian 
assistance especially when using military force, justified in moral terms, in this 
context, is described as just another manifestation of Western motives for global 
dominance. It is based on the use of the old, “familiar” thesis that “enlightened states 
should use force when they ‘believe it to be just’”146 with a view to “reliev[ing] the 
plight of the backward peoples of the world”:147 
 
From a contrasting perspective, “the new interventionism” is replaying an old record. It is an 
updated variant of traditional practices that were impeded in a bipolar world system that 
allowed some space for non-alignment – a concept that vanishes when one of the two poles 
disappears. The Soviet Union, and to some extent China, set limits on the actions of the 
Western powers in their traditional domains, not only by virtue of the military deterrent, but 
also because of their occasional willingness, however opportunistic, to lend support to targets 
of Western subversion and aggression…With the Soviet deterrent in decline, the Cold War 
victors are more free to exercise their will under the cloak of good intentions but in pursuit of 
interests that have a very familiar ring outside the realm of enlightenment.148 
 
In this respect, Chandler, who describes the adoption of human rights and 
democracy-emphasised foreign policy by Western states as the resurrection of the 
“divisive colonial framework of the ‘White Man’s Burden’”,149 argues that the 
international community’s engagement in establishing democratic peace in the 
Balkan region, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, has had “less to do with the 
problems of the region and more to do with the search for legitimacy and policy 
coherence on the part of international institutions and leading Western 
governments”.150 The inclusion of human rights, minority issues and consolidation of 
democracy in domestic governmental and political frameworks of Eastern European 
societies as part of their membership process in Western institutional structures in the 
post-1989 period indicates the emergence of new standards of good governance in 
 
145 Chomsky, 1999. 
146 Ibid., p. 12. 
147 Ibid., p. 77. 
148 Ibid., p. 11. 
149 Chandler, 2000, p. 200. 
150 Ibid. 
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the post-Cold War era.151 This situation, according to Chandler, represents a division 
between ‘mature’ democracies and ‘new’ democracies that need to be supported and 
regulated by the former, thereby, providing a powerful justification for external 
intervention.152  
In this context, Chandler suggests that Western institutions, such as the 
OSCE, which link the issues of democratic governance and protection of minority 
rights to domestic and international security, have tended to focus on democratic 
government problems and regulate policy development around minority rights in the 
‘new’ democracies of Eastern Europe while disregarding similar problems in 
‘mature’ Western democracies such as native Americans in the US, and the Turkish, 
Arab and Asian minorities in Germany, France and Britain.153 In the same way, 
Chomsky harshly criticises NATO’s unauthorised use of military force against 
Serbia to save Albanians from ethnic cleansing through emphasising the reluctance 
of Western governments to take similar action against Turkey to protect human 
rights of the Kurds, extensively reported by international human rights 
organisations.154 The international community’s “humanitarian” policy, in this 
respect, is seen as representing not only the operation of the “new standard setting 
regulations” in a selective manner but also the persistence of a tendency to 
“minimise” problems in Western states or states involved in Western political and 
security institutions while “exaggerating” the same in those states outside the 
West.155 This situation, Chandler argues, implies a new East/West divide; not 
between states with liberal democracy and those without but between the ‘mature’ 
Western democracies and those states perceived to be lacking in some way.156 
Like Chomsky, Chandler explains the growing emphasis put by leading 
Western governments on defending democratic rights and freedoms as universal 
values in terms of the reinterpretation of Western foreign policy objectives in the 
post-Cold War era. He suggests that the moralisation of foreign policy through 
rejecting the Realist perception of the state-based international system characterised 
 
151 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
152 Ibid., p. 16. 
153 Ibid., p. 20. 
154 Chomsky, 1999, pp. 6-10. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., p. 14. 
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by competition and conflicting interests of power was motivated by Western states’ 
desire to legitimise their claim for global power.157 For Chandler, the increasing 
involvement of international governmental and non-governmental agencies in 
promoting democracy and human rights in ‘failed’ states or potentially ‘failing’ 
states exemplifies the tendency of Western states to perceive non-Western 
governmental and societal structures as backward or inadequate frameworks to 
prevent violent conflict.158 In this respect, he points to the portrayal of conflict in 
non-Western societies as ‘irrational’ violence or simply a product of cultural and 
civilisational characteristics, driven by ethnic hatred and other internal problems, 
exacerbated by criminal elites, rather than by rational or legitimate political 
motives.159 This representation of the contemporary non-Western conflict as a 
dynamic of its own, which has served to strengthen the image that these societies do 
not have the capacity to regulate or prevent conflict by themselves, has justified 
Western intervention as a necessary action to create and safeguard local and regional 
security through building the capacity of civil society and promoting political and 
economic development.160   
International state-building, in this context, for Chandler, represents nothing 
more than a strategy developed by Western governments for the purpose of building 
a sustainable “cooperative relationship” between themselves and preventing potential 
divisions that may arise from their diverging economic and political interests rather 
than promoting democratic government and building sustainable peace in the 
conflict-affected society in question.161 Western powers’ willingness to get involved 
in democratising post-conflict societies, in other words, has helped to perpetuate 
“this co-operative relationship, not merely because the language of democratisation 
allows involvement to be seen as taking the high moral ground, nor because it 
provides a flexible framework for self-flattery while denigrating the ‘ethnic rivalries’ 
of the less civilised” peoples.162 For Chandler, these are important aspects of 
legitimising a relationship of domination in non-Western societies but the key to 
 
157 Chandler, 2000, 2002. 
158 Chandler, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006a, 2006b. 
159 Idem, 2006a, pp. 484-485. 
160 Ibid; Idem, 2000, pp, 29-32.   
161 Chandler, 2000, p. 188. 
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understanding the engagement of Western institutions in democracy promotion in 
conflict-affected societies is that democratisation, which is a gradual process with no 
fixed definitions and time-limits, allows Western actors to regulate local political and 
social processes as long as they wish.   
According to Chandler, the international community’s undertaking of the 
democratisation process through exercising wide-ranging executive and regulative 
powers in conflict-affected societies represents not only a contradiction between the 
stated objective (promoting democratic self-government) and the means applied to 
achieve it (authoritarianism) but also a racist approach that formed the basis of 
colonialism: “some cultures are not rational or civil enough to govern 
themselves”.163 He suggests that the international community’s interventionist 
approach to reconstructing post-conflict societies, which is based on excluding local 
parties from the decision-making process, restricts democratic accountability while 
undermining the self-government and autonomous decision-making capacity of the 
state at all levels; local and national.164 Chandler argues that the imbalance of power 
between Bosnian and international policy makers, which has widened in time as a 
result of the extension and redefinition of international mandates,165 weakened the 
capacity of the state institutions to operate autonomously, creating relatio
ency.166 
In this context, Chandler argues that the use of extensive interventionist and 
regulatory powers is met with “denial” by international actors who exercise these 
wide-ranging powers.167 He notes that bureaucrats representing Western institutions 
and governments tend to stress their role as “merely facilitators” despite the fact that 
 
163 Ibid., p. 3. 
164 Ibid., pp. 85-181; Idem, “How ‘State-Building’ Weakens States”, Spiked Essays, (24 October 
2005). 
165 Originally, as per the Dayton Agreement, the international transitional period was envisioned for 
one year, during which elections would be held and two sets of joint institutions would be created: the 
political institutions of the state which would be elected and be directly accountable, and the 
economic, judicial and human rights institutions which would be filled through the appointment of 
international representatives for five or six years. These states bodies were established and elections 
were held by September 1996 but the transitional administration was prolonged for a “consolidation 
period” to facilitate democratic development, ethnic reconciliation and effective governance while 
new mandates for NATO, OSCE, the UN and OHR were defined by the international community. 
See, Chandler, 2001, p. 115. 
166 Chandler, 1999, p. 3; Idem, “Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox”, Current History, 100:644 (March 
2001), pp.114-119. 
167 Chandler, 2006b. 
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they set strict conditions on gaining access to external loans and credits as well as on 
obtaining membership to international organisations.168 Chandler suggests that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, has repeatedly been portrayed as an independent 
state with the capacity to negotiate with the EU rather than as an entity being run by 
it,169 although the scope of powers exercised by the High Representative amounts to 
an international protectorate.170 In the case of Iraq, he notes that the invasion of the 
country in 2003 was “marked by bans on the coalition forces raising national flags 
and the rapid removal of the Stars and Stripes when it was displayed by victorious 
US forces”.171 According to Chandler, this ‘denial’ of the exercise of political, 
economic and military power as well as accountability by Western institutions and 
governments not only represents their reluctance to appear as colonial but also 
exemplifies thei
es.172     
The above points that Chomsky and Chandler make provide a significant 
contribution to understanding the contradictions and limitations of the international 
community’s engagement in humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion, 
characterised by a highly selective and interventionist approach. The selective 
conduct of international intervention for human protection purposes, affected by the 
political interests, preferences and practical concerns of the leading members of the 
international community, is in fact nothing new. As Michael Walzer rightly points 
out, there have been “more occasions for intervention than…actual interventions”.173 
In this context, it can be said that despite the rejection of the Realist portrayal of 
international politics and state behaviour and the growing emphasis on cosmopolitan 
security frameworks aiming to protect the rights of individuals in a globalised world, 
the international community’s continued selective approach to humanitarian 
intervention and democracy promotion illustrates the persistence of Realist style 
behaviour in the post-Cold War era. State behaviour, in other words, is still shaped 
by the considerations of power and national interest rather than the prioritisation of 
 
168 Ibid. 
169 Since February 2002, the High Representative has also been serving as the EU’s Special 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
170 Chandler, 2006b, p. 8; Idem, 2000, p. 189.  
171 Chandler, 2006b, p. 8.  
172 Ibid., pp. 9-11; Idem, 2000, p. 189. 
173 Walzer, 2002, p. 30. 
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tervention setting the conditions, means and ends of military 
interve
 
 on the capacity of local populations to hold their governments 
accountable. 
                                                
individual rights and freedoms. As noted earlier, most of the world’s states are 
unwilling to adopt an objectively defined, legally binding humanitarian intervention 
framework. While major Western powers do not want to commit themselves to 
taking political and military action in every humanitarian crisis situation, some other 
major actors such as China and Russia and a number of small states, most of which 
are criticised for their limited or poor performance in human rights by international 
human rights associations, tend to see the adoption of such a legal framework as a 
‘Trojan horse’ that could potentially be used against them in the future. Under these 
circumstances, it seems unrealistic to expect a fundamental change in international 
law and norms and the universal adoption of an objectively defined doctrine of 
international in
ntion.    
Regarding the exercise of extensive interventionist roles and powers by 
external actors, the use of military force and the concentration of powers in non-
elected, external agents in the aftermath of military intervention represent a 
contradiction between the means and ends: protecting human rights by relying on 
military force and promoting democratic principles through non-democratic methods. 
The exercise of executive and regulatory powers by external agents in the post-
military intervention period sets a negative example for the implementation of 
democratic principles and norms in places where there is little or no prior experience 
of democratic government. It also tends to limit the autonomy and self-sufficiency of 
societies where democracy is introduced to promote the notion of good governance. 
Political representation, accountability and transparency, emphasised by the 
international community as the fundamentals of good governance, are seldom 
observed by international actors, which enjoy immunity from local laws and avoid 
consultation with and accountability to local populations.174 Representing a 
democracy deficit, this situation, in turn, has an undermining effect on the ability of 
newly-established government institutions to make and implement autonomous 
decisions and
 
174 Chesterman, 2005; Chopra, Jarat. “The UN’s Kingdom in East Timor”, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 
(Autumn 2000), pp. 27-39; Idem, “Building State Failure in East Timor”, Development and Change, 
Vol. 33, No. 5 (November 2002), pp. 979-1000. 
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The new imperialism thesis provides a critical analysis of the portrayal of 
contemporary conflicts in non-Western societies as a means of justification for 
external intervention.175 The description of internal conflicts in the developing world 
arising from institutional and societal structures incapable of democratic self-
government and conflict regulation rationalises the international community’s 
engagement in transforming conflict-affected societies through building public 
institutions, reconstructing social relations and changing behaviours and attitudes of 
the populations concerned.176 Despite this emphasis put on the relationship between 
internal conflict and state capacity, the international community is far from accepting 
the impact of past economic policies, pursued by international financial institutions, 
in weakening the state capacity and the rise of “shadow” states in the developing 
world.177 While many African rulers used the privatisation of state assets as a means 
for developing extra-legal trans-border networks to pursue their personal interests, 
the downsizing of the public sector led to an increase in the number of the 
unemployed.178 The failure of the World Bank and IMF-led structural adjustment 
and market liberalisation policies to alleviate economic problems through reducing 
public expenditures on education, health, security and infrastructure in the 1980s was 
followed by the emergence of a number of sub-regional and regional networks of 
parallel economies in West and Central Africa, where local resources are linked to 
trans-border markets.179 The pursuit of deregulation and privatisation of public goods 
and services, in other words, contributed to the weakening of the state in Africa 
while strengthening the reliance of the populations on informal, non-state actors an
ks for ensuring their survival and meeting their basic needs and services.180   
The new imperialism argument, however, has several important flaws. It 
looks at the international community’s engagement in promoting humanitarian 
policies and democratic government structures in non-Western societies as the 
 
175 Duffield, 2002, p. 32. 
176 Idem, 2001, pp. 1066-1067. 
177 Duffield, 2001, 2002; William Reno, “Shadow States and the Political Economy of War”, Mats 
Berdal and David Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne 1999), pp. 43-68. 
178 Duffieild, 2002, p. 1056. 
179 Ibid., pp. 1056-1059. 
180 Duffield, 2001, 2002. 
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outcome of one single motive; establishing global domination. This is not to 
disregard the hierarchical and interventionist types of relations shaped by power 
imbalances that have continued to characterise the current international system in the 
post-Cold War era but to point to the mixed or complex nature of the international 
community’s policy motives. It is not simply material gains, be it political, territorial, 
military or economic, but also other factors including humanitarian, ideological, 
strategic, logistical and cultural concerns that affect the international community’s 
policy choices and decision to where, when and how to intervene. It is not simply 
about exercising hegemonic political, economic and military control but is also 
related to promoting regional and world-wide security and stability and coping with 
or responding to humanitarian issues raised by international governmental and non-
governmental organisations as well as by the media. One therefore should not 
assume that motives and factors that affect the international community’s decision
ne or not to intervene in intra-state conflict are simple rather than complex. 
Another weakness of the new imperialism argument is related to its approach 
to the nature of relations between international and local agencies and its tendency to 
see the latter simply as the “archetypal victim” of Western “manipulation and 
oppression”.181 This is not to say that local actors are accepted as equal partners by 
the international community. On the contrary, as discussed throughout this thesis, 
they are given limited space for participating in political processes and issues related 
to establishing the institutional and societal basis of good governance that directly 
affect their present situation and political and social future. On the other hand, the 
portrayal of the international community’s engagement in democratic state-building 
in conflict-affected societies simply as the imposition of the will of the powerful on 
the weak does not represent the type of relations between Western and local actors in 
full. This is not to say that there is not a hierarchy of power in the international 
system. The implementation of conditionality by Western financial institutions and 
governments, for instance, well illustrates the hierarchical nature of international 
relations. It is rather to point to the importance of the interaction between 
international and domestic actors and the impact of the considerations and practices 
of relevant domestic actors and structures on the prospect of the democratic 
 
181 Duffield, 2001, p. 33. 
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development process. Certainly, globalisation puts enormous pressures on national 
governments to adopt a set of standardised social and political arrangements in the 
areas of human rights, environmental protection, educational development and 
economic policy.182 However, the adoption of these “standards” by national 
governments does not necessarily mean that they are fully implemented in practice 
and these policies simply reflect the ideals or interests of the leading members of the 
international community.183 Concentrating on the behaviours and motives of 
international actors, Chandler and Chomsky, in this respect, end up marginalising the 
role of local actors, structures and environments, which they often emphasise while 
criticising the international community’s approach to non-Western societies. While it 
is important to acknowledge the paradoxes of international democracy promotion, it 
is also necessary to approach the international community’s involvement in 
promoting democratic governance in a more cautious way. Lumping together all 
instances of intervention as the resurrection of ‘imperialism’ or ‘colonialism’ has the 
risk of repeating the claims of dictators, who appear to blame everything that is going 
wrong in their cou
list aims.  
One further weakness of the new imperialist thesis is that it does not offer an 
alternative solution in regards to “how else to reach the end point of stable and 
lasting peace” in conflict-affected societies184 and how to respond to or address intra-
state conflict, its domestic and global implications and actual and potential 
governmental problems that trigger conflict such as systematic human rights 
violations, political corruption, insecurity, environmental and infrastructure 
problems. Achieving the active participation of local actors and developing locally-
produced solutions that address and reflect the needs and interests of the local 
populations concerned represents an ideal solution but the point is how to accomplish 
this goal. Should the UN and other members of the international community wait 
until one side wins a victory over another and expect the winning side to produce 
solutions and policies for good governance? Identifying the issues with the 
 
182 John W. Meyer, “The Nation as Babbitt: How Countries Conform”, Contexts, 3:3 (Summer, 2004), 
pp. 42-47. 
183 Ibid., pp. 44-46. 
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’s approach to conflict resolution through promoting 
democr
ene”. The issue of “when to 
tervene” therefore is beyond the scope of this study.  
2.4. Bu
een 
nationa
share a distinct culture, nationalism has served as “a theory of political 
international community’s involvement in democracy promotion and pointing to 
international aspects of conflict resolution are significant contributions; however it is 
equally vital to provide alternatives to solving or at least addressing governmental 
and societal problems faced in developing societies and problematic aspects of the 
international community
atic governance.  
In this context, it is important to note that the issue of “when to intervene” is 
a significant aspect of debates on the involvement of external actors in intra-state 
conflict. However, since this thesis is concerned with understanding and evaluating 
the aspects of the international community’s involvement in the reconstruction of 
political and social structures in Kosovo and East Timor in the post-conflict era, the 
focus of the study is on the question of “how to interv
in
 
ilding the Nation after Conflict 
In today’s world of nation-states, “nationness” is treated as “the most 
universally legitimate value in the political life of our time”.185 Having a nationality 
and national identity is taken for granted and treated like “hav[ing] a nose and two 
ears”.186 However, what Massimo d’Azeglio said at the first session of the Italian 
parliament just after the unification of the country, “We have made Italy, now we 
have to make the Italians”,187 illustrates its constructed nature. His remarks on the 
creation of the Italian state and Italian nation also indicate a distinction betw
lism and nationness or nationhood,188 denoting two different phenomena.  
Based on a “political principle, which holds that the national unit and the 
political unit should be congruent”,189 nationalism has become the driving force in 
the disintegration of empires and the emergence of the modern form of political 
organisation. Promoting the notion that the state should rule on behalf of people who 
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legitimacy”190 to unify individuals, coming from different political, economic and 
social backgrounds, around a common goal of forming an independent or 
autonomous political organisation or governing unit of their own.191 Nationalism can 
therefore be seen as a “politicising force that transforms cultural communities and 
other collectivities into gestative political entities”192 through “locat[ing] the source 
of individual identity within a ‘people’, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, 
the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity”.193 In addition to 
its capacity to engender the notion of self-determination based on the idea that the 
state and nation should be identical, nationalism also serves as an ideology to attain 
and maintain a sense of unity and create a collective political and cultural identity.194 
Nationness or nationhood, in this context, refers to the institutionalisation of a 
collective identity as a political and/or cultural form,195 forged out of ethnic, cultural, 
territorial, political, economic and legal materials.196 
The making of the nation, which refers to an “imagined” political community, 
whose members feel connected to each other even though they will never meet most 
of their fellow nationals in person,197 is therefore about the development of a 
common consciousness of unity and solidarity among individuals, who share a 
mutual commitment to living together within the polity, as Ernest Renan suggested 
over a century ago:198  
A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made 
and those that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past, it renews itself especially in 
the present day by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the 
communal life. The existence of a nation (pardon this metaphor!) is an everyday plebiscite; it 
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is, like the very existence of the individual, a perpetual affirmation of life. 
Referring to “grand solidarity” groups, nations are based upon the idea of a 
people held together by habits and facilities of communication.199 Membership in a 
nation is determined by the ability of individuals to communicate effectively over a 
wider range of issues with each other.200 Communication habits and facilities, which 
range from symbols such as languages, alphabets and systems of writing and painting 
to the material facilities such as libraries and monuments, serve to store and transmit 
a variety of information that enables individuals to conceive themselves as members 
of a political and cultural community.201 The cultivation of a sense of solidarity and 
belonging among individuals coming from diverse social, economic and political 
backgrounds, in other words, is about the construction of a unifying collective 
identity and its socialisation through 
202  
Nations and national identities, which represent “cultural artefacts of a 
particular kind”,203 can be “imagined” and institutionalised in different ways. 
Regardless of whatever principles and elements they are built upon, it is important to 
note that national identities are shaped by political elites. The choice of language 
policies, writing of national historiography and adopti
ific objectives and considerations. 
Language policies, which refer to “deliberate efforts to influence the 
behaviour of others, with respect to the acquisition, structure or functional allocation 
of their language codes”,204 occupy a significant place in the construction of national 
identities, which, as Gellner argues, are associated with standardised “high cultures”, 
created and sustained by the state.205 The creation of literate, standardised “high” or 
“garden” cultures, which Gellner defines primarily in terms of cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity, is a requirement of the modern state. He suggests that modern 
societies, which depend on “perpetual growth”,206 require “the modular man”, who is 
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 be 
sustained by the state, which provides a standardised public education system:209 
man beings. This 
ecomes one of its main tasks. Society must be homogenised…and the only agency capable 
f carrying out, supervising or protecting this operation is the central state. 
 in inculcating a sense of 
nationa identity and solidarity in the following way:210 
votion and a distinctive, 
derable energy under 
e influence of nationalist ideals of cultural authenticity and unity.  
e rise of anti-
colonial national movements led by the bilingual local intelligentsia:211 
                                                
“capable of performing highly diverse tasks in the same general cultural idiom, if 
necessary reading up manuals of specific jobs in the general standard style of the 
culture in question”.207 Modern societies, in other words, require individuals who 
have strong literacy, numerical and technical skills and able to communicate in a 
“context free” fashion; in a shared, standardised language.208 Entailing the 
homogenisation of culture and language, this modern social organisation can only
 
The standardised educational system which processes the totality of the human material 
which goes to make up the society, which turns the biological raw material into an acceptable 
and serviceable cultural product, is enormous, and exceedingly expensive. A large part of its 
cost tends to be taken up by the state or by its local sub-units. In the end, only the state, or the 
public sector in a slightly wider sense, can really shoulder this onerous responsibility, and 
only the state can perform the task of quality control in this most important of all industries, 
that is the production of socially acceptable, industrially operational hu
b
o
 
Anthony Smith, who suggests that the power and persistence of nationalism 
comes from its emotional aspect such as ethnic myths, historical memories, symbols 
and traditions, describes the role of public education
l 
 
National identities also fulfil more intimate, internal functions for individuals in 
communities. The most obvious is the socialisation of the members as ‘nationals’ and 
‘citizens’. Today this is achieved through compulsory, standardised, public mass education 
systems through which state authorities hope to inculcate national de
omogeneous culture, an activity that most regimes pursue with consih
th
 
Similarly, Benedict Anderson, who explains the emergence of nationalism 
and nations as an outcome of the proliferation of “print capitalism” of newspapers 
and novels in vernacular languages, points to the role of education in th
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ern culture in the broadest sense, and, in particular, to the models of 
ationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth 
lues and 
charact
wards either through “turning peasants into Frenchmen” or “making 
Italians
                                                
 
 
Third [factor that affected the rise of nationalism] was the spread of modern-style education, 
not only by the colonial state, but also by private religious and secular organisations. This 
expansion occurred not simply to provide cadres for governmental and corporate hierarchies, 
but also because of the growing acceptance of the moral importance of modern knowledge 
even for colonised populations…[T]he intelligentsia’s vanguard role derived from its 
bilingual literacy…Bilingualism meant access, through the European language-of-state, to 
modern West
n
century.  
 
Mass media including books, newspapers, the radio and television contribute 
to generating and disseminating the feeling of national consciousness. They allow 
individuals coming from diverse class, ethnic, and educational backgrounds to 
“imagine” a group of other people who, simultaneously in time, consuming the same 
televised or print media narratives circulated, share common va
eristics even though they have no direct contact with each other.212  
The development of local vernaculars either as a result of the proliferation of 
“print capitalism”213 or the creation and imposition of a “high culture” on society214 
contributed to the creation of political communities, “imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign”215 towards the end of the 18th century.216 This, however, does 
not necessarily mean that these newly emerging political communities, consisting of 
many linguistic and cultural groups, were homogeneous entities. The creation of the 
new state, as noted earlier, was only the beginning; the nation was going to be 
created after
”.217 
As noted earlier, national identities can be constructed in different ways. 
They can be created in ethnic terms, based on a myth of common ancestry, culture, 
language and religion. Alternatively, they can be constructed as civic or political 
entities, based on the exercise of citizenship rights and commitment to a set of 
 
212 Ibid., pp. 28-37. 
213 Anderson, 1991. 
214 Gellner, 1983. 
215 Anderson, 1991, p. 15. 
216 While Gellner and Hobsbawm argue that nationalism emerged in Western Europe after the French 
Revolution, Anderson suggests that the first nationalist aspirations came into existence in the creole 
states in the Americas. 
217 Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 91. Hobsbawm suggests that during the time of the Revolution in France, one 
half of the population did not speak French at all and only 12% spoke it properly. In the case of Italy, 
only 2.5% of the population used Italian for everyday purposes at the time of unification in 1860. 
Ibid., pp. 60-61.  
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 addressing the questions of 
“nation
service
languag
placed by the child 
caught using his native tongue. The token varied…A child saddled with such a ‘symbol’ kept 
common values and principles such as democracy, human rights and 
constitutionalism. This is, however, not to suggest that the civic conception of the 
nation does not contain any shared cultural characteristics. In fact, nationalisms, 
which serve to maintain the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation, involve both 
civic and ethnic ingredients in varying degrees and different forms.218 Obtaining 
citizenship in many liberal democracies, for example, requires prospective applicants 
not only to express their allegiance to the fundamental principles of these countries 
but also speak the language, and, in some cases such as Australia, the Netherlands 
and Germany, know the culture and history of their adopted countries. What 
distinguishes civic nations from ethnic nations, as Will Kymlicka suggests,219 is 
therefore not the absence of ethno-cultural components to national identity but the 
degree to which it allows individuals to “integrate into the common culture, 
regardless of race or colour”.220 The difference between civic and ethnic models of 
national identity, in other words, is about its inclusiveness or exclusiveness. The 
construction of collective identities in inclusive or exclusive terms, in this context, 
affects the prospect of building enduring peace through
ness” and “stateness” in post-conflict societies.  
As also noted earlier, regardless of whatever principles they are based on, 
national identities are created and sustained by political elites. Political elites of the 
19th century French state, for example, relied on primary education, public 
ceremonies such as the Bastille Day, mass production of public monuments, and the 
pursuit of strict, assimilationist language policies in education, military and civil 
221 to put into practice the policy of “one people, one nation, one 
e”:222  
 
Breton was hunted out of the schools. Children caught using it [the Breton language] were 
systematically punished – put on dry bread and water or sent to clean out the school 
latrine…A favourite punishment…was the token of shame to be dis
                                                 
218 Smith, 1991. 
219 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: 
ersity Press, 1983), p. 271; 
u, 1996, pp. 67-70; Hechter, 2000, pp. 63-64; Anthony D. Smith, Nations 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 24. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ
Hobsbawm, 1990; Guiberna
and Nationalism in A Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 91. 
222 Guibernau, 1996, p. 70. 
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lemented 
cultura
ce in 1948, the state declared Sinhalese 
the offi
                                                
it until he caught another child not speaking French, denounced him and passed it on. The 
pupil left with the token at the end of the day received a punishment.223 
Similarly, many other Western European states pursued integrationist policies 
aimed at assimilate “periphery” communities to the culture of the dominant ethnic 
community in order to facilitate the principle of nation-state congruence based on 
cultural and linguistic homogeneity.224 The Castilians, English and Swedes, whose 
elites and monarchs established centralised states, became the dominant cultures and 
assimilated the Catalan, Celtic, Welsh and Danish-speaking communities.225 In other 
countries such as Prussia, Russia, Hungary and Japan, political elites imp
l homogenisation policies in varying degrees and different forms.226  
The creation of a unifying national identity was one of the challenging issues 
in many post-colonial states, where the boundaries of the political community and 
socio-cultural unit were not “congruent”. National integration involved the 
assimilation of ethnic or tribal groups into a homogeneous system of language and 
culture. In Sudan, for example, the national integration programme of the Arab-
dominated state was based on the expansion of Islam and the Arab language. In Sri 
Lanka, where Sinhalese was the mother tongue of some 11 million people practicing 
Buddhism and Tamil was spoken by some 5 million people of mixed religious and 
ethnic groups during the time of independen
cial language in 1956.227  
The pursuit of state-led purposeful national integration policies was not 
limited to post-colonial states. Recent examples include the multi-ethnic successor 
states to the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia. In these states, political elites 
have tended to define the nation in ethnic terms and pursue cultural and linguistic 
homogenisation policies to promote the interests of the so-called “core” or “titular” 
nation. They regarded the “core” nation as being the “legitimate owner” of the state 
which was under threat from other ethnic or cultural groups within their territory.228 
Political elites of Serbia, Croatia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan have undertaken “nationalising” practices in varying degrees and forms 
 
223 Hechter, 2000, p. 64, citing Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural 
France, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 313. 
224 Hechter, 2000, p. 63. 
225 Smith, 1996, p. 61; Guibernau, 1996, p. 70. 
226 Smith, 1996, pp. 92-93; Guibernau, 1996, p. 70. 
227 Guibernau, 1996, p. 125. 
228 Brubaker, 1996, p. 5, 63-66. 
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ied automatic citizenship after these states gained their independence in 
1991.23
s alienated minorities, producing ethnic tensions and conflicts such as in 
Kosovo
sense of allegiance and trust among citizens that facilitate the making of collective 
                                                
in education, language policy, mass media programming, migration policy, public 
sector employment, constitutional symbolism and citizenship legislation.229 The 
Serbian state under Milosevic, for example, abolished Kosovo’s autonomous status 
and deprived ethnic Albanians of their civil, political and cultural rights.230 In 
Croatia, the new Constitution, adopted after its secession from Yugoslavia, declared 
“full state sovereignty” as the “historical right of the Croatian nation”, demoting 
Serbs, who constituted some 10% of the population before the outbreak of war in 
1991, from their previous status as “co-owners” of the Republic.231 In Estonia and 
Latvia, Russian-speaking minorities, who settled after the Soviet occupation of 1940, 
were den
2 
The pressure for national integration through oppressing, rejecting or 
modifying sub-cultural or ethnic identities, imposing the cultural identity of the 
dominant group and excluding minority groups from the political decision-making 
process have produced counter-nationalisms, leading to the intensification of intra-
societal competition and at times the outbreak of violent conflicts. The imposition of 
Islam and the Arab language on non-Muslim communities in Sudan and the 
“Sinhalese only” language policy of the government in Sri Lanka exacerbated inter-
communal rifts and led to the outbreak of civil war. In post-communist Eastern 
Europe, the oppression of ethnic diversity through the pursuit of “nationalising” 
policies ha
.  
The creation of a sense of national coherence, which Rustow defines in terms 
of the absence of doubt among a great majority of people within a given territory 
over the question of as to which political community they belong to”, entails 
achieving some degree of consensus on a national identity.233 A common 
overarching national identity which, David Miller suggests, is necessary to build a 
 
229 Ibid., pp. 55-76. 
230 Ibid., p. 70. 
231 Ibid., p. 71. 
232 Peter van Elsuwege, “Russian-Speaking Minorities in Estonia And Latvia: Problems Of Integration 
At The Threshold of the European Union”, European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Working 
Paper, 20 (Flensburg, Germany: April 2004). 
233 Rustow, 1970, pp. 350-352. 
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decisions and exercising a stable, functioning democracy.234 This identity does not 
necessarily require cultural and linguistic homogenisation. As noted earlier, 
nationhood is about the development of a common consciousness of unity and 
solidarity among individuals, or what Ernest Renan calls a “daily plebiscite”, which 
refers to their collective wish and commitment to living together within the same 
polity.235 In other words, national identities are based on a belief or recognition 
shared by individuals who do not personally know each other but feel themselves as 
members of a national community and have some characteristics in common.236 As 
also discussed earlier, nationhood also entails social communication, characterised 
by the ability of individuals within a community to communicate on a variety of 
issues with each other.237 Although possessing a common language facilitates the 
development of social communication as well as the creation of a “high culture”,238 it 
is not necessarily an objective condition for generating a sense of unity. In 
Switzerland, which has four official languages (German, French, Italian and 
Romansh), individuals belonging to different ethnic groups still act as one people, 
communicate effectively with each other,239 and share a common national identity or 
a shared “public culture” constructed around historical myths, societal experiences, 
an effective public welfare system, and common political values and institutions.240  
The creation of a sense of national unity across diversity is therefore 
dependent on the degree to which equilibrium between groups is reached. This can 
be achieved through the recognition of plural or multi-cultural character of the nation 
and guaranteeing of individual and collective rights by the state.241 The role of the 
state in multi-cultural or multi-ethnic settings, in other words, should be to create a 
political, legal, institutional, social and economic system conducive to the 
development of a sense of solidarity stemming from an all-encompassing national 
identity while ethnic and other cultural characteristics are also maintained.242 This 
can be achieved through employing non-majoritarian political formulas such as 
 
234 David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 90-98. 
235 Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 17. 
236 Anderson, 1991; Miller, 1995, p. 22. 
237 Deutsch, 1953. 
238 Gellner, 1983; 
239 Deutsch, 1953, p. 71. 
240 Miller, 1995, p. 22, 94, 98, 113. 
241 Kymlicka, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996b, pp. 33-34. 
242 Miller, 1995, p. 88. 
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“consociational” forms of government and political representation, pursuing 
inclusive and equal citizenship policies and nurturing “multiple and complementary 
political identities”.243 As discussed earlier, national identities are not fixed but 
constructed entities. They can be constructed in different ways and shaped around 
different factors such as state institutions. Political institutions seen representing all 
different ethnic or other social groups, for example, may generate a sense of civic 
identity.  
In the case of post-conflict societies, divided along ethnic or other lines, the 
pursuit of “inclusiveness”, which was defined in the Introduction chapter in terms of 
the recognition of diversity, and representation and involvement of individuals, 
coming from diverse backgrounds, in governmental, political, social and cultural 
processes that affect themselves and society, becomes extremely important. The 
formulation and implementation of inclusive initiatives and policies may help to 
forge a sense of belonging or least implant the notion of peaceful co-existence of 
groups around issues and decision that affect them all. This, in turn, may form the 
basis of peaceful resolution of the issue of “nationness”. The undertaking of a 
reconciliation process designed to address the painful aspects of past conflict, for 
example, may foster a sense of “inclusiveness” and contribute to facilitating 
integration at the societal or national level. Aiming to transform antagonistic 
relations between groups and persons through changing their attitudes, perceptions, 
motivations, beliefs and ideas about each other and themselves,244 reconciliation 
refers to a psychological and structural process as well as an outcome.245 Entailing 
the “formation of a new outlook of the past”,246 reconciliation requires the fulfilment 
of certain material and psychological conditions. These conditions include finding a 
solution to the conflict that satisfies the fundamental needs and fulfils national 
 
243 Linz and Stepan, 1996b, pp. 34-35. 
244 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, “Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a 
Process”,  Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Reflections on 
the Theoretical and Practical Utility of the Term, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 11-38; 
Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, (Lanham, Maryland; Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), pp. 351-352; John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: 
Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
1997), pp. 26-27; Herbert C. Kelman, “Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies”, 
Robert L. Rothstein (ed.), After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999), p. 194. 
245 Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004. 
246 Ibid., p. 18. 
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aspiration of parties involved in the conflict; parties’ mutual acceptance of and 
respect for each other’s existence, identity and welfare; and developing a sense of 
security and dignity for each group.247 Reconciliation, in other words, requires the 
creation of new attitudes based on inclusion, empathy and respect.248 
In Lederach’s terms, reconciliation is the place where truth, justice, mercy 
and peace meet:249 
1) Truth: Acknowledgement, recognition and validation of past 
human rights abuses, injuries, losses and suffering by members of 
adversary groups; 
2) Justice: Restitution, reparation or restoration of losses and rights 
and punishment of those who committed harmful actions and 
injustices; 
3) Mercy and forgiveness: Acceptance of those who acknowledged 
their past injurious conduct and apologised for their misdeeds by 
those who suffered harm; 
4) Security and peace: Supporting mutual security and well-being.250 
 
As Kriesberg rightly points out, although it is difficult to fully achieve 
reconciliation because it is almost impossible to satisfy all these different aspects, 
which reflect contradictory values and principles, the failure to reach at least some 
level of reconciliation is likely to produce instability and trigger conflict in the 
future.251 Justice and mercy suggest two paradoxical principles and balancing these 
two components of reconciliation is a challenging and delicate process for society. 
Reconciliation measures taken to discuss the past and meet the psychological needs 
of the population, however, can be seen to form part of a political and social effort to 
prevent social amnesia. These measures are not limited to but include initiating 
interactive processes such as problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training 
programmes and cooperative projects; providing psychological rehabilitation 
 
247 Kelman, 1999, pp. 197-201. 
248 Ibid., p. 199. 
249 Lederach, 1997, pp. 29-31. 
250 Kriesberg, 1998, p. 352; Lederach, 1997, p. 29; Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict 
Societies: Strategy and Process, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2005), pp. 156-
157. 
251 Kriesberg, 1998b, p. 354. 
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assistance; establishing special institutional bodies such as truth commissions; 
adopting necessary legislative and institutional mechanisms to restore and guarantee 
people’s rights and security; setting up formal legal and social justice mechanisms; 
and making use of traditional local community-level channels and initiatives.252  
Workshops, training programmes and cooperative projects aim to establish an 
interactive process of conflict analysis, dialogue and communication through which 
adversary groups can gradually overcome their feelings of hate, mistrust, fear and 
their desire for revenge.253 Problem-solving workshops mediated by a neutral third 
party, which enable individuals to express their experiences, perceptions and feelings 
in a safe environment, can help parties understand each other’s suffering.254 These 
workshops aim to deepen participants’ analysis of the conflict and enable them to 
look at their shared problems and seek joint solutions.255 Training programmes, 
which aim to educate people and teach them specific techniques, skills and 
approaches for dealing conflict in the form of analytical, communication and 
mediation skills, bring people from the same level of society but on different sides of 
the conflict.256 The execution of cooperative projects in the economic sphere and in 
other cross-cutting areas such as public health, education, science and environmental 
protection can also help to establish interactive and functional relations while 
promoting commitments and expectations consistent with maintaining peaceful co-
existence.257  
Reconciliation can also be addressed by establishing truth commissions to 
clarify the question of what happened in the past, which is a precondition for socially 
and officially acknowledging the significance of the injury and preventing its 
recurrence in the future.258 Truth commissions which seek “the truth” through the 
stories of victims and individual testimonies have moral implications for engendering 
collective responsibility for past wrongdoings and commitment to establishing 
 
252 Lederach, 1997, pp. 44-55; Jeong, 2005, pp. 158-165; Kelman, 1999, pp. 195-204.  
253 Jeong, 2005, p. 158; Kelman, 1999, pp. 201-202. 
254 Jeong, 2005, pp. 158-159. 
255 Lederach, 1997, p. 47; Kelman, 1999, pp. 195-196. 
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 86
                                                
constructive relations in the aftermath of violence and oppression.259 Remembering 
the past and testifying in public hearings is a painful experience for the victims and 
survivors and there is no magical solution or remedy for healing the wounds of the 
past and fixing all wrongdoings. In fact, it is debateable if “the truth” of what 
happened in the past can actually be established at all. The process of telling what 
they experienced and witnessed, however, can help victims restore their self-esteem 
while encouraging the perpetrators to accept public accountability for their 
misdeeds.260 Truth telling can also be used to support the rights of the victims to seek 
compensation for their material and psychological losses.261 Truth commissions 
established to investigate past crimes can help to prevent future abuses by clarifying 
individual and institutional responsibilities for abuses, outlining weaknesses in the 
institutional structures or existing laws, recommending necessary reforms to 
overcome these challenges, and publishing an accurate and detailed record of past 
abuses.262 Public knowledge of past wrongdoings and institutionalisation of a 
common memory can serve to build a new society.263  
Although the disclosure and acknowledgement of what happened in the past 
is a necessary condition for breaking with it and establishing a new society, it is not a 
sufficient condition for breaking the cycle of violence.264 Reconciliation also 
requires justice, which serves as a deterrence against future abuses while reducing 
the risk of retribution and revenge by victims.265 Justice, which is a “wider or thicker 
multi-dimensional concept”, can be served in forms: prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators for their criminal responsibility (retributive justice); restoration, 
rehabilitation and compensation of the harm done to the victim (restorative 
justice);266 establishing fair rules and social behaviour (regulatory justice); and 
 
259 Brandon Hamber, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Paradise Lost or Pragmatism?”, Peace and 
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seeking distributive and economic justice (social justice).267 Delivering justice, 
which has many aspects (legal, political, social and economic), becomes a desirable 
but daunting task in traumatised societies such as Kosovo and East Timor where a 
large number of factions and their supporters are involved in fighting, murder, 
looting and rape.268 The achievement of this objective entails the pursuit of a multi-
dimensional policies and strategies geared towards establishing a secure and stable 
political and social environment. Its components include initiating an interactive and 
cooperative process, ensuring individual and group security, searching for the truth in 
relation to the past, creating accountability for past events, delivering justice in 
different forms, and encouraging a to
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Building peace in societies emerging from violent conflict is a complicated, 
multi-dimensional process. It requires not only the establishment of competent 
government structures with the capacity to respond to social needs but also creating a 
sense of “imagined community” whose members have a shared commitment to living 
together within the same polity.  The pursuit of “inclusive” policies, in this respect, 
may facilitate creating a sense of peaceful co-existence and belonging in post-
conflict societies at least around shared principles, values and interests.  
With the above in mind, the process of nation-building in Kosovo and East 
Timor will be analysed on the basis of the following framework: 
1. Reconciliation: Establishment of mechanisms to heal the wounds of the 
past and address inter-group hostilities. 
2. Social communication: Development of channels of dialogue and 
communication in society and cross-cultural contacts and transmission 
and exchange of information and messages. 
 
3. Constructing a sense of national community around a shared collective 
identity: Process of collective identity construction, its components 
including language and education policies. 
 
267 Bloomfield, 2006, p. 21; Jeong, 2005, pp. 165-168. 
268 Jeong, 2005, p. 166. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nation-building: Creating a sense of community and inclusive identity in the 
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Figure 2.1. Aspects of achieving a sense of cohesive “imagined community” in the post-
armed conflict period 
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Chapter Three 
International State-Building in the 
Post-Cold War Era 
 
Observation tells us that every state is an association, and 
that every association is formed with a view to some good 
purpose. I say ‘good’ because in all their actions all men do 
in fact aim at what they think good. Clearly then, all 
associations aim at some good, that association which is the 
most sovereign among them all and embraces all others will 
aim highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods. This is 
the association, which we call the state, the association 
which is ‘political’. 
                                                                                Aristotle 
 
  
3.1. Introduction 
   
The international community’s growing, albeit selective, involvement in 
constructing ‘good, sovereign political associations’1 along democratic norms and 
principles in conflict-torn societies in the post-Cold War era, as discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, aims to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. The international 
community’s involvement, usually under the umbrella of the UN, in democratic 
state-building is based on two main convictions: (1) Intra-state conflicts, which have 
replaced inter-state wars in the post-Cold War era, often result from weak, incapable 
political systems, which ‘fail’ to deliver essential government functions, and address 
social and political grievances in an effective and democratic manner.2 And (2) given 
the absence of the required domestic capacity, resources and willingness to reverse or 
prevent this process, the international community has the ‘responsibility’ to save 
these states from governmental breakdown and societal fragmentation so as to avert 
humanitarian and regional implications of ‘state failure’.3   
89 
 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T. A. Sinclair, (London, New York: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 
54. 
2 Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 1996; Annan 1998a, 1998b; Kaldor, 1999; Ignatieff, 2002. 
3 International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (ICSSI), 2001; British Department 
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This chapter reviews the externally-led democratic state-building process in 
societies emerging from violent conflict. It is structured in three main parts. The first 
part discusses the UN’s increasing involvement in democratic state-building in the 
post-Cold War era. The second part addresses the question of “what to construct” in 
conflict-affected societies. The third part elaborates on the aspects of international 
state-building by focusing on the question of “how to construct the state in the post-
conflict period”. It also provides an analytical framework to explore the aspects of 
the process of state-building in Kosovo and East Timor in the next chapters.    
 
3.2. The UN’s Changing Role in the Post-Cold War Era  
 
“The United Nations is faced every day with internal conflicts, 
civil wars, secessions, partitions, ethnic confrontations and tribal 
struggles. It is these new conflicts which are most threatening to 
international peace today and which are most damaging to the 
rights of individuals. We have, therefore, to invent new responses 
and find new solutions. We must…promote, in the same spirit, a 
new diplomacy for democracy and human rights.”  
     Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
    
Since the first deployment of peacekeeping operations to Palestine to oversee 
the truce called for by the Security Council during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948,4 
then to Egypt to ensure the withdrawal of the occupying forces in 1956,5 and later to 
Congo DR in response to the first instance of ‘state collapse’ in 1960,6 UN 
peacekeeping has developed as a mechanism to resolve armed conflicts. Described 
by former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld as actions falling under 
“Chapter Six and a Half”, which denotes something more than what Chapter VI of 
 
for International Development (DFIT), 2005; Rotberg, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004. 
4 United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was the first UN “observer mission” set 
up with the deployment of unarmed military personnel to monitor the peace in Palestine pursuant to 
the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 50 of 29 May 1948 which called for a cease-fire and 
its supervision by the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden. For further information, see 
United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, (New York: United 
Nations, Department of Public Information, 3rd edition, 1996), pp. 18-19.  
5 The first peacekeeping force consisting of lightly armed military personnel was established by the 
Resolutions adopted by the first emergency session of the General Assembly held between 1 and 10 
November 1956 under “uniting for peace resolution” following the British and French vetoes in the 
Security Council and dispatched to Egypt (United Nations Emergency Force / UNEF I) to station 
along the Egyptian-Israeli border and facilitate the withdrawal of British and French forces from 
Egypt. Ibid., pp. 36-40.  
6 Established by Security Council Resolution 143 of 14 July 1960, United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC) was mandated to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops and provide “military 
assistance” to the Congolese government in restoring law and order.  
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the Charter of the United Nations prescribes on the use of diplomatic means but not 
quite as substantive as the provisions of Chapter VII on enforcement actions, 
peacekeeping was not envisioned by the drafters of the UN Charter but came into 
being during the Cold War as an ad hoc conflict resolution technique to address 
hostilities and prevent a direct super-power involvement in conflicts and thus deter 
the risk of escalation.7  
During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were largely deployed in 
response to conflicts in the Middle East and other regional conflicts in Africa and 
Asia stemming from decolonisation. These missions, which are now described in the 
literature as “traditional”, “classic”, “old” or “first generation” peacekeeping,8 were 
established to oversee the implementation of cease-fire and related peace agreements 
and act as a neutral buffer zone between former warring parties while a political 
solution to the conflict was being sought.9 Enjoying the explicit consent of the 
parties involved, peacekeepers acted with complete impartiality and were mandated 
to use force for only self-defence. With the exception of the Congo mission,10 all 
other Cold War peacekeeping operations were small; composed of unarmed or 
lightly armed military personnel. It is also important to note that except for the 
 
7 Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, (London: Hurst, 1984). 
8 See, for example, William J. Durch (ed.), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis,  (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of 
United Nations Peacekeeping”, International Affairs, 69:3 (July 1993), pp. 451-464; Paul F. Diehl, 
International Peacekeeping, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); John  Mackinlay and 
Jarat Chopra, “Second Generation Multinational Operations”, The Washington Quarterly, 15:3 
(Summer 1992), pp. 113-31; Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands 
of Conflict after the Cold War, New York: St. Martin’s Press: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995); 
Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc 
Missions, Permanent Engagement (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); United 
Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, (New York: United Nations, 
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9 Diehl, 1993; Goulding, 1993; Durch, 1993; Ratner, 1995. 
10 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) which was entrusted with both military and 
civilian duties was the first peacekeeping mission deployed in response to ‘state collapse’. It was also 
the largest operation undertaken to that date. At its peak strength in July 1961, the mission comprised 
of nearly 20,000 international military and civilian personnel. ONUC’s original mandate of ensuring 
the withdrawal of Belgian forces, assisting the Congolese government in maintaining law and order, 
and providing technical assistance was modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and 
political independence of the country, prevent the occurrence of civil war and ensure the withdrawal 
and evacuation of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel who were not operating 
under the United Nations command, and all mercenaries. The mission was authorised to use force “if 
necessary, in the last resort”. For further information, see UN Doc. S/RES/161 (1961) and UN Doc. 
S/RES/169 (1961) available via http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1960/scres60.htm [accessed 12 
October 2005]. 
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missions established in Congo DR (1960), West New Guinea or West Irian (1962),11 
and Cyprus (1964),12 the Cold War operations were deployed in response to inter-
state confli
Since the year 1988, when UN peacekeepers were awarded the Noble Peace 
Prize for their efforts in ending conflict and securing peace, peacekeeping went 
through a significant transformation.13 The number of peacekeeping operations 
increased from five in 1988 to eleven in 1992 and to sixteen in 1998. Compared to 
thirteen peacekeeping operations deployed over the period 1948-1988, thirty-five 
peacekeeping operations were authorised between 1988 and 1998. This growth in the 
number of operations was accompanied by an increase in the number of military and 
civilian personnel deployed; with the annual peacekeeping budget rising from $230 
million in 1988 to $3.6 billion in 1995.14 At the end of July 1995, approximately 
65,000 military personnel, 1,700 civilian police and 6,000 civilian personnel served 
in sixteen peacekeeping operations.15 
Most of these operations, which are now referred to as “new”, “second 
generation” or “multi-dimensional” peacekeeping in the literature, were assigned 
complex mandates designed to settle conflicts and establish sustainable peace. The 
 
11 Between 1 October 1962 and 1 May 1963, the territory of West New Guinea was temporarily 
administered by the UN to facilitate its transfer from Dutch to Indonesian rule by a popular 
consultation as agreed by the two states. Concluded in New York on 15 August 1962 without the 
consent of the Papuan people but between the Netherlands, coloniser, and Indonesia, claimant over the 
control of the territory, and recognised by the UN, the Agreement Concerning West Papua Guinea 
provided that the territory would be administered by the United Nations Temporary Executive 
Authority (UNTEA). UNTEA was mandated to facilitate the transfer of the control of the territory to 
Indonesia. For further information, see “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)”, (15 August 1962), 437 
UNTS 274. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1752 on 21 September 1962 and 
authorised the Secretary General to carry out the tasks entrusted in the Agreement. It is available via 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/17/ares17.htm [accessed 15 September 2005]. 
12 Following the outbreak of inter-communal violence in December 1963, the UN Security Council 
authorised the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to 
restore law and order and prevent the recurrence of fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
See, UN Doc. S/RES/186 (1964). 
13 Durch, 1993; Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?: An analysis of the Changing Military 
Requirements of UN Peacekeeping with Proposals for its Enhancement,  (London: Brassey’s for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993); Ratner, 1995; Agostinho Zacarias, The United 
Nations and International Peacekeeping, second edition, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 
1999). 
14 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century”, Olara A. Otunnu 
and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, (International 
Peace Academy, 1998), p. 21. 
15 United Nations, “Report to the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation”, General 
Assembly Document, A/50/1, (22 August 1995), p. 81. 
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peacekeeping missions in Namibia (1989), El Salvador (1991), Angola (1991), 
Mozambique (1992) and Cambodia (1992), for example, were established to 
implement comprehensive peace agreements concluded by relevant local parties 
involved in the conflict in question. In some cases, UN peacekeepers operated within 
the context of ongoing violence such as in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where the fighting and hostilities continued due to the absence of a 
cease-fire agreement or its limited implementation.  
The scope of tasks assigned to peacekeepers also widened in the post-1988 
period. These new tasks included disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of 
former combatants; repatriation of refugees; delivery of humanitarian aid; protection 
of civilian staff; human rights monitoring; building sustainable government 
institutions; and promoting political participation.16 The undertaking of these new 
functions, added a new dimension to UN peace operations: peace-building, i.e., 
taking of actions to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace” in the aftermath of conflict.17 The post-1988 UN peacekeeping 
missions, in other words, aimed to create the necessary governmental and societal 
structures to institutionalise long-lasting peace through eradicating the structural 
causes of conflict seen lying in the weakness or absence of democratic government.18  
The transformation of UN peacekeeping operations is explained in the 
literature as an outcome of the combination of three inter-related factors: (1) 
changing nature of conflicts; (2) contextual changes in the international system; and 
(3) changing norms in the post-Cold War era.  
The development of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations as a means 
to promote international peace and security is located within the context of changing 
characteristics of conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Some academics described the 
post-Cold War conflicts as “complex political emergencies”19 or “new wars”.20 
 
16 Berdal, 1993; Durch, 1993; Ratner, 1995; Boutros-Ghali, 1992. 
17 Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 21. 
18 Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 1995, 1996; Kofi Annan, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the 
Organisation”, General Assembly Official Records, No. A/51/4, (31 August 1999), United Nations, 
“Security Council Addresses Comprehensive Approach to Peace-Building in Presidential Statement”, 
Security Council 4278th Meeting, SC/7014, (21 February 2001a). 
19 Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies”, Third 
World Quarterly, 20:1 (March 1999), pp. 13-26. 
20 Kaldor, 1999; Helman and Ratner, 1992-3; Kaplan, 1994. 
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Referring to intra-state conflicts or wars taking place within the context of the 
“disintegration” or “collapse” of states, the “new wars” are described in terms of a 
blurring of the distinction between war, organised crime and large scale violations of 
human rights.21 Due to their spill-over effects, they are considered as the most 
serious threat to regional and international peace and security. The outbreak of a 
number of this kind of wars, in which the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants and between international and domestic disappears, created a rising 
demand for new conflict resolution techniques, leading to the formulation of 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The changing nature of conflict 
characterised by the collapse of government structures, massive human rights 
violations and refugee flows, in other words, required not only the deployment of 
international military personnel but also civilian, non-governmental and private 
agents such as police officers and legal experts, electoral observers, human rights 
monitors, humanitarian workers and communications experts.22 The military 
component of the mission, tasked with restoring security, law and order and 
disarming warring parties, is expected to create the necessary conditions for civilian 
staff members to deliver humanitarian aid and undertake a comprehensive political, 
economic and social reconstruction process.23 This reflected the convergence of the 
international development and security agendas in the post-Cold War era: that is, 
development resources must be used to change societies and the behaviour and 
attitudes of people in relation to violent conflict in order to reduce the likelihood of 
conflict in the future but development is impossible without attaining security and 
stability in the first place.24  
The following excerpts from An Agenda for Peace, prepared by former UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 to reform the UN with a view to 
strengthening its capacity to safeguard international peace and stability, highlight 
these changing perceptions of peace, security, threat, conflict, and conflict resolution 
in a rapidly globalising world in the post-Cold War era:  
 
 
21 Kaldor, 1999, p. 2. 
22 Boutros-Ghali, 1992.   
23 Duffield, 2001, p. 58. 
24 Ibid., pp. 15-16; 35-43. 
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We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. 
Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and 
ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National 
boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by the 
decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political 
associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and 
sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, 
social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new 
assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to 
undermine evolution and change through democratic means…As racism becomes recognised 
for the destructive force it is and as apartheid is being dismantled, new racial tensions are 
rising and finding expression in violence. Technological advances are altering the nature and 
the expectation of life all over the globe. The revolution in communications has united the 
world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice. But progress also 
brings new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, 
greater intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals. This new dimension of insecurity 
must not be allowed to obscure the continuing and devastating problems of unchecked 
population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, drugs and the growing disparity 
between rich and poor. Poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair abound…These are 
both sources and consequences of conflict that require the ceaseless attention and the highest 
priority in the efforts of the United Nations…So at this moment of renewed opportunity, the 
efforts of the Organisation to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters 
beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have 
characterized the past.  
 
 
However, given the already changing profile of wars since the end of the 
Second World War, the past occurrences of ‘state failure’ and the UN’s intervention 
in the Congo DR following the collapse of formal governmental structures, it is 
difficult to argue that it is simply the changing nature of conflicts or the outbreak of 
“new wars” in the post-Cold War era that led the UN to deploy complex peace 
operations and get involved in democratic peace-building. Holsti, for example, 
estimates that more than two-thirds of all armed conflicts, i.e., 77% of 164 wars, 
fought during the period between 1945 and 1995 were internal.25 These wars had 
devastating effects for civilian populations. According to one estimate, up to three 
million African civilians died in intra-state wars in the 1980s and, according to 
another, between one-half and 1.7 million Africans died as a result of repressive and 
violent government policies during this period.26 In the same way, given the earlier 
instances of governmental and societal breakdown such as in the Congo DR (1960-
1), Uganda in (1979-81), Ghana (1979-80), Chad (1980-82)27 and Lebanon in 
                             
-22. 
3. 
25 Holsti, pp. 21
26 Ibid., p. 37. 
27 Zartman, 1995, pp. 2-
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1975,28 it is difficult to suggest that ‘state failure’ associated with violent internal 
conflict is “a disturbing new phenomenon”29 that has emerged in the post-Cold War 
era. Given the deployment of UN peacekeepers to restore law and security in the 
Congo DR in 1960, it is difficult to argue that intervention conducted to provide 
emergency relief, provide educational and medial services and build collapsed 
government structures is a new phenomenon for the UN in
It is therefore not the changing nature of conflict but rather the changing 
meaning and content of intervention that was affected by global contextual and 
normative shifts. Thus, it would be fair to argue that what has changed in the post-
Cold War era is rather the international community’s approach to conflict than the 
form of conflict itself, which was already changing since the end of the Second 
World War. A long-serving UN diplomat describes this change in the following way: 
In many ways, it is intervention itself that should be seen as the new defining element in the 
post-bipolar world, rather than conflict, which of course existed throughout the previous era, 
whether in the form of wars by proxy or in resistance to superpower hegemony. Thus, recent 
years have witnessed a kind of double lifting of inhibitions that had been largely suppressed 
by the Cold War’s rules of the game: the inhibition to wage war and the inhibition to 
intervene.30 
 
Those who emphasise the impact of contextual changes in the literature on 
the transformation of UN peacekeeping operations cite a list of factors that enabled 
the UN to address conflict, including intra-state wars, in a more efficient way: (1) 
lessening of Soviet-American tension in the second half of the 1980s and the 
subsequent collapse of the bipolar world system; (2) disappearance of superpower 
support for proxy wars and conclusion of many internal conflicts such as Namibia, 
Angola, Mozambique and El Salvador; (3) decline in the use of veto powers by the 
permanent members of the Security Council; (4) rising sense of optimism and 
confidence in the UN’s capacity to address conflict in the absence of superpower 
rivalry; and (5) increasing willingness of UN member states to participate in 
peacekeeping operations.31  
 
 
28 Holsti, 1996, p. 120. 
29 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3, p. 3. 
30 Antonio Donini, The Policies of Mercy: Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda, Occasional Paper 
No. 22, (Providence: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996), p. 7, cited in 
Duffield, 2001, p. 31. 
31 Durch, 1993; Ratner, 1995; Berdal, 1993; Paris, 2004. 
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The third factor that is cited in the literature to explain the operational and 
functional evolution of UN peacekeeping is the shift in international norms and 
values.32 As noted in Chapter 2, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
were argued to have diminished as a result of globalisation and the outbreak of a 
number of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War international system. In An 
Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for example, suggested that “[t]he time of 
absolute and exclusive sovereignty…passed” and states are now required to “find a 
balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an 
ever more interdependent world”. 33 That is, domestic characteristics of states and 
their ability to control their territory and provide good governance to their citizens 
are relevant to international security and order.34 This suggests that if a state fails to 
control and administer its territory, then the UN has the right to intervene to address 
humanitarian and security needs of local populations, restore the state capacity along 
democratic principles, and sustain a secure regional and international system. This 
line of thinking, as noted earlier, formed the basis of the idea of the international 
community’s “responsibility to protect” that was developed in late-2001. 
The UN’s engagement in turning war-torn societies into well-functioning 
democratic polities in the post-Cold War era took a new dimension in Kosovo and 
East Timor where it was empowered to exercise all legislative, executive and judicial 
powers in the aftermath of military interventions justified on humanitarian grounds. 
Representing an expansion of complexity of peacekeeping operations in the post-
Cold War era,35 the UN’s engagement in Kosovo and East Timor aimed to establish 
 
32 Esref Aksu, The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change, (Manchester, 
New York: Manchester University Press, 2003); Michael N. Barnett, “The New UN Politics of Peace: 
From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty”, Global Governance, 1:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 
79-97; Paris, 2004. 
33 Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 17. 
34 Barnett, 1995. 
35 Joel C. Beauvais, “Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor”, 
International Law and Politics, 33:1101 (December 2001), pp. 1101-1178; Jarat Chopra, “The UN’s 
Kingdom in East Timor”, Survival, 42:3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 27-39; Boris Kondoch, “The United 
Nations Administration of East Timor”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 6:2 (2001), pp. 245-
265; Michael J. Matheson, “United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies”, American Journal 
of International Law, 95:76 (2001), pp. 76-85; Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, “Report of 
the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” [Brahimi Report], A/55/305-S/2000/809, (21 August 
2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations [accessed 27 March 2005]. For 
a discussion of the UN’s engagement in Kosovo and East Timor as “third generation” peacekeeping, 
see Christine D. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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democratic, self-government institutions with a view to establishing an enduring 
peace.  
 
3.3. What to Construct in the Post-Armed Conflict Period?  
The transformation of conflict-torn societies into peaceful, liberal democratic 
polities through establishing effective and democratic public institutions from the 
outside has come to be regarded not only as falling under the international 
community’s “responsibility to protect” societies from “failure” but also an 
achievable policy. Towards this aim, considerable financial, political and military 
resources have been channelled by various international agencies and individual 
countries into laying the administrative and institutional basis of long-lasting 
democratic peace in conflict-ridden societies in the post-Cold War period.36   
 
2001).  
36 The United Nations Development Programme, for example, spent US$ 1.4 billion, corresponding to 
46% of UNDP’s global technical assistance expenditures, on projects aiming to support democratic 
governance in 133 countries in 2005.  For further information, see UNDP, Democratic Governance 
Group: Annual Report 2005, available at 
http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Overview_DGGReport2005.pdf [accessed 25 August 2006]. 
The European Union (EU), which included having well-functioning, stable political structures and 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minority rights in the membership criteria, known as the Copenhagen political criteria adopted in 
1993, and which integrated democratisation and human rights into all aspects of EU’s external 
relations policy through several legislative acts adopted and concludes thereafter, made available 
funds amounting to over EUR 11 billion for improving human rights, facilitating judicial reform and 
strengthening democratic governance by supporting government institutions and civil society in 
eastern and south-eastern Europe, central Asia, Africa, the Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern regions 
over the period between 2000 and 2006. This figure is compiled from the data demonstrating the EU 
commitments to democratic development under geographical programmes provided until December 
2006, which can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/funding_en.htm [accessed 14 April 2007]. 
The EU committed a total of EUR 11.181 billion for democratic development assistance under its 
European Neighbourhood Policy for the period 2007 - 2013. See, “Council Approves Financing 
Instrument to Provide More Than EUR 11 billion for European Neighbourhood Policy”, 14087/06 
(Presse 292),  (Luxembourg: 17 October 2006), available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st14/st14087.en06.pdf [accessed 14 April 2007]. A 
breakdown of funds to be made available to the beneficiary countries can be seen at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi_figures_en.pdf [accessed 1 June 2007]. Pursuing 
the similar objectives, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated a 
total of over USD 5.5 billion for the implementation of democratic development programmes in 
different parts of the world from Latin America, Eurasia, Africa, Asia and Europe to the Caribbean, 
Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions during the period 1990-2004. For further information, see 
Steven E. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-
National Quantitative Study, (12 January 2006), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/impact_of_democracy
_assistance.pdf [accessed 1 June 2007]. In 2004, USAID committed a total of USD 1.2 billion for 
democracy assistance to promote free political competition, rule of law, accountable governance and 
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This growing, albeit selective, commitment of the international community to 
promoting democratic governance in conflict-affected societies in the post-Cold War 
era aims to “develop institutions, behaviour patterns, and a political culture that 
contain the exercise of power within the limits established by representative 
institutions and the rule of law”.37 Democratic governance based on political 
representation and participation through competitive elections, and protection and 
guaranteeing of individual rights and freedoms through constitutional checks and 
balances, in this context, is believed to minimise the likelihood of violent conflict. 
The rationale behind this optimism is that democratic government structures will 
encourage political groups and individuals contest for power on the basis of 
accountability and rule of law, mobilise public opinion into the political system in a 
peaceful way and resolve their differences through using conflict-mediation 
mechanisms.38  
Divided along ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, geographical, ideological 
 
citizen participation. For further information, see USAID, Democracy Rising: Grassroot Revolutions, 
Elections and Beyond, Building Freedom, Washington, DC: September 2005, available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/democracy_rising.pdf 
[accessed 15 May 2006]. It is worth noting that established in July 2005 to complement the UN’s 
engagement in democracy promotion, which includes inter alia organising and monitoring elections, 
developing civil society agencies, providing civic education, and strengthening the capacity of the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government in societies traumatised and divided by 
violent conflicts, the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), as of May 2007, received a total of 
over US$ 60 million from donor countries, to finance democratisation projects for building and 
consolidating democratic institutions and facilitating democratic processes. For further information, 
visit http://www.un.org/democracyfund/ [accessed 18 June 2007]. 
37 Krishna Kumar, “After the Elections: Consequences for Democratization”, Krishna Kumar (ed.), 
Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynee 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 215. 
38 See for example, United States Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy, 
(2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf [accessed 28 July 
2006]. For a discussion of the UN’s and other international agencies’ engagement in promoting good 
governance through creating effective, responsive and efficient government structures and developing 
human resources, see Merilee S. Grindle, “The Good Government Imperative: Human Resources, 
Organisations and Institutions”, Merilee S. Grindle (ed.), Getting Good Government: Capacity 
Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for 
International Development, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1997). For a discussion of the 
relationship between democracy and intra-state violence, Rudolph J. Rummel, “Democracy, Power, 
Genocide, and Mass Murder”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:1 (March 1995), pp. 3-26; Idem, 
Death by Government, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 1994). For a 
discussion of management of ethno-political conflicts in democracies, see Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples 
Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, (Washington DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2000). For a discussion of liberal democracy as a solution to conflict and other problems, 
see Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and 
Imperatives”, Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence, (New York: 
Carnegie Corporation, 1995).  
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or other lines, post-conflict societies, however, have the least favourable conditions 
for undertaking a peaceful process of transition to democratic government. Fragile 
conditions of public security and peace, persistence of hostilities, social polarisation, 
fear of violence, and weak or non-existing institutional capacity make it extremely 
difficult to implant the notion of establishing democratic rule based on public 
participation, contestation and peaceful resolution of differences. In this respect, 
statistical evidence suggests that societies with recent experience in violent conflict 
have a 44% risk of relapsing into violence within five years.39  
In addition to the legacy of armed conflict, the risk of instability and violence 
that democratisation itself contains further complicates political restructuring in post-
conflict societies. Democratisation, which refers to the transformation of the political 
system from an authoritarian to a democratic one, is a political as well as a social 
process. Rustow, for example, analyses democratisation as a three-stage process 
consisting of the preparation, decision and consolidation phases.40 The first stage of 
democratisation, “preparatory phase” is characterised by a “prolonged and 
inconclusive political struggle” between political elites and social groups to agree on 
some common attitudes on the characteristics of the political community they are 
part of.41 In this context, Rustow notes that rather than simply copying the 
constitutional or parliamentary practices of other democratic countries, transitional 
societies should devise their own effective procedures and tools for democratic 
government and conflict resolution in accordance with their characteristics and 
needs.42 This stage is followed by the “decision phase” when political actors 
“institutionalise” a set of democratic procedures and practices, representing their 
acceptance of and commitment to promoting the notion of “diversity in unity”.43 The 
last stage, which he calls “habituation stage”, is characterised by three factors: 1) 
politicians and citizens place faith in democratic principles and practices and apply 
them to address issues; 2) new political actors join the political arena; and 3) the 
 
39 Paul Collier et al., “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy,” World Bank 
Policy Research Report, (Washington DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 83. 
40 Rustow, 1971, p. 345. 
41 Ibid., p. 352. 
42 Ibid., p. 354. 
43 Ibid., p. 355. 
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population at large is linked to democratic structures through political parties.44 
In a similar fashion, O’Donnell and Schmitter, and Linz and Stepan, who base 
their theoretical approach to democratic transition on the political experience of Latin 
American and Southern European societies in the 1970s and 80s, offer a similar 
three-phased model to explore the aspects of transition to democracy. According to 
their model, democratisation starts with political liberalisation, i.e., the opening up of 
the political landscape through adopting and implementing a set of policies geared to 
safeguarding individual and collective rights and liberties.45 It proceeds with the 
transition to a relatively democratic system following the holding of the first multi-
party elections and is completed when democratic norms and principles have become 
socially internalised and accepted by all relevant political actors as the only 
legitimate framework to seek political power and resolve disputes.46 Democracy, 
which denotes the projected end-point of this process, can therefore be seen as a 
political system characterised by the restriction of powers exercised by rulers with a 
view to protecting social and political liberties, and the peaceful change of 
government by the ruled.47. It can be analysed, as Robert Dahl suggests, by the 
degree to which it allows the inclusion and contestation of its citizens in the political 
process and its responsiveness to the preferences of the citizens.48 
Although these theoretical models offered by O’Donnell and Schmitter, and 
Linz and Stepan on the basis of the Latin American and Southern European 
experience in the 1970s and 80s do not represent the process of the international 
community-led democratic transformation in Kosovo and East Timor, their 
conceptualisation of democratisation may provide a useful analytical framework to 
explore the aspects of democratic transition characterised by uncertainty and 
understand the role of political elites involved in the process in these two transitional 
societies in the post-1999 period. As O’Donnell and Schmitter point out, the 
characteristic of the transition, which refers to an “interval between one political 
 
44 Ibid., p. 360. 
45 Linz and Stepan, 1996b, p. 3; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 7. 
46 Linz and Stepan, 1996b, 3-5; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 7-11. 
47 Popper, 1966, pp. 124-127. 
48 Dahl, 1971. 
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regime and another”, is uncertainty.49 It may involve interruptions, result in state 
disintegration or reversals to authoritarian regimes, or evolve into “ambiguous 
systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of 
some formal democratic institutions and respect for a limited sphere of civil and 
political liberties”50 The uncertainty over the direction of democratic transition arises 
from the very nature of the process itself. Democracy, which is about exercising the 
right of the citizens to “formulate” and “signify” their preferences,51 entails the 
redistribution of political power and interests, creating winners and losers. Fuelling 
political and social competition, this situation is likely to create incentives and 
opportunities for conflict because it is almost impossible to set some objective rules 
of engagement that all relevant political actors involved in the process would 
observe.52 Instead, feeling threatened by the changing political circumstances, 
political elites usually end up in a fierce struggle to satisfy their immediate interests 
and/or interests of those whom they claim to represent while attempting to define 
their own rules and procedures with a view to determining likely winners and losers 
in the future.53 
The expansion of mass political participation and contestation for power in an 
increasingly competitive environment during the early stages of democratisation may 
prompt political elites to appeal to ethno-nationalist or other particularistic 
allegiances and identities to attract popular support.54 The weakness of institutions 
allows them to campaign on ethno-nationalist ideas and propagate a sense of threat 
coming from a neighbouring nation, an ethnic minority or some other groups within 
the society.55 This, in turn, increases the risk of violent conflict in democratising 
countries. Studies of democratic transition, in this context, suggest that the states 
undergoing a rapid change from authoritarian to democratic regimes are more likely 
to get involved in inter-state wars and have a greater propensity for civil strife than 
 
49 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 6. 
50 Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, (Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 3. 
51 Dahl, 1971, p. 2. 
52 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 6. 
53 Ibid. 
54  Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a, 1995b, 2002; Snyder, 2000. 
55 Snyder, 2000. 
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stable democracies and autocracies.56 This situation tends to imply that 
democratising post-conflict societies are doubly vulnerable to violence. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, democracy requires an effective state system and 
consensus on national identity: the presence of a sense of national unity57 and 
competent and impartial institutional and bureaucratic structures with the capacity to 
protect and guarantee the rights of citizens and execute the rule of law throughout the 
entire territory.58 This is not to discount the relevance of other factors such as 
economic and social development to political stability and successful 
democratisation.59 Certainly, there are a considerable number of countries with high 
levels of social and economic development that are also stable democracies. This, as 
Rustow rightly points out, may suggest a correlation between democracy and 
economic development but not necessarily a causal relationship between the two.60 It 
is in fact impossible to apply a blanket rule that explains the relative standing of 
every country in the world. There will always be exceptions in the form of countries 
with high levels of economic and/or social development but no practice of 
democracy. Cuba, Singapore, and the oil-rich Gulf states such as Qatar, Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia exemplify this group of countries. There is another group of countries 
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea and Chad which extract wealth from rich natural resources but are facing the 
problems of democracy deficit, political instability, government ineffectiveness, 
corruption and ethnic conflict. On the other hand, there are some other countries such 
as India, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Costa Rica, which, despite their low 
level of income, opted for democracy and have successfully sustained democratic 
rule while performing economic development. Given these examples, the 
 
56 Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a, 1995b, 2002; Snyder, 2000; Orentlicher, 1998; Havard Hegre et al., 
“Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Political Change and Civil War, 1816–1992”, American Political 
Science Review, 95:1, (March 2001), pp. 33-48.  
57 Rustow, 1970. 
58 Dahl, 1971, p. 3; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a, 1995b, 2002; Idem, Electing to Fight: Why 
Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005); Linz and Stepan, 1992, 1996b; 
Francis Fukuyama, 2004; Idem, “‘Stateness’ First”, Journal of Democracy, 16:1 (January 2005), pp. 
84-8. 
59 See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, 53 (March 1959), pp. 69-
105; Adam Przeworski et al., “What Makes Democracies Endure?” Journal of Democracy, 7:1 
(January 1996), pp. 39-55; Dahl, 1971. 
60 Rustow, 1970, pp. 342-343. 
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achievement of a certain level of economic and/or social development is not 
necessarily a precondition for the implementation of democracy. That is, it seems 
premature to assume that poor or low-income societies such as Kosovo and Timor-
Leste cannot hope to succeed in democratisation without first attaining a certain level 
of economic and/ or social development. 
Democratisation of conflict-affected societies, as suggested throughout this 
thesis, requires the tackling of the questions of “nationness” and “stateness” in the 
post-armed conflict reconstruction period. As discussed in Chapter 2, the former, 
which denotes creating a sense of “imagined community”, can be addressed through 
undertaking a reconciliation process, promoting social communication and forging 
an inclusive collective identity. The latter involves creating an effective system with 
institutional structures which are capable of endorsing a legal and political system to 
protect and guarantee the individual and collective rights and freedoms, and 
executing the rule of law throughout the territory.61 International involvement in 
state-building in conflict-torn societies aims to establish the state capacity to provide 
security, the rule of law, and economic and social development.62  
The definition of the state has undergone significant changes since it was 
classically elaborated by Max Weber as “a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory”.63 Chris Morris, for examples describes the state as a form of political 
organisation that exercises sovereign authority over its realm, claims a monopoly on 
the use of legitimate force as well as independence from other states, and generates 
the loyalty of the permanent inhabitants of its territory.64 Zartman defines the state in 
terms of its capacity to fulfil a set of “basic functions”: 1) exercising sovereign 
authority and effective governmental capacity; 2) serving as the “accepted source of 
identity”; 3) making and implementing binding decisions; and 4) providing security 
for the population.65 Margaret Levi defines the state as a “complex apparatus of 
 
61 O’Donnell, 1999, pp. 135-7. 
62 Fukuyama, 2004; Chesterman, 2005. 
63 H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (London: Routledge, 
1991), p. 78. 
64 Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 45-6. 
65 Zartman, 1995a, p. 5. 
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centralised and institutionalised power that concentrates violence, establishes 
property rights, and regulates society within a given territory while being recognised 
as a state by international forums”.66 The state, in other words, as Barry Buzan 
suggests, encompasses three inter-connected components,: 1) a physical base: a 
population and its associated territory; 2) institutional capacity: presence of 
institutions of law and government with the capacity to control the physical base and 
3) the “idea of the state”: widespread and deeply-rooted “idea of the state” which 
establishes its authority in the minds of its people who perceive themselves as 
members of a unified political and cultural community.67 ‘State strength / weakness”, 
in this context, is determined not only by its capacity to exercise territorial authority 
and control, maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and provide 
security68 but also by the degree to which individuals and groups in a given territory 
identify themselves with the state and its institutions and enjoy intra-societal 
tolerance and solidarity.69 What distinguishes ‘weak’ states from ‘strong’ states, 
according to Buzan, is “their high level of concern with domestically-generated 
threats to the security of the government”.70 ‘Weak’ states, in other words, “either do 
not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of 
sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing 
element in the domestic political life of the nation”.71 
Based on the above definitions, the state can be conceived as a political 
organisation made up of institutions with the capacity to exercise sovereign authority 
over a territory and population within this territory and provide the security and other 
needs of the population. The aspects of building a functioning state system in 
conflict-torn societies, in this context, can be outlined in the following way:  
1. Security-building 
2. Institution-building 
 
66 Margaret Levi, “The State of the Study of the State”, Ira Katznelson and Helen V Milner (eds.), 
Political Science: The State of Discipline  (W.W. Norton and Co., 2002). 
67 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-
Cold War Era, second edition, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1991), pp. 39-40.  
68 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and 
the International System, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 4; Buzan, 1991, pp. 53-60. 
69 Buzan, 1991, pp. 66-69; Holsti, 1996, pp. 82-97. 
70 Buzan, 1991, p. 67. 
71 Ibid. 
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3. Capacity-building 
Security, which can be defined as the “pursuit of freedom from threat and the 
ability of states and societies to maintain their identity and their functional integrity 
against forces of change which they see as hostile”, is a multi-dimensional concept.72 
It is not only about the offensive and defensive capabilities of the state (military 
security), but is also related to organisational and governmental stability (political 
security), access to the resources and financial markets necessary to sustain 
acceptable levels of welfare and state power (economic security), the ability of 
societies to maintain their identity and culture (societal security), and the capacity of 
states to protect local and global environment (environmental security).73 As a multi-
dimensional phenomenon, security is not only about the political, economic and 
other capabilities of states but is also about the protection of individuals and social 
groups. It entails not only the absence of war and the threat of war but also the 
“emancipation” of individuals and social groups from political oppression, poor 
education and other socio-economic constraints.74   
This multi-dimensional conceptualisation of security by Buzan and Booth 
provides a useful framework to analyse the international community’s engagement in 
security-building in post-conflict societies. The provision of security in post-conflict 
societies requires the creation of an environment in which local populations and 
international staff members can enjoy physical, political, social, economic and other 
aspects of safety. Providing and maintaining public security is the necessary 
prerequisite to implement a peace process and achieve successful outcomes in 
administrative, institutional and civilian tasks that the UN and other international 
agents are mandated. The capacity to enforce security also affects the credibility of 
the UN and other international agents in the eyes of the local population. It may help 
to generate a sense of public trust in transitional government structures seen capable 
of responding to basic human needs. It has also implications for the disbursement of 
financial aid pledged by international donors.75 Security-building in the immediate 
 
72 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, International Affairs, 
67:3, (July 1991), pp. 432. 
73 Ibid., p. 433, 439-451. 
74 Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation”, Review of International Studies, 17:4, (1991), p. 319. 
75 During the transitional administration of Cambodia by the UN (1992-3) for example, continued 
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post-conflict period involves (1) the demobilisation and disarmament of former 
combatants and their integration into civilian life, (2) repatriation of refugees and 
displaced people, and (3) reforming the security sector.  
Demilitarisation is a sine qua non condition not only to revive civil society, 
reduce poverty and likelihood of conflict recurrence and achieve sustainable 
development in societies emerging from violent conflicts76 but also to generate the 
feeling of security by individuals. Disarming former belligerents and reintegrating 
them into civilian life involve the collection and destruction of weapons, cantonment 
and relocation of armed groups, provision of food, housing material and payments 
assistance, creating incentives, and offering information and counselling services, 
employment opportunities and vocational training programmes that will enable 
former combatants to have new skills and a sustainable source of income and prevent 
their involvement in banditry or other illegal activities and violence.77 As noted 
earlier, security has also economic and social dimensions. A complete and successful 
disarmament and reintegration process, which is highly dependent on the capacity to 
meet the security concerns of parties involved in the conflict,78 helps to eradicate the 
alternative sources of violence e.g., militias, guerrillas and warlords.  
Providing a secure environment is a requirement for facilitating the return and 
repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, which, in return, affects the 
sustainability of the newly-developed institutions and inter-group relations. This 
requires a full commitment and ability by international and local security agents to 
enforce rules and regulations for the security of all especially the most vulnerable 
groups. By enhancing the feeling of individual and collective security, such a 
capacity may encourage the participation of competing groups in the community 
 
cease-fire violations and incomplete demobilisation of former belligerents were often cited by the 
international donors as the main reason for the delays in disbursing the financial assistance promised 
in the Tokyo Conference of 20-22 June 1992. As of March 1993, only $100 million of the $880 
million pledged at the Tokyo Conference was released. United Nations, “Fourth Progress Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia”, Security Council 
Document, S/25719, (3 May 1993), para. 95. 
76 Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration”, Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 170; Brahimi Report, pp. 7-8. 
77 Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, “Disarmament”, 2004, pp. 170-177. 
78 J. Bayo Adekanye, “Review Essay: Arms and Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Societies”, Journal of 
Peace Research, 34:3 (August 1997), p. 362.   
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reconciliation and political institutionalisation processes. It may also contribute to 
implanting the notion of the rule of law, which is often emphasised by international 
state-builders as one of the fundamental values of successful statehood and good 
governance, and attracting the population’s confidence in the international 
community-driven policies, initiatives and institutional structures.  
The third component of the international community-led security-building 
efforts in the post-armed conflict period is the development of the new police and 
armed forces and the incorporation of old security agents into the new system, in 
other words, the security sector reform.79 The creation of the security apparatus with 
the capacity to monopolise the use of legitimate force and operating in a manner 
consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, including the 
rule of law, accountability and transparency,80 is crucial to generate the “idea of the 
state” needed to transform conflict-ridden societies and reduce the risk of violent 
conflict through controlling potential sources of conflict. The provision of stability 
by competent and legitimate security forces in societies emerging from violent 
conflict, in other words, is one of the most important issues to maximise the benefit 
from international development programmes.81 
Institution-building, which refers to the “planning, structuring, and guidance 
of new or reconstituted organisations which…embody changes in values, functions, 
physical and/or social technologies…[and which] establish, foster, and protect new 
normative relationships and action patterns”,82 constitutes the second dimension of 
the externally-led state-building process in societies recovering from violence. The 
 
79 The security sector encompasses not only armed forces and the police but also civil authorities 
responsible for oversight and control (e.g. parliament, the executive, and the defence ministry), the 
gendarmerie, customs officials, judicial and penal institutions, intelligence services, civil society, 
including human rights organisations and the press. Organisation for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (OCED), “Security System Reform and Governance”, Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) Guidelines and References Series, (2005), p. 3, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf [accessed 26 August 2006]. While acknowledging 
the multi-dimensional characteristic of the security sector, throughout this thesis, only the creation of 
armed forces and the police in Kosovo and East Timor will be treated within the scope of the security 
sector reform while the construction of the elected and appointed civil authorities including the 
legislature, judiciary and executive will be discussed under political institutionalisation.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, Security Sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies, (London: 
Centre for Defence Studies, 2002), p. 5. 
82 Joseph W. Eaton (ed.), Institution Building and Development: From Concepts to Application, 
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construction of effective and legitimate political institutions, which exercise a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force and put some limitations on the use of 
authority and power by the state at the same time, is seen as key to preventing the 
recurrence of violent conflicts, stemming from weak and incapable government 
institutions.83 Political re-structuring through institution-building, in this context, 
encompasses the construction of new public institutions and administrative structures 
as well as the incorporation of the existing, ‘traditional’ institutional structures into 
the new system introduced.84 Aiming to secure the population’s confidence in and 
allegiance to the state rather than the existing local, regional, ethnic or cultural 
groups or personalities, institution-building during the transitional period involves 
establishing effective legislative, executive, judicial and bureaucratic structures, 
drafting the constitution and designing electoral systems.85  
The third aspect of the international community-supervised state-building 
process is capacity-development, which refers to the development of administrative 
and institutional competence to run the newly-established institutions and meet the 
basic demands of society. It encompasses efforts, strategies, policies and 
programmes undertaken to transform the overall system, environment or context 
within which individuals, organisations and societies operate and interact. This 
entails supporting and strengthening the capability of institutions to identify 
problems and challenges, offer solutions to these problems, and implement strategies, 
plans, and activities to address these challenges and problems in an efficient, 
effective and sustainable manner.86 Capacity-development efforts include the 
 
83 Fukuyama, 2004; Rotberg, 2002a, 2002b, Jens Meierhenrich, “Forming States after Failure”, Robert 
I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), pp. 153-169; Mohammed Ayoob, “State-Making, State-Breaking and State Failure: 
Explaining the Roots of ‘ Third World’ Insecurity”, Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Paul 
Sciarone (eds.), Between Development and Destruction, (London and New York: Macmillan Press 
and St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 67-86; Idem, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure”, 
Chester A. Croker, Fen Olster Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Turbulent Peace, The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict, (Washington: United State Institute of Peace Press), pp. 127-143. 
84 Meierhenrich, 2004, p. 159  
85 Paris, 2004; Chesterman, 2005.  
86 This definition of the term capacity-building derives from United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), “Capacity Assessment and Development: In a Systems and Strategic Management Context”, 
Technical Advisory Paper No. 3, (January 1998), p. 5 available via 
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education and on-the-job training of bureaucrats, formal and informal skills 
development, organisational structuring, developing a positive-enabling environment 
and producing policies, plans, legal frameworks and incentives.87 Assessment of 
skills and identification of needs, definition and implementation of strategies and 
approaches, participation of local stakeholders in the process, and monitoring the 
results of programmes and projects implemented can be cited among the factors that 
affect the outcome of the capacity-development process. 
 
3.4. How to Construct a Functioning State System? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the general approach at the academic and policy-
making level to the issue of ‘state failure’ associated with violent internal conflict has 
been characterised by a neglect of the historical context and political, economic and 
social factors that catalyse governmental and societal collapse. This approach is also 
underpinned by a tendency to measure the institutional and functional aspects of 
“stateness” against a set of benchmarks, derived from an idealised type of the state.88 
This, in turn, affected the outcome of the intervention strategies that the international 
community adopted to address ‘state failure’ in the post-Cold War era. Developed on 
the neglect of the interplay of national and trans-national economic and social forces, 
these reconstruction strategies have either resulted in limited success or in some 
cases led to unintended and contradictory consequences.89 In Sudan, for example, 
international aid agencies, despite their active engagement in the country since the 
late-1980s, failed to improve the dismal conditions of displaced southern Sudanese 
living in the north while also diminishing their chances of development, self-
sufficiency of autonomy.90  
Ottaway describes the international community’s approach to reconstructing 
conflict-affected societies, where formal government institutions have disintegrated 
or become polarised and the society is divided along ethnic or other lines, as an 
“example of intrusive social engineering”: that is, the international community 
 
87 UNDP, 1997, pp. 3-5.  
88 Milliken and Krause, 2002. 
89 Ibid; Ottaway, 2002b; Duffield, 2001. 
90 Duffield, 2001, pp. 202-256. 
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prescribes a model for the reconstructed state (democratic nation-state), then builds 
its main organisational components and hopes that the society in question will accept 
and maintain the state.91 The pursuit of this externally-imposed “quick fix” 
approach92 demands a “short-cut” transition to the Weberian state.93 With a view to 
achieving this rapid transition, international state-builders tend to bypass local 
authorities and take over the responsibility of providing core government services 
such as public health, primary education or irrigation.94 Most of the money provided 
by the donor community, in this respect, goes to cover high salaries for expatriates 
who supply core governmental and institutional functions. While governance 
functions are performed, indigenous capacity does not develop and the societies in 
question tend to revert to their former situations once the international community 
withdraws its resources and moves on to another crisis area.95 The result of capacity-
development initiatives, in other words, usually becomes a failure, which Fukuyama 
calls “capacity destruction” or “capacity sucking out”.96 
The imposition of strict deadlines to achieve a set of predetermined objectives 
therefore puts a tremendous pressure on post-conflict societies and their political 
leaders. This, in turn, tends to fuel political instability and intra-societal competition. 
The simultaneous undertaking of democratisation, which requires public 
participation and contestation, complicates the task of crafting effective state 
institutions (state-building) and achieving societal cohesion (nation-building) in post-
conflict settings. The establishment of political, economic and social organisations 
by external actors, in this context, is not an indication of the completion of the 
institution-building process and the resolution of “stateness” and “nationness” issues. 
In fact, the organisations and processes introduced by the international community 
can only turn into strong, competent institutions when they are seen by relevant local 
populations as capable of providing solutions to their problems such as security and 
unemployment.97  
 
91 Ottaway, 2002b, p. 1017. 
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95 Ibid., p. 103. 
96 Ibid., pp. 41-42; 103. 
97 Ottaway, 2002b; p. 1004. 
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In the light of this information, the following points can be identified as the 
crucial aspects of international state-building in post-conflict societies: 
a) an accurate understanding of specific internal and external 
dynamics and processes that led to the outbreak of armed conflict 
and governmental and societal breakdown;98  
b) abandoning the “best practice” mentality, i.e., setting up a model or 
blueprint for all societies from one practice that has worked in one 
part of the world;99 
c) designing and implementing reconstruction strategies and practices 
in response to specific demands and urgencies arising in each 
case;100 
d) setting “modest” objectives and goals, adopting long-term 
approaches and providing long-term political and financial 
commitment;101 
e) sequencing of tasks i.e., providing peace, security, stability with a 
view to establishing the institutional and social background of 
‘stateness’;102 
f) using local knowledge and encouraging local actors to take active 
roles and responsibilities for producing institutional and 
administrative solutions in response to local demands and 
problems.103   
 
Developed as a solution to the problem of sovereignty and governance in 
post-conflict settings, the establishment of international administrations is one of the 
strategies adopted by the international community to pacify and rebuild conflict-
affected territories along democratic lines.104 Indicating the suspension of 
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103 Doornbos, 2002; Ottaway, 2002; Fukuyama 2004. 
104 Robert Jackson, “International Administration of War-Torn Countries”, Global Governance, 10 
(January-March 2004), pp. 21-36.  
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sovereignty by an external agent responsible for day-to-day governance functions 
and development of administrative procedures and structures, the notion of 
international territorial administration implies the weakness or absence of local 
capacity to manage their own affairs and initiate, execute and lead such a process.  It 
was first proposed by Helman and Ratner in the early 1990s as a “novel” and 
“expansive” mechanism to fix or prevent the problem of governmental ‘failure / 
collapse’ or to reconstruct societies affected by violent conflicts through developing 
functioning administrative structures.105 Reviving the old UN trusteeship system, 
which Helman and Ratner suggested as a solution for addressing ‘state failure’, was 
criticised by some schools on moral as well as legal grounds. Zartman, for example, 
suggested that proponents of the notion of trusteeship “err in the arrogant 
presumption that only the West can govern and in the arrogant fallacy that a 190-
member bureaucracy that cannot pay for its emergency interventions is suited to 
exercising or supervising colonial-like rule”.106 In this context, Ruth Gordon argued 
that the trusteeship system based on the question of “how to bring ‘backwards’ 
people to self-government”107 reflects notions of “cultural superiority” and “rational 
inequality”.108 This attitude, Gordon emphasises, was dismissed by the international 
community when the principles of universal democracy, self-determination of 
peoples and human rights were included in international law to facilitate the process 
of decolonisation.109 Therefore, these old, already rejected “racist” approaches 
“should not be accorded legitimacy” by bringing back trusteeship in the twenty-first 
century.110 Despite these criticisms, the UN trusteeship system was implemented in 
different forms and degrees as a policy prescription for creating conditions for 
building an effective and democratic state in conflict-torn territories in the post-Cold 
War era. Exercising varying degrees of control and authority over the territories 
temporarily administered, transitional administrations were established under the 
auspices of the UN in Cambodia, eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor.  
Transforming societies emerging from violent internal conflict into 
 
105 Helman and Ratner, 1992-3; Mazrui, 1994; Pfaff, 1995.  
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democratic polities through establishing transitional administrations vested with 
some or all sovereign powers, on the other hand, embodies an inherent contradiction: 
promoting democratic government principles such as popular participation, 
accountability, transparency, consultation and the rule of law through centralising 
legislative, executive and judicial powers in the hands of a non-elected transitional 
administrator.111 This contradiction between the end and means, i.e. promoting 
democratic principles in a non-democratic way, not only creates uncertainty over the 
prospect of democratic state-building process and represents a democracy deficit and 
but also has the potential to lead to a crisis of legitimacy due to tension between 
international state-builders and local-stakeholders.  
Legitimacy, which, as noted earlier, entails the presence of a belief shared by 
individuals in the rightfulness of a rule or appropriateness of an institution whose 
authority ought to be obeyed not simply out of fear of retribution or a calculation of 
self-interest but an internal sense of moral obligation,112 is one of the key but 
controversial issues in transitional administrations for several reasons. However 
benign, international territorial administrations are imposed from the outside.113 
Transitional administrations are based on the exercise of a high degree of control by 
a foreign power over a foreign society. It is difficult to argue that the obtaining of the 
consent of nominal governments in power for the establishment of transitional 
administrations reflects the existence of a belief held by local populations in the 
appropriateness or rightfulness of rule and authority exercised by a non-elected 
external agent. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which authorised the 
establishment of an international interim administration in Kosovo, and Resolution 
1272 (1999) on the establishment of UN transitional administration in East Timor 
make reference to the acceptance of international transitional / interim 
administrations by the governments concerned i.e. the Yugoslav (now Serbian) and 
Indonesian governments rather than the people of Kosovo and East Timor.114 Two 
 
111 Chesterman, 2005, p. 127. 
112 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics”, International Organisation, 53:2 
(Spring 1999), p. 381, 387; Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).  
113 David Harland, “Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration”, Global 
Governance, 10:1 (January-March 2004), p. 15. 
114 See the preamble paragraph of UN/Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) stating that “the general principles on 
115 
 
                                                                                                                                         
significant points are worthwhile noting in this respect. Firstly, unlike the UN 
missions in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia and Eastern Slavonia, which were 
established by the UN Security Council as per the relevant peace agreements 
concluded by the parties involved in conflict, the transitional administration missions 
in Kosovo and East Timor were imposed by the international community. 
Resolutions 1244 and 1272, which authorised the establishment of the UN missions 
in these two conflict-affected territories, were endorsed by the international 
community without the participation of the representatives of the societies in 
question. Secondly, the governments of Serbia (then Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia) and Indonesia were forced to accept the said Resolutions. The 
government of Serbia agreed to withdraw from Kosovo at the end of an intensive air 
campaign conducted by NATO between March and June 1999 and the government 
of Indonesia forfeited its claims over East Timor under intense international pressure. 
It can be suggested that rule by an external power can be seen as legitimate 
“only if that rule is exercised on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the foreign 
population”.115 The capacity to generate and keep such a sense of trust on the part of 
local populations requires the development of consultation mechanisms,116 
institutionalisation of accountability and transparency,117 and having a good 
knowledge of and respect for local culture, traditions, political aspirations and social 
structures.118 The absence of these conditions, which results in the perception of 
policies and efforts as externally-imposed actions, undermines the sustainability of 
the state-building process due to a lack of ‘local ownership’.  
Creating a sense of local ownership can be facilitated through adopting an 
inclusive and participatory approach to encourage the articulation and representation 
of the needs, wishes and views of all local stakeholders in the planning, designing 
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and implementation of reconstruction programmes developed as solutions to meet 
the society’s needs. It involves the ‘ownership’ of ideas, strategies, processes, 
resources and outcomes by the groups that are affected by the institution-building 
process.119 Developing a sense of ‘local ownership’, in this context, requires the 
recognition that partial or total collapse of formal government institutions and 
structures caused by war and the withdrawal of the political authority in power does 
not necessarily leads to a power vacuum that is filled by international transitional 
administration.120 In fact, political life continues and different actors ranging from 
rebel leaders, clan chiefs, opposition party leaders and dissidents compete for formal 
authority and power, and alternative informal modes of order and justice, which are 
often far from Western notions of human rights.121 Exercising power over the 
population, these actors may provide education or health services. Therefore, a good 
understanding of local conditions and power structures, the choice of local 
interlocutors as the legitimate representative of the population,122 and the capacity to 
develop an effective mechanism of cooperation and coordination between 
international and local actors123 may facilitate the achievement of ‘local ownership’.  
This requires clarity and transparency about (1) the nature of relationship 
between international and local actors, and of the mandate and powers assumed by 
international actors; (2) projects, policies and efforts undertaken to achieve the 
mandate; and (3) fundamental legal issues and procedures that contribute to reducing 
mistrust and building confidence in the institutions created.124 In addition to these 
 
119 This definition of ‘local ownership’ derives from Annika S. Hansen and Sharon Wiharta, “The 
Transition to a Just Order – Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict: A Policy Report”,  Folke 
Bernadotte Academy Publications, (Stockholm:  Printgraf, 2007), p. x, available at 
http://www.folkebernadotteacademy.se/roach/images/pdf/Transition%20to%20a%20Just%20Order%2
0Policy.pdf [accessed 7 August 2007]; Carlos Lopes and Thomas Theisohn, “Ownership, Leadership 
and Transformation: Can We Do Better for Capacity Development?”, (New York: UNDP), p. 30, 
accessible via 
http://www.capacity.undp.org/index.cfm?module=Library&page=Document&DocumentID=5015 
[accessed 7 August 2007]. 
120 Chesterman, 2005, p. 242-243; Jarat Chopra, “Building State Failure in East Timor”, Development 
and Change, 33:5 (November 2002), p. 981.  
121 Hansen and Wiharta, 2007, p. 6; Chesterman, 2005, p. 243. 
122 Sergio de Mello, “How Not to Run a Country: Lessons for the UN from Kosovo and East Timor”, 
unpublished manuscript, (2000) cited in Joel C. Beauvais, “Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. 
State-Building in East Timor”, International Law and Politics, 33:1101 (December 2001), p. 1120. 
123 Mark Baskin, “Between Exit and Engagement: On the Division of Authority in Transitional 
Administrations”, Global Governance, 10 (2004), p. 121. 
124 Hansen and Wiharta, 2007, p. 35; Chesterman, 2005, pp. 241-242. 
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factors, the capacity and willingness of international agencies to develop mechanisms 
that allow and encourage the inclusion and participation of diverse political and 
social groups rather than certain political groups affect the achievement of a sense of 
ownership of the international community-supervised state-building process by local 
populations. 
Devising and implementing an ‘exit strategy’ based on clearly and 
realistically set end-states and deadlines is another significant component of state-
building efforts that affect the capacity to construct effective and sustainable 
institutional structures.125 This, however, requires developing and adopting clear 
objectives and effective strategies in the first place, as former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan puts in the following way:126 
 
 
A good exit strategy results from a good entrance strategy. In this connection, the Security 
Council is expected to reach agreement on a clear and achievable mandate based on a 
common understanding of the nature of the conflict. The Secretariat should provide the 
candid and well-informed analysis that the Security Council’s decision on an effective peace 
strategy will require. The members of the Council are expected to use their influence to 
ensure from the outset that the necessary means of implementation are available, and it is up 
to the General Assembly to authorise a timely budget allocation. 
 
The termination and withdrawal of the mission and handover of 
administrative responsibility to local authorities usually takes place following the 
completion of the first national elections and the inauguration of a new government. 
However, war-shattered societies involve the risk of what Roland Paris calls 
“pathologies” of political and economic liberalisation resulting from their recent 
history of intense societal conflicts, their lack of a tradition of peaceful dispute 
settlement and cultural constraints on violent behaviour, and their lack of effective 
political institutions and lack of a tradition of peaceful dispute settlement.127 These 
“pathologies” include (1) the problem of “bad” (illiberal) civil society, (2) the 
opportunistic behaviour of “ethnic entrepreneurs” who extract popular support in 
 
125 Caplan, 2002; Chesterman, 2005; Paris, 2004; Baskin,, 2004. 
126 United Nations, “No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or 
Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”, Report of the Secretary-General, 
S/2001/394, (20 April 2001), p. 8. 
127 Paris, 2004, pp. 168-175. For a discussion of the potential impact of elections on undermining the 
prospect of democratic development, see also Benjamin Reilly, “Democratic Validation”, John Darby 
and Roger MacGinty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), pp. 174-183. 
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deeply-divided societies through inciting inter-communal polarisation and distrust, 
(3) the risk that elections may serve as catalysts and focal points for destructive 
societal competition and conflict, (4) the danger posed by local “saboteurs” who may 
use elections to win power democratically but later seek to undermine democracy to 
maintain their rule,  and (5) the disruptive and conflict-provoking effects of 
economic liberalisation.128   
The increased likelihood of conflict during the transition from autocracy to 
democracy129 makes the choice and design of electoral system, and timing and 
sequencing of elections important factors in laying the foundations for a sustainable 
democratic state.130 The potential divisive and destabilising effects of elections 
require designing the rules in such a way that is likely to “promote moderate voices 
over extremist ones….and…facilitate[s] intra-group as well as inter-group 
competition”.131 The nature of conflict and the situation of post-conflict environment 
play a significant role in the choice of electoral models e.g. proportional 
representation, quotas for ethnic representation, mixed systems and preferential 
models.   
Experience in various post-conflict societies demonstrated that the holding of 
elections immediately following the end of armed conflict tends to exacerbate 
divisions and generate violence rather than facilitating a peaceful democratic 
transformation. The international community’s plan for power-sharing followed by 
elections as a means of resolving Rwanda’s civil war and fostering democracy in the 
country, for example, “served as a catalyst for the genocide by threatening Hutu 
 
128 Paris, 2004, pp. 159-168. 
129 According to the findings of the State Failure Task Force Report, partial democracies are seven 
times more likely to face governmental ‘failure’ than full democracies as well as autocracies. Jack A. 
Goldstone et al., State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings, (McLean, VA: Science 
Applications International Conference (SAIC), 30 September 2000), p. 29, accessible via 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/publication.asp?pubType=paper&id=9 [accessed 25 April 
2005]. Mansfield and Snyder found that democratising states are about two-thirds more likely to get 
involved in war than states undergoing no regime change. Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a, p. 12, 14. 
See also, Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, “Democratising for Peace”, American Political 
Science Review, 92:1, (March 1998), pp. 51-61.  
130 Reilly, 2003, pp. 174-9; Idem, “Elections in Post-Conflict Societies”, Edward Newman and Roland 
Rich (eds.), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality, (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 2004), pp. 113-134; Chesterman, 2005, pp. 206-221; Paris, 2005, pp. 188-
194. 
131 Reilly, 2003, p. 179. 
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elements with the prospect of losing power”132 while the 1996 elections in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in which ethnic political parties and generals-turned-politicians 
competed, served to legitimise the political power of the same nationalist leaders, 
who were reluctant to implement the Dayton Agreement, and reinforced ethnic 
divisions.133 The timing and sequencing of local, regional and national elections are 
therefore another significant aspect of democratisation in post-conflict societies. 
Building the institutional and social foundations for a democratic nation-state 
in conflict-ridden societies, where power has been exercised by government 
institutions as an instrument of oppression, is a slow and arduous process. It, above 
all else, requires the development of the notion that “the state is an important, if not 
foremost, public good”.134 This includes the construction of transparent and 
accountable public institutions with the capacity to meet the basic needs of society 
and the development of a political culture based on the participation of the 
population in the political process and non-violent settlement of disputes. Not only 
the political and societal legacy of the armed conflict and the absence of prior 
experience of democratic tradition but also the incompatibility between the mandate 
assumed i.e. the construction of public institutions consistent with democratic 
principles including the rule of law, accountability and transparency, and the means 
used towards this aim i.e. ‘benevolent autocracy’ further complicates the process of 
initiating democratic transformation in post-conflict societies.   
In the light of this information, the international community-led state-building 
process in Kosovo and East Timor will be investigated in the next chapters on the 
basis of the following framework: 
1. Security-building: Demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration 
of former combatants, repatriation of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and creation of the armed and police force. 
2. Institution-building: Designing and adoption of governmental and 
institutional structures. 
 
132 Paris, 2004, p. 75. 
133 Paris, 2004, p. 101-2; Chesterman, 2005, p. 208. 
134 Meierhenrich, 2004, 154. 
3. Capacity-Building: Development of civil administration with 
necessary skills and competence to produce policies in response to 
local needs and problems through identifying assets and needs, 
adopting and implementing strategies and policies and monitoring 
the results. 
As shown in Figure 3.1., the international community’s engagement in 
building an effective state system in Kosovo and East Timor during the post-armed 
conflict period will be investigated by taking the interaction between state-building 
and nation-building into account. 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity-building 
Developing  
institutional 
structures with the 
capacity to  produce 
solutions to the 
problems in society 
and meet demands 
in society 
Institution-building 
Political 
institutionalisation 
(construction of the 
legislative, executive 
and judicial branches 
of government) 
the nation as a political and cultural artefact 
(people unified by historical, cultural and 
political  bonds and a shared cultural identity 
transcending local / regional and ethnic 
peculiarities) 
Nation-building:  
Creating a sense of community and inclusive identity in the post-armed conflict 
period through eliminating potential or actual sources of divides arising from 
regional / local / ethnic differences and developing integrative bonds 
state as a ‘common 
roof’ or political 
community with  
functioning governing 
institutions  
Security-building 
Provision and 
maintenance of a 
secure and peaceful 
environment through 
demilitarisation, law 
enforcement, and 
security sector 
reform 
State-building:  
Construction of self-government structures and public institutions and 
development of the capacity required to enable these institutions to effectively 
deliver their functions 
Construction of an 
identity: Integrative 
and disintegrative 
elements e.g. 
language, history, 
education and 
religion
Social 
communication and 
contacts: 
Developing 
mechanisms of 
communication 
Reconciliation:  
Healing the wounds 
of the past and 
legacy of the armed 
conflict 
Figure 3.1. Main aspects of the reconstruction of conflict-affected territories during the transitional 
period. 
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3.5. Conclusion  
Influenced by the growing optimism in the capacity of democracy, 
transforming territories with recent experiences of armed conflict into peaceful 
polities through promoting democratic governance has come to be regarded not only 
as an ‘achievable’ policy, but also falling under the ‘responsibility’ of international 
actors due to the absence of domestic capacity and willingness to initiate such a 
process. The UN’s increasing engagement in turning conflict-devastated societies 
into peaceful, democratic polities, in this context, culminated in Kosovo and East 
Timor where it was temporarily vested with sovereign powers to give birth to liberal 
democratic structures after a period of transitional administration. The UN’s 
complex, multi-dimensional mandate in these two conflict-torn societies included 
restoring law and order, ensuring demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of 
former combatants into civilian life, repatriation of displaced persons, organisation of 
elections and construction and strengthening of governance institutions based on 
democratic principles.  
Although democracy has come to be regarded as a solution to build 
sustainable peace, societies emerging from violent internal conflict offer the least 
favourable conditions to achieve a democratic transition. The legacy of armed 
conflict, persistence of a climate of polarisation and distrust, political exclusion, 
competing identities, intolerance, fear of violence and feelings of insecurity are 
among the challenges to establishing self-sufficient, sustainable forms of democratic 
government in post-conflict societies. The persistence of these conditions which are 
not conducive to establishing sustainable democratic rule raises the question of 
whether or not rapid democratisation from the outside is the right prescription to heal 
problems in conflict-torn societies.  
In the light of this information, the international community’s engagement 
under the umbrella of the UN in Kosovo and East Timor which became a test-case as 
to whether or not it is possible to transform societies emerging from violent conflicts 
into democratic polities after a period of transitional / interim administration will be 
investigated in the following chapters.  
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Building the Nation  
in Timor-Leste 
 
You, the Timorese people, must stand up against anyone 
who tries to divide you on regional or ethnic lines. Don’t 
allow anyone, by exploiting minor differences among you, 
to rob you of the peace, democracy, and freedom from 
poverty which are your right. Let no one deprive you of 
your hard-won freedom, of your right to live in security and 
without fear. 
                                                                        Kofi Annan 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The achievement of independence on 20 May 2002, exhorted by Kofi Annan in 
2006 to alleviate the destructive and divisive effects of the violent riots,1 was a long and 
arduous process for the people of East Timor.2 Independence came after more than four 
centuries of Portuguese colonial administration, twenty-four years of Indonesian 
occupation and two and a half years of UN transitional administration. The East 
Timorese people paid a considerable price for this autonomy, losing up to an estimated 
200,000 people during the Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999.3  
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1 “Secretary-General, in Video Message, Calls on People of Timor-Leste Not to Despair, Stay United on 
Course Toward Nation-Building,” SG/SM/10493, (1 June 2006), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10493.doc.htm [accessed 4 July 2006]. 
2 The eastern half of the island of Timor, the islands of Atauro lying to the northern coast and Jaco to the 
northeast and the enclave of Oecussi in the western part of the island constitute the territory of today’s 
Timor Leste. The official name of the territory, formerly known as East Timor, was changed to the 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste when it became independent. In this study, the country is referred to 
as East Timor when events preceding independence are discussed and Timor-Leste for the period 
following the achievement of official independence in May 2002 although East Timor is the most 
common and most readily identifiable name of the country in English-language publications. 
3 The estimated number of the East Timorese people who were killed by the Indonesian troops or died as a 
result of famine or disease varies between 100,000 and 200,000. In a report released to the international 
community in January 2006, East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) 
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The achievement of independence, which marked the end of a long struggle for 
liberation from foreign rule and establishing a political community of their own, also 
denoted the beginning of another long and difficult process aimed at integration at the 
national level. This was to be accomplished through healing the wounds of the past, 
promoting social reconciliation and communication and creating a new sense of 
“imagined” community based on a shared collective identity. This new sense of national 
unity would replace the consensus of the resistance years constructed on the basis of 
opposition to a common enemy. Shortly after the withdrawal of the Indonesians, 
however, the coalition of resistance, built upon the suppression of ideological, political 
and societal differences in the interest of ‘national struggle’, was replaced by a fierce 
struggle for power at the elite level and an intense competition within the society.  
Power struggles centring on the question of who ‘owns’ the resistance and 
deserves to hold power after independence have constituted the essence of problems 
with achieving unity at the national level in the post-Indonesian period. Are the military 
leaders and guerrillas, who fought for national liberation in the mountains, the centre of 
authority? Or is it the Church that protected civilians against the brutality of the 
Indonesian military? Should more say be given to the educated youth who created a 
critical clandestine network organised in the villages and cities? Or should the country 
be run by the members of the diplomatic front in exile who for years struggled to keep 
the East Timor conflict on the international agenda and lobbied for the conduct of a UN-
sponsored referendum? Or is it those from eastern part of the country that contributed 
more to the national struggle than westerners that should be given more say and 
influence in Timorese politics and government? Each of these actors representing 
competing interests had a different vision for and expectation from the new Timorese 
nation-state to be built in the post-Indonesian period. The growing rift between these 
competing groups in the post-independence period, as will be discussed later, was 
followed by the eruption of violence in April 2006, triggered by unrest within the army.  
 
estimated that up to 180,000 Timorese civilians lost their lives during the Indonesian occupation. For 
further information, see East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), “Part 
8: Responsibility and Accountability”, Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and 
Reconciliation Timor-Leste (Dili, 2005).  
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In accordance with the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2, this chapter 
reviews the process of national integration in Timor-Leste in the post-Indonesian period. 
It treats East Timorese nationalism and East Timorese nationhood as two inter-related 
but separate phenomena. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part discusses 
the socio-political situation in Timor prior to and following the establishment of 
Portuguese colonial rule. The second part explores the emergence of the East Timorese 
national movement towards the end of the Portuguese colonial rule and its development 
under the Indonesian occupation. The next part discusses the process of nation-building 
in the post-independence period and focuses on the issues of national reconciliation, 
social communication and construction of a cohesive national identity. The last part 
analyses the issue of regional differences and its implications for the process of national 
integration in the post-independence period. 
 
 
4.2. Socio-Political Structure of East Timor Prior to and After the Establishment of 
Portuguese Colonial Rule: Diversity and Divisions 
 
The arrival of the European powers in Southeast Asia, first the Portuguese and 
later the Dutch, resulted in stiff rivalry for establishing a commercial domination over 
the region surrounding the island of Timor and contributed to the already existing 
political and socio-cultural divides and competition in Timor. Prior to the arrival of 
Portuguese merchants and Dominican priests at the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
Timor was populated by diverse ethno-linguistic groups and ruled by a number of 
hierarchically organised small kingdoms and princedoms with shifting alliances.4 The 
division of the island into two halves was a direct result of the political and economic 
competition between the two colonial powers. In fact, the official partitioning of the 
island between Portugal and the Netherlands in the early twentieth century “roughly 
 
4 James J. Fox, “Tracing the Path, Recounting the Past: Historical Perspectives on Timor”, James J. Fox 
and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds.), Out of Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, (Adelaide: 
Crawford House Publishing, 2000), pp. 7-8; Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism, (St. 
Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 17-19; John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s 
Forgotten War: the Hidden History of East Timor, (London, New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1991), pp. 1-3. 
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corresponded”5 to the early ethno-linguistic and political division between the 
Vaiqoeno-speaking Atoni people thought to be of Melanesian descent in what is now 
West Timor and the Tetum-speaking Belu people of Malay descent in the east.6  
Traditional Timorese political structure took the form of small polities ruled by a 
local chief (liurai). According to Portuguese colonial historiography, the western half of 
the island, referred to as Servião, consisted of 16 small polities (reinos or regulados), 
and the eastern part, Bellum (or Bellos), was made up of 46 reinos.7 Each polity was 
divided into sucos comprising villages populated by various ethno-linguistic groups and 
led by a chefe (chief) de suco.8  
The Portuguese presence in the island, which was renowned for its sandalwood, 
was initially motivated by commercial interests. With the defeat of the Wehale kingdom, 
which the most powerful indigenous polity in Timor, by the Black Portuguese or 
Topasses (a mixed race of Portuguese and local islanders) in the mid-seventeenth 
century, local liurais’ power sharply declined.9 Regional sandalwood trade passed to the 
hands of the Topasses, who represented Portuguese power in the island and became the 
dominant commercial power in the region in the next two centuries.10 Despite the 
Portuguese settlement in the east and the Dutch advance in the western half of the island, 
local liurais were able to maintain their political power structures. It was not until the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century that the Portuguese were able to take firm 
control over their sphere of influence in the eastern part of the island.11  
Traditional Timorese society, which was based on hierarchy and kinship, was 
divided into three classes: dato (aristocrats), ema rai (commoners) and ata (slaves).12 
 
5 Jolliffe, 1978, p. 19. 
6 Ibid.; Fox, 2000, p. 12. 
7 Jolliffe, 1978 p. 19; Fox, 2000, p. 12; João Saldanha, The Political Economy of East Timor Development, 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994), p. 45. 
8 Taylor, 1991, p. 7; Saldanha, 1994, p. 45. 
9 Fox, 2000, p. 10; Taylor, 1991, p. 8. 
10 Fox, Ibid; Taylor, Ibid. 
11 Peter Carey, “East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity”, Conflict 
Studies, 293/294, (October / November 1996), p. 1; Fox, 2000, pp. 12-18; Douglas Kammen, “Master-
Slave, Traitor-Nationalist, Opportunist-Oppressed: Political Metaphors in East Timor”, Indonesia, 76 
(October 2003), p. 71; Taylor, 1991, pp. 8-10.    
12 Helen M. Hill, Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor: FRETILIN 1974-1978: The Origins, Ideologies 
and Strategies of a Nationalist Movement, (Otford, New South Wales: Otford Press, 2002), p. 2. 
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The social, political and economic organisation of the Timorese was based on a system 
of exchange which involved both goods and individuals. Creating strong kinship 
alliances and power structures, this socio-political organisation of the Timorese inhibited 
the establishment of direct colonial rule up until the late nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century when Portugal implemented pacification policies to wipe out the existing local 
power structures following the conclusion of border agreements with the Dutch.13 These 
policies included the introduction of forced labour and cash crops to transform the 
subsistence and self-regulated nature of the agricultural economy, and the introduction 
of a new administrative system to undermine the indigenous system of kinship 
exchange, from which liurais derived their power a new administrative system and from 
time to time revolted against Portuguese rule.14 Despite this intense pacification 
campaign, local political, economic and social structures coexisted with the Portuguese 
administrative and social policies, and largely remained intact. They persisted not only 
through the years of Portuguese colonisation, but also Japanese invasion15 and 
Indonesian occupation.  
 
 
4.3. Development of the East Timorese National Movement and the Process of 
Nation-Building under Foreign Rule: Diversity, Divisions and Attempts to Build 
Unity 
 
Neglected for centuries by Lisbon, East Timor was the least developed part of 
the Portuguese state, which always defended the idea of ‘lusotropicalism’ and claimed 
that the people of the so-called ‘overseas provinces’ were “as Portuguese as the whiter 
 
13 Taylor, 1991, pp. 8-10; Fox, 2000, pp. 12-18; José Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East 
Timor, (Lawrenceville, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 1987), 1987, p. 19; Kammen, 2003, p. 71; Carey, 
1996, p. 1; Saldanha, 1994, pp. 38-39. 
14 Jolliffe, 1978, p. 35; Saldanha, 1994, pp. 38-39; Taylor, 1991, pp. 10-12; Donald E. Weatherbee, 
“Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma”, Asian Survey, 6:12 (December 1966), p. 685. 
15 The invasion of the territory by the Japanese between 1942 and 1945 can be seen as an indication of the 
impact of regional and international developments on the fate of East Timor throughout its history. 
Following the landing of the Dutch and Australian commandos in Dili to pre-empt a possible Japanese 
takeover, the Japanese sent 20,000 troops to invade the island in February 1942. For further information, 
see Taylor, 1991, p. 13. The Japanese invasion cost the lives of between 40,000 and 60,000 East Timorese.  
See, James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, new edition (Sydney: ABC Books, 1996), p. 22; Jolliffe, 
1978, p. 46; Carey, 1995, p. 4; Taylor, 1991, p. 14.   
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ones living in Lisbon”.16 Timor Pequena Monografia, for example, portrays East Timor 
not only as part of Portugal but also as a showcase of the supposedly multi-racial 
Portuguese state.17 This official line claiming that ‘overseas provinces’ were equal to the 
mother country, on the other hand, disguises the fact that considerable differences 
existed in the distribution of resources including in which direction they travelled. 
According to UN sources dated 1962, the relationship between Portugal and Timor was 
“a colonial one” and the Timorese people had “very limited participation in the central 
and local organs of government”18 while there was “no significant progress” in the 
territory’s economic development in the post-Second World War period.19 Public 
services were poorly developed and transportation and communication facilities were 
inadequate or absent outside the capital Dili,20 which was provided with electricity in the 
1960s and had only a few main streets paved by 1974.21  
In addition to the allocation and distribution of resources in favour of Portugal, 
the restricted recognition of Portuguese citizenship to the East Timorese raises questions 
on the salience of Lusotropicalism and ‘multi-racialism’ of the Portuguese state. The 
population of East Timor was classified into indigenes (‘unassimilated’ natives) or não 
civilizado (‘uncivilised’ persons) and não indigenes including mestiços (mixed race) and 
assimilados (‘assimilated’ natives).22 For an ‘uncivilised’ Timorese to gain assimilado 
status required proof of sufficient income and ‘good character’.23 The requirements, 
which also included literacy in Portuguese, paying all taxes, completing military service 
and living in the ‘European manner’, were even beyond the capacity of over 50% of the 
Portuguese people themselves if they were asked to meet.24 Although the Overseas 
Organic Law of 1963 theoretically extended the right to vote and representation to the 
‘uncivilised’ Timorese, tax, property and ‘Portuguese way of life’ requirements 
 
16 Ramos-Horta, p. 25. 
17 Timor: Pequena Monografia, (Lisboa: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1965), p. 27. 
18 Weatherbee, 1966, p. 686. 
19 Ibid., p. 687. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ramos-Horta, 1987, p. 22. 
22 Taylor, 1991, p. 13; Weatherbee, 1966, p. 684; Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle, translated by 
Michael Wolfers, (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 22. 
23 Taylor,1991, p. 13. 
24 Cabral, 1980, p. 22. 
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restricted their participation in the political process.25 
 
Europeans 568 
Mestiços 2,022 
Chinese 3,122 
Other não indigenes (Goans, etc.) 212 
Indigenous civilizado 1,541 
Indigenous não civilizado 434,097 
Total 442,378 
Table 4.1. Racial Composition of Timor’s Population in 1950 - 98% of the Timorese were considered 
outside Portuguese civilisation (Source: Donald E. Weatherbee, “Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian 
Dilemma”, Asian Survey, 6:12 (December 1966), p. 684). 
 
Although almost all social, economic and political conditions conducive to a 
nationalist movement to put an end to foreign rule existed, it was not until the mid-1970s 
that an organised East Timorese nacionalismo began to develop. In addition to the 
limited availability of transportation and communication systems, insufficient formal 
educational facilities, which as noted in Chapter 2 as crucial elements of thinking in 
national terms and formation of national identities,26 affected the belated the 
development of Timorese nationalism.  
The education system under the Portuguese was established primarily to serve 
the needs of colonial administration.27 Only a small portion of the elite, consisting of the 
Portuguese, mestiços and descendants of liuari families, had access to school and 
opportunities for employment with the administration. The first schools in the former 
colony were established by the Catholic Church for missionary purposes in the 18th 
century.28 The first government school was established in the early-1860s to provide 
education for the first and second primary grades to sons of local rulers with the aim of 
overcoming problems arising from the “customs of such barbaric peoples”.29 A primary 
school was later established at Soibada in central Timor in 1904 to train teacher-
catechists for the Catholic Church and provide four years of education for sons of 
                                                 
25 Weatherbee, 1966, pp. 686-7. 
26 Gellner, 1991; Smith, 1991; Anderson, 1991. 
27 Saldanha, 1994, p. 57. 
28 Taylor, 1991, p. 17. 
29 Hill, 2002, p. 9.  
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liurais.30 There were two types of primary schooling systems for Timorese under the 
Portuguese. While the children of Portuguese-speaking local urban elite were allowed to 
obtain education in the colonial state-run escolas primárias (primary schools) along with 
European pupils, rural Timorese received a second class ensino rudimentar (rudimentary 
education) at suco (village) and posto (sub-district) schools run by the Catholic 
missions.31  
Starting from the mid-1960s, Portuguese colonial administration expanded 
educational facilities. Primary schooling for children between the ages of 6 and 12 was 
made compulsory in 1964.32 The number of students enrolled in primary schools 
increased from 6,076 in 1960 to 57,579 in 197233 and the total number of schools 
operating throughout East Timor rose from 202 in the 1967/8 school year to 463 in 
1972/3.34 Despite this gradual improvement in education levels, 93% of East Timor’s 
population of some 650,00035 were still illiterate by 1973.36 After primary schooling, 
students were required to pass an entrance exam to study two years of the ciclo 
preparatorio (preparatory cycle or junior secondary education) before they could enter 
secondary school.37 The first secondary school was opened in 1952 but enrolment was 
only 854 in 1969.38 The Chinese and Muslim Arab communities had their own private 
schools. By 1974, the Chinese community had 14 primary schools throughout East 
Timor and a secondary school in Dili.39 The curriculum of the Chinese schools was 
formulated in Taiwan but they also had Portuguese language and history classes.40 The 
Arab community, numbering some 900 in 1970,41 had a school within the mosque in 
 
30 Ibid. 
31 Hill, 2002, pp. 35-36; Weatherbee, 1966, p. 688. 
32 Weatherbee, 1966, p. 688. 
33 Saldanha, 1994, p. 59.  
34 Hill, 2002, p. 39. 
35 This figure is taken from Terence H. Hull, “From Province to Nation: The Demographic Revolution of a 
People”, James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds.), Out of Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of 
East Timor, (London: Hurst, 2000), p. 31.  
36 Taylor, 1991, p. 17. 
37 Hill, 2002, p. 37. 
38 Saldanha, 1991, p. 59. 
39 Hill, 2002, p. 36. 
40 Timor: Pequena Monografia, 1965, p. 61 
41 Hill, 2002, p. 36. 
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Dili to teach children the Qoran and to read Arabic.42 At the same time, they were taught 
Portuguese.43  
By 1973, as shown in Table 4.2., there were 463 schools in East Timor – 15 
primary schools, 298 village and sub-district schools, 50 Diocese schools, 93 military 
schools and 7 junior secondary schools.44 There was no university during Portuguese 
rule. Few students were provided with scholarships to study in Portugal. The number of 
Timorese students attending university in Portugal increased from 2 in 1970 to just 39 in 
1974.45 Most of these graduates eventually took up posts in government institutions, 
health service and the army and formed their own ideas on national development, and 
played a significant role in the development of a sense of Timorese nationalism.46 
 
  School 
Year 
Primary 
schools 
Village and sub-
district schools 
Diocese 
schools 
Military 
schools 
Junior secondary schools 
(Ciclos Preparatorios) 
1967/68 13 110 40 38 1 
1968/69 14 120 41 62 1 
1969/70 15 150 42 80 1 
1970/71 15 191 42 89 2 
1971/72 15 244 44 92 2 
1972/73 15 298 50 93 7 
 Table 4.2. Number of schools in East Timor between 1967 and 1973. (Source: Helen M. Hill, Stirrings of 
Nationalism in East Timor: FRETILIN 1974-1978: The Origins, Ideologies and Strategies of a Nationalist Movement, 
(Otford, New South Wales: Otford Press, 2002), p. 39.). 
 
Despite the sporadic rebellions against the Portuguese administration and its 
exploitative economic and social policies such as the Dom Boaventura uprising of 1912 
and Viqueque uprising of 1959, there was no organised nationalist movement in the 
former colony until the mid-1970s. The new regime in Lisbon established in Lisbon 
after the Carnation Revolution of April 1974, which toppled which toppled the Salazar / 
Caetano regime, unexpectedly announced that Portugal would loosen its rule over the 
‘overseas provinces’. This announcement was met with excitement in East Timor, 
resulting in the sudden formation of political associations a small group of young urban 
                                                 
42 Timor: Pequena Monografia, 1965, p. 58. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hill, 2002, p. 39. 
45 Ibid., p. 38; Taylor, 1991, p. 17. 
46 Taylor, 1991, p. 18. 
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educated assimilado Timorese. These associations included the Timorese Democratic 
Union (União Democratica Timorense, UDT) and Timorese Social Democratic 
Association (Associação Social Democrata Timorense, ASDT). The latter transformed 
itself into the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, (Frente 
Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente, FRETILIN) and pioneered nationalist 
projects.  
The lack of communication between the nationalist Timorese organised under 
FRETILIN and the Timorese living in the interior regions constrained FRETILIN’s 
capacity to generate an organised mass nationalist movement with a claim for an 
independent East Timor. An overwhelming majority of the population in the interior 
regions of East Timor was illiterate and uninformed of political developments in Lisbon 
and Dili, and of alternatives to Portuguese colonial rule. Within this process of nation-
building, Mambai47 idioms and cultural artefacts occupied a central place in 
FRETILIN’s efforts to generate a sense of national unity and cultural identity in a land 
of ethnic and linguistic diversity. 
 
Years Males Females Total 
1920 215,916 181,959 397,875 
1930 249,257 222,964 472,221 
1946 217,354 185,878 403,232 
1950 232,018 210,360 442,378 
1960 267,783 249,293 517,079 
1970 316,128 293,031 609,477 
1973 340,128 306,207 646,155 
Table 4.3. Population of East Timor under Portuguese (Source: Terence H. Hull, “From Province to Nation: The 
Demographic Revolution of a People”, James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds), Out of Ashes: Destruction and 
Reconstruction of East Timor, (London: Hurst, 2000), p. 31.) 
 
Meaning “my brother” in Mambai language, “maubere” was originally used by 
the Portuguese to denigrate the Timorese as backward and primitive people and to 
distinguish ordinary East Timorese from the Portuguese and the assimilated Timorese. 
The concept of maubere, which involved a socialist connotation, served as a popular 
ideology for FRETILIN to develop a national cultural identity and generate unity and 
                                                 
47 One of the indigenous ethno-linguistic groups, the Mambai are the hill people and occupy a large area 
from the interior of Dili to the south coast including Ainaro and Manufahi. 
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solidarity against foreign rule.48 In addition to the use of “Maubere people” to create a 
sense of East Timorese nationness, FRETILIN also revived some traditional Timorese 
songs and poems with images familiar to ordinary Timorese in the countryside.49 A song 
written about the highest mountain in East Timor “Foho Ramelau”, for example, was 
used by FRETILIN to reach the people in remote areas and promote the message of self-
determination. It became very popular by the end of 1974.50 
Why, Timor, is your head forever bowed? 
Why, Timor, are your children enslaved? 
Why, Timor, do your children doze like chickens? 
Why, Timor, do your children doze like slaves? 
Awake! The foot of the mountain is white 
Awake! A new sun has risen 
Open your eyes! A new sun is over your village 
Open your eyes! A new sun is over our land 
Awake! Take the reins of your own horse 
Awake! Take the command of our land 
 
Complementary to these policies, FRETILIN initiated a series of rural literacy 
and education campaigns in Tetum to unify various ethnic and linguistic groups around 
indigenous values.51 However, most of the people in the interior regions considered 
themselves as belonging to a particular linguistic group and tended to treat those 
speaking other local languages as foreigners. The literacy programme therefore 
emphasised national unity and promoted the idea of being Timorese. One of the literacy 
handbooks stated that “A long time ago colonialism came to our land because our 
ancestors were fighting”.52  
However, it did not take long for new divisions and a contest for power between 
Timorese political groups to arise. This power struggle between socialist FRETILIN and 
the more conservative UDT, which was manipulated and exploited by Indonesia, 
resulted in UDT’s ‘pre-emptive’ coup and the outbreak of a brief but bloody civil war in 
August 1975. The turmoil provided the Indonesian military with a justification to invade 
East Timor in December 1975: to bring peace and liberate the East Timorese people. 
 
48 Taylor, 1991, p. 42; Hill, 2002, p. 73; Jolliffe, 1978, pp. 103-5. 
49 Hill, 2002, pp. 75-6. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. p. 77; Taylor, 1991, p. 35; Jolliffe, 1978, p. 69. 
52 Quoted in Hill, 2002, p. 77. 
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Indonesia’s invasion, which interrupted the FRETILIN-led nation-building process, 
deprived the Timorese people of discussing and achieving the reconciliation of the 1975 
civil war. The trauma of the short but bloody civil war would have significant 
implications for future Timorese politics and lead many Timorese to associate political 
party competition with internal conflict rather than as a requirement of democracy.  
East Timorese nationalism, whose foundations were laid by FRETILIN from 
indigenous values towards the end of Portuguese era, fully grew under Indonesian rule. 
Timorese society underwent a profound transformation under Indonesia and experienced 
both unity and division at the same time.  
To start with unity, the Indonesian government’s integrationist strategy, which 
relied on a mixture of military repression, economic development programmes, 
resettlement, and imposition of Indonesian culture and political ideology through 
universal education, had the opposite effect.53 The Indonesian state’s attempts to 
integrate East Timor in political, economic and cultural terms fuelled a rising sense of 
national unity among linguistically and culturally diverse and politically divided East 
Timorese against the dominant ‘other’.  
During the Indonesian occupation, Catholicism and Tetum emerged as the two 
distinctive characteristics of the East Timorese expression of national identity.54 The 
Indonesian government banned the use of Portuguese in education and in the Catholic 
liturgy in 1981. This led the Church to adopt Tetum as a full liturgical language. The 
Church’s choice of Tetum rather than Indonesian was an important expression of the 
Timorese national identity. The Church’s decision to use Tetum not only raised its status 
from being a local language to the language of East Timorese religion and identity55 but 
also helped the Church integrate “even more closely with the community”56 and 
strengthen its position in Timorese social and political life.  
 
53 Alberto Arenas, “Education and Nationalism in East Timor”, Social Justice, 25:2 (Summer 1998), pp. 
131-148; Peter Carey, “East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity”, 
Conflict Studies, 293/294 (October / November 1996); Anderson, 2001 [1993]; Taylor, 1991. 
54 Anderson, 2001 [1993]; Arenas, 1998. 
55 Anderson, 2001 [1993], p. 238. 
56 Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor, (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 
121. 
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In addition to the use of military and police control, the Indonesia government 
implemented development programmes in its twenty-seventh province particularly in 
education with a view to capitalising on East Timor’s socio-economic 
underdevelopment and winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of young Timorese. To this end, 
the government invested more in the construction of physical infrastructure, improved 
healthcare facilities and built new schools. As the below table shows, under Indonesia, 
the number of primary schools where the curriculum was based on the state ideology, 
Pancasila57 had risen from 47 in 1975 to 788 in 1999 and enrolment increased from 
10,500 in 1975 to some 167,000 by 1999.  
Access to education 1975 1999 
Number of primary schools / 
number of students attending 
47 primary schools  
10,500 students 
788 primary students 
167,181 students 
Number of junior secondary 
schools / number of students 
attending 
2 junior secondary schools 
315 students 
114 junior secondary schools 
32,197 students 
Number of senior secondary 
schools / number of students 
attending 
- 54 senior secondary schools 
18,973 students 
Table 4.4. Number of schools and students during Indonesian period (Adapted from United Nations, Building Blocks 
for a Nation, (November 2000), p. 59, available at www.undp.org/rbap/Country_Office/CCA/Cca-
EastTimor2000.pdf  [accessed on 28 August 2006]). 
 
As can be seen in the below table, the expansion of educational facilities led to a 
significant increase in the number of Bahasa-speakers in East Timor. According to the 
1990 census results, 85 per cent of Timorese males and 77.7 per cent of females aged 
between 15 and 19 could speak Bahasa.  
Age group Male Female 
15-19 85.0 77.7 
20-24 78.3 59.3 
25-29 64.6 43.2 
30-34 57.5 31.7 
35-39 46.8 27.1 
40-44 34.7 16.8 
45-49 30.5 15.4 
50-54 25.0 12.3 
55-59 20.5 8.9 
60-64 16.0 9.1 
65-69 20.0 8.7 
All ages 56.4 39.4 
Table 4.5. Percentage of Bahasa Indonesian speakers from households whose head was born in East Timor (Source 
Gavin W. Jones, “East Timor: Education and Human Resource Development”, James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo 
Soares (eds), Out of Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, (London: Hurst, 2000), p. 51).  
                                                 
57 Introduced by Sukarno, Pancasila meaning “five principles” rests on nationalism, humanitarianism, 
democracy, social justice and the belief in one God. 
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The expansion of educational facilities in East Timor, similar to the effect of 
Dutch colonialism on the emergence of Indonesian nationalism, fostered a greater sense 
of nationalism amongst the educated East Timorese youth who were fluent in Bahasa.58 
The education system they went through led them to see the gap between what they were 
taught at school and the reality on the ground. Just as at the turn of the 20th century, the 
language of the coloniser, Dutch, enabled Indonesian intellectuals to communicate with 
the outside world, get access to modernity, perceive the real condition of their society 
and understand the modern means to emancipate themselves from foreign rule, 
Indonesian served in the same way.59 Taught about Indonesia’s decolonisation process 
against Dutch supremacy, educated young Timorese became involved in clandestine 
networks organised throughout Indonesia and East Timor rather than being ‘integrated’ 
into the Indonesian state and society. For many Timorese, the word ‘integrasi’, as Carey 
suggests, became synonymous with Indonesian colonialism and the persecution of 
Timorese culture and society by the Indonesian state.60 
The spread of Roman Catholicism among the East Timorese was another kind of 
societal transformation that took place in East Timor under Indonesian rule. In 1974, 
while a majority of the East Timorese were animist, only approximately 20 per cent 
were Catholic.61 By 1999, more than 90 per cent of East Timor’s population of 750,000 
became Catholic.62 Two factors led to this rise: (1) According to Indonesian law, every 
Indonesian citizen had to belong to one of the five officially recognised religions (Islam, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism) in order not to be labelled as 
atheist, and thus, communist, (2) the Catholic Church became the “mouth of the people 
oppressed”63 while the Catholic faith was seen as an instrument to resist the ‘oppressor’. 
In other words, being a member of the Catholic Church meant “enjoy[ing] protection 
 
58 Anderson, 2001 [1993], pp. 236-239; Peter Carey, “Introduction”, Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, 
East Timor at the Crossroads, (London: Cassell), 1995, p. 12. 
59 Anderson, 2001 [1993], pp. 236-239. 
60 Carey, 1996, p. 14. 
61 Arnold S. Kohen, “The Catholic Church and The Independence of East Timor”, Richard Tanter, Mark 
Selden and Stephen R. Shalom (eds.), Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the 
World Community, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p. 46. 
62 Ibid., p. 49. 
63 Interview with João Cancio Freitas, Dili Institute of Technology, (Dili, 3 February 2006). See also 
Kohen, 2001, pp. 46-49. 
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according to the Indonesian state’s logic” and Catholicism became “an expression of a 
common suffering”.64  
The Indonesian authorities’ engagement in militarising the East Timorese, on the 
other hand, provoked regional, political and social divisions and created new divides in 
the form of “pro-Indonesian vs. pro-independence”. The Indonesian military recruited 
East Timorese civilians into “auxiliary units” and a “civil defence force” formed to 
provide logistic support for combat troops and to function as intelligence agents.65 The 
mobilisation of civilians into paramilitary forces accelerated in the years 1998 and 1999 
prior to the UN-sponsored “popular consultation”. In this context, some commentators 
such as Kammen suggest that militia recruitment was based on particular social 
backgrounds.66 In the eastern district of Lautem, where Fataluku speakers constitute the 
only caste-based society in the country, militia members tended to come from the 
ancient akanu (slave) caste.67 Those who were descendants of forced plantation 
labourers from the late Portuguese era, referred to as asuliar, were largely recruited into 
militia forces formed in Liquica and Ermera districts in the west.68 
In the same vein, Xanana Gusmão’s efforts in the 1980s to revitalise the three-
pronged resistance, i.e. the military wing, clandestine movement and diplomatic front, 
led to two contradictory outcomes: achieving a unified stance against the Indonesians on 
the one hand and fuelling political, ideological and social divisions on the other. The 
divisions within the resistance arose from differences of opinion on the structure of the 
resistance, strategy to use against the Indonesian military, and implementing the 
principle of civilian control of military affairs.69  
The armed front was led by Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East 
Timor (Forças Armadas de Libertaçao Nacional de Timor Leste, FALINTIL), which was 
set up on 20 August 1975 as the armed wing of FRETILIN to counter UDT’s ‘pre-
 
64 Anderson, 2001 [1993], p. 238. 
65 For further information on militarisation of the Timorese by the Indonesian government and army, see 
CAVR, 2005, Part 4.  
66 Kammen, 2003, p. 82. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid., pp. 82-3. 
69 For further information on the splits in the resistance, see CAVR, 2005, Part 5. 
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emptive’ coup of 11 August. The initial resistance strategy adopted by FRETILIN in 
1976 was based on the formation of liberated zones (zonas libertadas) controlled and 
protected by FALINTIL troops, and the organisation of civilians in the resistance 
support bases (bases de apoio) where they would provide logistic support to the armed 
forces while being mobilised and educated.70 Following the killing, capture and 
surrender of FALINTIL fighters, and the fall of the last support base in February 1979, 
Indonesia declared that East Timor was pacified. Almost the complete annihilation of 
the resistance led the surviving leaders to seek new tactics both inside and outside East 
Timor. To start with regenerating the armed front, the surviving resistance leadership 
including Xanana Gusmão, who was appointed as political commissar and FALINTIL 
commander-in-chief in 1981, admitted that FALINTIL could never defeat the 
Indonesian military.71 With the destruction of the liberated zones and support bases, the 
FALINTIL leadership decided to separate civilians from the armed forces. FALINTIL’s 
new military strategy was based on guerrilla warfare and obtaining the support of 
civilians living in the Indonesian controlled areas. Having initiated a series of 
negotiations with the Indonesian military leadership in 1983, Gusmão also worked to 
achieve a national front that would include other political parties and the Catholic 
Church, which had distanced themselves from FRETILIN.72 In 1984, FRETILIN 
abandoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology and revolutionary politics adopted in 1977.73  
These developments deepened the ideological differences between Gusmão, who 
was in favour of the adoption of a policy of resistance based on national unity rather 
than FRETILIN partisanship, and hard liners within FALINTIL. Several senior 
FALINTIL officers, who were also members of the FRETILIN central committee, 
attempted a failed coup against Gusmão. The commanders and political leaders who 
were at odds with Gusmão were then expelled from FALINTIL. Subsequently, several 
of them died or surrendered to the Indonesian military.74  
 
70 Ibid., paras. 63-68. 
71 CAVR, 2005, Part 5, para. 112. 
72 Ibid., paras. 111-116. 
73 Ibid., para. 117. 
74 Ibid., paras. 119-123. 
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Having defeated the dissident voices in FALINTIL, Gusmão strengthened not 
only his personal position but also the armed front’s dominance in the resistance 
movement against the party, FRETILIN. In 1987, he resigned from the FRETILIN 
central committee and announced the separation of FALINTIL from FRETILIN. While 
his move encouraged the establishment of a national front, it also deepened the existing 
divisions and rivalries between those who led the resistance in East Timor and those 
who struggled for independence and lobbied abroad, and between the military and 
FRETILIN. 
With regard to the clandestine front, it was initially made up of FRETILIN 
members and their families, engaged in providing logistical support for FALINTIL 
troops based in the interior regions. Following the fall of the liberated zones and support 
bases in the interior regions, this front was restructured into organised networks in the 
villages and towns in East Timor and Indonesia. The clandestine front gained strength 
with the establishment of student cells at high school and university level in East Timor 
and Indonesia in the second half of the 1980s. By infiltrating the legal youth 
organisations and student bodies, members of the student cells were able to expand the 
support for the national struggle. The underground movement not only provided the 
logistical support that the armed front needed but also organised public protests in cities 
in East Timor and Indonesia as well as in Portugal and Australia where solidarity groups 
were established by the diaspora.75  
The diplomatic front was also re-organised in the 1980s to encourage the 
participation of non-FRETILIN members in promoting self-determination in the 
international arena. After the Indonesian invasion, some members of UDT leadership 
including João Carrascalão migrated to Australia and restructured the party there.76 
FRETILIN established the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Conselho 
Revolucionária de Resistência Nacional, CRRN) in 1981 but failed to achieve an 
effective national unity. Following Gusmão’s declaration that FALINTIL was a 
politically neutral army, a new umbrella organisation was established in 1988 – the 
 
75 Ibid., paras. 145-170. 
76 CAVR, 2005, Part 7.1, para. 388. 
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National Council of Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere, 
CNRM).  
These developments were accompanied by a new diplomatic campaign. José 
Ramos-Horta resigned from FRETILIN and was appointed as Gusmão’s personal 
representative and the special representative of the CRNM abroad in 1989.77 This 
change was followed by the consolidation of the CRNM’s leading role for independence 
struggle at the international level, diminishing FRETILIN’s position.78 It was not 
welcomed by other members of the diplomatic front based in Mozambique, but for the 
time being internal differences were suppressed for the sake of the national resistance. 
Ramos-Horta’s leading position in the diplomatic front reflected a changing tone of the 
language of the national struggle. This change in the diplomatic language was, to a 
larger extent, influenced by the change in the international sphere with the collapse of 
the bipolar world system following the disintegration of socialist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. The old leftist rhetoric was replaced with a new language emphasising the East 
Timorese people’s right and commitment to democratic government and human rights. 
Ramos-Horta’s efforts to attract international attention culminated in 1996 when he and 
Bishop Belo were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.79 In April 1998, just before 
Suharto’s fall following the collapse of the Indonesian economy, at a conference in 
Peniche, near Lisbon, CNRM was transformed into the National Council of Timorese 
Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência Timorense, CNRT). Due to its association 
with FRETILIN as well as its socialist implications, the word “Maubere” was replaced 
with “Timorese” to strengthen the policy of national unity.80   
 
 
77 CAVR, 2005, Part 5, para. 131. 
78 Ibid. 
79 “East Timor Democracy Leaders Named Nobel Peace Prize Winners, Indonesia Angered by Selection”, 
CNN World, (11 October 1996), http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9610/11/nobel [accessed 15 April 2007]. 
80 CAVR, 2005, Part 5, para. 135. 
 Picture 4.1. Rua do Timor-Leste (East Timor Street) in Maputo, Mozambique where members of the diplomatic front 
were organised during the Indonesian occupation (Photo courtesy: Anka Sahin). 
 
The adoption and implementation of the principle of national unity at political 
and societal level had the desired effect, enhancing solidarity amongst the East 
Timorese. The changing domestic conditions within Indonesia and international 
circumstances also helped the Timorese leadership achieve their goal: exercising the 
right to self-determination. Under enormous international pressure, President 
Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie, who replaced Suharto in May 1998 following the Asian 
financial crisis, agreed to conduct a UN-sponsored “popular consultation” in relation to 
the status of East Timor in January 1999. The vote, organised on 30 August 1999, 
resulted in an overwhelming majority (78.5 %) in favour of independence.81 Although 
the 30 August popular consultation marked the end of centuries-old struggle against 
foreign rule and the beginning of a new era, the announcement of the results of the vote 
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81 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), established by Security Council Resolution 1246 on 
11 June 1999 to organise and conduct a popular consultation in order to ascertain whether the East 
Timorese people accept the proposed autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed 
special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia, registered 451,792 
voters in and around East Timor between 16 June and 5 August 1999. A total of 446,953 – 98.9 per cent of 
the registered voters – cast their ballots on 30 August. For further information, see “Secretary-General 
Informs Security Council People of East Timor Rejected Special Autonomy Proposed by Indonesia”, UN 
Press Release SC/6721, (3 September 1999) available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990903.sc6721.html [accessed 23 December 2006]. 
 141
                                                
sparked a scorched earth campaign by Indonesian-military backed pro-Jakarta local 
militias, resulting in the destruction of East Timor’s already insufficient infrastructure, 
displacement of two-thirds of the population including 250,000 refugees thought to have 
been forcibly transferred to West Timor82 and the death of at least 1,000 people.83 In 
response to the escalation of violent events, covered largely in the media, President 
Clinton threatened to suspend all military cooperation programmes with Indonesia and 
called for the implementation of financial sanctions if Indonesia did not cooperate to end 
the violence.84 Just two days after Clinton’s call for cuts in international lending, the 
IMF announced the suspension of talks with the Indonesian government on its economic 
programme and the World Bank froze its $1 billion aid programme to the country.85 
Under this intense international pressure, President Habibie had no choice but to agree to 
the deployment of the Australian-led multinational force to restore law and order in 
September 1999 and the subsequent establishment of the UN transitional administration 
mandated to supervise East Timor’s political independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 Joint Assessment Mission, “East Timor, Building a Nation: A Framework for Reconstruction and 
Development”, Governance Background Paper, (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 1999); United 
Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor”, United Nations Security 
Council, S/1999/1024, (4 October 1999). 
83 James Dunn, Crimes against Humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their Nature and 
Causes (Dili: 14 February 2001), p. 26, http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdf1/dunn.pdf [accessed 10 April 
2006]. 
84 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, “East Timor and the New Humanitarianism”, International 
Affairs, 77:4 (2001), pp. 818-819. 
85 Ibid., p. 819. 
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4.4. Building the East Timorese Nation in the Post-Independence Period 
The building of a nation, which Benedict Anderson defines as a political 
community, whose members do not personally know each other but feel culturally and 
political connected,86 is a process. Nationhood, as discussed in Chapter 2, is about the 
institutionalisation of a political and cultural collective identity which reflects the mutual 
commitment of members of an “imagined” community to living together within the 
polity. The achievement of independence by the East Timorese people, in this context, 
marked the end of a long process resulting in their liberation from foreign rule and the 
establishment of a political community of their own. It also denoted the beginning of 
another process leading to the integration of diverse ethno-linguistic and cultural groups 
as well as politically and socially-divided groups around a shared national identity 
constructed upon common historical, cultural, and political bonds and characteristics. In 
other words, the achievement of independence entailed the creation of a new sense of 
‘imagined community’ that would represent the East Timorese people’s commitment to 
living together within the same polity they have created. This involved the creation of an 
inclusive, unifying collective identity that would replace the notion of national unity 
constructed during the resistance upon common suffering and painful struggle against 
foreign rule. 
The euphoria of long-awaited liberation from foreign domination in East Timor, 
however, was short-lived. Shortly after the withdrawal of the Indonesian government 
military and pro-Indonesian Timorese militias, the old ideological, political and personal 
differences and divisions within the Timorese political leadership resurfaced and the 
coalition of the resistance, outlined in Figure 4.1., came to an end.  
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military 
Figure 4.1. Structure of the Timorese Resistance (Unity against the ‘Enemy’) (Data compiled from 
CAVR, Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (Dili, 
2005), Chapters 5 and 7). 
 
The rapidly changing political environment witnessed the emergence of a 
number of diverse actors and groups, affecting the emergence and intensification of 
intra-societal competition and divisions. Most of the political actors were the old, 
familiar faces who led the resistance inside East Timor e.g. Xanana Gusmão and 
Francisco Guterres (a.k.a. Lu’Olo), and those who returned from exile e.g. José Ramos-
Horta, Mari Alkatiri, Rogerio Lobato, Francisco Javier do Amaral and João Carrascalão. 
There were also some new-generation actors, e.g. former student activist Fernando de 
Araujo, who assumed a leading role in the clandestine front of the resistance. All these 
political groups differed in their visions for the future of the new Timorese state and 
nation and were involved in a fierce struggle for power immediately after the 
disappearance of the enemy. As the below figure shows these political groupings did not 
have monolithic structures but were internally fragmented.  
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Figure 4.2. Fractures in the Timorese political community following the disappearance of the common 
external enemy 
 
The divisions within the Timorese elite affected the emergence of intra-societal 
competition and new divisions as well as the intensification of the pre-existing divides. 
Centred on the question of ‘who fought for independence’, divisions in the society were 
also associated with a growing sense of disappointment with the general socio-economic 
situation. The inclusion of some parts of the population into the newly developed 
government structures and exclusion of some others fuelled discontent and led to the 
emergence of intra-societal competition and new divisions. The recruitment of some 
former FALINTIL guerrillas, most of whom were from eastern provinces with loyalties 
to particular commanders, into the newly-created national defence force, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, led to resentment within the veteran community. The 
employment of the returned Portuguese and/or English-speaking diaspora Timorese, 
who were better educated and more qualified than indigenous Timorese, with UNTAET 
and later with the Timorese government exacerbated tensions. The exclusion of some 
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segments of the population caused resentment amongst those who had stayed inside East 
Timor during the Indonesian occupation and led them to see themselves as “the 
oppressed” and the diaspora community as “opportunists” or those “who did not 
participate in the struggle for [independence] but immediately enjoy[ed] 
independence”.87  
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(Mozambique, Angola)  
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Figure 4.3. Fault-lines in the Timorese society in the post-independence period  
 
The process of national integration in the post-independence period therefore 
entailed not only the discussion and reconciliation of past differences but also dealing 
with newly emerging political and social divisions. In the following section, I will 
discuss social reconciliation and communication and development of a national identity 
in the post-independence period.  
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4.4.1. Reconciliation as Nation-Building 
Psychologically and emotionally traumatised by their long experience of 
violence, repression and political and social divisions, the East Timorese people needed 
a reconciliation process designed to disclose the truth of what happened in the past and 
deliver justice in order to make a new beginning. Such a process required bringing all 
relevant parties and giving them an opportunity to discuss and illuminate the ‘dark sides’ 
of their history and resolve political, ideological and social differences which came into 
existence before the Indonesian invasion and intensified under Indonesian rule. To this 
aim, two complementary bodies were set up to promote community reconciliation in 
East Timor: Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU), and Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (CAVR).  
The SCIU was established by UNTAET in June 2000 to conduct investigations 
and prepare indictments for cases of “serious crimes” committed between 1 January and 
25 October 1999.88 The investigation of crimes committed before 1999 was not under 
the jurisdiction of the serious crimes regime. Serious crimes were defined as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, murder, sexual offences and torture.89 At the end 
of 2003, 81 people against 369 accused were indicted and 46 individuals were convicted, 
one person acquitted and two indictments were dismissed.90 Many suspects named in 
indictments remained in Indonesia while the Indonesian authorities consistently refused 
to transfer them to Timor-Leste to stand trial.91 In addition to political constraints, time 
and funding limitations led the unit to focus on “priority cases” where evidence was 
easily attainable, crimes were severe and the accused had a significant degree of 
 
88  See UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000), available via 
http://www.unmiset.org/legal/UNTAET-Law/Regulations%20English/regenglish.htm [accessed 28 
August 2006].  
89 Ibid, Section 1.3. 
90 Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), “The Future of the Serious Crimes Unit”, JSMP Issue 
Report, (Dili, January 2004a), p. 3.  
91 Amnesty International, “Timor-Leste: International Community Must Press for Justice for Crimes 
against Humanity”, Amnesty International Press Release, ASA 57/007/2003, (29 August 2003b), available 
at http://origin2.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA570072003?open&of=ENG-TMP [accessed 3 
September 2006]. 
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responsibility.92 This, however, resulted in almost half of some 1,400 murder cases from 
1999, let alone the other serious crimes including rape and torture, remaining 
uninvestigated.93  
The CAVR, established by the UN in July 2001, was mandated to establish the 
truth about human rights violations committed between April 1974 and December 1999, 
mediate reconciliation agreements between victims and perpetrators of “less serious” 
criminal offences such as theft and looting, and refer cases involving serious criminal 
offences to the serious crimes regime with recommendations for prosecution.94 Having 
collected more than 7,000 statements in interviews and public hearings held throughout 
the country, the CAVR detailed and clarified responsibility for crimes committed by 
FRETILIN, UDT and other Timorese political groups, and the Indonesian government 
and military during the course of the political conflict between 1974 and 1999 in a report 
of some 2,500 pages on 31 October 2005.  
The report concluded that the Indonesian military and the government were 
primarily responsible and accountable for the human rights violations committed during 
the 24-years of occupation, which amounted to crimes against humanity.95 Among other 
things, the CAVR recommended the renewal of the serious crimes process to investigate 
and prosecute crimes committed by Timorese political groups and members of the 
Indonesian military in the past and establishment of an international criminal tribunal 
“should other measures be deemed to have failed to deliver a sufficient measure of 
justice and Indonesia persists in the obstruction of justice”.96 The CAVR report also 
recommended measures to seek reparations from the government of Indonesia, 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, and foreign governments and private 
companies, which provided Indonesia with the necessary military and political 
 
92 Megan Hirst and Howard Varney, “Justice Abandoned? An Assessment of the Serious Crimes Process 
in East Timor”, International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper Series (June 2005), p. 7, 
available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/ictj.justice-abandoned.pdf [accessed 19 September 2006]. 
93 JSMP, 2004a, p. 7.  
94 UNTAET/REG/2001/10, (13 July 2001), available via http://www.unmiset.org/legal/UNTAET-
Law/Regulations%20English/regenglish.htm [accessed 19 September 2006]. 
95 CAVR, 2005, Part 8, p. 5. 
96 CAVR, 2005, Part 11, pp. 23-26. 
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assistance during the occupation.97 
The recommendations of the CAVR found little support from the Timorese 
leadership. President Gusmão, for example, described the recommendations as an 
example of “grandiose idealism”.98 Regarding the CAVR’s recommendation for 
renewing the serious crimes process to investigate and prosecute the human rights 
violations committed before 1999, Gusmão suggested that the prosecution of Timorese 
perpetrators for the past crimes would only open old wounds and trigger a wave of 
“political anarchy and social chaos”.99 He also argued that the investigation of past 
crimes by international legal staff would be likely to result in the portrayal of the East 
Timorese as a “brutal, violent and bloodthirsty people”.100 He therefore encouraged the 
Timorese political and social groups to apologise and forgive each other. The two old, 
rival parties, engaged in a fierce power struggle leading to a short but bloody civil war in 
August 1975, Fretilin and UDT publicly apologised for the crimes and abuses of human 
rights they committed in the past but reconciliation between the two parties was yet to be 
completed.  
As to the implementation of recommendations on reparations, the Timorese 
leaders such as Gusmão and Ramos-Horta stated that they would not seek compensation 
from Indonesia and other foreign governments. They tended to praise the financial 
contributions of donor countries to the reconstruction and development of the country 
since 1999 and argued that it would be difficult to find out who the victims were and 
who participated in the resistance.101 Thus, the Timorese leaders advocated the view that 
the recognition by the international community of the right to self-determination and 
independent statehood should be seen the delivery of “the best”102 or “the greatest act of 
 
97 Ibid., p. 4, 42. 
98 José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão, “Speech of His Excellency President Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão on 
the Occasion of the Handing Over of the Final Report of the CAVR to the National Parliament”, (28 
November 2005). 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 “Speech of His Excellency President Kay Rala Gusmão”; “Interview with José Ramos-Horta”, Asia 
Source, (20 March 2006), http://www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/horta2.cfm [accessed 6 
November 2006]. 
102 Gusmão, 2005. See also, “Security Council 5351st Meeting”, Press Release SC/8615, (23 January 
2006), available via http://www.unmiset.org/UNMISETWebSite.nsf/UNDocuments.htm?OpenPage 
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justice”.103 
With regard to the implementation of recommendations pertaining to the 
prosecution of Indonesian military figures, the Timorese government advocated the 
notion of joint-investigation of the past human rights violations by the Indonesian and 
Timorese governments rather than the establishment of a formal tribunal. Several factors 
affected the Timorese leadership’s approach: (1) power imbalances between Timor-
Leste and Indonesia; (2) economic and political dependency of the former on the latter; 
(3) the poor performance of the ad hoc human rights court established by the Indonesian 
government to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violations committed before 
and after the 1999 referendum; and (4) lack of international financial and political 
support for establishing an international tribunal for Timor-Leste.104 The UN budget for 
the serious crimes regime in 2001, for example, amounted to only US $ 6.3 million, 
which was far lower than what was allocated to the international tribunals established in 
Rwanda and former Yugoslavia to address past human rights abuses. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) budgets for 2002–2003 were $178 million and $ 223 respectively.105  
In addition to this, it is also important to note that the UN demonstrated limited 
support for the serious crimes process despite former Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 
frequent emphasis on the need to bring perpetrators of past crimes to justice.106 The 
events that followed the issuing of the indictment for General Wiranto, Commander-in-
Chief of the Indonesian armed forces in 1999, illustrate the UN’s lack of commitment to 
the justice process. The indictment of Wiranto for crimes against humanity which was 
condemned by the Indonesian government as a “politically motivated” action was issued 
in February 2003.107 The UN declined to support the indictment by suggesting that it 
was issued through the prosecution service of Timor-Leste not by the UN. While this 
 
[accessed 20 May 2006].  
103 Asia Source, 2006. 
104 Interview with Dionisio Babo Soares, (Dili, 10 February 2006). 
105 Suzanne Katzenstein, “Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor”, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, 16 (2003), p. 258. 
106 Hirst and Varney, 2005, p. 25. 
107 Ibid. 
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statement was “technically correct”, the work of the prosecution service was actually 
carried out by a UN unit and filled in by UN staff.108 This attitude of the UN 
strengthened the Timorese leaders’ perception that the “UN’s support for justice cannot 
be taken for granted”109 and prompted them to form a bilateral “Commission of Truth 
and Friendship” (CTF) with the government of Indonesia to investigate the events 
surrounding the 1999 referendum and promote reconciliation and good neighbourhood 
relations between the two countries. Justified as an effort to promote ‘forward-looking’ 
restorative justice rather than ‘backward-looking’ retributive justice, the CTF, however, 
was given power to grant amnesty for perpetrators who “cooperate fully in revealing the 
truth”.110  
The Timorese government’s pragmatist position, however, contradicted those of 
human rights activists, civil society organisations and the victims of human rights 
violations, all of whom hoped the identification of responsibilities for the past atrocities 
would create a formal mechanism of accountability and justice to investigate and 
prosecute both Indonesians and Timorese for crimes committed in the past.111 Overall, 
the establishment of a community reconciliation process was an important mechanism 
towards seeking the truth about the past human rights abuses, gathering evidence and 
identifying the responsibility of Timorese, Indonesian and international institutions and 
personalities for the crimes committed. The conduct of public hearings also raised 
expectations amongst the victims and survivors that justice would be served in respect to 
serious crimes, at least for those individuals falling under the jurisdiction of the serious 
crimes regime within Timor-Leste.112 However, the SCIU’s failure to indict most of the 
suspects referred to it by the CAVR led to the emergence of a sense of impunity and 
 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 “Terms of Reference for the Commission of Truth and Friendship Established by the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste”, (Jakarta: 9 March 2005), Point 14(c). 
111 Piers Pigou, Crying Without Tears: In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor Leste: 
Community Perspectives and Expectations (International Centre for Transitional Justice, August 2003); 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Unfulfilled Expectations: Community Views on CAVR’s 
Community Reconciliation Process, (Dili, August 2004b). 
112 Hirst and Varney, 2005, p. 15.  
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unfairness amongst the victims.113  
The limited capacity and enthusiasm of the Timorese government to follow the 
recommendations of the CAVR inhibited the achievement of a complete reconciliation 
process in the country, leaving the deep wounds of the past unhealed. Although, in 
general, the Timorese people are said to understand that their “poor, tiny country” has to 
establish good relations with its “giant neighbour”, the establishment of the CTF caused 
tension between the Timorese government and civil society organisations and raised 
concerns about the government’s capacity to uphold the rule of law as the basic 
democratic principle in politics and society.114 It was criticised by the Church as an 
attempt to “bury the past rather than pursue justice”115 and protested by East Timorese 
and Indonesian NGOs as a “hasty move” motivated by “political deals”.116  The 
Timorese government’s limited progress in holding the perpetrators of human rights 
abuses in the past accountable caused frustration in the individuals who lost members of 
their family during the struggle for independence. This incomplete reconciliation 
process, which fuelled potential sources of division within the society, has constituted a 
serious challenge to accomplishing integration at the national level stemming from 
public trust in the capacity of government institutions to respond to the moral, political 
and legal demands of the Timorese society. 
 
 
113 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
114 Aderito de Jesus Soares, Justice in Limbo: The Case of East Timor”, paper presented at International 
Symposium on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Victims of Serious Crimes, organised by 
Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo, (29 March 2005), available at 
http://www.etan.org/et2005/may/22/18jstce.htm [accessed 25 September 2006].  
115 Rachel Harvey, “E Timor Truth Commission Formed”, BBC News, (1 August 2005). 
116 “‘Political Deals’ Were Made over the Establishment of the Commission of Truth and Friendship 
(CTF)”, Joint Statement of Non Government Organisations of Timor Leste and Indonesia, (Jakarta and 
Dili, 18 March 2005), available at http://www.etan.org/et2005/march/20/19iandt.htm [accessed 2 
November 2007]  
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4.4.2. Constructing an Inclusive East Timorese National Identity 
As noted in Chapter 2, which provides an analytical framework for studying the 
process of nation-building in Kosovo and East Timor in the post-armed conflict period, 
the accomplishment of a sense of national cohesion in post-conflict societies entails the 
creation of an inclusive collective identity. In the following section, the aspects of the 
construction of Timorese national identity in the post-1999 period will be discussed. 
 
4.4.2.1. History as a Source of Timorese National Identity 
History serves as an important source for developing and promoting a sense of 
unity and national identity. In the case of Timor-Leste, history has both integrative and 
disintegrative elements. The strong emphasis put on the centuries-old suffering, national 
struggle and the subsequent triumph against foreign rule attributes Timorese history a 
unitary role in transcending linguistic or ethnic differences and binding diverse ethno-
linguistic groups on the basis of a common historical experience and capacity to resist 
the domination of malae, meaning foreigner. On the other hand, the Timorese history 
has some disintegrative elements originating from (1) decades-old political and social 
splits and rivalries, and (2) the level of leadership and participation in the resistance 
movement of different regions of the country and segments of society. In this context, 
writing and narrating the history of Timor-Leste becomes a challenge.  
To start with writing the history of Portuguese colonialism, the dominant 
narrative of the country’s colonial past is the 450 year history of the enslavement of the 
Timorese people by the Portuguese masters117 and the continued anti-colonial funu or 
national struggle of the Timorese people against the Portuguese.118 Portuguese colonial 
historiography attributes a civilising role to Portuguese rule in the island and depicts the 
military campaigns taken against Timorese rebellious subjects as acts of benighted 
pacification or civilisation efforts. For the East Timorese, sporadic rebellions represent 
                                                 
117 Kammen, 2003, p. 71. 
118 Geoffrey C. Gunn, “The Five-Hundred-Year Timorese Funu”, Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and 
Stephen R. Shalom (eds.), Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World 
Community, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), pp. 3-14.  
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heroic struggles, wars of independence and precursors to national emancipation.119 
East Timorese nationalist historiography which started to emerge towards the end 
of the Portuguese rule attributes a national heroic role to the Boaventura rebellion of 
1912 and the Viqueque uprising of 1959 even though very little is known about these 
rebellions and it is debateable whether the two events were motivated by nationalist 
sentiments to overthrow the Portuguese administration. According to the Portuguese 
accounts of the 1912 rebellion led by Dom Buaventura, son of a local liurais from 
Manufahi (present day Same) in the south, the “complex” causes of the revolt included a 
proposed increase to the head tax, prohibition of the cutting of sandalwood, registration 
of livestock and coconut trees, imposition of new taxes on logging and on the slaughter 
of animals for festive occasions, and a change in the design of the Portuguese flag when 
it became a republic in 1910.120 With the crushing of the Boaventura rebellion, the 
Portuguese pacification campaign was completed, while Dom Boaventura was elevated 
to the status of national hero.  
The 1959 Viqueque uprising was initiated by a dozen Indonesians who were 
involved in a secessionist movement against the Sukarno administration and granted 
political asylum by the Portuguese governor of the time.121 Allowed to reside in Baucau, 
these Indonesian refugees, who are also claimed to be Sukarno’s agents and sent to 
cause trouble in the Portuguese colony, are said to have encouraged the local Timorese 
to attack Portuguese posts in the Viqueque district.122 The Portuguese administration 
which employed local militias from the neighbouring Los Palos district suppressed the 
rebels with brutality.123 Accounts of the casualties vary between 160 and 1,000 and 58 
Timorese were exiled to Angola, Mozambique and Lisbon.124  
Towards the end of Portuguese rule, these two rebellions became central 
reference points for the nationalist leaders of FRETILIN in their efforts to generate a 
sense of national unity based on a perceived tradition of anti-colonial struggle. Abilio 
 
119 Ibid., p. 6. 
120 Jolliffe, 1978, p. 36; Hill, 2002, p. 45. 
121 Jolliffe, 1978, p. 49; Hill, 2002, p. 49. 
122 Jolliffe, Ibid.; Hill, Ibid. 
123 Hill, Ibid. 
124 Jolliffe, Ibid.; Hill, Ibid., p. 50. 
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Araujo, one of the first East Timorese historians and leaders of FRETILIN who later 
turned into a pro-Jakarta businessman, depicted East Timor’s colonial history as a two-
phased resistance movement: the period of guerras independentistas (independence 
wars) led by liurais to defend their local kingdoms between 1642 and 1912, and the 
period of resistência passiva (passive resistance) against Portuguese political and 
economic domination between 1912 and 1975.125  
In his efforts to rejuvenate the resistance around the principle of national unity in 
the 1980s, Xanana Gusmão invoked the long heroic struggle of the Timorese people to 
foreign rule by referring to these rebellions and argued that Portuguese colonialism 
interrupted the natural development of the Timorese nation: 
 
The historical identity of East Timor dates back to long before the arrival of the Portuguese. If it 
had not been the intrusion of Portuguese colonialism, the people of East Timor would have 
followed their own path; they would have created a socio-political structure defined by the 
essence of one people and one nation. With the arrival of the colonialists, this march was halted 
because of the necessity of exploring our wealth caused a war of pacification that put a stop to the 
struggles between the diverse kingdoms, each one wanting to take a position of ascendancy and 
domination over others. The ascendancy of these tribes would have determined the formation of a 
great kingdom – the embryo of the Maubere Homeland!...the kingdoms together formed an 
alliance and to expel the foreign oppressor from what was already being considered a common 
Homeland: this new character united the common aspirations and the will of all. It is out of this 
common character that an understanding that this piece of land is ours was generated. A feeling 
was generated in all the kingdoms of a common heritage, and the notion that we were all equal to, 
while at the same time different from, the Portuguese who wanted to dominate us.  And it is 
because of this, because this character gave all the kingdoms a common motive, a united cause in 
the civil resistance against Portuguese colonialism, that I say we should consider it a common 
Homeland.126 
 
Despite this perceived image of centuries-old anti-colonial struggle and of a 
peaceful society before the arrival of the Portuguese colonisers, it is a matter of 
discussion whether unity was ever strongly present in East Timor. The history of East 
Timor is one of internal struggles and rivalries between local kingdoms and clans or 
ethnic groups.127 Alliances between local kingdoms tended to shift when internal 
conditions changed.128 Existing rivalries between Timorese kingdoms were exploited by 
 
125 Gunn, 2001, p. 11; Hill, 2002, p. 43. 
126 Sarah Niner (ed.), To Resist is to Win: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmão, (Richmond, Victoria: 
Aurora Books, 2000), p. 102. 
127 Gunn, 2001, p. 7. 
128 Fox, 2000, p. 19.  
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the Portuguese to consolidate their rule and weaken the position of the liurais who were 
opposed to the Portuguese. The imperial officials first used the armed forces of loyal 
liurais in 1642 during the campaign against the kingdom of Wehale on the south coast 
(now in Indonesia) and continued to do so until the suppression of the Viqueque 
rebellion in 1959.129  
Discussing and writing modern Timorese history is a more challenging task than 
dealing with the colonial past. The civil war of 1975, organisation of the resistance, 
participation in the resistance movement, and political and social divisions are some of 
the sensitive issues. The brief but bloody civil war which started after UDT’s coup to 
eradicate “communist elements” within FRETILIN on 11 August 1975 caused the death 
of 3,000 people.130 The subsequent Indonesian occupation deprived the Timorese people 
of an opportunity to discuss and resolve their political, ideological and social differences 
and divisions, and thus achieve reconciliation.  
The achievement of independence and the withdrawal of Indonesians provided 
the East Timorese people with an opportunity to discuss the past. However, rather than 
addressing the responsibility for past crimes and wrongs, heated historical debates 
centred on the question of ‘who contributed more to the resistance’ and ‘who betrayed 
it’. Therefore, rather than contributing to the resolution of past differences, these 
historical debates led to the maintenance of old divisions and the emergence of new 
ones. As noted earlier, political and ideological differences in the Timorese nationalist 
leadership, which emerged during the intensive annihilation campaign of the Indonesian 
military in the late-1970s and intensified during the re-structuring of the resistance in the 
early-1980s, were suppressed in the interest of ‘national struggle’. Following the 
achievement of independence, this old ‘unsettled business’ took the form of rivalry over 
the ‘ownership’ of the resistance. This struggle was mainly between those who fought 
for independence inside the country and members of the diaspora community who 
returned to East Timor in late 1999 and occupied important positions of power. The 
former group included guerrilla fighters and student activists and the latter involved 
 
129 CAVR, 2005, Part:3, para. 18. 
130 Ibid., paras. 146, 153. 
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those who for years kept the Timorese conflict alive on the international agenda and 
lobbied for the conduct of a UN-sponsored referendum for independence. The rivalry 
between these groups in the post-independence period undermined the prospect for 
developing a new understanding of unity in the absence of a common enemy. 
 
4.4.2.2. Language 
Timor-Leste is a land of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. The country’s 
population includes indigenous ethno-linguistic groups, some Chinese, descendants of 
Arab migrants and Indonesian transmigrants.131 Although diversity is not necessarily a 
divisive factor, it has occupied an important place in the construction of the East 
Timorese national identity in the post-independence era. 
Languages spoken in Timor-Leste can be classified into main two groups: 
indigenous and non-indigenous languages.132 The former includes sixteen languages 
belonging to two language families: Austronesian and Trans-New Guinean languages.133 
The latter includes Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesian, varieties of Chinese, and English.134  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 Prompted by anticipation of unrest, security threats and intimidation, virtually all non-East Timorese 
transmigrants, estimated to have numbered 60,000, fled the territory prior to and following the 30 August 
1999 popular consultation. Amnesty International, “East Timor, Seize the Moment”, 21/49/99, (21 June 
1999), p. 14 available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA210491999ENGLISH/$File/ASA2104999.pdf [accessed 16 June 
2006]; Anthony L. Smith, “East Timor”, Self-Determination Conflict Profile, a project associated with 
Foreign Policy in Focus, (2001), p. 3, available at http://www.irc-
online.org/selfdetermine/pdf/overview/OVtimor.pdf [accessed 16 June 2006]. 
132 John Hajek, “Language Maintenance and Survival in Eat Timor: All Change Now? Winners and 
Losers”, David Bradley and Maya Bradley (eds.), Language Endangerment and Language Maintenance, 
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 182. 
133 Geoffrey Hull, “The Languages of East Timor: Some Basic Facts”, Instituto Nacional de Linguística 
Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa’e [The National Linguistic Institute of the National University of 
East Timor], 1999, revised on 24/08/2004, http://www.asianlang.mq.edu.au/INL/langs.html [accessed 12 
April 2006]; Fox, “Tracing the Path”, p. 3. 
134 Hajek, 2002, p. 182. 
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Austronesian languages  Trans-New Guinean languages 
Tetum (includes four different variants; (1) Tetum Prasa / 
Tétum Praça or Tetum Dili spoken in Dili and its 
surroundings, (2) Tetum Terik spoken along the south coastal 
region, (3) Tetum Belu or Belunese dialect spoken in the 
south-west of East Timor and the south-east of West Timor), 
and (4) Nana’ek dialect spoken in the village of Metinaro, on 
the coastal road between Dili and Manatuto) 
Bunak (spoken in central interior and south-
western East Timor) 
Habun (spoken in the south coast of Manatuto district) Makasai (spoken in Baucau and Viqueque 
districts in the east) 
Kawaimina (acronym used by linguists to refer to similar 
dialects of Kairui, Waimaha, Midiki and Naueti – the first 
three are spoken along the north coast of Baucau district and 
Naueti in the south coast of Lautem district ) 
Makalero (spoken on the south-east coast) 
Galoli (spoken along the north coast between Dili and 
Baucau) 
Fataluku (spoken in Lautem district) 
Wetarese (has three dialects – Rahesuk, Resuk and Raklungu 
– spoken on the island of Atauro) 
 
Bekais (named Welaun by its speakers and spoken in the 
south of Balibo, on both sides of the East Timorese-
Indonesian border) 
 
Dawan (its Baiqenu dialect is spoken in the Oecussi enclave)  
Makuva (spoken in Lautem district)   
Mambai (spoken in the south of Dili, Ermera, Aileu, Ainaro 
and Same) 
 
Kemak (spoken in the north-west of East Timor, in and 
around Atabae, Atsabe and Maliana) 
 
Tokodede (spoken along the north-western coastal strip of 
East Timor around Vatoboro, Maubara, Liquica and 
Bazartete) 
 
Idalaka (acronym used by linguists to refer to similar dialects 
of Lakalei, Idate and Isni spoken in central East Timor) 
 
Table 4.6. Indigenous languages of Timor-Leste (Data compiled from Hull, “The Languages of East 
Timor: Some Basic Facts”, Instituto Nacional de Linguística Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa’e [The 
National Linguistic Institute of the National University of East Timor], 1999, revised on 24/08/2004; 
James J. Fox, James J. Fox, “Tracing the Path, Recounting the Past: Historical Perspectives on Timor”, 
James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds.), Out of Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East 
Timor, (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000), p. pp. 3-5; Idem, “Diversity and Differential 
Development in East Timor: Potential Problems and Future Possibilities”, João Saldanha and Hal Hill 
(eds.), East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies; Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), pp. 159-161), John Hajek, “Language 
Maintenance and Survival in Eat Timor: All Change Now? Winners and Losers”, David Bradley and 
Maya Bradley (eds.), Language Endangerment and Language Maintenance, (London: Routledge Curzon, 
2002), p. 183). 
 
Tetum which has served as lingua franca since the nineteenth century when a 
simplified form of it – Tetum Prasa / Tétum Praça or Tetum Dili – was adopted by the 
Portuguese administration and the church as vernacular.135 Tetum Prasa, greatly 
influenced by Portuguese, is spoken by over 80% of the population.136 A standardised 
                                                 
135 Hull, 2004; Fox, 2000, pp. 22-3. 
136 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ukun Rasik A’an: The Way Ahead, (Dili: 2002), p. 
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orthography of Tetum was developed by the Timorese National Institute of Linguistics 
(INL in Portuguese) in 2004.137  
 
Languages Percentage of Speakers 
Tetum Prasa 82 %  
Bahasa 
Indonesian 
43 % – mostly those under 35 years old educated under Indonesian 
rule 
Portuguese 5 % – mostly older people educated under Portuguese and exiled 
community 
English 2 %  – educated elite, university students, returnees from Australia 
Table 4.7. Knowledge of official and working languages in Timor-Leste (Data compiled from United 
Nations Development Programme, Ukun Rasik A’an: The Way Ahead, (Dili: 2002), pp. 36-37). 
 
Along with Tetum, Portuguese was adopted as the official national language of 
the country.138 The decision was announced only two days before the visit of Portuguese 
President Jorge Sampaio to East Timor in February 2000.139 Bahasa Indonesian and 
English were designated as working languages used in government institutions “side by 
side with official languages as long as deemed necessary”.140 The choice of Portuguese 
was a political decision made by older Portuguese-speaking political leaders, who spent 
the 24 years of Indonesian occupation either fighting in the mountains or in exile 
overseas, and found a “nation of Indonesian speakers” upon their return.141 The 
language issue, however, became the country’s “first social conflict”.142 
                                                                                                                                               
Dominating the government in the post-1999 period, senior Timorese leaders, 
who were educated under the Portuguese, justified the decision to adopt Portuguese as 
official language as an action necessary (1) to neutralise Indonesian cultural and 
linguistic influence on East Timorese society;143 (2) facilitate the country’s access to the 
 
36. 
137 For a historical background of the standardisation of Tetum, see National Institute of Linguistics (INL), 
“The Standard Orthography of the Tetum Language: 115 Years in the Making”, (Dili: August 2004), 
available at http://www.asianlang.mq.edu.au/INL/orthhist.pdf [accessed 12 December 2006]. 
138 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Section 13.1. 
139 Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom, 
(Crow’s Nest, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2002), p. 311. 
140 Constitution, Section 159. 
141 Dennis Schulz and Fernando de Freitas, “East Timor’s Tower of Babel: Cultural Clash over Timor’s 
Official Language”, Sydney Morning Herald, (16 August 2002), available at 
http://www.etan.org/et2002c/august/11-17/16tower.htm [accessed 19 April 2006]. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Dionisio Babo Soares, “Challenges for the Future”, James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds.), Out 
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Timor”.152  
                                                                                                                                               
outside world, primarily the community of Lusophone countries;144 and (3) reinforce 
Timor-Leste’s cultural, economic and political independence from Indonesia and 
Australia.145 Proponents of the Portuguese language also asserted that Portuguese would 
support the development of Tetum, whereas Bahasa Indonesia would “kill” it.146 For 
most of the senior Timorese leaders, Portuguese represented a “fundamental” component 
of Timorese national identity147 because “if the Portuguese had not come, today East 
Timor would be part of Indonesia”.148 Since the Portuguese colonial past enabled the 
Timorese people with the capacity to resist Indonesian rule and exercise the right to self-
determination, historical and emotional links with Portugal had to be maintained in the 
post-independence period.149  
Xanana Gusmão, for example, argued that Timor-Leste had to adopt the 
coloniser’s language because the country owed its independence to Portugal, which gave 
the territory a “historical, cultural and religious” identity: “If the Portuguese left many 
years ago, the Dutch would have taken this area and we would have become Indonesia. 
We have them to thank for our own identity”.150 Similarly, José Ramos-Horta, who after 
the achievement of independent claimed that “[i]f you take away Portuguese language 
and religion, there is no such thing as East Timor”,151 explained the choice of 
Portuguese along with Tetum “as a strategic decision to strengthen the uniqueness of 
East Timor, the national identity of East 
 
of Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000), p. 
292. 
144 Simon Chesterman, “East Timor in Transition: from Conflict Prevention to State-Building”, 
International Peace Academy Reports, (New York, May 2001), available at 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2001/IPA%20-%20East%20Timor%20in%20Transition.pdf 
[accessed 28 June 2006]. 
145 Discussions with several UNDP and AusAID staff members, Dili, February 2006. 
146 Chesterman, 2001. 
147 “Portuguese Is A ‘Fundamental Part’ of National Identity”, Lusa (19 April 2004), 
http://www.etan.org/et2004/april/22/19portug.htm [19 April 2006]. 
148 Interview with João Cancio Freitas, Dili Institute of Technology, (Dili, 3 February 2006). 
149 Schulz and de Freitas, 2002; “Portuguese is a ‘fundamental part’ of national identity”, Lusa (19 April 
2004), available at http://www.etan.org/et2004/april/22/19portug.htm [accessed 19 April 2006]. 
150 Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p. 312. For similar arguments, see Sian Prior, “Languages in East Timor, 
Part 2”, Radio National, (3 July 2004), available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/ling/stories/s1144109.htm [accessed 20 April 2006].  
151 Quoted in Chesterman, 2001. 
152 BBC, “Talking Point Forum: East Timor’s José Ramos-Horta”, (12 June 2002), available at 
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This official definition of East Timorese national identity in terms of the 
perceived Portuguese political and cultural heritage, which contradicts the narration of 
the country’s colonial past in the nationalist historiography, is based on the neglect of a 
number of historical events. As noted earlier, the nationalist historiography, which 
started to emerge towards the end of Portuguese rule, attributes a nationalist vision to 
indigenous rebellions, although not all of them were anti-colonial in character.153 In 
addition to this, it is important to note that under the Portuguese, as discussed earlier, the 
former colony’s population was classified into two main groups: não civilizados 
(‘uncivilised’ natives) and civilizados including mestiços (mixed race) and assimilados 
(‘assimilated’ natives).154 Assimilados had the right to vote in elections for the 
Portuguese National Assembly and the local legislative council.155 They were treated by 
the Portuguese as ‘non-indigenous’ and had access to formal education provided by the 
colonial state-run schools and seminaries. According to the 1950 census results, 
Portuguese-speaking native assimilados and mestiços, who constituted the former 
colony’s local elite, numbered only 3,563 of the territory’s population of some 440,000 
people, while over 98% of the population was classified as ‘uncivilised’.156  
With regard to the knowledge of Portuguese in the post-independence period, 
fewer than 10% of the country’s population, mostly those educated under the Portuguese 
or members of the returned diaspora, could speak it. Approximately 90% of those under 
30 years old, and 50% of those over that age could understand Indonesian.157 According 
to the results of a survey undertaken by the Asia Foundation in 2001, 91% of 
respondents said they could speak Tetum and 58% could read it while 63% said they 
could understand Indonesian and 54% could read it. Some 17% stated they could speak 
Portuguese and 14% said they could read it.158 This is not to suggest that the Indonesian-
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/forum/2026934.stm [accessed 5 June 2006]. 
153 Gunn, 2001. 
154 Weatherbee, 1966, p. 684; Taylor, 1991, p. 13. See also Cabral, 1980, p. 22. 
155 Taylor, 1991, p. 13. 
156 Weatherbee, 1966, p. 684. 
157 Joseph Oenarto, “Can East Timor Survive?”, Australian National University North Australia Research 
Unit Discussion Paper 17/2000, (2000), p. 12. 
158 Asia Foundation, East Timor National Survey of Voter Knowledge (Preliminary Findings), (Dili, May 
2001), p. 70, http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/EastTimorVoterEd.pdf  [24 December 2005]. 
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speaking youth conceived the Indonesian language as an essential marker of their 
national identity. Instead, as mentioned earlier, they were aware of their distinct 
Timorese identity and a majority of them took part in the clandestine networks against 
Indonesian rule. For a majority of the country’s youth, the ability to speak Tetum rather 
than Portuguese represented East Timorese national identity. The results of a survey 
conducted in August 2002 to obtain information on the perception of national identity by 
tertiary students in Dili tends to support this point: some 83% of respondents described 
“ability to speak Tetum” as “very important to being truly East Timorese” while only 
24% said it for Portuguese.159  
As discussed in Chapter 2, national identities are constructed by political elites in 
different forms on the basis of specific political objectives. In the construction of 
national identities language policies occupy a significant place because national 
identities are associated with “high cultures”, created by ruling political elites in a 
standardised language, which permits “context-free communication”.160 Fluency in the 
“high culture” enables individuals to achieve upward social mobility.161 In the case of 
Timor-Leste, the choice of Portuguese to shape the East Timorese “high culture” 
advantaged those who were educated in Portuguese. The decision of the senior Timorese 
leaders, who come from a mestiço or assimilado background, to adopt Portuguese as the 
country’s official language can therefore be seen as an effort of a small group of people 
or a class to sustain their historically privileged status and entrench their power in the 
post-independence period. Their decision, which undermined the already limited 
employment opportunities for the Indonesian-educated young Timorese with 
government, however, fuelled a rising sense of alienation and exclusion among the 
majority of the population. The youth, in  other words, felt being denied playing “an 
appropriate role in the new nation”:162 
 
 
159 Michael Leach, “‘Privileged Ties’: Young People Debating Language, Heritage and National Identity 
in East Timor”, Portuguese Studies Review, 11:1 (2003), p. 147.  
160 Gellner, 1983. 
161 Ibid. 
162 James Cotton, “East Timor in 2004, It is All About Oil”, Asian Survey, 45:1 (January / February 2005), 
p. 187. 
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[T]he young Timorese who fought for independence in East Timor and in Indonesia; they soon 
became simply spectators; they were also shocked to see how the leaders they supported and 
glorified like Xanana and Jose Ramos-Horta very quickly started to form inner circles in which 
East Timorese from exile and from the diaspora including young Timorese who grew up in 
Australia or Portugal, became their most loyal staffers.163 
 
Feeling marginalised by their own leaders, the youth expressed their resentment 
in various ways and usually pointed to the fact that there is no other country in the 
region where Portuguese is spoken.164 In an interview in Dili in February 2006, a young 
Timorese lawyer, for instance, claimed that those lacking good command of Portuguese 
and employed with government institutions feel looked down upon by their colleagues 
and seniors who are fluent in Portuguese. Lyrics of a song recorded by a local rock band 
in Dili “Hau La Hatene Portugersh” which means “I don’t speak Portuguese” in Tetum, 
in this context, might illustrate the frustration of the non-Portuguese-speaking Timorese 
youth towards the government’s language policy: “I can dance, I can sleep, I can fish but 
I don’t know how to speak Portuguese”.165  
By law, the development of Tetum is an important priority and production of 
legislation is required both in Tetum and Portuguese. However, in practice Portuguese is 
given primacy over Tetum. Recently standardised, Tetum is considered weak or 
underdeveloped in terms of political, managerial and technical vocabulary. This 
complicated situation of the language issue, in turn, create has created difficulties in 
education and communication problems. 
 
163 George Junus Aditjondro, “East Timorese Becoming Guests in Their Own Land”, Interview by Ati 
Nurbaiti, Jakarta Post, (2 February 2001), available at 
http://members.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/febguests.htm [accessed 17 August 2006]. 
164 In a number of discussions in Dili in February 2006, many young Timorese argued that the real 
international language in Southeast Asia is not Portuguese but English and Indonesian. 
165 Sian Prior, “Languages in East Timor”, Radio National, (26 April 2004), available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/ling/stories/s1138367.htm [accessed 13 August 2006]. 
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4.4.2.3. Social Communication 
As noted in Chapter 2, Karl Deutsch argued that social communication plays a 
significant role in the development of nations. Arguing that economic development will 
lead to urbanisation and mobilisation of people from villages to towns, Deutsch 
suggested that individuals’ exposure to new social and economic relationships and 
political conditions in urban centres and cross-cultural contacts166 would result in the 
cultural and linguistic assimilation of minority groups and the formation of new 
identities at the nation level. Social mobilisation along with the growth of markets, 
industries, towns, literacy, transportation and mass communication would weaken 
kinship links, local customs, cultures and dialects, and lead to smaller groups being 
absorbed into larger national units.167 
Increasing levels of urbanisation and cross-ethnic contacts, on the other hand, do 
not necessarily indicate the existence of integration. Limited job opportunities in urban 
areas have a negative impact on the process of integration. The situation in Timor-Leste 
tends to support this point. According to the 2004 census results, more than 70 per cent 
of Timor-Leste’s population live in rural areas, where the majority of the households 
rely on subsistence cultivation, and 26% reside in urban areas with 14% living in Baucau 
and Dili. The census also showed that over 50% of the population are under 15 years and 
more than two-thirds are under 25.168. This, in turn, suggests that a large number of 
youth enter the job market every year. Due to poverty and lack of educational and 
employment opportunities in rural areas, many youth migrate to urban areas to seek a 
better life. The relatively higher wealth of Baucau and Dili attract the unemployed youth 
from rural areas. However, neither Baucau nor Dili, where the unemployment is 
estimated to be around 50%, has much to offer to the unemployed youth. Despite this, 
the young Timorese still continue to flow to Dili where they think that at least they have 
“access to information” in the capital.169 Unable to find a job, a number of unemployed 
                                                 
166 Deutsch, 1953, Chapter VI; Idem, 1969, pp. 21-25. 
167 Deutsch, 1953, pp. 97-126; Idem, 1969, pp. 21-27. 
168 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The Path out of Poverty: Integrated Rural 
Development (Darwin: Image Offset, January 2006a), p. 6.  
169 Interview with João Cancio Freitas from Dili Institute of Technology. 
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youth end up in cult-like organisations established by disaffected former veterans or 
ethnically distinct gangs and involve in crime and violence.   
Mass communications, which can be said to be the most effective way of 
disseminating information and reaching people, play a crucial role in integrating people, 
as well as promoting national culture. As noted in Chapter 2, mass media including 
newspapers, the radio and television allow individuals with diverse class, ethnic, and 
educational backgrounds to “imagine” a group of other people who, simultaneously in 
time, consuming the same televised or print media narratives circulated, share common 
values and characteristics even though they have no direct contact with each other.170 
Timor-Leste’s insufficient communications and transportation infrastructure stemming 
from damaged roads and bridges, geographic challenges, underdeveloped 
telecommunications networks outside the major urban centres, and limited access to 
electricity in rural areas, on the other hand, limits (1) inter-regional communication, (2) 
links between the government in the capital and remote areas, and (3) the capacity to 
disseminate information and access to reliable information. The most widespread and 
effective means of communication in the country is radio. Around 63% of the population 
use the radio as the main source of information for current issues and political 
developments while only 12% watch TV to get political information.171 However, 
electricity supplies and telecommunications are limited and radio signal strength is poor 
in rural areas. While 92% of households in Dili and Baucau are supplied electricity, the 
proportion drops to 10% in rural areas.172 Limited electricity supplies and 
underdeveloped telecommunication networks in rural areas, in turn, constrain access to 
accurate and reliable information. 
Partly as a result of geographic challenges, poor transportation facilities and 
communications infrastructure, and partly as a legacy of the clandestine resistance, there 
is a strong reliance on informal communication networks among the East Timorese 
people.173 The lack of effective communication mechanisms and the reluctance or 
 
170 Anderson, 1991. 
171 International Republican Institute (IRI), East Timor National Opinion Poll, (November 2003), p. 48. 
172 UNDP, 2006a, p. 19. 
173 Cynthia Brady and David G. Timberman, The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and 
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inability of government institutions to share information with the general public and 
civil society organisations have limited the government’s capacity to establish an 
effective dialogue with the population and explain its policies and initiatives to its 
citizens, contributing to institutional weaknesses within the government and to a 
growing sense of confusion, frustration and mistrust of ‘official’ information in the 
population.174 Uninformed or insufficiently informed about government policies and 
social and political developments at the local and national level, many people have 
become susceptible to rumours and speculation, which spread extremely fast especially 
during times of crises. The rumours that the army had massacred 60 people took root 
and rapidly spread on 28/29 April 2006. This, in turn, fuelled the panic and population 
movement in Dili, leading to the displacement of some 150,000 people in a short span of 
time. These rumours were later investigated by the UN Independent Special Inquiry 
Commission of Timor-Leste, which found that no such massacre occurred.175  
Information dissemination and exchange is further complicated by the limited 
reach and low quality of print and broadcast media, and the use of multiple languages.176 
Newspapers reach only a small percentage of the population mainly those residing in 
urban areas. Some 61% of the people do not read printed media.177 In Dili, where this 
number drops to 44%,178 as of February 2006, three newspapers were in circulation: 
Diario Nacional published in Portuguese, Timor Post in Indonesian, and Suara Timor 
Lorosae in Portuguese, Tetum, English and Indonesian. The press in Timor-Leste, which 
enjoys a “relatively high degree of freedom” compared to neighbouring countries,179 
 
Options for Conflict Management and Mitigation, A Report for USAID Timor-Leste, (12 November 
2006), p. 10; World Bank, International Development Assistance Strategy for the Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste for the Period FY06-08, Report No. 32700-TP, (18 August 2005), p. i, 4. 
174 Ibid., p. 10, 19.  
175 United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, “The Report of the 
United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste”, (Geneva, 2 October 2006), 
pp. 28-29, 42, 75.  
176 Ibid, p. 19. 
177 International Republican Institute, 2003, p. 49. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Shanthi Kalathil, Timor-Leste Media Assessment, (February 2006), p. 9. Timor-Leste was rated by 
Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press 2005 Report as one of 39% of countries, out of 194 surveyed, 
with a free press. Cited in World Bank, Strengthening the Institutions of Governance in Timor-Leste, 
(April 2006), p. 25.  
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suffers from financial difficulties and lack of professionalism. Most journalists are quite 
young, with only high school level degrees180 and they are still learning how to report 
responsibly and fairly.181 Despite an overall improvement in the quality of print media 
and a reduction in rumours-based reporting, media observers still point to problems with 
the prevalence of one-sided, one-sourced articles.182 In addition to these problems with 
professionalism and availability of equipment, the media in Timor-Leste also suffers 
from language problems. A majority of the journalists are Tetum and/or Indonesian 
speakers and are reported to fail to understand or misunderstand government releases 
produced in Portuguese and ignore them.183 These problems with communication and 
dissemination of reliable and accurate information to the public by mass media, in turn, 
tended to undermine the progress with developing a sense of cohesive national identity 
in Timor-Leste in the post-independence period.  
 
 
4.4.2.4. Education 
Development of the education sector and improving education and literacy levels 
– 50.1 % in 2004184 – were among the priorities of the FRETILIN-led government. 
Aiming to achieve universal primary education by the year 2015, the government 
allocated substantial amount of resources to education from the annual budget in the 
post-independence period. It is important to note that although expenditures on 
education increased in dollar terms, their share of total government spending declined in 
the fiscal years of 2006 and 2007.   
                                                 
180 Ibid., p. 7. 
181 Ibid., p. 11. 
182 Ibid., p. 6. 
183 Seth Mydans, “A Babel for East Timor as Language Shifts to Portuguese”, International Herald 
Tribune, (23 July 2007), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/23/asia/timor.php [accessed 20 
August 2007].  
184 UNDP, 2006a, p. 1. 
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Share of Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports Fiscal year* Government budget  
(USD ‘000) Amount (USD ‘000) Percentage 
2002/2003 74,271 17,713 23 
2003-2004 79,113 16,648 21 
2004-2005 78,674 16,488 21 
2005-2006 130,142 18,510 14 
2006-2007 217,935 33,289 15 
Table 4.8. Government spending on education (Data compiled from World Bank, Background Paper for 
the Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting, (Dili, 4-5 June 2003) p. 9; Idem, Background Paper 
for the Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting, (Dili, 18-19 May 2004) p. 14; Idem, Background 
Paper for the Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting, (Dili, 25-26 April 2005), p. 12; Idem, 
Background Paper for the Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting, (Dili, 3-4 April 2006), p. 18. 
* The fiscal year in Timor-Leste runs from July 1 to June 30. 
 
The East Timorese education system comprises six years of primary education, 
three years of junior secondary education and three years of senior secondary education. 
At the beginning of the 2004/2005 school year, a total of some 240,000 students were 
enrolled in over 860 primary and secondary schools throughout the country. Between 
2001 and 2003, the number of primary school teachers increased from 2,992 to 4,080 
and the pupil-teacher ratio fell from 67:1 to 45:1. At the junior secondary level, the 
number of students rose from 29,586 to 38,180 and the number of teachers from 884 to 
1,103. 185 Despite this gradual progress in access to education, the net enrolment ratio 
for children of primary school age was around 70%, compared with 97% in 
Indonesia.186 This was partly a reflection of poverty and partly as a result of some 
parents’ reservations about their children becoming involved in a repressive system and 
being taught by foreign teachers.187 The quality of education and student achievement 
have also remained poor. Between 20 and 25% of children repeat a grade and about 10% 
drop out of each grade in primary education and junior secondary education.188   
                                                
 
 
 
185 World Bank, Timor-Leste – Education Since Independence From Reconstruction to Sustainable 
Improvement, Report No. 29784-TP, (December 2004), p. xviii. 
186 UNDP, 2002, p. 14. 
187 Ibid. 
188 World Bank, 2004, p. 27. 
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School Year 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Primary 
Schools 719 734 749 759 759
Students 164,700 175,000 185,600 175,600 179,900
Teachers 3,470 3,860 4,248 4,862 5,415
Junior Secondary 
Schools 109 115 113 120 129
Students 28,600 32,900 37,800 40,300 41,516
Teachers 1,111 1,120 1,121 1,135 1,652
Senior Secondary 
Schools 41 48 43 55 76
Students 15,800 19,900 20,900 21,000 24,500
Teachers 634 761 800 670 725
Table 4.9. Ministry of Education of Timor-Leste and World Bank estimates of schools, teachers and 
students enrolled in Timor-Leste (Adapted from World Bank website, http://web.worldbank.org [accessed 
on 26 November 2006]).  
 
Challenges in education are further intensified by a shortage of textbooks and 
resources, poor classroom facilities, underdeveloped curriculum and teaching plans, and 
difficulties with implementing the government’s policy on medium of instruction. 
Following independence, it was agreed that Bahasa Indonesian materials would be used 
as a transitional measure.189 Textbooks used in the schools included: 
(1) Indonesian textbooks: Purchased from Indonesian publishers, photos of East 
Timorese students were put on their cover, a preface by President Gusmão 
was added, and controversial text around history and national identity were 
removed. 
(2) Portuguese textbooks: Purchased for grades 1 and 2 in the subjects of 
language, mathematics, social and physical sciences. For grades 3 to 6 and all 
secondary school grades, language books were purchased. 
(3) Picture books: Purchased to help build communication skills, these wordless 
books were produced in Finland to encourage discussion in the mother 
tongue or facilitate secondary language teaching.190 
 
 
                                                 
189 Susan Nicolai, Learning Independence: Education in Emergency and Transition in Timor-Leste since 
1999, (Paris: UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004), p. 110.  
190 Ibid., pp. 110. 
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A total of 2,073,400 textbooks, of which 1,584,000 were Indonesian textbooks, 
272,000 were Portuguese and 216,000 were picture books, were distributed by the 
World Bank-financed Emergency School Readiness Project (ESRP) free of charge to 
Timorese students during the transitional period. In addition to this, 120,000 textbooks 
in mathematics and social studies for grade 1 and 2 students were also donated by the 
Portuguese government.191 However, according to a UNICEF study conducted in 2001, 
it was found that only 5% of students had a complete set of textbooks while 42% had 
some textbooks and the remaining 53% had no textbooks at all.192 
In 2000, the Timorese government designated Portuguese as the language of 
instruction in primary education. It was introduced in Grades 1 and 2 and extended to 
the upper grades by one grade each year since then while Indonesian is still permitted 
from Grade 4 to tertiary level. Most of the lower primary school teachers, lacking good 
knowledge of Portuguese to teach in that language, were frustrated with the 
government’s decision.193 Of some 3,000 teachers, who took a language proficiency test 
in 2001, only 158 (5%) achieved the pass mark.194 No primary school teachers in 
Manufahi and Aileu districts and no secondary school teachers in Ainaro, Bobonaro and 
Manatuto districts qualified to teach Portuguese.195 The Timorese government appealed 
to Portuguese-speaking countries to send teachers to provide language education and 
teacher training programmes. Portugal sent 150 teachers to Timor-Leste to train the 
Timorese teachers to enable them to teach in Portuguese.196 Timorese teachers were 
offered language courses a few hours a week and expected to have sufficient 
understanding of the Portuguese language to teach in Portuguese.  
However, these programmes did not help to implement the government’s 
language of instruction policy and improve the quality of instruction and student 
 
191 Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
192 Ibid., p. 112. 
193 Schulz and de Freitas, 2002. 
194 UNDP, 2002, p. 51. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, “East Timor – Timor-Leste”, Activities Report for 2000, 
Indicative Programme for 2001, (June 2001), p. 17, available at http://www.comissario-
timor.gov.pt/pdf/rel_actividades_00_prog_indicativo_01_ortugues_english.pdf [accessed 7 October 2006]. 
See also, UNDP, 2002, p. 51. 
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achievement. During my discussions with several primary and junior secondary school 
teachers in February 2006, for example, almost all teachers I spoke complained about 
the language problem in class. Most of the young primary and secondary school 
teachers, who were educated in Indonesian schools, said that there were only few 
Timorese teachers who completed their education before 1975 could speak Portuguese. 
They stated that although the government designated Portuguese as the language of 
instruction, they continued to teach in Tetum and Indonesian in which they felt more 
confident.  
Language Knowledge Not at all A Little Well Excellent 
Portuguese Speak 7.8 48.6 37.9 5.8 
 Read 2.9 37.0 53.9 6.2 
 Write 3.7 38.3 51.4 6.6 
     Tetum Speak 0.0 1.6 74.5 23.9 
 Read 0.0 1.6 74.1 24.3 
 Write 0.0 1.6 74.1 24.3 
Indonesian Speak 0.8 7.0 76.1 16.0 
 Read 0.8 5.8 77.4 16.0 
 Write 0.8 6.2 77.0 16.0 
Table 4.10. Language Proficiency of Teachers Surveyed (World Bank, Timor-Leste – Education Since Independence 
From Reconstruction to Sustainable Improvement, Report No. 29784-TP, (December 2004), p. 154). 
 
The results of a national survey, given in Table 4.10., tend to support the 
information I collected from my discussions with Timorese teachers. In 2003, 3,487 
students in the third and fourth grades in 95 primary schools in 13 districts were given a 
mathematics test by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports with a view to 
assessing the level of student achievement and its determinants. In the schools, where 
the test was conducted, 243 teachers were asked to fill in separate questionnaires. As can 
be seen in Table 4.10., only a small minority of the teachers reported that they had an 
“excellent” command of Portuguese. It is important to note that although half of them 
said they could speak Portuguese well, a very low percentage of students (0.3-0.8%) 
stated that only Portuguese was used as the medium of instruction. Between 40 and 50 
% of the students, who completed the survey, reported that a mixture of Portuguese, 
Bahasa Indonesian and Tetum was used in the classroom.197 The survey also found that 
holding their background characteristics constant, students entirely taught in Tetum had 
                                                 
197 World Bank, 2004, p. 41. 
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a higher probability of better performance than students taught in a mixture of 
Portuguese and Tetum.198  
 
4.4.2.5. Religion 
The Catholic religion which had a strong nationalising effect on the struggle for 
independence during the Indonesian occupation came to be regarded as a significant 
marker of the East Timorese national identity. On the official web-site of the 
government, it is stated that “Neither Hinduism nor the [sic] Islam had influence in the 
Timorese beliefs. That achievement was reserved to the Christian missionaries”.199 
However, as noted earlier, the spread of Catholicism among the Timorese is a relatively 
recent development. Although Portuguese colonists introduced the Catholic religion to 
the island of Timor in the 16th century, approximately 80% of the population were still 
animist before 1975. It was not until the Indonesian occupation that large numbers of 
East Timorese converted to Catholicism and that it became an important expression of 
Timorese national identity. It was this shared commitment to the Catholic faith that, 
Benedict Anderson argued, “in some sense substitute[d] for the kind of 
nationalism…which comes from print capitalism”.200   
Today, an overwhelming majority of East Timorese are Roman Catholic while 
traditional animistic beliefs and practices merged into Catholicism are still preserved. 
The population also includes small Protestant, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist minorities 
generally belonging to non-East Timorese ethnic communities. The number of 
Protestants and Muslims, who constituted a total of 7% of the population according to 
the 1992 Indonesian government statistics,201 declined following the vote for 
independence. According to the most recent estimates, 98% of the population is 
                                                 
198 Ibid., p. xxii. 
199 It can be seen on http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl/AboutTimorleste/culture.htm [accessed 13 November 
2006]. 
200 Benedict Anderson, “Imagining East Timor”, Arena Magazine, 4 (April / May 1993), reprinted in 
Lusotopie, (2001), p. 238. 
201 Cited in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book – Timor-Leste (2006).  
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nce to parents.  
                                                
Catholic, 1% Muslim and 1% Protestant.202  
The Constitution of Timor-Leste, which separates the religious denominations 
from the state, provides for freedom of conscience, religion, and worship.203 The 
Catholic Church, whose contribution to the independence movement is acknowledged in 
the Constitution,204 on the other hand, enjoys a strong influence on the process of 
political decision-making. In April 2005, for example, representatives of the Church 
organised protests against a government policy of dropping religious education from the 
national primary school curriculum as a compulsory subject, and demanded the 
resignation of then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, who is Muslim and of Arab origin. The 
dispute was resolved in May when the government and bishops of the Church signed a 
joint declaration, reinserting religious education into the curriculum.205 Having 
reiterated “the important contribution that religious values have in the construction of 
the national identity, in the construction of the nation…[and] the formation of the 
individual”, the government and bishops left the decision on attenda
The Catholic Church was assigned a further political role following the 
intensification of intra-societal divisions based on regional differences during the 
political crisis in April and May 2006. Having described the Church as “the only 
continuous solid institution, that has absorbed the fabric of Timorese”, in his swearing-in 
speech, the new Prime Minister José Ramos-Horta called for the Church to assume a 
greater role in the fight against poverty, education and human development and help 
heal the recent division in society.206 It remains to be seen whether or not the shared 
commitment to Catholicism and the Church’s spiritual, political and social influence will 
once again serve to produce national unity, as achieved during the Indonesian 
occupation.  
 
 
202 CIA World Fact Book – Timor-Leste, (2007). 
203 Constitution, Section 45. 
204 Ibid., Section 11. 
205 “Joint Declaration”, (7 May 2005), can be seen at 
http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/documento%20acordo%20dili.pdf [accessed 25 December 2006]. 
206 “Address by Dr José Ramos-Horta at his swearing in ceremony as Prime Minister of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste”, (10 July 2006), available at 
http://www.mmiets.org.au/archive/horta_inaugural.pdf [accessed 5 January 2007]. 
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4.5. The Impact of Regional Differences on Building the East Timorese Nation in 
the Post-Independence Period  
 
In addition to the controversial language policy, regionalism, which exacerbated 
the April and May 2006 crisis, emerged as another serious threat to achieving the 
integration of diverse social groups at the national level. Describing the prevailing 
ethno-regional differences as a potential “political fault line” in the post-independence 
period, Smith warned against the divisive and destabilising effects of regionalism in 
Timor-Leste as early as 2001.207 The eruption of violent riots in the country on 28 April 
2006, however, came as a shocking incidence for the international community. 
Focusing on the issues of external security threats and shortage of qualified human 
resources, members of the international community failed to see the potential 
destabilising effects of intensifying intra-societal competition on the country’s 
institutions. During the course of my fieldwork in Dili in February 2006, several 
international staff members from AusAID, World Bank and UNDP, for example, 
reiterated that most of the societies emerging from violence tend to fall into conflict 
within the first five years and there was no such threat of return to violent conflict in 
Timor-Leste unless militia members in West Timor were supported by “some external 
elements”. In fact, none of the four international staff members I interviewed had heard 
about the east-west divide or Kaladi-Firaku competition until I asked them whether 
such a regional divide was “real” or “artificial”. The following portrayal of the country 
in a UNDP project document can further illustrate the perceived image of the country in 
early 2006:  
Several factors favour the new country’s development prospects. The territory and population 
are relatively modest; there is no sectarianism, tribalism, secessionism, or external threats; the 
population is, relatively speaking, ethnically and religiously homogenous; and there is still a 
nation-building spirit.208 
 
 
207 Anthony L. Smith, “East Timor,” Self-Determination Conflict Profile, a project associated with 
Foreign Policy in Focus, (February 2002), p. 3, http://www.fpif.org/indices/regions/asia_body.html 
[accessed 26 April 2006]. 
208 UNDP, “Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste (Parliament Project – project no. 
00014960)” Revised Project Document for the Period 2006-2009, unpublished working draft, (January 
2006), p. 4. 
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The Kaladi (or Loromonu) / Firaku (or Lorosae) divide, which refers to a 
geographical distinction in the country, involves political and socio-economic 
implications. Kaladi, which constitutes around 55% of the total East Timorese 
population,209 refers to the districts of Aileu, Ainora, Liquica, Manufahi, Ermera, 
Bobonaro and Covalima in the west of the country, and the Oecussi enclave of Timor-
Leste, located wholly within West Timor.210 Corresponding to around 30% of the 
population,211 Firaku includes Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem districts in the 
east.212 Both regions are populated by diverse ethno-linguistic groups. Although the 
Kaladi / Firaku geographical division in general denotes the areas to the west and east 
of Dili, where approximately 20% of the population live, the capital can be included in 
the Kaladi region because during the violent clashes in April and May 2006 some 
150,000 people, mostly easterners, fled their homes to escape from attacks. 
Regarding the origin of the Kaladi / Firaku distinction, there is a divergence of 
opinion among the Esat Timorese. For some, such communal factionalism never existed 
but was manipulated by some groups with a “hidden political agenda” in the post-
independence period.213 For others, it existed but never became an issue or source of 
conflict.214 For some others, it was created by the Portuguese to exploit the Timorese. 
Fretilin Vice-Secretary General Jose Reis, for instance, argued that the terms Kaladi and 
Firaku were irrelevant and artificial, invented by “white men”, i.e. Portuguese 
colonisers, to divide and rule the Timorese.215  
In this context, it is important to note that although Timor-Leste’s modern 
history has no concerted political violence between easterners and westerners as unified 
and opposing groups,216 internal divisions based on regional differences have long 
 
209 James J. Fox, “Diversity and Differential Development in East Timor: Potential Problems and Future 
Possibilities,” Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha, (eds.), East Timor: Development Challenges for the 
World’s Newest Nation, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001b), p. 159; Smith, 2001, p. 
3. 
210 Fox, 2001b, p. 159. 
211 Ibid; Smith, 2001, p. 3. 
212 Fox, 2001b, p. 159.  
213 Interview with João Cancio Freitas, Dili Institute of Technology, (Dili, 3 February 2006). 
214 Interview with Marcelino Magno, Timor Institute of Development, (Dili, 31 January 2006). 
215  “F-FDTL Strike Considered A Revolt”, UNOTIL Daily Media Review, (11-13 February 2006). 
216 United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, 2006, p. 20. 
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existed among the East Timorese since the time of the Portuguese. Mau Lear, one of the 
founding members of FRETILIN, for example, criticised the prevalence of divisive 
“tribalist attitudes” among the East Timorese in October 1975: “One of the variations of 
tribalism is the division of the population into Loro Mono, and Loro’Sae…and the 
belief that some groups are superior to others”.217  
For some foreign observers interested in Timorese politics and society, the 
Kaladi / Firaku divide reflected a form of behavioural stereotyping. Fox described this 
stereotyped distinction as “talkative Easterners (firaku) and more taciturn Westerners 
(kaladi)”.218 Oenarto noted that the westerners “have been described as ‘civilised’ and 
diplomatic” while easterners are considered to be “wild fighters, preferring to find 
solutions through fighting than negotiating”.219  
For some others, the Kaladi / Firaku distinction in Timor-Leste is more than just 
a stereotype. Rebecca Engel, for example, argues that the east / west distinction 
represent a long-standing issue and its origins can be found in the country’s turbulent 
history, particularly economic rivalries between the east and the west and the resistance 
against the Indonesians:220 
 
…there are historical grievances that have existed between certain groups in the East and others 
in the West. At times there has been tension among Makasae traders from the East who have a 
traditionally strong presence throughout the country’s markets. Similarly, following the 
Indonesian invasion, many in the West were killed, leading the resistance to seek out the more 
secure base in the Matebian Mountains of the East. The rich agriculture lands of the Western 
districts enabled farmers to contribute financially to the resistance through their coffee and rice 
sales. At the same time, the Indonesians had a particularly pronounced presence in the West of 
the country stemming from their invasion over the mountains along the border. 
 
The issue has become a serious obstacle to achieving national integration in the 
post-1999 period. The mercado or central market in Dili, for example, was reported to 
have been a scene of clashes between gangs of the Firaku and Kaladi until mid-2001 
 
217 Quoted in Hill, 2002, p. 77. 
218 James J. Fox, “Tracing the Path, Recounting the Past: Historical Perspectives on Timor”, James J. Fox 
and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds.), Out of Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, (Adelaide: 
Crawford House Publishing, 2000), p. 23. 
219 Oenarto, 2000, p. 10. 
220 Rebecca Engel, “The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Restoring National Unity through State Institutions, 
Culture, and Civil Society|, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior 
(FRIDE) Working Paper, 25, (August 2006), pp. 8-9. 
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when UNTAET temporarily solved the problem by physically removing the old 
market.221 In a speech in 2001, Xanana Gusmão pointed to the salience of regional 
differences as a potential divisive factor amongst the East Timorese in the following 
way:222 
 
Our differences, pushed aside and apparently forgotten during these events, especially during the 
bloody month of September [1999], have surfaced again. The level of participation of each 
group in the bloody events, still prominent in the memory of the clandestine, has been evoked, 
by some to describe a greater participation on their part, versus that of others, instead of trying to 
emphasise the value of the actual sacrifices made. This has even resulted in some regional 
conflicts, with such slogans as “firakus fought more than kaladis”. 
 
The question of ‘who owned the resistance’, as argued earlier, constituted the 
essence of problems with building a unified East Timorese nation following the 
disappearance of the enemy, against which a sense of unity was established in the past. 
Coupled with socio-economic problems, regional differences exacerbated tensions in 
the post-independence period. Members of the Firaku population tended to consider 
themselves as more dynamic and more committed to independence than their 
counterparts; while seeing the Kaladi as being more accommodating to the years of 
Indonesian occupation.223 In this context, Fox notes that a majority of former 
FALINTIL commanders and guerrillas were from Firaku districts while “a high 
proportion of former militia leaders [came] from the western end of East Timor, 
particularly the border regency of Bobonaro”.224 In the same way, regarding the 
regional characteristics of the resistance movement, Kiernan notes that the Indonesian 
military relied on liurais and other local political leaders in the north-western part of the 
country and the FRETILIN-led resistance found “its firmest support base in the remote 
eastern sector of the half-island”.225 Although this does not necessarily mean that 
 
221 Reyko Huang and Geoffrey C. Gunn, “Reconciliation as State-building in East Timor”, Lusotopie, 
(2004), pp. 27-28. 
222 José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão, “Reconciliation, Tolerance, Human Rights and Elections”, National 
Council Dili, (12 February 2001), available at http://www.etan.org/et2001a/february/11-17/12pres.htm 
[accessed 8 October 2007]. 
223 Fox, 2001b, p. 159. See also Smith, 2001, p. 3. 
224 Fox, 2001b, p. 159. 
225 Ben Kiernan, “War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975–99: Comparative Reflections on 
Cambodia”, Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So (eds.), War and State Terror: The United States, Japan, and the 
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westerners had no role in the liberation of the country from Indonesian rule, this 
regional organisation of the resistance movement fuelled discontent and regional 
differences in the post-Indonesian period. 
The social dimension of the Kaladi / Firaku competition became evident in the 
rise of gangs of unemployed and unskilled youth who felt marginalised or excluded 
from the reconstruction of a democratic Timor-Leste. Regional differences-based intra-
societal competition, which replaced the principle of national unity achieved during the 
years of resistance movement, became obvious in the violent clashes between gangs of 
youths from western and eastern districts in May 2006. The factional violence of Spring 
2006, which cost the lives of at least 38 people,226 showed how serious potential threat 
the regional differences may pose to internal peace, security, and stability as well as to 
the prospect of the country’s democratic development. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
After decades of conflict and violence, the achievement of independence for the 
East Timorese people marked the beginning of another long process leading to the 
development of a new sense of national unity, which, as suggested throughout this 
thesis, is a requisite for achieving democratic transition and consolidation. This new 
sense of national unity would replace the consensus of the resistance years, which had 
been constructed on the notion of opposition to a common enemy. The reconciliation of 
decades-old political and social differences, which were buried in the interest of the 
struggle against Indonesian rule, development of social communication, and 
construction of a shared collective identity uniting diverse linguistic groups, in this 
context, constituted the basic aspects of the nation-building process that the country has 
undergone in the post-independence period. 
The resurfacing of old political and social divisions and differences and the 
emergence of new fractures resulting from the disagreement over the choice of the 
 
226 United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, 2006, p. 42. 
Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century, (Lanham, Maryland: Routledge, 2003), p. 208. 
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official language and insufficient progress in social reconciliation constrained the 
capacity to create a sense of national cohesion. The adoption of Tetum, which has served 
as the lingua franca of the country, as one of the two official languages was a significant 
step in promoting national cohesion in the post-Indonesian period. The choice of 
Portuguese, on the other hand, has been divisive, reflecting inter-generational and 
political frictions. For older Timorese political leaders, who were educated under the 
Portuguese and dominated the government in the post-independence period, the 
Portuguese language is an integral part of the East Timorese national identity. For a 
majority of the country’s Indonesian-speaking younger generation, however, the 
decision to designate Portuguese as the official language represented a deliberate action 
to exclude them from the political process. Still a controversial issue, the choice of 
Portuguese has been far from generating a sense of unity among the Timorese in the 
post-independence period 
In addition to the language issue, the incomplete reconciliation process and 
problems with social communication and dissemination of information within the 
society also undermined the achievement of a sense of national cohesion. The limited 
capacity of the Timorese government to deliver justice relating to past human rights 
crimes posed a serious challenge to accomplishing integration at the national level. 
Insufficient mass communication and educational facilities did little to encourage 
individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural and other backgrounds to “imagine” themselves 
as part of a national community. Increasing factionalisation, which took the international 
community by surprise, fuelled divisions within the society, further complicating the 
process of national integration. The weak sense of national cohesion in the post-
independent period, as will be discussed in the following chapter, had an undermining 
effect on the capacity of the state institutions constructed by the UN to establish 
sustainable peace. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Building the State in East Timor 
under Transitional Administration: 
An Unfinished Business? 
 
“After so much suffering, after enduring so much 
sacrifice, sanctioned and embraced by our people, 
what is it that the people of East Timor expect as a 
result of independence?”  
                                            Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão      
“Don’t expect miracles!” 
                                                         José Ramos-Horta   
“Most post-conflict countries relapse into violence 
within five years. Though you have had difficult 
moments and times of tension, you have opted for 
peace. You have come together as a nation where so 
many other countries fall apart in factions”. 
                                                             Paul Wolfowitz  
 
5.1. Introduction                                            
 Until the 2006 crisis, Timor-Leste was widely viewed as a success story of 
the international community in establishing democratic governance to promote 
sustainable peace in conflict-torn societies. In his report to the Security Council in 
January 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, for example, stated that except 
for a few isolated border incursions of former militias, the overall political and 
security situation in the country was “generally calm and stable”.1 During his Spring 
2006 visit, Paul Wolfowitz, then World Bank President, described the young nation 
as the “leader among post-war countries” and praised the country’s progress in 
building a “a functioning economy and a vibrant democracy from the ashes and 
destruction of 1999”.2 Only three weeks after Wolfowitz’s visit, Timor-Leste hit the 
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1 United Nations, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Timor-
Leste”, Security Council Document, S/2006/24, (17 January 2006), para. 53. 
2 “Timor-Leste – The Challenge of Keeping Peace for Development”, Remarks by Paul J. Wolfowitz, 
Dili, (9 April 2006). 
international headlines with the eruption of violence on 28 April.    
The dismissal of approximately 600 soldiers, almost 40% from the national 
defence force, catalysed the violence. The sacked soldiers, mostly from western part 
of the country, had signed a petition with claims of ill-treatment and discrimination 
in favour of soldiers from eastern districts. The peaceful demonstrations of the 
“petitioners” turned into violent clashes with government troops and police in the 
capital, Dili. The violence appeared to have been spawned by unidentified groups of 
youths.  It was not clear who these groups were associated with or what political 
agenda they had. However one thing was clear: they were not part of the original 
“Petitioners Group”. Having vandalised some houses and a market during the rallies, 
these unidentified groups broke the police line and attacked the headquarters and 
officers of the national police on April 28. Unable to restore deteriorating security 
and order, the Timorese police, already suffering from a number of institutional 
weaknesses,3 promptly disintegrated as officers abandoned their posts. 
 
Figure 5.1. Map of Timor-Leste (Source: United Nations Department of Public Information, 
Cartographic Section, Map No. 4111, Rev. (4 January 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/timor.pdf [accessed 3 March 2006]) 
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3 Shortly before the Timorese police proved incapable of managing a social movement in a 
professional manner on 28 April, a report released by the Human Rights Watch on 20 April 2006 
pointed to the institutional weaknesses that PNTL had. The Report urged the government to address 
these weaknesses including insufficient professional skills and experience, and the police’s inability to 
comply with human rights standards. For further information, see Human Rights Watch, “Tortured 
Beginnings: Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in East Timor,” Human Rights Watch 
18:2 (New York, April 2006), http://hrw.org/reports/2006/easttimor0406 [accessed 9 July 2006]. 
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5 May. 
                                                
This led the government to take the controversial decision to call out the 
army to restore law and order, even though the army is not constitutionally 
responsible for internal security and law enforcement. The army’s use of 
disproportionate force against the protestors left five people dead,4 dozens injured, 
and thousands displaced, hiding in the mountains or taking shelter in seminaries or 
churches. In protest of the killing of the demonstrators by the army, Major Alfredo 
Reinado, head of the military police, along with two other senior officers from 
western districts, joined the “petitioners” and were involved in violent clashes with 
the army.5 The continuing violent events led the Timorese government to request 
the deployment of troops from regional countries. Composed of troops from 
Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia, the force was deployed to the 
country on 26 May. However, by this time nine unarmed police officers had been 
killed and 27 persons, including two UN police training advisers, had been wounded 
by army officers on 2
The UN, which administered the territory for two and a half years to 
supervise its transition to political independence, described the violent events 
triggered by the unrest within the military as “only the precursor to a political, 
humanitarian and security crisis of major dimensions with serious consequences” for 
the country.6 The violence, which acted as a ‘wake-up call’ for the UN and other 
members of the international community, led the UN to pursue a more integrated 
capacity development policy aiming to strengthen the institutions of the country, 
create livelihood opportunities with particular attention to exclusion and youth 
unemployment, promote political dialogue and social communication and foster 
national reconciliation.7 The UN’s response, in this context, can be seen as a 
reflection of its tendency to pursue reactive rather than proactive policies to post-
 
4 Despite various claims about the death toll, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
Sukehiro Hasegawa, reported to the Security Council that five persons were killed in the riots on 28 
April 2006. See “Recent Timor-Leste Violence Reminder Democracy ‘Still Fragile’, United Nations 
Presence Needed Through 2007 Elections, Security Council Told”, Security Council 5432nd Meeting, 
SC/8712, (5 May 2006), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8712.doc.htm [accessed 10 
October 2006]. See also United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1690”, United Nations Security Council, S/2006/628, (8 August 2006), 
para. 3. 
5 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1690 (2006)”, Security Council Document, S/2006/628, (8 August 2006), para. 4. 
6 Ibid., para. 2.  
7 Ibid., para. 43. 
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conflict reconstruction in that the absence of armed conflict, i.e. negative peace, is 
seen as a sufficient benchmark. New policies are therefore formulated if and when 
conflict does break out again. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, in Kosovo, for 
instance, it was not until the March 2004 violent riots that the UN took more 
concrete steps to address the issue of future political status of the province with a 
view to strengthening the capacity of the newly created provisional institutions and 
promoting political stability and sustainable peace. 
The violent riots and rapid breakdown of law and order during the 2006 crisis 
indicated that Timor-Leste’s problems were deep-rooted, arising from socio-
economic hardship, institutional weaknesses, political divisions and power struggles. 
As will be discussed later, Timor-Leste, which has faced the problems of poverty, 
high unemployment rate and limited prospects for creating job opportunities, has 
ranked one of the poorest countries in the post-independence period. In addition to 
these socio-economic problems, the relative consensus on national unity achieved 
during the resistance years yielded to internal political struggles and intra-societal 
competition in the post-Indonesian period. Internal power struggles have fractured 
externally designed and funded projects for institutional capacity development, 
spurring rivalries among institutions. The competitive development of the two 
security bodies, the armed forces and police, can be seen as a reflection both of 
internal power struggles within the political elite and its implications for the society 
in the absence of a common external enemy – the Indonesians. 
The 2006 crisis, until which the country was portrayed as a showcase for 
successful democratic state-building in post-conflict societies, brought the question 
of whether the UN hastily proclaimed Timor-Leste’s independence and left the 
country to its own device. With a view to addressing this question, this chapter 
explores the three significant aspects of the UN’s engagement in building a 
functioning state system in the post-Indonesian period: security-building, institution-
building and capacity-building. The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first 
part briefly discusses the East Timorese people’s long and arduous journey to 
independence.  The next part reviews the UN’s and other external agents’ 
engagement in giving birth to an independent, democratic state of Timor-Leste in the 
post-Indonesian period. The third part evaluates the outcome of the UN-led state-
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building process and investigates the challenges to the country’s democratic 
development in the post-independence period.  
 
5.2. On the Long Path to Independence 
 
 
5.2.1. Portuguese Colonial Rule 
The western half of the island colonised by the Dutch became part of 
Indonesia when the country gained independence in 1949, while East Timor was 
added to the UN’s list of non-self governing territories by General Assembly 
Resolution 1542 (XV) in 1960. Although the territory, like other dependencies of the 
Portuguese state, was recognised as an overseas status in 1951, according to UN 
sources dated 1962 the relationship between East Timor and Lisbon “remained[ed] 
essentially a colonial one” and the people of East Timor exercised “very limited 
participation in the central and local organs of government”.8   
Partly in response to this growing pressure put by the UN on Portugal to 
facilitate the participation of the local people in government, and partly influenced by 
a desire to create loyal local administrative staff and delay an independence 
movement as much as possible, the Portuguese administration started to improve 
education levels from the mid-1960s onwards. These improvements in education, 
which resulted in the formation of a small local intelligentsia, facilitated a slight 
extension of elite membership to the indigenous Timorese, who were able to take on 
administrative duties in government offices. Although these restricted ‘Timorisation’ 
policies aimed to enhance the separation between rural indigenous and urban-based 
colonial-oriented elites, thereby, delaying independence and maintaining Portuguese 
rule through loyal local administrative staff, they brought the opposite result; 
reinforcing ties with rural-based groups and adoption of novel ideas by the newly 
recruited young Timorese, who came up against the realities of colonialism – 
political control, colonial hierarchies, social inequalities, discrimination and 
underdevelopment.9   
The “Carnation Revolution” of April 1974 in Lisbon, resulting in the 
overthrow of the Salazar / Caetano dictatorship and demise of the 400-year old 
 
8 Weatherbee, 1966, p. 686. 
9 Taylor, 1991, pp. 18-19. 
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Portuguese Empire, began the decolonisation process in overseas territories of 
Portugal, including East Timor. This unexpected change in the political climate in 
Lisbon was met with excitement in East Timor, followed by the formation of 
political parties mostly by assimilados such as Xanana Gusmão or descendants of 
deportados (persons of Portuguese origin who had married Timorese women while 
in exile) e.g. José Ramos-Horta and Mario and João Carrascalão.10  
Founded on 11 May 1974 by senior civil servants, leading coffee plantation 
owners and some village chiefs, the Timorese Democratic Union (União 
Democratica Timorense, UDT) favoured the notion of eventual independence after a 
transition period of federation with Portugal.11 Founded on 20 May 1974 by the 
newly-recruited members of the urban administrative elites, who maintained their 
links with their rural areas of origin, the Timorese Social Democratic Association 
(Associação Social Democrata Timorense, ASDT) had an anti-colonial, nationalist 
and socialist manifesto calling for independence following a preparatory period of up 
to ten years in order to develop a sufficient political and economic infrastructure.12 
Transforming itself into the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, 
(Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente, FRETILIN) in September 
1974, the party followed a more radical nationalist programme emphasising 
indigenous values and calling for immediate independence. Favouring integration 
with Indonesia, Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Associação Popular 
Democrática Timorense, APODETI) was established on 27 May 1974 and had the 
support of certain liurais in Atsabe near the border with Indonesia and some 
members of the small Muslim community in Dili.13 Other parties, which had a very 
marginal influence on the course of Timorese politics, included (1) the Association 
of Timorese Heroes (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain, KOTA), which sought to restore the 
old liurais system, (2) Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista), which did not have a 
programme, and (3) Australia Democratic Association for the Integration of East 
Timor with Australia, (Associação Democrática para a Integração de Timor-Leste na 
Austrália, ADITLA).14 
 
10 Jolliffe, 1978, p. 69. 
11 Taylor, 1991, p. 26; Dunn, 1996, p. 53; Ramos-Horta, 1987, pp. 29-30. 
12 Taylor, 1991, p. 27; Dunn, 1996, p. 56.  
13 Taylor, 1991, p. 28.  
14 Ibid.; Dunn, 1996, pp. 62-67. 
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Pressed by the colonial administration, Fretilin which stood on the left wing 
in the political arena and UDT on the right formed a fragile coalition in early 1975. 
Although both parties expressed their commitment to an independent East Timor, the 
coalition proved to be a short-lived alliance because UDT, which felt threatened by 
the increasing popular support for Fretilin especially in the countryside and 
influenced by the Indonesian-sponsored fear of communist threat posed by Fretilin, 
withdrew from the coalition at the end of May 1975.15 Convinced by Indonesian 
military intelligence that Fretilin was getting prepared to organise a coup, UDT 
staged a ‘pre-emptive’ coup on 11 August 1975, in an attempt to eliminate the 
alleged communist factions within Fretilin, halt its growing popularity and seize 
power from the Portuguese.16 The Portuguese governor and his staff fled to the 
island of Atauro, to the north of Dili. Appealing to Portuguese-trained East Timorese 
troops, Fretilin formed the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor 
(FALINTIL) and responded with a counter-attack against UDT troops, leading to a 
brief but bloody civil war.  
The fight between Fretilin and UDT left between 1,50017 and 3,000 dead.18 
Taking control of the territory in three weeks, Fretilin transformed itself from a 
political party to a de facto government and administered East Timor until the 
Indonesian invasion. In an effort to publicise the continued Indonesian army’s 
incursions since October 1975 to the international community, which failed to act 
against Indonesian aggression, and prevent its incorporation by Indonesia, Fretilin 
unilaterally declared independence on 28 November, which was recognised by only 
former Portuguese colonies including Mozambique, Cape Verde, Angola and Guinea 
Bissau.19 Having UDT, APODETI, Trabalhista and KOTA party leaders, who 
crossed the border with Indonesia during the civil war, sign a petition calling for 
integration with Indonesia, the Indonesian military responded by launching a full-
scale invasion on 7 December.  
 
5.2.2. Under Indonesian Rule  
 
 
15 Taylor, 1991, pp. 39-47. 
16 Ibid.; Carey, 1996, p. 4. 
17 Dunn, 1996, p. 184. 
18 Ramos-Horta, 1987, p. 91. 
19 Jolliffe, 1978, p. 217. 
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Since the early 1960s, an integrationist lobby in Indonesia campaigned for the 
annexation of East Timor in the event of Portuguese withdrawal.20 By mid-1974, 
Indonesian military intelligence (BAKIN) finalised a covert operation based on an 
intense propaganda campaign designed to annex the territory, preferably by non-
military means. Entitled Operasi Komodo (Operation Giant Lizard), Indonesia’s 
strategy aimed to create a pretext for invasion through manipulating political events 
in East Timor, discrediting Fretilin and the notion of independence as a political 
option, and generating support for integration in East Timor and diplomatic support 
for incorporating East Timor into Indonesia on the international platform.21  
Although Indonesia’s invasion was condemned by the UN,22 Indonesia’s 
sovereignty over East Timor, which was declared as its twenty-sixth province in 
1976, was tacitly recognised by the industrialised Western states.23 Given the 
importance of the US-Indonesian alliance to contain the communist threat in 
Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam, the East Timor conflict 
remained a peripheral question to the UN’s agenda, preventing its resolution in 
favour of the East Timorese people.  
Indonesia’s integrationist policies, encompassing a mixture of imposing 
Indonesian language and culture, implementing development programmes, 
transmigration,24 education, and reliance on military means, fostered the 
development of East Timorese nationalism, which was “embryonic” before the 
invasion.25 The Indonesian government tried to abolish the remnants of local 
political and social structures and alienate the young Timorese to local culture 
through education but failed to do so. The Indonesian government’s blend of 
education-repression-development policy26 led to the growth of East Timorese 
                                                 
20 Dunn, 1996, p. 91; Taylor, 1991, p. 22. 
21 Dunn, 1996, pp. 78-107; Taylor, 1991, 31-37. 
22 UN Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) demanded Indonesian forces to 
withdraw from East Timor but did not describe the invasion of the territory as an act of aggression or 
as the violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. See, UN/Doc. S/RES/384 (1975) and UN/Doc. 
 Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1980s, 
 Press, 1994), p. 210. 
S/RES/389 (1976). 
23 In 1985, Australia extended de jure recognition to East Timor’s annexation by Indonesia. 
24 By the year 1989, more than 80,000 migrants from Bali, Java and Sulawesi were settled in East 
Timor by the Indonesian government. Adam
(Colorado: Westview
25 Carey, 1995, p. 4. 
26 Arenas, 1998, pp. 139-144. 
 187
90s.   
nationalism27 that would lead to a rejuvenation of the clandestine networks organised 
by the nationalist youth in the early-19
As noted above, although the UN condemned Indonesia’s invasion, there was 
no concrete attempt by influential international actors to resolve the East Timorese 
conflict. The reports of the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre of 12 November 1991, 
during which over 200 civilians were killed by Indonesian troops, on international 
TV channels, helped the international community change its attitude towards the 
Indonesian government and opened the way to end Indonesian rule. This incident 
became a turning point where Indonesia started to lose its credibility and support 
among international actors who had implicitly recognised Indonesia’s rule over East 
Timor and provided military aid for years.28  
The beginning of the end for Indonesia’s rule over East Timor came with the 
end of Cold War and rising nationalism among the youth. The increasing coverage of 
human rights abuses by the media and NGOs, and the growing optimism in the rise 
of such liberal values as human rights in a rapidly globalising world helped to 
galvanise international support. The driving force in the rise of East Timorese 
nationalism and growing resistance to Indonesian rule in the 1990s was the 
Kopassus’ (Indonesian Army’s Special Forces unit) push to wipe out the last vestiges 
of the independence guerrillas following the Indonesian government’s decision to 
open the territory to foreigners in 1989. The Indonesian army’s extermination 
policies of 1989-1990 were so brutal that it re-kindled nationalist feelings especially 
among the Timorese students leading to an organised civilian movement to 
complement the guerrilla resistance. The Indonesian military’s mishandling of the 
resurgence of popular unrest through brutality as in the Santa Cruz cemetery sparked 
a nationalism that might not otherwise have taken root.  
Growing international sympathy culminated when two East Timorese, José 
                                                 
27 Anderson, 2001 [1993], 233-239. See also Idem, “East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications”, 
Peter Carey and Carter G. Bentley (eds.), East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, 
(London: Cassell, 1995), pp. 137-147. 
28 As Taylor rightly points out both the Ford (1974-6) and Carter (1976-80) administrations supported 
the Indonesian military beyond the accepted traditional ways. Based on the congressional rulings that 
arms should not be supplied for external aggression, the Ford administration increased the US military 
aid from US$83 million in 1975 to US$146 million in 1982. The US arms supplies reached its peaks 
in the periods 1978-9 and 1981-2 coinciding with the Indonesian army’s offensives against the 
Timorese people. In the period between 1982-4, military sales exceeded US$1,000 million. In 1986, 
Indonesia purchased twelve F-16 fighter aircraft, costing US$337 million. See, Taylor, 1991, p. 169.   
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oice between special autonomy and 
independence to the people of East Timor.  
Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, being jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1996. Partly due to the international pressure and partly due to his optimism on the 
Timorese people’s preference for autonomy within Indonesia, in January 1999, 
President Habibie, who had succeeded Suharto the year before during the Asian 
economic crisis, agreed to offer a ch
 
P
troops on 12
icture 5.1. A view from the Santa Cruz cemetery where over 200 people were killed by the Indonesian 
 November 1991 (Photo taken by the author on 15 February 2006). 
 
After a series of negotiations brokered by the UN, on 5 May 1999, Indonesia 
and Portugal, agreed on the organisation of a referendum called “popular 
consultation” under the auspices of the UN in order to ascertain whether the East 
Timorese people wanted to enjoy “special autonomy” within Indonesia.29 The 
announcement of the 30 August 1999 referendum results triggered a three-week 
systematic rampaging and plundering campaign committed by Indonesian armed 
forces (TNI)30-backed pro-autonomy ethnic Timorese militias.31 Having obtained the 
                                                 
29 “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of 
East Timor and the Constitutional Framework” can be found at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame_Eng01.html [accessed 19 December 2005]. 
30 The title of Indonesian Armed Forces, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), was 
announced to have been changed as TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) in April 1999. In this paper, 
TNI will be used in referring to the events in which the army was involved after April 1999 and ABRI 
r.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.54.726,+S.2000.59.En
before that date.  
31 On the involvement of the Indonesian armed and police forces in acts of violence before and after 
the referendum, see “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the 
Secretary-General”, UN A/54/726, S/2000/59, (31 January 2000), available at 
http://www.unhch  [accessed 18 
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TAET) responsible 
r governing the territory during its transition to independence. 
.3. Transforming Conflict-Devastated East Timor into a Democratic State 
 of law and order and collapse of formal administrative 
structu
consent of Indonesia, the UN Security Council, which acted under Chapter VII, 
responded to the deteriorating conditions of peace and security by adopting 
Resolution 1264 of 15 September 1999, which authorised the establishment of the 
Australian-led multi-national force (International Force for East Timor, INTERFET) 
to restore peace and order, and facilitate humanitarian assistance. Following the 
acceptance of the popular consultation results by the Indonesian People’s 
Consultative Assembly, the Security Council, through Resolution 1272, set up the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UN
fo
 
5
 
 With a low GDP per capita ranging between US$374 and 424 over the period 
1995-1998,32 East Timor was one of the least developed and poorest parts of 
Indonesia. The post-ballot violence ruined much of the territory’s already inadequate 
infrastructure. The result of the large scale atrocities committed by the pro-Jakarta 
militias was the death of many people, displacement of a majority of the population, 
massive destruction of the physical infrastructure and the departure of some 7,000 
civil servants and professional staff, most of whom were of Indonesian origin,33 
leading to the breakdown
res in East Timor.  
It was against this background that the UN Security Council authorised the 
establishment of UNTAET mandated to provide security and maintain law and order 
throughout East Timor (security-building), establish an effective administration 
(institution-building), and develop the capacity of the East Timorese people to 
democratically govern themselves (capacity-building).34 While carrying out this 
                                                                                                                                          
January 2006].   
32 Luis M. Valdivieso et al., East Timor: Establishing the Foundations of Sound Macroeconomic 
Management, (International Monetary Fund, 2000), p. 33, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/etimor/index.htm [accessed 3 March 2006]. 
33 In the Report of the World Bank-led Joint Assessment Mission it is noted that 25.6% of an 
estimated total of 28,000 civil servants employed in East Timor under Indonesian occupation thought 
to be of Indonesian origin left the territory. Indonesian civil servants occupied the higher grades and 
skilled positions that created a significant shortage of capacity in civil service. Joint Assessment 
Mission, 1999, p. 1.   
34 UN Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999), para. 2. 
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perate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its 
mandat
for self-democratic government, on the other hand, required sharing 
power 
                                                
broad mandate, UNTAET, albeit in ambiguous terms, was specifically called on to 
“consult and coo
e effectively with a view to the development of local democratic 
institutions”.35  
Established to turn the war-devastated East Timor into a democratic polity 
after a period of transitional administration, UNTAET, from the outset, suffered from 
a fundamental contradiction between its mandate (preparing the East Timorese for 
independence) and its structure (based on a peacekeeping model).36 UNTAET’s 
mandate to supervise the territory’s transition to independence had a dual character: 
(1) to administer the territory and (2) develop sustainable self-government 
institutions. This dilemma between its short-term mandate and long-term objective 
reflected a tension and shaped UNTAET’s approach to institution-building and 
capacity-building.37 UNTAET’s short-term mandate, which included the delivery of 
humanitarian relief assistance, reconstruction of the devastated infrastructure, 
adoption of an applicable law, maintenance of domestic law and order, was 
structured on centralised international control. Its long-term goal of preparing the 
East Timorese 
with local parties in order to encourage pluralism, legitimacy and local 
ownership.38   
Concentrating on achieving quick operational and technical results through 
responding to immediate humanitarian and security needs on the ground, UNTAET 
was designed as a peacekeeping rather than a state-building mission.39 Therefore, 
rather than creating mechanisms and strategies to enable local stakeholders to take a 
responsibility in the construction of their government and society, UNTAET adopted 
a heavily centralised approach to carry out its long-term objective of developing 
local capacity. Reflecting a contradiction between the end (developing local capacity 
for self-government) and means (concentration of all powers in a non-elected 
 
35 Ibid., para. 8. 
36 Astri Suhrke, “Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor”, International 
Peacekeeping, 8:4 (Winter 2001), p. 1. 
37 Beauvais, 2001, pp. 1105-6.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Suhrke, 2001, pp. 1-20; Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieck, “The United Nations and East 
Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building”, International Peacekeeping, 12:1 (Spring 2005), 
pp. 125-145. 
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oliticians but also hindered the development of local capacity for 
sustain
turn, hindered the development of a mission plan that would better 
equip U
                                                
external agent), UNTAET’s centralised control and reluctance to include local parties 
in the democratic state-building process not only set a negative example in terms of 
the exercise of democratic principles and became a source of frustration on the part 
of local p
able self-government, creating a culture of dependency on external agents and 
solutions.  
Like all other missions established by the UN in the past, UNTAET which 
included peacekeeping troops and civilian administrative staff was designed and 
detailed at the UN Headquarters in New York with little knowledge of the situation 
on the ground. The mission was planned by the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) rather than by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which 
had organised the 30 August 1999 ‘popular consultation’. The planning team was 
narrowly based and did not provide much space for potential contributors, e.g. the 
DPA, World Bank, and East Timorese pro-independence umbrella organisation 
CNRT, to participate in the planning process.40 DPKO treated DPA as if it had given 
up any role in the planning stage due to its security failure during and after the 
popular consultation41 and rejected DPA and CNRT proposals for Timorese 
participation in the transitional administration42 as well as the World Bank’s proposal 
to establish three posts for World Bank staff in UNTAET.43 This inter-departmental 
rivalry within the UN and a lack of coordination between DPKO and other 
interlocutors, in re
NTAET with the capacity to undertake its short-term and long-term mandates 
more efficiently.  
With little experience in governance, the DPKO heavily relied on its most 
recent experience in Kosovo,44 where both the nature of conflict and post-conflict 
social and political conditions were different from those in East Timor. In Kosovo, 
the source of conflict was the opposing sovereignty claims of the Serbs and 
 
40 King’s College London, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change, East Timor Report, 
(2002), http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/rep006/index.html [accessed 18 Mar 2006], para. 20; Jarat Chopra, 
“The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor”, Survival, 42:3 (Autumn 2000), p. 32; Suhrke, 2001, p. 9.    
41 King’s College London, 2002, para. 21; Suhrke, 2001, p. 6. 
42 King’s College London, para. 25; Chopra, 2000, p. 32; Suhrke, 2001, p. 9. 
43 King’s College London, 2002, p. 24. 
44 Anthony Goldstone, “UNTAET with Hindsight: The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete 
State”, Global Governance, 10:1 (January-March 2004), p. 85; King’s College London, 2002, para. 
23; Suhrke, 2001, pp. 7-8.    
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ns within the Albanian political 
commu
arties, 
UDT a
return, left UNTAET poorly equipped with the capacity to cope with a range of 
Albanians. Hostilities between the two ethnic groups did not cease to exist in the 
post-armed conflict period and rival factio
nity were struggling for power when UNMIK (United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo) was set up.  
In East Timor, on the other hand, the root cause of the conflict was the 
occupation of the territory by neighbouring Indonesia. The main political division 
was between the pro-independence Timorese organised under the CNRT (National 
Council of Timorese Resistance) and pro-Indonesian integrationists. Pro-
integrationist militias, discredited by the post-ballot violence, crossed the border with 
Indonesia following the deployment of the Australian-led multinational force to 
restore law and order in the post-ballot period.45 This is not to suggest that CNRT 
was a unified body with no internal divisions within it. To the contrary, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter in detail, the decades-old personal, political and 
ideological differences within the Timorese nationalist elite immediately resurfaced 
following the disappearance of the ‘enemy’. UNTAET’s reluctance to recognise 
CNRT as a legitimate and equal partner, as Jarat Chopra and Dionisio Babo-Soares 
suggest,46 accelerated its disintegration because the two major political rival p
nd FRETILIN, saw no reason to maintain CNRT given its inability to pressure 
UNTAET to involve Timorese stakeholders in the transitional administration. 
The other major difference between East Timor and Kosovo was that in 
Kosovo, the UN assumed the task of governing the province for an indefinite period, 
putting the issue of future political status on hold. In East Timor, on the other hand, 
UNTAET was precisely mandated to prepare the East Timorese for independence. 
The mission planners’ over-reliance on their experience in Kosovo, where they 
encountered difficulties in putting an end to hostilities amongst local parties in the 
post armed-conflict period, led to the adoption of centralised control and strict 
adherence to the principle of neutrality in relations with the local parties.47 This, in 
                                                 
45 Suhrke, 2001, p. 8; Goldstone, 2004, p. 84; Chesterman, 2001. 
46 Jarat Chopra, 2002, pp. 996-7; Dionisio Babo Soares, “Successes, Weaknesses and Challenges: A 
Critical Overview of the Political Transition in East Timor”,  Council for Asia Europe Cooperation 
Conference, Comparing Experiences with State-building in Asia and Europe: The Cases of East 
Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo (2001), p. 4, available via http://www.caec-
asiaeurope.org/Conference/Publications/index.html [accessed 5 June 2006].   
47 Chesterman, 2001; Shurke, 2001; Goldstone, 2004; King’s College London, 2002.  
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g, lacked the capacity to perform its institution-building 
and cap
ouncil’s and donor countries’ (un)willingness to provide support for East 
Timor.
rnance and public 
administration division. UNTAET consisted of three components: 
 
                                                
challenges and dilemmas that were specific to East Timor.48 Designed as a 
peacekeeping mission aiming to end hostilities between former warring parties and 
respond to immediate humanitarian needs rather than a state-building mission, 
UNTAET, from the beginnin
acity-building tasks. 
UNTAET’s objectives, detailed in the Secretary-General’s Report dated 4 
October 1999, included a range of tasks: assisting and protecting the East Timorese 
people displaced or affected by the conflict, creating the basis for good governance, 
developing mechanisms for dialogue at the national and local levels, assisting in the 
drafting of a constitution, organising and conducting elections and building the 
institutional capacity for electoral process, undertaking confidence-building 
measures and providing support to indigenous initiatives and processes of social 
reconciliation, creating non-discriminatory and impartial institutional structures, 
particularly the judiciary and the police, promoting economic and social recovery 
and developing accountable, transparent and efficient administrative institutions.49 
The Report did not provide any strategic plan for achieving these goals but 
determined a very ambitious time-scale: “two to three years”.50 Given the scale of 
difficulties and challenges and availability of resources on the ground, this seemed an 
unrealistic time-frame. This time-scale set by the UN Secretariat reflected the 
Security C
51  
Unlike Kosovo where the UN shared the burden in re-building the war-
shattered province of former Yugoslavia with regional organisations e.g. NATO, the 
EU and OSCE, UNTAET did not have the assistance of regional institutions in East 
Timor. The mission did not include a separate division responsible for institution-
building although its mandate included the development of competent self-
government institutions. These functions were assigned to the gove
 
48 Goldstone, 2001, p. 85. 
49 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor”, Security Council 
Document, S/1999/1024 (4 October 1999c), para. 29.  
50 Ibid., para. 27. 
51 Goldstone, 2004, p. 87. 
 194
                                                
(1) Governance and public administration including a civilian police 
(CivPol later renamed as UNPol) contingent of up to 1,640 
officers: This pillar was tasked with restoring essential 
infrastructure, providing basic social services, recruiting civil 
servants and reviving trade and commerce in the short-run while 
overseeing the development of sustainable administrative 
structures and institutions at the central and local level,52 
(2) Humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation 
component: Responsible for providing and coordinating 
humanitarian and relief assistance, and meeting the immediate 
needs of the East Timorese people such as access to water, 
shelter, food relief as well as arranging the return of displaced 
people and refugees,53  
(3) Military component: Responsible for the maintenance of law, 
order and security, it was the largest pillar (approximately 8,500 
troops and military observers from 27 countries).54  
 
In the light of this information, an analysis of the three aspects of the UN-led 
state-building undertaken during the transitional period, i.e. security-building, 
institution-building and capacity-building, will be conducted in the next section.  
 
 
5.3.1. Security-Building 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, achieving the feeling of security by individuals 
facilitates their participation and confidence in the post-conflict reconstruction 
process. The provision of security through disarming, demobilising and reintegrating 
fighting factions into civilian life and developing security institutions capable of 
monopolising the use of legitimate force also contributes to the effective delivery of 
short-term humanitarian assistance and creating an environment conducive to long-
 
52 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor”, Security Council Document, S/2000/53, (26 January 2000), paras. 40-
63. 
53 Ibid., paras. 29-39. 
54 Ibid., paras. 25-28. 
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term political, economic and social development.   
 
5.3.1.1. Demilitarisation 
The demilitarisation in East Timor, which included the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of former ex-guerrillas and militias, encountered 
many problems. Resolution 1272, which mandated UNTAET to govern and prepare 
East Timor for independence and democratic self-governance, did not address the 
issues of demilitarisation and the future status of FALINTIL. Poorly prepared to deal 
with former combatants, UNTAET was slow to address the question of the future of 
FALINTIL troops. Some 1,000-1,300 ex-guerrillas, who were cantoned in Aileu,55 
to the south of Dili, were left with no plan for demobilisation and little material 
support from late 1999 to February 2001.56 Feeling marginalised and frustrated with 
the uncertainty over their future and poor physical conditions, FALINTIL fighters 
suffered from weakening cohesion and discipline problems.57 A significant number 
of ex-guerrillas were reported to have departed from the cantonment site during the 
first half of 2000.58 It was not until the threat of mutiny among FALINTIL’s ranks 
which FALINTIL Supreme Commander and President of the National Council of 
Timorese Resistance (CNRT) Xanana Gusmão reported in June 2000 that UNTAET 
acted to address the question of the future status of FALINTIL.59  
Subsequently, UNTAET and FALINTIL High Command agreed a 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration plan in January 2001. Although a 
number of weapons were collected, some FALINTIL members never surrendered 
                                                 
55 Although FALINTIL High Command agreed to a single cantonment in Aileu following the arrival 
of the Australian-led multinational security force (International Force for East Timor, INTERFET) 
deployed to restore law and order in late-September 1999, guerrilla leaders rejected INTERFET’s call 
for disarmament.  See, “Gusmao Rejects Disarmament Call”, BBC World News, (4 October 1999), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/464931.stm [accessed 5 June 2006]. 
56 Amnesty International, “The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: A New Police Service – A New 
Beginning”, ASA 57/002/03, (2003), p. 21; Edward Rees, “Under Pressure FALINTIL – Forças de 
Defesa de Timor-Leste: Three Decades of Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste 1975-2004”, 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper, No. 139, 
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Crisis Group, 2006c, p. 5. 
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59 King’s College London, 2002, para. 49; Rees, 2004, p. 46. 
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their weapons and the number of arms in circulation remained unknown.60 The 
reintegration component of the plan envisioned the partial recruitment of former 
guerrillas into the newly-created defence force. The selection process, however, as 
will be discussed later, led to many problems. Those, who were excluded from 
recruitment into the defence force, acted as unofficial security groups and were 
reported to have been involved in robbery, extortion, and other crimes.61 
With regard to militias, as noted earlier, militia violence was rapidly 
contained by the Australian-led multi-national force (INTERFET) deployed in late 
September 1999. By the time UNTAET peacekeepers fully assumed the security 
responsibility from INTERFET in February 2000, the security situation had 
stabilised throughout East Timor, the actual security work required of the 
international military force was mostly routine.62 Efforts to disarm former militia 
members, however, remained inadequate. Those who took refuge in West Timor 
were never disarmed.63 The threat of renewed militia violence was strongly felt in 
summer 2000, during which militia groups, based in the refugee camps in West 
Timor, launched a series cross-border attacks and infiltrated into East Timor.64 
Despite a significant decline in militia activity by July 2001 as a result of operations 
conducted by UNTAET and the Indonesian armed forces’ efforts to disarm militias, 
militias and illegal cross-border trade and movement continued to pose a threat to 
security in East Timor throughout the transitional period.65   
As for the return and repatriation of refugees, which constituted a significant 
component of the security-building efforts undertaken during the transitional period, 
as of October 2001, a total of 185,519 refugees returned to East Timor while still an 
 
60 King’s College London, 2002, para. 51. 
61 Elsina Wainwright, New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia and the Security of East Timor 
(Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2002), p. 12. 
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Southeast Asia, (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 133. 
63 King’s College London, 2002, para. 48; Rees, 2004, p. 46. 
64 In armed clashes between militia groups and UNTAET peacekeeping troops, two UN soldiers were 
killed in July and August 2000. United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General”, (16 January 
2001), para. 10; Cotton, 2004, p. 133. In early-September 2000, three UNHCR (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and 20 Timorese were murdered by militias in the refugee 
camp of Atambua in West Timor, leading to the evacuation of UN staff in West Timor. United 
Nations, “Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor”, Security Council Document, S/2001/436, (2 May 2001), para. 17. 
65 United Nations, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor”, S/2001/719, (24 July 2001c), para. 47-48.  
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estimated 60,000 to 80,000 were still residing in West Timor.66 Although organised 
revenge against the returnees was eliminated thanks to conciliatory messages of 
Timorese political and religious leaders, cases of violence, illegal detention and 
threats against those suspected militia members were reported. These acts, carried 
out by unofficial security groups, often with links to FALINTIL or other political 
groups, as well as by others against refugees returning from Indonesia, were not 
effectively addressed by UNTAET and Timorese authorities.67    
With regard to other sources of threat, sporadic incidents of violence which 
rapidly turned into larger clashes and house burnings in Baucau and Viqueque 
districts in March and May 2001 signalled the salience of potential communal or 
inter-party violence in East Timor, fuelled by poverty and unemployment.68 The 
violent incidents in Baucau, in which members of an anti-UNTAET group, known as 
CPD-RDTL (Conselho de Defesa Popular da Republica Democrática de Timor 
Leste, Popular Council for the Defence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor),69 
and members of FALINTIL were involved, had clear political overtones.70 This led 
many Timorese, traumatised by violent inter-party competition in the past, to 
associate multi-party politics with confrontation and violence.71 It was against this 
backdrop that the Timorese security institutions were created by the international 
community as part of a comprehensive security sector reform.  
 
5.3.1.2. Creation of the Timorese Defence Force  
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Although initially the leaders of the Timorese resistance were in favour of a 
demilitarised East Timor but only a small gendarmerie with a limited budget,72 later 
they called for an army.  Two factors led to this policy shift: potential violence by 
former militias and disaffected former FALINTIL guerrillas in the post-UNTAET 
period.73  
Based on Option III proposed by King’s College London, which 
independently carried out a detailed assessment of the security sector options in East 
Timor between May and August 2000, by 2001 Timorese officials agreed to set up a 
limited army of 3,000 soldiers without the use of conscription; half would be made 
up of ex-FALINTIL guerrillas with the remainder being volunteer reservists.74  
FALINTIL was transformed into F-FDTL (FALINTIL-Defence Force of Timor-
Leste or FALINTIL – Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste in Portuguese) on 1 February 
2001.75 However, transforming FALINTIL from a clandestine organisation to a 
professional, depoliticised national defence force became a painful exercise that was 
hobbled by financial limitations and the exclusion of some former veterans from 
recruitment. 
Treated as an internal matter of FALINTIL, the selection process for the new 
defence force was left to FALINTIL High Command, resulting in the admission of 
guerrillas and commanders with loyalties to Xanana Gusmão and his successor Taur 
Matan Ruak.76 The creation of F-FDTL provided only one-third of some 1,900 
former guerrillas with employment by July 2001.77 The selection of younger, well-
educated recruits to the Second Battalion based in Metinaro, to the east of Dili, was 
to be completed shortly afterward. Internal differences stemming from personal 
conflicts, ideological and political differences, and affiliations to particular 
 
72 Wainwright, 2002, p. 23, citing José Ramos-Horta.  
73 Ibid. 
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76 Rees, 2002, pp. 45, 47; King’s College London, 2002, para. 56. 
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commanders affected the selection process. The recruitment of some former 
guerrillas from eastern districts caused discontent within the veteran community.78 
This led to the army being identified with the Firaku region.79 The process led the 
excluded veterans to feel that their years of resistance and sacrifice had gone 
unacknowledged.  
In addition to the exclusion of some veterans from the recruitment process, 
financial constraints harmed the development of the defence force, which was 
heavily dependent on international commitments and support. Funding shortfalls 
meant the formation of reserve battalions was indefinitely put on hold.80 The result 
was the emergence of a number of armed gangs formed by ex-guerrillas who had 
been excluded from recruitment to the national defence force. 
For those who were excluded from the process, FALINTIL Reinsertion 
Assistance Programme (FRAP) funded by the World Bank and USAID and 
implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), was initiated. 
Created to assist the social and economic reintegration of 1,308 former FALINTIL 
fighters, who were not recruited to the national defence force,81 FRAP consisted of 
four stages: cantonment and registration, discharge and departure activities, 
reinsertion, and reintegration.82 The listing of those eligible to receive FRAP 
benefits, which included the payment of the US$ 500 subsidy for a five-month 
period, assistance with establishing income-generating activities and vocational 
training, was also left to the FALINTIL High Command.83  
The selection of FRAP beneficiaries caused discontent among those who 
were excluded from FRAP as well.84 The FRAP programme ended in December 
2001 and was not followed with supplementary measures to facilitate the longer term 
reintegration of veterans. UNTAET’s failure to address the problems of former 
guerrillas negatively affected the reintegration process. It fuelled a growing sense of 
dissatisfaction within the veteran community and had an undermining effect on the 
 
78 Wainwright, 2002, p. 26. 
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83 McCarthy, 2002, pp. 36, 103. 
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legitimacy of F-FDTL.  
In addition to unresolved relations with former guerrillas and problems with 
recruitment procedures and availability of funding, the defence force also suffered 
from a number of institutional problems, including limited training facilities, poor 
living conditions, insufficient resources for communications and logistics, 
weaknesses in operational planning and policy guidance, low morale and uncertain 
respect for discipline, authority and professionalism.85 Officers recruited from 
FALINTIL ranks were reported to have lacked professionalism under civilian 
control. Some F-FDTL officers were said to have appeared only to collect their pay 
packets.86 Competition between Kaladi and Firaku officers continued as an 
important source of discontent. Allegations by Kaladi officers for discrimination in 
favour of Firaku never went away. The response of the F-FDTL High Command and 
the Timorese government was to deny such claims and discharge officers rather than 
investigating these issues. In December 2003 and January 2004 a small group of 
troops from Kaladi districts who had complained about regional discrimination were 
removed from the army.87  
Regional schisms also affected the relations between the army and police 
service. While the former was perceived to have been dominated by Firaku officers, 
the latter was seen to have been composed principally of Kaladi officers.88 Fluidity 
over their respective roles and responsibilities further complicated the relations 
between the two security institutions, contributing to their competitive development. 
F-FDTL is constitutionally responsible for the defence of “national independence, 
territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the populations against 
aggression or external threat”.89 However, the army increasingly became concerned 
with internal security issues following the growth of organised armed gangs formed 
by disgruntled veterans.90 The increasing preoccupation of the army with internal 
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87 Ibid., p. 32. 
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security, in turn, raised questions on the accountability of the armed forces,91 in 
other words, the issue of democratic control of F-FDTL by the civilian leadership. 
Despite the government’s adoption of some key legislation on the two forces’ 
respective roles, rivalry between the security institutions has continued in the post-
independence period. For example, the government’s reliance on the police rather 
than the F-FDTL for patrols of the border with Indonesia, which was agreed to be a 
non-militarised border with the Indonesian government, led to problems between the 
two institutions.  
Frictions between the army and police service intensified when Rogério 
Lobato, who had been convicted for diamond smuggling in Angola in 1983, was 
appointed as Minister of Interior Affairs in May 2002.92 Taking advantage of 
growing discontent within the veteran community and manipulating their anger 
against the police officers, who had served previously in the Indonesian police, 
Lobato built a strong support base amongst the dissident groups. Lobato’s 
opportunistic and populist appeals, as will be discussed in the following section, 
contributed to the intensification of competition between the police and national 
defence force and had an undermining effect on the legitimacy of the two 
institutions. 
All these challenges compounded and exploded in 2006 when the discharge 
of approximately 600 soldiers from Kaladi districts, equivalent to 40% of the army, 
triggered violence that brought the country nearly to the brink of civil war. The 
issues discussed above were all well-documented in UN reports,93 academic 
papers94 as well as in a presidential commission report.95 Investigation and 
resolution of disciplinary problems, adoption of a participatory approach by the F-
FDTL High Command and the government to address grievances within the army 
and disaffected veteran community, clarification of the roles and responsibilities of 
the security institutions, provision of equipment and facilities, and organisation of 
training and leadership programmes were repeatedly recommended to address these 
 
91 Ibid. 
92 Rees, 2004, p. 23. 
93 United Nations, 2004a. 
94 Wainwright, 2002; Shoesmith, 2003; Rees, 2004; Alex J. Bellamy, “Security Sector Reform: 
Prospects and Problems”, Global Change, Peace and Security, 15:2 (June 2003), pp. 101-119. 
95 President of Timor-Leste, 2004. 
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problems.96 The UN and Timorese leaders, however, failed to address these issues 
and take the necessary measures in a timely manner.  
 
5.3.1.3. Creation of the Timorese Police Service 
 
Established in March 2000 with the opening of the Police Academy, the 
Timorese police service, like F-FDTL, was an externally-designed security-building 
project. UNTAET’s civilian police (UNPol),97 responsible for maintaining law and 
order, was entrusted to build the Timorese police force with a planned overall 
strength of 3,000. Having completed three months of special training (later expanded 
to six months) in July 2000, the first graduates of the Police Academy were deployed 
to the field to receive on-the-job training from UNPol, which retained its executive 
authority over the Timorese police in the post-independence era. Some 1,800 
Timorese officers were recruited and trained by UN police officers by the date of the 
country’s independence.98 
However, facing a number of difficulties, the Timorese Police (PNTL, Polícia 
Nacional Timor Leste or National Police of Timor Leste) remained a fragile and 
underdeveloped institution which was not adequately prepared and equipped to 
maintain law and order in a manner consistent with international human rights 
standards.99 Inadequate resources, equipment, infrastructure and facilities needed for 
an effective police force, limited professional skills and experience in investigation, 
legal proceedings and administration as well as a lack of professional expertise in 
management positions were among the factors that constrained the development of 
the Timorese police service as an effective and professional institution.100 
Insufficient field and in-service training especially in human rights standards 
provided by UNPol, low pay rates, lack of clarity on the role and responsibility of the 
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military and police, and ineffective accountability structures to oversee the exercise 
of powers by the police further aggravated the problems with the institutional 
development of PNTL.101 
 In addition to these difficulties, the Timorese police service suffered from 
credibility and legitimacy problems resulting from the manner in which it was 
created. The recruitment of former officers who served with the Indonesian police 
led to discontent within the veteran community especially amongst those, who were 
excluded from the recruitment into the military. Approximately 12% of PNTL 
officers (a total of over 300 persons), mostly in senior positions, had served during 
Indonesian rule.102 UNTAET justified the selection of former Polri (Kepolisian 
Republik Indonesia or Police of the Republic of Indonesia) officers into the PNTL on 
the need for experienced senior police officers with a “clean” record. The vetting 
process undertaken by the senior leadership of the pro-independence umbrella 
organisation (CNRT) and many of former Polri officers absorbed into PNTL were 
reported to have participated in the clandestine resistance movement during the 
Indonesian period.103 This, however, did not satisfy dissidents in FRETILIN and 
disgruntled ex-FALINTIL guerrillas.  
The recruitment of former Polri officers became dangerously politicised as 
disaffected ex-combatants and members of clandestine resistance networks clustered 
around some political figures,104such as former Minister of Interior Affairs, Rogério 
Lobato, who did not hesitate to manipulate the situation to increase his political 
power. In September 2002, Lobato demanded the recruitment of some 500 former 
guerrillas to PNTL. This led to a clash between Lobato and Police Service Chief 
Paulo Fátima Martins, himself employed in Polri.105 Martins rejected Lobato’s order, 
leading to protests and attacks on the police in November 2002. In response to the 
killing of one protestor by the police, Gusmão demanded that the government 
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dismiss Lobato from the cabinet.106 This request was declined by Prime Minister 
Mari Alkatiri, sparking a political crisis followed by the outbreak of violence in Dili 
in early December, only six months after UNTAET had handed over power to the 
Timorese government.107 
The riots, which began as a student demonstration on 4 December 2002 
against the arrest of a youth by the East Timorese police, rapidly turned into an 
organised protest against the Alkatiri government. Several buildings, including 
Alkatiri’s house, were burned down and an Australian-owned supermarket was 
looted by an angry crowd. The Timorese police service, operating under the authority 
of the UN police (UNPol), failed to control the situation, prompting the 
government’s appeal for UN peacekeepers and national defence forces to restore 
order. As a solution to reduce the tension, the recruitment of 150 former FALINTIL 
members into the police service was agreed.108 This, however, as Edward Rees 
points out, opened the door for politicised recruitment to the police service rather 
than on the basis of qualifications and educa
 The December 2002 riots demonstrated the salience of power struggles 
among the Timorese leaders and its implications for the country’s newly established 
institutions. As will be discussed later, a semi-presidential system was adopted in the 
country. The constitutional principle of the separation of powers between president 
and prime minister which aims to prevent the abuse or concentration of powers in the 
hands of one single actor requires a collaborative relationship between the two.110 In 
the case of Timor-Leste, these two positions were occupied by two “political 
opponents, perhaps even political enemies” – Xanana Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri.111 
Due to the long-standing antagonism between the two figures, the semi-presidential 
system in the country fuelled a power struggle within the Timorese political 
leadership.112 This, in turn, hampered the professional and efficient development of 
the security institutions.   
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The national army is constitutionally under the command of the President 
while powers over expenditure and policy are held by the government and the 
Parliament. Although the President has symbolic powers, the army was identified 
with former FALINTIL Gusmão, who became the country’s first President in April 
2002. By law, the police operate under the government through the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs, headed by Rogerio Lobato until June 2006. The Minister is 
responsible for “general policy” on police.113 However, what exactly this involves 
remained unclear and the Ministry of Interior Affairs exercised “no real capacity for 
police development”.114  
Rivalries between the Timorese political leaders led to the development of the 
security institutions as rival agencies. Members of F-FDTL criticised the capacity of 
the police in law enforcement and were involved in law enforcement.115 In Ermera 
district in January 2003, for example, F-FDTL arrested 90 people, including women 
and children, following an attack by an armed group in which five people were 
killed.116 The event indicated a blurring of the responsibility and authority of the 
army and police and the tendency of the army that they have the right to interfere in 
the internal security of the country because the police service has no capacity.117 
There have also been a number of instances of clashes between the defence 
force and police reported since the year 2002. In November 2002, for example, F-
FDTL officers were reported to have attacked traffic police, seriously injuring two of 
them.118 In January 2004, members of F-FDTL were involved in a confrontation with 
PNTL in Los Palos and detained a number of police officers.119 In December of the 
same year, a group of F FDTL soldiers attacked a PNTL station where a sergeant in 
the armed forces had been detained and allegedly mistreated.120 These incidents 
prompted senior government officials to call for a coordinated effort to resolve the 
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issues between the police and the armed forces. “The only concrete actions” that the 
Timorese leadership took towards this aim included “a series of high-profile 
goodwill meetings and a soccer game between the [police] and the [army], in which 
the President served as referee”.121 Tensions between the two security institutions 
increased and the most tragic incidents took place during the violent events in late-
May 2006. As noted earlier, F-FDTL soldiers killed nine unarmed PNTL officers, 
who were under UN protection.122 The events were followed by the deployment of 
international troops from Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia to restore law and 
order and rebuild the disintegrated security structures. 
 
5.3.2. Institution-Building  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, which provides the analytical framework for 
investigating the international community’s involvement in state-building in Timor-
Leste and Kosovo, institution-building during the transitional period entails the 
establishment of effective legislative, executive, judicial and bureaucratic structures. 
The undertaking of these efforts requires the adoption of a participatory approach 
with a view to setting a good model for democratic government in places, where 
democratic rule was never practised before, and creating a sense of ‘ownership’ of 
externally-introduced concepts, projects and systems by the local population. Several 
important challenges and problems encountered in East Timor during this process 
would have serious implications for the prospect of democratic transition in the 
country. 
As mentioned earlier, designed as a peacekeeping rather than a state-building 
mission, UNTAET was concerned with avoiding the short-term risk of failure and 
open conflict with factions123 and with completing the mission as soon as possible.124 
Two assumptions affected the adoption of the peacekeeping model, which required a 
centralised approach. One was the threat of resumption of violence between parties 
and the other was that there was a political vacuum in East Timor following the 
withdrawal of the Indonesian government.  
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Regarding the first assumption, as noted earlier, by the time UNTAET arrived 
in East Timor, the Australian-led multinational force took control of security 
throughout the territory and most of militias fled to West Timor. There was a risk of 
renewed militia violence through cross-border attacks and incursions from West 
Timor. Overcoming this threat was dependent on the capacity to convince the 
Indonesian government to cooperate with UNTAET to disarm the militias and 
initiate a sustainable return process for the displaced East Timorese in West Timor.  
The second assumption, that there was a political vacuum in East Timor, did 
not exactly reflect the situation on the ground. Despite the emergence of a legal and 
administrative vacuum resulting from the mass destruction of the physical 
infrastructure and collapse of formal government structures following the militia 
violence and subsequent dissolution of Indonesian administration, East Timor was 
not “a political no man’s land”.125 It was not a place where there were no prior 
concepts of political authority, social structures and power systems that the 
population had just to be “taught” democracy.126 To the contrary, traditional social 
and political power structures still existed. Hierarchical kinship and exchange 
relations, which, as noted earlier, formed the basis of the Timorese local power 
structures and political organisation and survived centuries of Portuguese colonial 
rule and over two decades of Indonesian occupation. The traditional Timorese 
society, characterised by the division of political authority and ritual authority, 
differs from Western societies where the powers of judiciary, legislature and 
executive powers are separated.127 The “highest family”, believed to have arrived 
first on the land, is treated as ritual authority, connected to the value of fertility and 
to the ancestors.128 Political authority which deals with conflict resolution and 
defending borders is conducted by a specific person coming from the second family 
in the hierarchical order. He is recognised as a single power with an unchallenged 
decision-making authority.129 In such a social system, there is no room for 
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opposition, which can only exist between different political rulers such as between 
neighbouring kingdoms.130 Although the old liurais system was abolished by 
Indonesia, most of former Timorese kings, who were elected by villagers in 
accordance with the traditional power structure, turned into village chiefs or sub-
district leaders and retained their authority.131   
Therefore, given the fact that neither the Portuguese nor Indonesians managed 
to destruct those old power structures, they had to be taken into consideration and 
incorporated into the new system to be introduced from the outside. Otherwise, any 
institutional project to build a viable liberal democratic state in Timor-Leste, 
Dionisio Babo-Soares, Co-chair of the Truth and Friendship Commission with 
Indonesia, argued, would be “doomed to failure”.132   
Another important point that needs mentioning is that although there was no 
sovereign government in East Timor at the time UNTAET was deployed, the pro-
independence umbrella organisation, CNRT, whose flag was used as the symbol of 
independence on the 30 August 1999 popular consultation ballot paper,133 existed as 
a potential partner. Consisting of all pro-independence political parties, civil society 
groups and individuals, it had “considerable de facto legitimacy” in the eyes of the 
people.134 However, since the 1999 vote was not held for CNRT as the government 
but for independence, UNTAET treated CNRT as a “faction” rather than a legitimate 
partner representing the Timorese people.135 Therefore, it had to be kept at distance. 
UNTAET’s reluctance to share power with CNRT, however, not only caused 
resentment on the side of local actors but also contributed to the dissolution of 
CNRT, which was facing internal differences, divisions and power struggles that 
 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., p. 305; Idem, 2004, pp. 574-576.  
132 Interview with Dionisio Babo Soares, (Dili, 10 February 2006). For a discussion of the survival 
and evolution of traditional social organisations in the aftermath of the disintegration of formal 
governing institutions, see also Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe, “Participatory Intervention”, Global 
Governance, 10: 3 (July-September 2004), pp. 289-305. For a discussion of international state-
builders’ failure to understand the pre-existing local concepts, ideas, systems and structures, and 
integrate them into the newly created formal structures transferred from the outside, see Sofi Ospina 
and Tanja Hohe, Traditional Power Structures and the Community Empowerment and Local 
Governance Project, (Dili, September 2001); Tanja Hohe, “Justice Without Judiciary in East Timor”, 
Conflict, Security & Development, 3:3 (December 2003), pp. 335-357.  
133 The ballot paper used during the popular consultation can be found at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/POSTERS/ballot.pdf [accessed 15 March 2006]. 
134 Goldstone, 2004, p. 85.  
135 Suhrke, 2001, p. 8; Chopra, 2002, pp. 996-7. 
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came into existence following the disappearance of a common enemy. 
Until the Constituent Assembly elections in August 2001 and the subsequent 
formation of the first all-Timorese cabinet, de Mello, who acted as the transitional 
administrator, retained all legislative, executive and judicial powers. In December 
1999, a non-elected fifteen-member advisory body, known as the National 
Consultative Council (NCC), was established.136 It was designed as a small advisory 
body to facilitate swift decision-making during the emergency phase because 
UNTAET believed that only centralised control could lead to operational and 
institutional efficiency.137  
In this context, it is important to note that similar to the local pro-
independence umbrella organisation (CNRT), UNTAET, which was established to 
supervise East Timor’s transition to independence, was not a unified organisation 
either. It was facing internal divisions, arising from differences of opinion regarding 
the political reconstruction of the territory. Jarat Chopra, Head of Office of District 
Administration, for example, resigned from his post in March 2000 to protest 
UNTAET’s failure to consult with district administrators over the issues that directly 
affected them. Chopra was in favour of a decentralised approach at the local 
administration level. Under increasing internal criticisms for UNTAET’s reluctance 
to share decision-making powers with the Timorese as well as external pressure put 
by local Timorese leaders for a more inclusive and participatory mechanism, Sergio 
de Mello proposed a ‘co-governance’ model in July 2000. Responsible for 
administering the territory during the transitional period leading up to the adoption of 
a constitution and establishment of a democratically elected government, a mixed 
cabinet with four Timorese ministers was set up.138 Along with the cabinet an 
 
136 Chaired by de Mello, NCC consisted of seven Timorese representatives from the CNRT, three 
from other political groups, one from the church, and three UNTAET staff. UNTAET/REG/1999/2, (2 
December 1999) can be found at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg2.htm [accessed 10 
March 2006]. 
137 Paulo Gorjão, “The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor” , Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24:2 (August 2002), p. 318. 
138 See UNTAET/REG/2000/23, (14 July 2000), which is accessible via 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/r-2000.htm [accessed 12 March 2005]. The portfolios 
designated to the Timorese were Internal Administration, Infrastructure, Social Affairs, and Financial 
Affairs. International members occupied the Police and Emergency Services, Justice, Political Affairs, 
and Finance portfolios. See, UNTAET Daily Press Briefing, (17 July 2000) available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/DB170700.HTM [accessed 13 March 2006]. See, also United 
Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor”, S/2000/738, (26 July 2000). On 19 October 2001, the Foreign Affairs portfolio was added to 
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enlarged non-elected legislative body, the National Council (NC) which consisted of 
thirty three members (all East Timorese), to be appointed by the transitional 
administrator, was also created.139  
Although the creation of the NC and the cabinet provided Timorese leaders 
with some voice in the transitional governing structures, these two bodies served as 
forums rather than transferring any authority to local political actors. Sergio de Mello 
retained ultimate power. UNTAET’s reluctance to share power with local parties, its 
limited capacity to deliver basic services and tangible reconstruction results, and the 
glaring contrast between the wealth of international staff and ordinary people140 
fuelled resentment against UNTAET. In October 2000, Xanana Gusmão expressed 
this collective frustration by arguing that the Timorese experience of the UN 
presence was limited to watching hundreds of white four-wheel-drive vehicles 
driving around Dili and receiving a series of regulations passed by the transitional 
administrator.141 This growing resentment, which stagnated relations between 
UNTAET and local Timorese political leaders, as well as UNTAET’s search for an 
‘exit strategy’ led the international state-builders to conceive the organisation of the 
Constituent Assembly election as a solution to revitalise the process and serve as an 
exit strategy. 
Sixteen parties, most of which were not widely known by the people, were 
registered with the Election Commission.142 All but two parties signed the “Pact of 
National Unity”, which obliged the signatories to commit themselves to supporting, 
observing and disseminating the principle of non-violence and to unconditional 
acceptance of the 30 August 1999 popular consultation results, and to respecting the 
results of the elections for a Constituent Assembly.143 For many East Timorese, who 
 
the cabinet and Mr. José Ramos-Horta was sworn in as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. See, UNTAET 
Daily Press Briefing (19 October 2000), http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/DB191000.HTM 
[accessed 13 March 2006]. 
139 See, UNTAET/REG/2000/24, (17 July 2000), available at 
http://www0.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg2400E.pdf [accessed 12 March 2006]. The membership 
was expanded to thirty six in October 2000. The council was composed of thirteen members from 
political parties, thirteen district representatives, seven from civil society organizations and three from 
religious groups. See, UNTAET/REG/2000/33, (26 October 2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/reg200033.pdf [accessed 12 March 2006]. 
140 Chopra, 2000, p. 34; Beauvais, 2001, pp. 1124-5. 
141 Chesterman, 2005, p. 140. 
142 United Nations, 2001c, para. 2.  
143 Laying out a set of principles relating to the outcome of the Constituent Assembly elections, the 
Pact of National Unity was adopted at the CNRT congress in August 2000 when FRETILIN and UDT 
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were traumatised by the 1975 civil war and the post-ballot violence in September 
1999, the principle of national unity and multi-party competition meant a 
contradiction and involved a potential threat of conflict. As noted earlier, the 1975 
civil war, which broke out as a result of a fierce competition for power between 
FRETILIN and UDT, cost the lives of at least 1,500 people. The militia violence, 
which erupted following the announcement of the UN-sponsored independence 
referendum, led to the death of many people and displacement of the two-thirds of 
the territory’s population.  
The results of a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation prior to the election 
tend to confirm this observation. When asked whether or not political party 
competition is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing, 54% of respondents considered it a bad thing 
or did not answer the question.144 Some 64% of those who indicated political party 
competition a bad thing explained it by citing the potential for conflict and riots 
while 43% felt that competitive multi-party elections would confuse the people.145 
This negativity does not necessarily suggest that the East Timorese people were 
pessimistic about the idea of democratic politics and government. According to the 
results of another opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute 
(IRI) with 1,561 East Timorese in October 2003, some 68% of respondents reported 
that they were either “optimistic” or “very optimistic” that democracy would reform 
their country and help to solve the problems they face.146 In fact, the high turnout 
(91.4%) in the Constituent Assembly elections tends to support their confidence in 
the democratic political process and its capacity to address the country’s problems.  
However, it is important to note that the IRI poll, which reflected the continued 
division of opinion on the issue of competition of political parties, also revealed that 
the persistence of negativity towards the notion of political contestation. While some 
46% of respondents indicated that competition among political parties is a ‘bad’ 
thing, 45% reported that it is a ‘good’ thing.147 
 
 
withdrew from CNRT.  
144 Asian Foundation, East Timor National Survey of Voter Education (Preliminary Findings), (Dili, 
May 2001), p. 33. 
145 Ibid., p. 35. 
146 International Republican Institute, 2003, p. 9. 
147 Ibid., p. 22. 
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The results of the two surveys, in this respect, can be read as highlighting the 
East Timorese people’s sympathy with practising participatory and inclusive aspects 
of democratic politics and their concern with implementing its competitive or 
potentially conflictual aspects and their implications for the territory’s political 
stability and development. These issues, however, were not seriously addressed 
during the transitional administration period. While the UN was busy with devising 
an exit strategy through organising the first free and fair elections in the territory’s 
history, most of the East Timorese people and their political leaders, as José Ramos-
Horta would later during the 2006 crisis admit, were “in a hurry to see the backs of 
the UN”.148 
Based on a mixture of district plurality and proportional representation,149 the 
election of the 88-member Constituent Assembly was held on 30 August 2001. 
Approximately 91% of eligible voters participated in the election150 and twelve 
political parties and one independent candidate won seats. FRETILIN, the leading 
resistance movement party won 12 of the 13 district seats and received 57.3% of the 
votes, corresponding to 43 seats in the Assembly. Although the percentage of votes 
gained by FRETILIN fell short of party secretary-general Mari Alkatiri’s pre-
election prediction for gaining 80% of votes, FRETILIN’s success was not 
unexpected,151 even though the international community was somewhat taken by 
surprise.152 Two factors contributed to FRETILIN’s success: its effective strong 
grassroots organisation, and the emphasis FRETILIN leaders put on the party’s 
historic role during the election campaign. FRETILIN effectively won back the 
grassroots by organising representatives at all levels from hamlet to the national level 
even when it was still part of the CNRT, which officially dissolved in June 2001.153  
 
148 “Timor Leste’s Police Are Very Factionalized”, Interview with José Ramos Horta, Jakarta Post, 
(16 June 2006) [cited as Jakarta Post, 2006]. 
149 13 representatives were elected from each district (Lautem, Baucau,  Viqueque, Manatuto, Dili, 
Aileu, Manufahi, Liquiça, Ermera, Ainaro, Bobonaro, Cova Lima and Oecussi) on majority basis and 
the remaining 75 seats were divided on national proportional representation. UNTAET/REG/2001/2 
(16 March 2001), Section 4.1., available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/r-2001.htm 
[accessed 25 March 2006]. 
150 United Nations, 2001e, para. 5. 
151 King, 2003, p. 750; Lurdes Silva-Carneiro de Sousa, “Some Facts and Comments on the East 
Timor 2001 Constituent Assembly Election”, Lusotopie, (2001), p. 309. 
152 Tanja Hohe, “Delivering Feudal Democracy in East Timor”, Edward Newman and Roland Rich 
(eds.), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality, (Tokyo, New York, Paris: 
United Nations University Press, 2004), p. 314. 
153 Hohe, 2004, p. 308; James J. Fox, “A District Analysis of the East Timorese Constituent Assembly 
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National Political Party / Independent Candidate 
Votes Percentage Seats 
District Seats Total Seats 
Fretilin - Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor 
208,53
1 
57.37 43 12 55 
PD - Democratic Party  31,680 8.72 7 - 7 
PSD - Social Democratic Party  29,726 8.18 6 - 6 
ASDT - Timorese Social Democratic 
Association  
28,495 7.84 6 - 6 
PNT - Timorese Nationalist Party 8,035 2.21 2 - 2 
PDC - Christian Democratic Party  7,181 1.98 2 - 2 
UDT - Timorese Democratic Union  8,581 2.36 2 - 2 
KOTA - Association of Timorese Heroes 7,735 2.13 2 - 2 
PPT - Timorese People’s Party  7,322 2.01 2 - 2 
UDC/PDC - Timor’s Christian Democratic 
Party 
2,413 0.66 1 - 1 
PST - Socialist Party of Timor 6,483 1.78 1 - 1 
PL - Liberal Party  4,013 1.10 1 - 1 
Apodeti - Timorese Popular Democratic 
Assosciation  
2,181 0.60 - - 
- 
Parentil - National Republic Party of East 
Timor  
1,970 0.54 - - 
- 
PTT - Timorese Labour Party  2,026 0.56 - - - 
PDM - Democratic Maubere Party  1,788 0.40  - - 
District Independent Candidate (Oecussi) - - - 1 1 
Independent Candidates 5,341 1.47 - - - 
Total 363,50
1  
100.00% 
75 
13 
88 
Table 5.1. The Constituent Assembly Election Results (Sources:  Dwight King, “East Timor’s Founding 
Elections and Emerging Party System,” Asian Survey, 43:5 (September / October 2003), Lurdes Silva-Carneiro 
de Sousa, “Some Facts and Comments on the East Timor 2001 Constituent Assembly Election”, Lusotopie, 
(2001), Pat Walsh, “East Timor’s Political Parties and Groupings, Brief Notes”, Australian Council for Overseas 
Aid, (April 2001),  UNTAET Daily Press Briefing, 6 September 2001) 
 
The results of the election, which displayed the victory of the FRETILIN 
‘family’ parties,154 revealed an inter-generational gap and inter-regional cleavage.155 
The two parties which won seats in the Assembly – Timorese Social Democratic 
Association (ASDT), and Democratic Party (PD) – were formed by former 
FRETILIN members. PD, which was established two months before the election by 
former student activist Fernando Araujo, attracted the sympathy of the educated 
urban youth who felt that their contributions to the resistance movement were not 
recognised by the returned exiles.156 PD gained the votes of those educated under 
Indonesia, who felt marginalised by the choice of Portuguese as the official language 
by the old Timorese leaders. ASDT, headed by Francisco Javier do Amaral, former 
                                                                                                                                          
and Presidential Elections 2001-2002”, Dionisio Babo Soares et al., Elections and Constitution 
Making in East Timor, (Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Australian 
National University, 2003), p. 17. 
154 de Sousa, 2001, p. 309. 
155 King, 2003, pp. 753-5. 
156 Ibid., p. 755; Shoesmith, 2003, p. 242; de Sousa, 2001, p. 309. 
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FRETILIN leader who became East Timor’s President in 1975, had the support of 
disaffected veterans and radicals who were organised under the CPD-RDTL, 
established as a political organisation in opposition to the UN-led transition process. 
The latter rejected UNTAET and called for the immediate restoration of the original 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste proclaimed in 1975 and the adoption of a set of 
early symbols including the previous FRETILIN flag.157 The regional cleavage also 
influenced the voting support for FRETILIN (higher in eastern districts) and ASDT 
(higher in western districts).158  
 The Constituent Assembly, which transformed itself into East Timor’s first 
parliament upon the adoption of the Constitution,159 approved the draft Constitution 
modelled on the 1989 Portuguese and 1990 Mozambique Constitution on 22 March 
2002.160 Except for a few modifications such as the recognition of Tetum as the 
official language of the nation alongside Portuguese, the Constitution did not differ 
much from the one drafted by Fretilin in 1998,161 even though more than 38,000 
Timorese people were consulted at 212 constitutional hearings held in 13 districts 
between June and July 2001.162 
Four separate and interdependent “organs of sovereignty” were created by the 
Constitution: the President of the Republic, the National Parliament, the Government 
and the Judiciary. 
 
The President: East Timor adopted a semi-presidential system in which the 
head of state, the President, is not in charge of the government, but is elected by 
direct universal suffrage for a term of office of five years, renewable only once.163 
                                                 
157 Dwight King, “East Timor’s Founding Elections and Emerging Party System”, Asian Survey, 43:5 
(September / October 2003), p. 752; Fox, 2003, p. 18. 
158 King, 2003, p. 753. 
159 As per Article 2.6 of the UNTAET/REG/2001/2, (16 March 2001), the Constituent Assembly had 
the option to transform itself into “the legislature of an independent East Timor, if so provided in the 
Constitution”. See the Constitution, Section 167.1. The measure to turn the Constituent Assembly into 
a fully fledged legislature was passed with 65 votes in favour, 16 against, two abstentions and five 
absent. See, UNTAET Daily Press Briefing, (1 January 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db310102.htm [accessed 28 March 2006]. 
160 Hilary Charlesworth, “The Constitution of East Timor”, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, 1:2 (2003), p. 328. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Executive summary of the constitutional hearings is available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db190901.htm [accessed 5 April 2006]. 
163 Constitution of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Sections 75.1 and 75.2. 
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The President’s powers and functions, which are largely ceremonial, include 
appointing the leader of the majority party or majority coalition as prime minister. 
Viewed as “the symbol and guarantor of national independence” the President is 
entrusted with different functions and appointments. Although the President is vested 
with the ultimate power to dismiss the Parliament and government, in practice most 
of the executive powers is held by the Prime Minister. The choice of such a semi-
presidential system, in which executive power is concentrated in the prime minister 
and the cabinet, was actually the result of decades-old rivalry between former 
FALINTIL commander Xanana Gusmão and FRETILIN secretary-general Mari 
Alkatiri, and the latter’s calculation that the former would be elected as the President 
in the 2002 presidential election.164  
The National Parliament: Designed to provide the government with an 
institutional and operational framework to rule the country in a manner consistent 
with democratic principles, which include political participation, accountability, 
transparency and respect for human rights, Timor-Leste’s Parliament is made up of 
representatives of all Timorese citizens elected for a five-year term.165 Parliament’s 
exclusive legislative competencies include a number of areas ranging from 
citizenship, rights, freedoms and guarantees, tax policy, budget system, education, 
health and security policies, amending territorial divisions and national symbols.166 
The Parliament, which is in charge of deliberating and approving the state budget 
and monitoring its execution,167 can authorise the government to make decrees on a 
number of areas including the definition of crimes, sentences and security measures, 
organisation of the judiciary, monetary system, banking and financial system, and 
civic or military service.168 
The Government: Headed by a prime minister, the government which is the 
“supreme organ of the public administration”169 includes the Ministers and the 
                                                 
164 Xanana Gusmão was elected on 14 April 2002. Contesting against Francisco Xavier do Amaral, 
who proclaimed the declaration of independence on 28 November 1975, Gusmão gained 82.7 per cent 
of the valid votes. UNTAET Daily Press Briefing, (17 April 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db170402.htm [accessed 5 April 2006]. 
165 Constitution of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Section 93. 4. 
166 Ibid., Section, 95.2. 
167 Ibid., Section 95.3.  
168 Ibid., Section 96.1. 
169 Ibid., Section 103. 
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Secretaries of State. Accountable to the President and the Parliament,170 the 
government’s competencies include defining and conducting the domestic and 
foreign policy of the country, ensuring public order and social discipline, preparing 
the state budget and executing it following its approval by the Parliament, and 
administering the social and economic sectors.171 As of mid-April 2002, just before 
independence, the Timorese public service consisted of approximately 11,000 civil 
servants against 15,000 approved posts, most of which were at the lower ranks. 
Fewer than 50% of management positions were filled by the Timorese.172 
The Judiciary: Responsible for the administration of justice, the judiciary is 
composed of three categories of courts provided by the constitution: the Supreme 
Court of Justice and other courts of law, the High Administrative, Tax and Audit 
Court and other administrative courts of first instance, and Military Courts.173 Due to 
the lack of qualified local personnel, none of these bodies were yet to be established. 
The justice sector was particularly weak during the transitional period and enhancing 
the institutional capacity of the judiciary remained a challenge throughout the post-
independence era. The factors that led to the weakness of the justice sector will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 
5.3.3. Capacity-Building 
 
As noted earlier, UNTAET was not only mandated to construct democratic 
government institutions but also to develop local capacities needed to run these 
institutions. However, from the outset, UNTAET did not have a clear strategy to 
build local institutional capacity in the context of post-conflict state-building. It was 
designed as a mission heavily dependent on international staff and externally-driven 
solutions, focusing on achieving quick results in the short-term.  
Large-scale destruction of the territory and withdrawal of some 7,000 
Indonesian civil servants during the events surrounding the 30 August 1999 
referendum led to the treatment of East Timor as a social terra nullis – an ‘empty 
place’ where everything had to be brought in from the outside and everything had to 
                                                 
170 Ibid., Section 107. 
171 Ibid., Section 115.1. 
172 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor”, S/2002/432, (17 April 2002), para. 13. 
173 Constitution of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Section 123.1. 
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be built from scratch. Although there was a shortage of skills at the managerial level 
due to the fact that these positions had mostly been filled by the Indonesians, who 
left the territory in the post-referendum period, there was no such shortage at lower 
levels in public administration.174   
However, UNTAET did too little to identify and build upon existing local 
capacities.175 After six months of its existence, UNTAET had not conducted a 
national skills audit or initiated a meaningful employment policy for local Timorese 
in the public administration.176 UNTAET’s approach to capacity building in public 
administration was based on importing international staff from the outside to perform 
public services and recruiting a separate Timorese civil service rather than 
integrating the East Timorese personnel into the transitional structure.177 This, in 
turn, not only limited employment opportunities for local Timorese but also 
hampered the possibilities for administrative experience and training for local 
personnel, who would eventually take over from the UNTAET.178 Except for a few 
individuals with short-term contacts, there were almost no Timorese in the rapidly 
growing UN administrative bureaucracy during the first six months of the mission.179   
The assumption behind the creation of an administrative bureaucracy filled by 
well-paid international personnel180 was that while carrying out civilian functions, 
international staff members would train Timorese staff. Slow recruitment of 
international staff, uneven quality of skills and their insufficient knowledge of the 
local context became handicaps to achieving these goals. By the end of January 
2000, only 351 international staff with varying levels of skills had arrived in East 
Timor, which damaged UNTAET’s credibility during the first months of the 
mission.181   
 
174 Interview with Marcelino Magno from Timor Institute of Development Studies (TIDS) and João 
Cancio Freitas from Dili Institute of Technology (DIT). See also, Joint Assessment Mission, 1999, p. 
1.  
175 James J. Fox, “East Timor: Assessing UNTAET’s Role in Building Local Capacities for the 
Future”, Council for Asia Europe Cooperation Conference Publications, (2001a), p. 6, available at 
http://www.caec-asiaeurope.org/Conference/Publications/fox.PDF [accessed 26 September 2006]. 
176 Chopra, 2000, p. 32.  
177 Chopra, 2000, p. 32. 
178 Fox, 2001a. 
179 Chopra, 2000, p. 33. 
180 The salary of international staff roughly ranged between US$ 4,000 and US$ 10,000 per month. 
Interview with Alex Grainger from La’o Hamutuk, (Dili, February 2006). 
181 Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, p. 134. 
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The only jobs available for many Timorese were driving, translation / 
interpretation, security and cleaning. Knowledge of English was required to obtain 
employment with UNTAET.182 From the UN’s perspective, the lack of competency 
in English language skills among the Timorese was one of the biggest challenges to 
finding and recruiting qualified local staff.183 While there appears to be concerns in 
relation to the skills and capabilities of the East Timorese people, it would also seem 
that what skills and capabilities existed were not used efficiently, in large part due to 
the shortage of English language skills. Therefore, it can be argued that perhaps more 
involvement by Indonesian / Malay speaking agents of the UN would have been 
appropriate given the number of people with the skills and capabilities needed who 
were also proficient in the Indonesian / Malay language. 
It was not until mid-2000 that UNTAET began recruiting local staff in 
civilian administration. The recruitment of Timorese civil servants was based on a 
“from the bottom-up” approach, which meant until late-2001, there were almost no 
Timorese at middle or senior levels in public administration.184 As noted earlier, as 
of April 2002, just before the country’s declaration of formal independence, only half 
of the management positions were filled with the Timorese. A number of specialists 
and consultants with different backgrounds and approaches coming from different 
countries flowed into East Timor, where there was no concrete, systematic capacity-
development approach until the post-transitional period. UNTAET, which tended to 
equate ‘Timorisation’ of civil service with ‘ownership’, paid attention to the 
appointment of local staff rather than focusing on the training that would enable them 
to carry out their duties.185 UNTAET’s capacity-building exercises focused on 
individual skills transfer186 rather than on institutional and structural procedures. 
Although international consultants and technical advisors were expected to advise 
their counterparts through coaching and mentoring and to encourage them to assume 
their responsibilities and functions, many of them either lacked time or training / 
 
182 Interview with Marcelino Magno and João Cancio Freitas. 
183 Interview with Scott Cunliffe, UNOTIL (United Nations Office in Timor-Leste), (Dili, 2 February 
2006). 
184 Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict 
Situations, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), p. 23. 
185 Chesterman, 2005, p. 144. 
186 Toshi Nakamura, Reflections on the State Institution-Building Support in Timor-Leste Capacity 
Development, Integrating Mission, and Financial Challenges, (Oslo: UNDP, November 2004), p. 16. 
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couching skills187 or had little interest in interacting with the Timorese civil 
servants.188 Displaying poor aptitude for capacity-development, they had little 
sensitivity to the socio-cultural context in which they were operating.189  
In addition to these behavioural factors, other difficulties hindered progress in 
the transfer of skills. Partly due to the government’s decision to temporarily freeze 
the recruitment of Timorese civil servants and partly due to the donors’ preference 
for tight financial control, a number of international advisors had to carry out “line 
functions”.190 Thus, they had little time for advising and training Timorese staff. 
Communication problems resulting from international staff members’ lack of local 
languages and local staff’s lack of proficiency in the English language made it harder 
to undertake meaningful on-the-job training.191 Hence, many Timorese staff ended 
up standing and watching around while their international counterparts were taking 
care of daily administrative tasks.192 The result was little achievement in transferring 
skills to local personnel and creating a sense of ‘ownership’ of approaches and 
procedures introduced and implemented by international consultants. 
In early 2001, the UNDP, in coordination with the National Planning and 
Development Agency established within the transitional government structure, 
formulated a comprehensive, sector-wide ten-year programme for governance and 
public sector development, called the Capacity Development for Governance and 
Public Sector Management (GPSM). Developed on the basis of a phased-approach, 
GPSM had a two-fold focus: prepare the ground for the transition to an independent 
administration, and develop and strengthen basic cross-sectoral capacities needed for 
a functioning public administration, supportive of a market economy in a democratic 
system of governance.193  
 
187 Patrick Keuleers, “Building The Public Administration in a Post-Conflict Situation The Case of 
Timor-Leste”, United Nations Development Programme Sub-Regional Resource Facility for the 
Pacific, (March 2004), p. 19. 
188 Interview with a Timorese civil servant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Dili, February 
2006). 
189 King’s College London, 2002, para. 176. 
190 Ibid. 
191 UNTAET and World Bank, Background Paper for Donors’ Meeting on East Timor,   (Canberra, 
14-15 June 2001), pp. 15-16. 
192 Chesterman, 2005, p. 144. 
193 Stephen Browne, Patrick Keuleers and Niloy Banerjee, “Assessment of Capacity Development 
Efforts and Outline of a Framework for Future UNDP Support to Public Sector Capacity 
Development”, Mission Report, (Dili: UNDP, August 2005), p. 8.  
In order to avoid duplication of efforts, wastage of resources and ad hoc 
approaches to capacity development, the GPSM proposed the establishment of a 
Capacity Development and Coordination Unit (CDCU) to be staffed by 5 nationals, 
supported by one international advisor. The GPSM programme was endorsed by the 
Canberra donors’ meeting of June 2001 and by the transitional cabinet. Donor 
countries expressed interest in providing bilateral support for 80 per cent of the 
individual projects proposed within GPSM.194 However, partly due to high turnover 
in UNDP and partly because of limited involvement of the Timorese, it did not 
become the single guiding framework for capacity-building.195 The initial 
appointment of an international advisor to recruit the CDCU personnel further 
aggravated this lack of ownership, leading to the perception of CDCU as a donor-
steering mechanism resulting from a donor-driven capacity-development 
framework.196 
  
Picture 5.2. A scene from Dili; as of February 2006, some of the basic infrastructure facilities in the 
capital Dili such as traffic and street lights, and waste water pipes were not constructed and 
demolished buildings were not repaired yet (Photo taken by the author, 12 February 2006).  
 
Although approximately US$ 2 billion was channelled to East Timor for its 
reconstruction as a self-sufficient democratic polity during the transitional period, the 
country ranked as “the poorest in Asia and one of the poorest in the world”, with 
more than 40% of the population living below the poverty line of $US 0.55 per 
                                                 
194 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General”, (17 April 2002), para. 14. 
195 Browne, Keuleers and Banerjee, 2005, p. 9. 
 220
196 Ibid. 
day,197 when it became independent. The donor community including Japan, 
Australia, Portugal, the European Commission, Sweden, New Zealand and a number 
of other countries at the Tokyo meeting in December 1999 pledged a total of US$ 
523 million, comprising of US$ 157 million for humanitarian aid and US$ 366 
million in support of socio-economic reconstruction and development for the period 
2000-02. This was outside UNTAET’s own budget, which only covered the costs of 
peacekeeping forces and civilian staff, which amounted to US$ 1,280 million during 
the period until independence.198  
 
 
Table 5.2. UNTAET Staff Expenditures (Source: United Nations, “Budget for the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor for the Period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002”, General 
Assembly Document, A/56/624, (15 November 2001), p. 6.) 
 
                                                 
197 UNDP, 2002, p. vii, 1. 
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198 Klaus Rohland and Sarah Cliffe, “The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems 
and Tradeoffs”, World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit Working Papers, 2 
(November 2002), pp. 6-7. 
 Table 5.3. Number of personnel employed with UNTAET (Source: United Nations, “Budget for the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor for the Period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 
2002”, General Assembly Document A/56/624, (15 November 2001), p. 7). 
 
The creation of separate funding mechanisms limited the effective use and 
distribution of foreign assistance mobilised to finance physical reconstruction and 
institutional development projects. This, in return, had negative repercussions for 
local capacity-building. The mechanisms created for the mobilisation of foreign 
reconstruction aid included (1) TFET (Trust Fund for East Timor) managed by the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank to finance sectoral investment projects, 
(2) UNTAET-administered CFET (Consolidated Fund for East Timor), covering 
recurrent expenses of public administration, rehabilitation and capacity-building, (3) 
the assessed contribution budget of UNTAET, (4) projects financed by different UN 
agencies, and (5) projects financed by different bilateral donors.199 The rough 
division between the recurrent cost financing (CFET) and reconstruction financing 
(TFET) and the arrangement of diverse and complex mechanisms of aid provision 
made it difficult to integrate all funding sources into East Timor’s budget.200 East 
Timorese civil servants were recruited to manage various projects, but project funds 
could not be used to pay their salaries, creating the difficult problem of finding 
funding for steps that needed to be taken before major reconstruction projects could 
begin.201 
As noted earlier, GPSM, which was initiated as a sector-wide programme did 
                                                 
199 Rohland and Cliffe, 2002, p. 7; Schiavo-Campo, 2003, p. 23. 
200 Ibid. 
 222
201 Dobbins et al., 2005, p. 174 
 223
not become a single guiding framework for building local capacity. Capacity-
building in governance and public administration through the transfer of skills in the 
post-independence period were undertaken on the basis of a UNDP-led “skills audit”, 
carried out in October 2001. UNDP identified over 300 international advisory 
positions to be placed in key government departments and units. Of the 300 
positions, 100 were classified as “stability” posts to be funded from the assessed 
contribution of a new peacekeeping mission that would replace UNTAET in the 
post-independence period and the remaining 200 were identified as “development” 
positions to be financed through voluntary contributions from donors. This new 
capacity-building programme envisioned the training of almost one in three public 
servants by an international advisor. The international community’s approach, 
therefore, continued to focus on the use of expatriate advisors to develop skills and 
relying on a one-to-one mentoring and skills transfer approach rather than through 
implementing formal training programmes.202 
 
Type of state institutions Stability post Development post 
Ministries and state secretariat 93 202 
Judiciary 6 1 
Parliament 1 2 
Office of the President 0 8 
Others 0 15 
Total 100 228 
Table 5.4. Composition of the ‘stability’ and ‘development’ posts by type of institution (Source: Toshi 
Nakamura, Reflections on the State Institution-Building Support in Timor-Leste Capacity 
Development, Integrating Mission, and Financial Challenges, (Oslo: UNDP, November 2004), p. 9. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.4., the focus of externally-led capacity building 
programmes during the post-independence period has been on the government, 
creating a strong executive at the expense of the development of other key 
institutions, namely the Parliament and the judiciary, required to oversee, check, 
balance and regulate the executive power. Lacking experienced MPs to draft and 
deliberate legislation, the FRETILIN-dominated Parliament relied on a few 
international advisors in the post-independence period. The legislative and oversight 
capacity of the Parliament was constrained by the lack of sufficient skilled and 
experienced in-house civil service, e.g. lawyers, administrative personnel, political 
                                                 
202 Browne, Keuleers and Banerjee, 2005, p. 10. 
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and financial advisors, with the capacity to provide the parliamentarians with 
“substantive advisory services”, and a shortage of physical infrastructure such as 
library, equipment and materials, offices and information centres.203 Most of the laws 
were initiated by the government: “almost 95% of the laws approved in the 
Parliament were proposals from the government rather than initiatives from the 
parliamentarians”.204  
 The justice sector, which has been constrained by the lack of skilled and 
experienced local lawyers, prosecutors and judges and limited availability of 
resources, has suffered from serious weaknesses in executing the rule of law in the 
post-independence period. In a World Bank report dated November 2002, the justice 
sector, along with the areas of land and property, was ranked as one of the least 
successful of the twelve sectors evaluated in terms their progress in establishing 
policies and institutional and management capacity during the transitional period.205 
The success of the sectors ranked higher such as health, water and agriculture was, to 
a larger extent, attributed to the “involvement of relatively experienced Timorese 
counterparts early in the transition”.206 In this respect, it is important to note that the 
justice sector was in fact “the only sphere…in which, virtually from the mission’s 
outset, UNTAET established genuinely East Timorese staffed institutions”.207 The 
factors that caused its capacity weaknesses included limited interaction and 
collaboration between international advisors and Timorese political leadership 
regarding the identification and targeting of training and information208 and the lack 
of experienced legal staff. All Indonesian-appointed judicial officers left East Timor 
when the Indonesian authorities withdrew in 1999. UNTAET found only seventy 
East Timorese who had law degrees from Indonesian universities but no courtroom 
experience.209 Having attended a brief “quick impact” training programme in 
Darwin, Australia in late 1999, some of them were nominated as judges, prosecutors 
 
203 UNDP, “Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste (Parliament Project – project no. 
00014960)” Revised Project Document for the Period 2006-2009, unpublished working draft, 
(January 2006), pp. 12-17. 
204 Interview Mr. João Goncalves, MP from the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Dili, 17 February 
2006. 
205 Rohland and Cliffe, 2002, p. 11. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Beauvais, 2001, p. 1155. 
208 Rohland and Cliffe, 2002, p. 11. 
209 James Traub, “Inventing East Timor”, Foreign Affairs, 79:4, (July / August 2000), p. 83. 
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and public defenders for a probationary period.210 None of these Timorese judges, 
prosecutors (including the Prosecutor-General) and public defenders appointed by 
UNTAET, passed the written evaluation exams they sat in 2004 and were found to be 
ready for immediate appointment.211   
Three other factors can be said to have contributed to the lack of success in 
building the capacity of the judiciary: the international community’s inability to 
establish a “standardised formal training system”,212 multiple sources of the law 
applied, and language of the legal system.213 As noted earlier, UN’s approach to 
building local capacity was based on a mentoring programme. Although the ideal 
was to provide one mentor per person mentored, and with the right language 
capacities, this was never achieved.214 The result was limited success in the transfer 
of skills.  It was not until 2004 that the Timorese government, assisted by the UNDP-
coordinated multi-donor Justice System Project, created a compulsory, standardised, 
professional training programme for the judges and public defenders.215 However, 
communication problems created difficulties in the transfer of skills. Many of the 
international judges and legal advisors came from Lusophone countries and the 
Timorese court staff, who graduated from Indonesian universities, had limited 
Portuguese language skills. Without effective communication, effective skills 
transfer did not take place.  
The laws passed by the Timorese Parliament and government decrees after 
independence, UNTAET regulations, Indonesian law,216 and international legislation 
were among the sources of law applied in Timor-Leste. UNTAET regulations were 
mostly passed in English only. Although by law, all legislation adopted by the 
 
210 Dionisio Babo-Soares, “Law and Order: Judiciary Development in East Timor”, Comparing 
Experiences with Post-Conflict State Building in Asia and Europe Conference Paper, (Denpasar, 
Indonesia, 15-17 October 2001), p. 6. On the appointment of Timorese legal staff, see 
UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (6 March 2000). 
211 Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), “Results of Judges’ Evaluations Released”, Press 
Release, (26 January 2005); Idem, “Prosecutors and Public Defenders Fail Their Evaluations”, Press 
Release, (25 May 2005);  
212 Interview with a UNDP staff member, (Dili, 12 February 2006). 
213 Ibid; Interview with Dionisio Babo Soares, (Dili, 10 February 2006). 
214 UNDP, Asia-Pacific Rights and Justice Initiative, Case Studies on Access to Justice by the Poor 
and Disadvantaged, Mentoring Programme in Timor-Leste, (July 2003). 
215 UNDP, “Enhancing the Justice System to Guarantee the Democratic Rule of Law – Strengthening 
the Justice System in Timor-Leste”, Revised Programme Document, (December 2005a), p. 12. 
216 The first regulation passed by UNTAET held that the law applied before 25 October 1999 would 
be in use unless it conflicted with international standards of human rights. See, UNTAET/REG/1999/1 
(27 November 1999). 
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Parliament and decree laws by the government must be published both in Tetum and 
Portuguese, as of August 2004, the legislation passed by the Parliament was 
published only in Portuguese in the official gazette.217 Educated in Indonesian 
universities, Timorese court staff had difficulties in understanding the legislation and 
decree laws that they would interpret and apply. They were given three months of 
intensive training in legal Portuguese and the laws of Timor-Leste before they sat the 
proficiency evaluations in 2004.218 Delivered in Portuguese, the training programme 
had a marginal impact on their performance. The choice of Portuguese as the 
language of the Timorese legal system, in other words, further constrained the 
capacity of Timorese judges and other legal staff who were already suffering from 
the lack of prior professional experience.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
The UN’s engagement in East Timor in the post-Indonesian period aimed to 
“invent” East Timor219 through building functioning state structures and transferring 
administrative and institutional capabilities in two or three years. The components of 
this process of establishing a functioning state system after years of conflict and the 
physical destruction of the territory during the violent events surrounding the 1999 
independence referendum included security-building, institution-building and 
capacity-building. The strategy that the UN adopted to achieve its mandate was 
based on the exercise of an extensive degree of interventionist role. 
To start with security-building, UNTAET succeeded in fulfilling its short-
term mandate of repatriating refugees and displaced persons, cantoning former 
guerrillas, and maintaining security, law and order throughout the territory. However, 
unable to resolve problems with demobilising and reintegrating former guerrillas into 
civilian life, the UN failed to build professional, sustainable security institutions.  
Regarding institution-building and capacity-building, although UNTAET 
succeeded in establishing key government institutions, restoring public services and 
 
217 As of August 2004, only one law was translated into Tetum. Judicial System Monitoring 
Programme, The Impact of the Language Directive on the Courts in East Timor, (Dili, August 2004), 
p. 8. 
218 Ibid., p. 12. 
219 Traub, 2000. 
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overseeing the transition to independence, it had limited achievement in undertaking 
its long-term objective of creating local capacity for self-government. Government 
institutions, based on external models and foreign assistance, were built but lacked 
the capacity to effectively and independently perform their key functions in the post-
transitional period. Ranking as the poorest country in Southeast Asia, Timor-Leste 
has suffered from institutional weaknesses and serious development challenges, 
remaining in need of external support and assistance throughout the post-
independence period.  
One of the key factors that affected this outcome is concerned with the 
international community’s approach to building sustainable peace in East Timor 
through transforming the territory from a conflict devastated to democratically 
functioning, self-sufficient society. That is, although UNTAET was mandated to 
achieve long-term, sustainable outcomes, the UN’s approach was influenced by a 
peacekeeping perspective; ending or preventing armed conflict. Lacking an in-depth 
understanding of local political, social and cultural processes that led to the outbreak 
of the post-ballot violence, the UN was heavily relied on its most recent experience 
in Kosovo and failed to adopt a participatory and inclusive approach to initiate a 
sustainable process of state-building and build upon the existing local capacities 
while developing new competences. The UN’s limited success in including local 
stakeholders in the reconstruction process led to the stagnation of relations between 
the international state-builders and the Timorese people. This, in turn, as Ramos-
Horta pointed to, led many East Timorese and their political leaders to be impatient 
to see the end of the UN-supervised rule in their country.220 
 
 
220 Jakarta Post, 2006. 
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
The Process of Creating a  
Multi-Ethnic Society  
in Kosovo  
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
As suggested throughout this thesis, the study of the reconstruction and 
transformation of post-conflict societies into democratic polities requires a good 
knowledge of the political and social processes that led to the breakdown of 
governmental and societal structures and outbreak of violent conflict in the past. It 
also requires the analysis of the two separate but complementary processes involved 
in post-conflict reconstruction: state-building and nation-building. The study of the 
reconstruction of conflict-affected societies, in other words, entails focusing 
separately on the issues of the construction of governmental and institutional 
structures and creation of a sense of unity around shared characteristics. The pursuit 
of a two-level analytical approach is therefore important in understanding the 
dynamics of local political and social processes and their impact on the prospect and 
sustainability of the international community-led democratisation. 
As noted earlier, democratisation, which has become an integral component 
of the UN’s conflict prevention and peace-building agenda in the post-Cold War era, 
is a gradual and open-ended process. As also discussed in the Introduction chapter, 
the undertaking of a successful process of democratisation, which is based on public 
participation and contestation, requires not only the presence of effectively 
functioning governmental, institutional and bureaucratic structures but also a shared 
sense of “imagined community”, characterised by the identification of individuals, 
 229
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coming from different backgrounds, with each other and their shared commitment to 
living together within the same polity. In the case of post-conflict societies, 
characterised by the weakness or total collapse of formal government institutions and 
the fragmentation or polarisation of the society along ethnic, religious, racial or other 
lines, the undertaking of a sustainable democratic peace-building process becomes 
extremely challenging. As discussed earlier, in places, where there is no shared sense 
of social cohesion, democratisation, which entails the distribution of political power 
and interests, may further undermine the capacity of newly built government 
institutions and trigger conflict. The reconstruction of post-conflict societies as 
peaceful, democratic entities therefore requires not only building loyalty to the newly 
established government institutions, seen as inclusive, representative and capable of 
responding to local needs, but also creating a sense of solidarity and cohesion within 
the population.  
In the case of Kosovo, since the establishment of the UN interim 
administration in mid-1999 following NATO’s unauthorised use of force against 
Serbia to stop human rights violations, the creation of a stable and cohesive ‘multi-
ethnic’ society has frequently been reiterated by the members of the international 
community to safeguard Kosovo’s peaceful and democratic development.1 In his 
 
1 See for example former Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan’s remarks, “Secretary-General 
Urges Restraint, Patience in Kosovo”, Press Release, SG/SM/7037, (18 June 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990618.sgsm7037.html [accessed 16 February 2007]; 
“Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Deputy-Secretary-General 
Louise Frechette at Headquarters,” Press Release, SG/SM/7055, (1 July 1999), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990701.SGSM7055.html [accessed 16 February 2007] 
“Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Address to The Permanent Council of the OSCE Vienna”, 
UNIS/SG/2314, (20 July 1999), available at 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/1999/sg2314.html [accessed 19 February 2007]; “UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan Arrives in Kosovo”, UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK/PR/869, (18 
November 2002), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr869.htm [accessed 19 
February 2007]. See also former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s remarks. See, for 
example, BBC, “Albright Urges Kosovo Serbs to Stay”, BBC World News, (29 July 1999), available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/406937.stm [accessed 19 February 2007]; “Address at the Friends 
of Kosovo Meeting”, (30 June 1999), available at 
http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/99_045.htm [accessed 19 February 2007]. It is important to 
note that although Mrs Albright, in the beginning, advocated the principle of multi-ethnicity in 
Kosovo, she later argued that “the word ‘multiethnic’ is harder to talk about for [Kosovo] because the 
Serbs are really a minority there, so it is a matter of respect for minority rights”. See “Albright Plays 
Down ‘multi-ethnicity’ for Kosova[o]”, RFE/RL, ( 3  March 2000), available at 
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/03/4-see/see-030300.asp [accessed 2 March 2007]. On the 
international community’s continued commitment to the developing a multi-ethnicity society in 
Kosovo, see also “Address to the Security Council By Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General”, UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK/PR719, (24 April 2002), available at 
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much-awaited “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”, offering 
“conditional independence” supervised by the international community, Martti 
Ahtisaari, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, once more 
emphasised the principle of multi-ethnicity upon which the Kosovo society should be 
based for a peaceful future.2 However, given the persistence of inter-ethnic 
intolerance and distrust, isolation of the Roma and Serbs, and continued existence of 
‘parallel structures’ of administration, security, education and health in Serb-
inhabited areas and enclaves in northern municipalities,3 Kosovo looked far from an 
integrated, multi-ethnic society in early-2007 when Ahtisaari presented his proposed 
solution to the parties involved in the conflict.  
This chapter seeks to analyse the issue of creating a sense of unified society 
in Kosovo in the post-conflict era. It is divided into two main parts. In accordance 
with the framework developed in Chapter 2, in which it was noted that nationalism 
and national identity construction denote two separate phenomena, the first section 
investigates the development of Serbian and Albanian nationalisms and evaluate how 
the clash of the two rival nationalisms, tied to competing narratives of history and 
national discourses and myths, led to a violent conflict in the late-1990s. The second 
part explores the aspects of the process of creating a sense of unified society in the 
post-NATO intervention period. In accordance with the analytical framework, this 
includes a review of the issues of reconciliation, social communication and the 
formation of a collective identity.  
 
 
 
 
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr719.htm [accessed 3 March 2007]; “Address to the 
Security Council by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the Secretary-General”, UNMIK 
PRESS Release, UNMIK/PR/792, (30 July 2002), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr792.htm [accessed 3 March 2007]. 
2 United Nations, “Letter Dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council, Addendum Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”, Security 
Council Document, S/2007/168/Add.1, (26 March 2007), accessible via 
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html [accessed 25 April 2007]. 
3 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, (OSCE), Parallel Structures in Kosovo, 
(October 2003), pp. 12-15, available at www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/10/698_en.pdf [accessed 
23 August 2006]; Idem, Parallel Structures in Kosovo 2006-2007, (4 April 2007), available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/04/23925_en.pdf [accessed 25 May 2007]. 
 
6.2. The Development of Two Rival Nationalisms 
Kosovo has occupied a central place in the ‘national consciousness’ of both 
Serbs and Albanians. For the Serbs, with a number of important religious sites and 
monuments, Kosovo is the ‘cradle’ of the Serb culture and national identity, and the 
heartland of the medieval Serbian Empire – the sacred place where the medieval 
Serbian Empire was destroyed by the Ottoman army with the defeat of Prince 
Lazar’s army by Sultan Murad I on 28 June 1389. The defeat at Kosovo Polje, the 
Field of Blackbirds, is mythologised in Serbian epic poetry and portrayed as the date 
for the destruction of the Serbian Empire and the ‘enslavement’ of its people.4 
 
Figure 6.1. Map of Kosovo (Source: United Nations Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section, 
Map No. 4133, Rev. (29 September 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unmik.pdf [accessed 29 October 2007]) 
 
 
In contrast to the Serbs, Albanians put forward an Illyrian myth. Claiming 
that they are the direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians5 with Kosovo part of the 
ancient people’s homeland, Albanians have maintained that they were the original 
natives of Kosovo and always lived in the region before the arrival of the Serbs.  
                                                 
4 Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, (New York: Columbia University, 
2000), p. 182. 
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5 The ancient Illyrians, a group of people speaking a common language belonging to the Indo-
European language family, used to live in the lands in the western Balkans, east of the Adriatic long 
before the arrival of the Slavs in the Balkans in the sixth century AD. For further information, see 
John Wilkes, The Illyrians, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: B. Blackwell, 1992). 
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Kosovo, where the League of Prizren was established in 1878 to defend the 
Albanian-populated lands against foreign invasion, is also regarded as the birthplace 
of the Albanian nationalist movement.  
Both Albanian and Serbian nationalisms, as elsewhere in south-eastern 
Europe, originated as elite-driven movements in the nineteenth century.  In common 
with other nineteenth century national movements in the region, the idea of the 
nation developed first in the minds of a handful of Serbian and Albanian intellectuals 
living abroad and influenced by liberalism rooted in the Enlightenment of the 
eighteenth century, and, to a greater extent, by the romanticism and historicism of the 
nineteenth century.6 The intelligentsia’s interest in language, folklore and history 
stimulated the development of nationalist aspirations. Due to the fact that the 
majority of Serbian7 and Albanian8 populations were illiterate peasants, historical 
myths, songs, symbols and folklore played a significant role in generating a sense of 
national consciousness and constructing a homogeneous cultural identity.9 Both 
Serbian and Albanian nationalists sought foreign support and tried to take advantage 
of the conflict of interest amongst Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy 
to achieve their national ‘cause’. While Serbs relied on the Russians, Albanians 
sought Austrian and Italian support. 
Both nationalisms were based on the myth of continuous national struggle 
against foreign ‘oppressors’. In the absence of a written popular literature and formal 
history, centuries-old religious texts written by medieval monastic authors after the 
Battle of Kosovo10 and oral epic and popular poetry11 transmitted from generation to 
generation by local guslar singers12 provided the nineteenth century Serbian 
 
6 Piro Misha, “Invention of A Nationalism: Myth and Amnesia”, Stephanie Schwander-Sievers and 
Bernd J. Fischer (eds), Albanian Identities: Myth and History, (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 
33; Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, volume 1, 
(Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 171-74. 
7 In 1866, only 4.2 per cent of the Serbs could read and write; with 1.6 per cent in rural areas. Miranda 
Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), p. 15. 
8 On the eve of the First World War, only three people out of a population of 18,000 in the Mirëdita 
region (in northern Albania) were able to read and write. Ibid., p. 38, citing the “Report of the 
Commission of the Council of the League of Nations on Albania” (1923). 
9 Misha, 2002, p. 34; Jelavich, 1983 p. 175. 
10 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 14, Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, (New York: 
New York University Press, 1998), p. 77. 
11  Vickers, 1998, p. 15; Malcolm, 1998, pp. 78-80.  
12 Those who play the gusla, a single-stringed instrument, and tell epic stories in the Balkans. Jelavich, 
1983, p. 175.  
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nationalist intellectuals with the cultural material needed to construct a forgotten but 
glorious past as the basis of Serbian national identity.13 The religious texts, 
proclaiming Prince Lazar a ‘martyr’ and transforming his defeat into a ‘moral / holy 
victory’ for the Serbs,14 were written in the fifteenth century.15 By romanticising the 
medieval Serbian state and removing any negative aspects of feudalism, the Serbian 
Church conveyed the image of a once magnificent state.16 This would later lead the 
Serbs in the nineteenth century to consider the demise of their medieval state as the 
most important event in their history, caused by the defeat at the hands of the Turks 
in Kosovo, creating the Kosovo myth. Mythologising the medieval Serbian state and 
Prince Lazar’s defeat as his conscious choice for a ‘heavenly kingdom’ to an ‘earthly 
crown’ in the following way, Serbian oral epic poetry was transformed into a 
nationalist ideology by the folksong collector and dictionary writer Vuk Karadžić 
and the poet Petar Petrović in the nineteenth century:17 
And Lazarus chose heaven, not the earth,  
And tailored there a church at Kosovo–    
O not of stone but out of silk and velvet–    
And he summoned there the Patriarch of Serbia,  
Summoned there the lordly twelve high bishops: 
And he gathered up his forces, had them 
Take with him the saving bread and wine.  
As soon as Lazarus has given out 
His orders, then across the level plain 
Of Kosovo pour all the Turks.18 
 
Although the Battle of Kosovo is mythologised in the Serbian historiography 
as an event that resulted in the demise of the once magnificent Serbian Empire and 
the beginning of the ‘dark ages’ under Muslim Turkish rule, historical data shows 
that the Serbian Empire had already disintegrated after the death of Tsar Dušan in 
1355 and was divided into principalities with the largest ruled by Prince Lazar.19 
Second, the issue of who was the winner and who was the loser is disputed. Given 
the huge losses both sides suffered, including the deaths of the Ottoman Sultan 
 
13 Duijzings, 2000, p. 184. 
14 Vickers, 1998, p. 15; Malcolm, 1998, p. 77. 
15 Vickers, 1998, p. 14 
16 Ibid., p. 15. 
17 Malcolm, 1998, p. 79. 
18 John Matthias and Vladeta Vučković, The Battle of Kosovo, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 
1987), p. 31 
19 Vickers, 1998, p. 12; Malcolm, 1998, pp. 58-9. 
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Murad and Serbian Prince Lazar on the battlefield, and the withdrawal of both sides, 
one might conclude that the war was a “draw” with no decisive winner.20 Third, the 
war did not immediately result in the establishment of Ottoman rule. The Serbian 
state survived for another 70 years with a limited degree of Ottoman interference.21 
Serbia became a vassal of the Ottoman state and Lazar’s daughter was sent to the 
Sultan’s harem while his brother Stefan was fighting alongside the Turkish army.22 
In the absence of a medieval Albanian state,23 the Albanian intelligentsia 
relied on the myth of Skanderbeg’s (a.k.a. Gjergj  Kastrioti, 1405-1468)24 ‘heroic 
struggle’ against the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century.25 He was 
mythologised as the national hero of the Albanians who defended Albanian-lands, 
which did not include Kosovo, against the Turks for twenty-five years.26 
Skanderbeg’s resistance to the Ottoman Empire contributed to the construction of the 
Albanian national identity as a people with a freedom-loving mind and rebellious 
spirit.27 His family emblem (a black double-headed eagle on a red field) was adopted 
as the Albanian national symbol,28 later becoming the national flag of Albania in 
1912. Since a majority of his people had already converted to the religion of his 
‘enemies’ by the nineteenth century, Skanderbeg’s Christian faith and the religious 
dimension of his uprising against the Ottoman Empire and the Kastrioti family 
 
20 Vickers, 1998, p. 13. 
21 Malcolm, 1998, p. 58. 
22 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth  and Destruction of Yugoslavia, (New Heaven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 32-3. 
23 For a detailed discussion of the factors that prevented the Albanians from forming a state of their 
own in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see Alain Ducellier, “Genesis and Failure of the 
Albanian State in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries”, Arshi Pipa “The Other Albania: A Balkan 
Perspective”, Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), Studies on Kosovo, (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1984), pp. 3-22. 
24 Born as Christian, Gjegj Kastirioti, was a son of an Ottoman vassal in southern Albania, and taken 
as a hostage to Istanbul where he converted to Islam and took the name of Skander (or Iskender in 
Turkish). He earned the title of beg (or bey meaning “lord” in Turkish). Later, during the war against 
the Hungarians in Niš in 1443, he revolted against the Ottoman Empire, became Christian again and 
fought against the Ottomans to liberate Albanian lands for twenty-five years. 
25 Misha, 2002, 43, Fatos Lubonja, “Between the Glory of a Virtual World and the Misery of a Real 
World”, Stephanie Schwander-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (eds), Albanian Identities: Myth and 
History, (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 92. 
26 Lubonja, 2002, p. 92. 
27 Antonina Zhelyazkova, “George Kastrioti – Skanderbeg’s Resistance to the Ottomans, Heroicity as 
Part of the Albanian Individuality”, Antonina Zhelyazkova (ed.), Albanian Identities, (Sofia: 
International Center for Minority Studies, 2000), available at 
http://www.omda.bg/imir/studies/alban_id1.html [accessed 13 March 2007]. 
28 Misha, 2002, p. 42. 
emblem’s Byzantine origin29 were almost never mentioned by Albanian 
nationalists.30 Neither was his mother’s alleged Slavic origin a matter of discussion.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. National emblem of 
Albania – Skanderbeg’s helmet and 
a goat’s head on top, a black two-
headed eagle on a red field. 
 
 
Picture 6.1. Skanderbeg’s statue in front of the government 
building in Prishtina / Priština, Kosovo (Photo taken by the 
author, 5 September 2006). 
 
 
Despite these parallels, there are significant contrasts between the two 
nationalisms. Firstly, serving as an element of unity, religion formed the basis of 
Serbian nationalist movement, although nationalism emerged as a secular movement 
in Western Europe. This, to a great extent, was a legacy of the Ottoman 
administrative and social system of millet31 which emphasised religion as the basis of 
group identity and social organisation.  
Dividing the population into communities along religious lines rather than 
linguistic or cultural attributes, the millet system enabled the Serbs and other 
Christian peoples in the Balkans to preserve their cultural, linguistic and religious 
                                                 
29 Symbolising the Emperor’s sovereignty, power and interests over the West and East, the double-
headed eagle was the symbol of the Byzantine Empire.  
30 Misha, 2002, p. 42. 
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31 The millet, meaning nation in Turkish, system was introduced by Mehmed II (the Conquer) in 1454 
after his conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) to prevent any possible alliance between Rome and the 
Orthodox Patriarchate in Constantinople and neutralise the influence of the Papacy and Venice over 
the Christian populations in the Balkan region. It formed the constitutional framework of the Ottoman 
Empire up until the second half of the nineteenth century when a series of administrative reforms were 
adopted in response to economic and social changes. For further information, Kemal Karpat, “Millets 
and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era”, 
Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning 
of A Plural Society, (New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982). 
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autonomy and identity during centuries of Ottoman rule. The non-Muslim subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire were organised into the Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish millets, 
each headed by its own ecclesiastical authority exercising wide jurisdiction over the 
church organisation, schooling, tax collection and the judicial systems.32  
Serbs belonging to the Orthodox millet were headed by the Patriarch of 
Constantinople. Providing the only education available, the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, acting under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, carried 
the idea that Muslim rule was a temporary phenomenon while keeping alive in the 
minds of the faithful the memory of an independent and glorious past.33 When 
nationalism intruded into the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the concept 
of nationality came to be conceived as a religious community although language was 
seen as a distinctive national characteristic by both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects 
of the Empire.34 The Serbs treated religion synonymous with national identification 
due to the fact that, like other Balkan Christians, they asserted their claims for 
independence and statehood on the basis of their religious differences with the 
Muslim Sultan.  
In the case of Albanians, religion had the potential to serve not only as a 
pretext for foreign influence and intervention35 but also as an obstacle to achieving 
Albanian national unity due to the fact that they were divided among four faiths: 
Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Sunni Islam36 and the Islamic Bektashi 
order, a syncretic and heterodox sect in Islam.37 Catholic Albanians were 
concentrated in the north mainly in Shkodër (Shkodra) and the Orthodox in the south 
of the Shkumbi River in Korçë and Gjirokastër.38 A great number of Albanians 
converted to Islam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and they exercised a 
 
32 Karpat, 1982, pp. 142-5; Jelavich, History of the Balkans, pp. 48-50; Vickers, 1998, p. 19; Hugh 
Poulton, Minorities in Southeast Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion, (London: Minority Rights Group 
International, 1998), p. 8. 
33 Jelavich, 1983, pp. 91-92. 
34 Karpat, 1982, p. 165. 
35 Misha, 2002, p. 45. 
36 Ibid.; Ger Duijzings, “Religion and the Politics of ‘Albanian’: Naim Frashëri’s Bektashi Writings, 
Stephanie Schwander-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (eds), Albanian Identities: Myth and History, 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 60; Jelavich, 1983, p. 81; Bernd J. Fischer, “A Brief Historical 
Overview of the Development of Albanian Nationalism”, East European Studies Meeting Reports, 
(2005), p. 2., accessible via http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ [accessed 13 March 2007]. 
37 Duijzings, 2002;  Fischer, 2005. 
38 Jelavich, 1983, p. 81. 
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privileged status both in their own lands and the entire empire.39 Since the Ottoman 
Empire provided the protection of Albanian interests against the Orthodox Slavs, and 
career opportunities in the army and administration, there was little or no incentive 
on the side of Muslim Albanians to claim an identity in national terms and seek 
liberation.40  
Due to its potential to further the already existing divides, Albanian 
nationalists emphasised the need to bury religious differences and propagated the 
idea that “the real religion of Albanians is Albanianism” coined by Vaso Pasha (a.k.a 
Pashko Vasa or Wassa Effendi, 1825-1892).41 Pointing to religious and cultural 
divisions within the Albanian population in his well-known poem “Oh Albania, Poor 
Albania” written just after the crushing of the Prizren League by the Ottoman Empire 
in 1880, Vaso Pasha, a Catholic from Shkodra who held high positions in the 
Empire, called all Albanians to unite and rise against the “foreigners” who for 
centuries divided and exploited them:  
Albanians, you are killing your brothers, 
Into a hundred factions you are divided, 
Some say ‘I believe in God,’ others ‘I in Allah,’ 
Some say ‘I am Turk,’ others ‘I am Latin,’ 
Some ‘I am Greek,’ others ‘I am Slav,’ 
But you are brothers, all of you, my hapless people! 
The priests and the hodjas∗ have deceived you 
To divide you and keep you poor. 
When the foreigner comes, you sit back at the hearth 
As he puts you to shame with your wife and your sister, 
And for how little money you are willing to serve him, 
Forgetting the oaths of your ancestors, 
Making yourselves serfs to the foreigners 
Who have neither your language nor your blood!42 
  
Another difference between Albanian and Serbian nationalisms is that while 
the Serbs were among the first people in the Balkans to be influenced by the newly 
emerging nationalist ideology that swept through Europe in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the development of Albanian nationalism as a mass political movement with 
 
39 At least thirty grand viziers (chief minister of the Sultan holding His seal) of Albanian descent 
served in the Ottoman Empire. 
40 Stark Draper, “The Conceptualisation of an Albanian Nation”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20:1 
(January 1997), p. 2; Bernd J. Fischer, “Albanian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century”, Peter F. 
Sugar (ed.), Eastern European Nationalism in the 20th Century, (Washington: The American 
University Press, 1995), p. 27. 
41 Misha, 2002, p. 45; Duijzings, 2002, p. 61. 
∗  Muslim religious leaders / teachers. 
42 The poem can be found at http://www.shkoder.net/en/pvasa_re.htm [accessed 12 February 2007]. 
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a demand for autonomy or independence took place in the last quarter of the century. 
The beginnings of Serbian cultural awakening took place in the late-eighteenth 
century in Vojvodina and Srem in the Habsburg territories, which emerged as the 
Serbian cultural and educational centre. The nationalist ideas and patriotic writings 
produced by a small but influential intelligentsia in Vojvodina were transmitted to 
the Pashalik (province administered by a pasha – general and governor) of Belgrade 
in Serbia proper and to Montenegro by the Church in Vojvodina which maintained 
regular contacts with Serbian communities in the south and close relations with the 
Russian Orthodox Church.43 It was a group of intellectuals from Vojvodina and 
Srem who wrote the history of Serbia and codified the Serbian language.44 The 
writings of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Serbian intellectuals from 
the Habsburg lands not only sparked the Serbian national ‘awakening’ against 
Ottoman and Habsburg domination and resulted in the formation of the autonomous 
principality of Serbia in 1830 but also inspired a cultural interaction between other 
South Slavic peoples, namely Croats and Slovenes, that would eventually lead to the 
idea of liberation and unification of South Slavs or the notion of Yugoslavism in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.45 
The “spark” of Albanian national ‘awakening’ took place in the 1860s among 
the Italo-Albanians (Arbëreshi) in southern Italy where a number of Albanians had 
migrated after the defeat of Skanderbeg in 1468.46 However, since they wrote in 
Italian and the great majority of Albanians were illiterate, it had a marginal 
influence.47 Although a series of insurrections against the Porte48 led by local chiefs, 
whose powers and privileges were reduced by the Tanzimat reforms,49 took place in 
 
43 Ivo J. Lederer, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs”, Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer (eds.), 
Nationalism in Eastern Europe, third printing, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 
1994), pp. 407-8; Vickers, 1998, p. 29. 
44 George W. White, “Place and Its Role in Serbian Identity”, Derek Hall and Darrick Danta (eds.), 
Reconstructing the Balkans: A Geography of the New Southeast Europe, (Chichester, New York: John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1996), p. 41; Jelavich, History of the Balkans, p. 149, 177; Lederer, 1994, pp. 412-
4.  
45 Lederer, 1994, pp. 414-24; Spyros A. Sofos, “Culture, Politics and Identity in Former Yugoslavia”, 
Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos (eds.), Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 254. 
46 Fischer, 1995, p. 28. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Meaning, the “gate” in French, the term Porte was used by Europeans to designate the Ottoman 
government or the court of the Sultan.  
49 Meaning ‘reordering’ in Turkish, the Tanzimat reforms, undertaken between 1839 and 1876, aimed 
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Albanian lands, it was not until the establishment of the Prizren League on the eve of 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878 that a group of Albanian intellectual and political 
leaders, headed by Abdyl Frashëri, brought the Albanian Question, thus the existence 
of the Albanian people, to the attention of the great powers of Europe.50 
The third difference between the two nationalisms is that while Serbian 
nationalism began as a movement to emancipate the Serbs from the ‘Turkish yoke’, 
Albanian nationalism originated against the territorial expansion of the Serbs and 
Greeks and their propaganda campaign denying the existence of the Albanian people 
rather than as a national liberation movement against the Ottoman Empire.51 Only 
when Albanian intellectual and political leaders became fully aware of the fact that 
the Empire’s disintegration was inevitable and would result in political and cultural 
domination of the Orthodox Christians over the disunited Albanian lands did 
nationalist conceptions and aspirations of statehood to the detriment of the Porte’s 
interests begin to develop.52 
Convened at the end of the Russo-Turkish war to revise the Treaty of San 
Stefano which assigned Albanian-populated lands to the principalities of Serbia, 
Montenegro and Bulgaria, the Congress of Berlin resulted in the granting of 
independence to Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, and of autonomy to Bulgaria53 
and the cession of a strip of Albanian lands (Bar, Pogdorica, Gusinje and Plav) to 
Montenegro.54 Established to defend Albanian lands against the Orthodox Slavs, the 
Prizren League initially had the support of the Porte. However, after the Albanian 
leaders demanded the unification of all Albanian lands, and cultural and political 
autonomy when it became clear that the Porte could no longer protect their interests, 
the League met with a harsh response from Sultan Abdulhamid II who suspended the 
 
at rejuvenating and modernising the Ottoman Empire, which was in a political and economic decline 
since the early eighteenth century. The reforms introduced to the Albanian-inhabited lands included 
new taxes, establishment of a new army based on recruitment, opening of Turkish schools, new 
administrative districts (vilayets) and a new fiscal system. 
50 Fischer, 1995, p. 28; Stavro Skendi, “Beginnings of Albanian Nationalist and Autonomous Trends: 
The Albanian League, 1878-1881”, American Slavic and East European Review, 12:2 (April 1953), 
pp. 219-220; Jelavich, 1983, pp. 362-363, Misha, 2002, p. 40; Malcolm, 1998, p. 223.  
51 Misha, 2002, p. 34; Lubonja, 2002, p. 91; Isa Blumi, “The Role of Education in the Formation of 
Albanian Identity and its Myths”, Stephanie Schwander-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (eds.), Albanian 
Identities: Myth and History, (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 51. 
52 Draper, 1997, p. 2. 
53 Jelavich, 1983, p. 360. 
54 Ibid., p. 364. 
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1876 Constitution and pursued a pan-Islamic ideology to counter-balance the 
Christian and Slavic influence in the Balkans. The writings of Ismail Qemal Bey 
(1844-1919), who is accepted as the ‘father’ of the Albanian nation due to his leading 
role during the declaration of Albanian independence in November 1912, can shed 
light on the changed nature of the Albanian-Ottoman relations with the demise of the 
latter’s power in the region: 
Since that time [the death of Skanderbeg], although the Albanians have never given up their 
passionate desire for independence, they have been the only Balkan people really attached to 
the Ottoman Empire, always happy to help strengthen it and to profit by its strength. But 
whenever the Albanians have become aware that, instead of growing stronger, Turkey had 
weakened herself, and hurried to her ruin, they have risen in an effort of self-preservation 
with the unanimous cry, ‘Let her commit suicide if she wishes; we intend to survive’.55 
 
Albanian nationalism entered its last stage, or what Miroslav Hroch calls 
Phase C (the political phase),56 in 1908 following the Young Turk57 Revolution in 
the Ottoman Empire. The restoration of the Constitution, which was suspended by 
Sultan Abdulhamit II, was initially met with euphoria in Albanian lands. However, 
discontent amongst the Albanian intellectuals and political leaders resurfaced when 
the new regime failed to deliver on its promise of undertaking democratic reforms 
and granting cultural and administrative autonomy and of keeping the Empire intact. 
The dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia Herzegovina and Bulgaria 
declared independence in October 1908.58 The aggressive centralisation and 
Ottomanisation policies of the Young Turks to keep the remaining lands of the 
Empire, which interfered with traditional Albanian freedoms, fuelled the already-
rising resentment against Ottoman rule, resulting in the outbreak of an uprising in 
Kosovo in 1908 and a series of sporadic revolts throughout Albanian lands by 1912, 
and the declaration of Albanian independence in November 1912.59 
The creation of an Albanian state was supported by the great powers of the 
 
55 Quoted in Noel Malcolm, “Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed 
in the Works of Albanian Writers in America in the Early Twentieth Century”, Stephanie Schwander-
Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (eds.), Albanian Identities: Myth and History, (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2002), p. 83. 
56 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations, (Cambridge; 
London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 23-24.  
57 The Young Turks were a group of nationalist military officers who were dissatisfied with the 
absolutist rule of Abdulhamid II and favoured reforming and modernising the Ottoman Empire.  
58 Malcolm, 1998, pp. 238-240. 
59 Fischer, 2005, p. 2. 
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rime in the London Conference held after the Balkan War in December 1912. 
However, almost half of its population was left outside the boundaries of the newly 
created Albanian state. The newly independent Albanian state did not include 
Kosovo and the predominantly Albanian-inhabited regions in Macedonia. Kosovo, 
which was partitioned between Serbia and Montenegro during the Balkan War,60  
was later annexed to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes created by the 
union of the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, the Croat and 
Slovene-populated territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First 
World War.61 The Kingdom also included the territories of Vojvodina and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. Treated as second class citizens, 
the Kosovo Albanians never felt themselves an integral part of the first (or Royal) 
Yugoslavia, meaning the ‘land of South Slavs’, to which they were forced to belong. 
They organised the Kaçak (fugitive in Turkish, derived from the word kaçmak 
meaning run away) movement with the support of Italy, and maintained guerrilla 
warfare against the Yugoslav government until 1924.62  
Rather than striving for creating a viable environment conducive to 
promoting the peaceful co-existence and integration of the two groups, the Serbs 
pursued an aggressive policy of colonisation and cultural assimilation throughout the 
interwar period to change the demography of Kosovo in favour of the Serbs. Under 
the Decree of September 1920 on the Colonisation of the Southern Regions of 
Yugoslavia, and the Law on the Colonisation of the Southern Regions of June 1931, 
a total of 10,877 Serb and Montenegrin families were settled on 120,672 hectares of 
lands, confiscated from the Albanians who participated in kaçak resistance and/or 
who failed to provide documents of proof of ownership, in the two waves of 
settlement in the periods 1922-1929, and 1933-1938.63 Although there are no exact 
figures, data from the administrations of Yugoslavia and Albania suggest that a total 
of between 200,000 and 300,000 Albanians were forced to migrate from Yugoslavia 
 
60 The eastern plain was given to Serbia, while the western plain was kept by Montenegro. Malcolm, 
1998, p. 257.  
61 Bitola (Monastir) in Macedonia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
and Janina was acceded to Greece at the end of the First World War.  
62 Vickers, 1998, pp. 99-102. 
63 Vickers, 1998, pp. 105-6; Malcolm, 1998, p 280. 
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to Turkey and Albania during the inter-war period.64  
The Kosovo Albanians were also denied their cultural rights including 
schooling in the Albanian language even though they were treated as Yugoslav 
citizens after 1918. By 1930, there was no officially recognised Albanian-language 
school throughout Kosovo.65 During the first years of Serbian rule, they were 
provided education only in the Serbian language66 so as to integrate the Albanians 
into Serbia as loyal subjects.67 Later, Muslim mektebs (elementary schools) and 
medreses (secondary schools), where the language of instruction was Turkish, were 
permitted with a view to undermining the feeling of Albanian national identity.68 
However, it was precisely these schools which the Albanians turned into centres of 
clandestine national education and oppositional activity that contributed to the rise of 
Albanian national identity in the inter-war period.69 The use of underground schools 
to generate national consciousness and unity under repression would leave a legacy 
for the Albanian national struggle in the late 20th century. 
Occupied by the Axis powers during the Second World War,70 Kosovo at the 
end of the war was incorporated into the socialist Yugoslavia, established by Josip 
Broz Tito. Tito was aware of Yugoslavia’s nationality question, specifically the 
Serbian desire to dominate the entire country. As an Orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
leader, he also believed that nationalism would disappear with the demise of the 
 
64 Vickers, 1998, p. 119. Malcolm gives a different figure. He argues that between 90,000 and 150,000 
left Yugoslavia in the period 1918-1941. See, Malcolm, 1998, p. 286. 
65 Malcolm, 1998, p. 267. 
66 Vickers, 1998, p. 103; Malcolm, 1998, p. 267. 
67 Denisa Kostovicova, “‘Shkolla Shqipe’ and Nationhood: Albanians in the Pursuit of Education in 
the Native Language in Interwar (1918-41) and Post-Autonomy (1989-98) Kosovo”, Stephanie 
Schwander-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (eds.), Albanian Identities: Myth and History, (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 159. 
68 Vickers, 1998, p. 103; Malcolm, 1998, p. 267; Kostovicova, 2002, p. 159. 
69 Kostovicova, 2002, p. 160; Vickers, 1998, p. 104. 
70 During the war, Kosovo was divided into three parts. The northern part, Mitrovica, remained under 
German control due to the importance of the Trepca mines, the eastern districts of Gnjilane, Kacanik 
and Vitin were attached to Bulgaria and most of Kosovo together with Debar, Tetova, Gostivar and 
Struga in western Macedonia were incorporated to the fascist Italy-controlled Albania. Taking 
advantage of the occupation, Kosovo Albanians, motivated partly by revenge and partly by a desire to 
take their expropriated lands back, harassed and attacked the Serb and Montenegrin settlers. 
According to Serb sources, some 10,000 Serb and Montenegrin families were forced to migrate during 
the war. See, Vickers, 1998, pp. 121-2. The Yugoslav partisans led by Tito struggling against the Axis 
forces, explicitly offered the unification of Kosovo with Albania at the Bujan Conference in 1943-44 
in return for the Albanian participation in the anti-fascist struggle. However, this offer included in the 
resolution statement of the Conference was later treated by the Yugoslav authorities as a “political 
blunder”. Ibid., p. 136.   
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bourgeois state. Therefore, he was in favour of a decentralised state structure and 
equal treatment of national groups and recognition of their legal, political, economic 
and cultural rights. This is why he granted separate and equal republican status to 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and autonomy to Kosovo and 
Vojvodina.  
Together with the Montenegrin intellectual Milovan Djilas and Slovene 
economist Edvard Kardelj, Tito devised ‘self-management’ (samoupravljanje)71 and 
‘brotherhood and unity’ (bratstvo i jedinstvo) as two core principles of socialist 
Yugoslavia. Aimed at replacing ethno-national sentiments with an economic class 
identity of workers and a supra-national Yugoslav identity, these two policies aimed 
to suppress the potential divisive elements through promoting a sense of shared 
ideological values and stressing similarities among the South Slav ethnic groups.72 
Tito was able to keep different nations with competing interests and agendas unified 
during his lifetime thanks to his charismatic leadership and policy of institutionalised 
balance of power aiming at minimising the potential for domination of one group 
over another. However, it did not take long until the nationality question resurfaced, 
shortly after his death, with the outbreak of mass riots of the Kosovo Albanians in 
March 1981, ignited by student grievances at the University of Pristina. 
Recognised as a nationality (narodnost) rather than a nation (narod) since 
their nation had a homeland elsewhere, the Kosovo Albanians were granted 
extensive political, economic and cultural rights in the late-1960s through 
 
71 Based on the replacement of a central-command economic structure with a self-managed socialist 
economy, self-management came into being as a new model of socialism or ‘Third Way’ that 
Yugoslavia offers following the country’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948.  Adopted in 1953, 
the law on self-management replaced the concept of state-ownership of means of production with 
social-ownership and assigned workers councils established within socially-owned enterprises with 
management and decision-making responsibilities. Self-management required the Communist Party to 
relinquish its control and power over decision-making, which Milovan Djilas pointed to in his 
writings. Criticising the continued centralised power of the Party and demanding a more participatory 
and democratic approach within the Party, Djilas, in 1955, published The New Class: An Analysis of 
the Communist System. Pointing to corruption and enormous differences in living standards caused by 
the rise of a new class of privileged ruling elite, the nomenklatura, enjoying material gains from their 
position, Djilas argued that socialism practised in Eastern European countries was not egalitarian. 
Purged from the Party, he was sentenced to ten-year imprisonment. He was later tried and jailed for 
his continued criticisms of the system. For further information on the Yugoslav system of workers’ 
self-management, see Saul Estrin, Self-Management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice, 
(Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John H. Moore, 
Growth with Self-Management: Yugoslav Industrialization, 1952-1975, (Stanford, California: Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1980); Ljubo Sirc, The Yugoslav Economy under Self-
Management, (London: MacMillan, 1979). 
72 Sofos, 1996, p. 258. 
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constitutional amendments. These policy adjustments, adopted in response to student 
demonstrations, staged in 1968 and calling for a university and a republican status in 
the post-Ranković73 period, were undertaken in parallel to a gradual rapprochement 
process between Belgrade and Tirana following the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.74 The federal government dropped ‘Metohija’, the Serbian term for 
the Western part of the province, from the official name of the province and allowed 
the public display of the Albanian flag in 1968.75 Accepted as equal to the Serbo-
Croat language, the Albanian language was introduced in schools and administration 
in 1969, becoming the official language.76 The University of Pristina and centres of 
Albanian literature were opened in the same year.77 Having signed a trade agreement 
with Enver Hoxha, Tito also allowed Kosovo Albanians to travel to Albania and the 
establishment of cultural contacts between Kosovo and Albania, leading to an influx 
of textbooks from Albania to Kosovo, the exchange of professors and even the 
planning of joint film productions.78  
The rising levels of education in the period 1968-1978 resulted in the growth 
of a new educated class and changed the imbalance in public employment in favour 
of the Albanians.79 This rapid Albanisation in the organs of local power and the 
rapidly declining ratio of the Serbs and Montenegrins throughout the 1970s fuelled 
the already-existing discontent among the Serbs inside and outside Kosovo who were 
treating Tito’s nationality policies with scepticism. The change in the demography of 
the province was caused by the high rate of birth among the Albanians and the 
ongoing outward emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province partly 
motivated by a desire to find better employment opportunities and partly due to 
intimidation and discrimination by the Albanians. 80 
 
73 Strongly in favour of centralisation, Aleksandar Ranković, who was a Serb, pursued a policy of 
repression and intimidation against the Albanians until he was dismissed from his posts as the head of 
the Yugoslav secret police and Vice-President of the state in 1966.  
74  Patrick F. Artisien, “A Note on Kosovo and the Future of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: A Balkan 
Perspective”, Soviet Studies, 36:2 (April 1984), p. 267; Vickers, 1998, pp. 162-6; Malcolm, 1998, pp. 
324-5. 
75 Artisien, 1984, p. 267; Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, pp. 168-9, Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 325. 
76 Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92, (London; New 
York: Verso, 1993), p. 36; Vickers, 1998, p. 170. 
77 Magaš,1993, p. 36; Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1999), p. 17; Vickers, 1998, p. 170. 
78  Mertus,, 1999, p. 17; Artisien, 1984, p. 270; Malcolm, 1998, pp. 325-6; Vickers, 1998, pp. 165-6. 
79  Malcolm, 1998, p. 326; Vickers, 1998, p. 174. 
80 Before World War II, the Serbs and Montenegrins constituted 33.1% of Kosovo’s population of 
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Dissatisfied with their autonomous status guaranteed by the 1974 
Constitution, which recognised self-rule for the province, the Kosovo Albanians 
staged mass demonstrations for the elevation of the province’s status to a republic in 
March 1981. For the Serbs, the Albanian demand for republican status meant that 
they were seeking to break away from Yugoslavia and unite with Albania. 
Emphasising their own grievances arising out of conflicting perceptions of 
ethnic inequalities and memories of victimisation by the ‘other’ side, the Serbs and 
Albanians generated their own national programmes in the post-Tito period. The 
Albanians, who believed that the denial of a republican status despite their sizeable 
population, which was much bigger than the Montenegrins and Macedonians, was 
because they were not Slavs. Believing that the causes of their socio-economic 
problems were rooted in the very structure of the Yugoslav state system, they 
thought that only the recognition of republican status would improve their situation 
and status in Yugoslavia. Viewing themselves as the ‘liberator’ of the South Slavs 
due to their commitment to the armed resistance against foreign invaders during the 
First and Second World Wars, the Serbs considered the creation of two autonomous 
units with extensive autonomous rights within Serbia as reflecting an ‘unfair’ 
situation. They were dissatisfied with the evolution of the Yugoslav federal state 
structure and believed that decentralisation was indeed a deliberate policy of the half-
Croat and half-Slovene Tito and his right hand man Slovene Edvard Kardelj to 
weaken the Serb position vis-à-vis the Croats and Slovenes.81 
The events that followed the brutal suppression of the mass riots of Kosovo 
Albanians in 1981, i.e. trials of the rioters, the cutting of cultural and educational 
contacts between Kosovo and Tirana by Belgrade, the voicing by a nationalist 
 
645,012. See, Mertus, 1999, p. 315. As noted earlier, during the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis 
powers between 1941 and 1945, the Serbs and Montenegrins were forced to migrate from Kosovo. 
After the war, the new Yugoslav socialist regime banned the return of the Serbs and Montenegrins to 
Kosovo for a while in order to convince Albania’s Enver Hoxha to join the projected socialist Balkan 
federation and strengthen the confidence of the Albanian national minority in the new political 
system. Despite the overall improvement in Kosovo’s economy in the post-World War II period, the 
Serbs and Montenegrins continued to migrate to Serbia and Montenegro due to economic reasons and 
continued harassment of the Kosovo Albanians. The ratio of the Serbs declined from 23.6 out of a 
population of 963,988 in 1961 to 13.2% out of the province’s population of 1,584,441 in 1981. Ibid., 
p. 316. 
81 For a review of the Serbian grievances, see Kosta Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic, Memorandum of 
the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts – Answers to Criticisms, (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, 1995), available at http://www.rastko.org.yu/istorija/iii/memorandum.pdf [accessed 
25 October 2006]. 
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Serbian intelligentsia of the grievances of the Kosovo Serbs and the calling for the 
‘de-Albanisation’ of the province, resulted in the rise of a “dangerous, defensive, 
populist, and officially sanctioned nationalism” in Serbia.82 This fuelled the already-
growing Albanian nationalism developing in opposition to the Serbian state. The 
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, and the accompanying expulsion of 
Albanians from government service and their deprival of political, economic, social 
and cultural rights led the Albanian political leaders to unilaterally declare the 
‘Republic of Kosovo’ and form a ‘shadow state’ by establishing their own ‘parallel 
systems’ of education, health, taxation and transportation. Albanian private house 
schools – shtëpi shkolla – where the teaching was based on a secular nationalist 
curricula focusing on prominent Albanian historical figures, events and dates, 
Albanian literature and the geography of Kosovo and other Albanian lands became 
the primary force for “symbolically engineering” the sense of Albanian nationhood 
and for strengthening the Albanian national political movement for statehood.83 By 
reinforcing unity and national identity among the Albanians, this situation, reduced 
the already limited contact, caused by linguistic, cultural and religious differences, 
between the two communities to a minimum, developing a system of ‘apartheid’ in 
the province.  
Failing to attract the international community’s interest in and support for 
their non-violent struggle due to the absence of armed conflict in the province during 
the Dayton peace process, which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, 
hard-liner Kosovo Albanians embarked on an armed struggle in the second half of 
the 1990s to internationalise their ‘cause’. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or 
UÇK in Albanian), formed with the support of the diaspora in the West in the early 
1990s, started their attacks on Serbian police forces in 1996. The harsh response of 
Milošević, which the KLA anticipated, resulted in the internationalisation of the 
conflict, prompting NATO’s military action to stop human rights violations on 24 
March 1999. 
 
 
 
82 Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 116. 
83 Kostovicova, 2002, pp. 166-9. 
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Undertaken with no explicit UN Security Council authorisation, NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo lasted until early-June when Slobodan Milošević agreed to 
the terms of a peace plan, calling for the withdrawal of Serbian forces and 
establishment of an interim international administration. The construction of a multi-
ethnic society in Kosovo has since then been emphasised by the international 
community to promote sustainable domestic and regional peace. In the following 
section, the aspects of the international community’s engagement in constructing a 
multi-ethnic Kosovo society in the post-NATO intervention period will be 
investigated. 
 
6.3. Building a ‘Multi-Ethnic’ Society in Kosovo 
 
 In accordance with the framework outlined in Chapter 2, the issues of social 
reconciliation, social communication and creating a unifying collective identity are 
investigated to analyse the aspects of the process of nation-building in Kosovo in the 
post-1999 period.  
 
6.3.1. Reconciliation: Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Post-Armed Conflict Period  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, building sustainable peace in war-torn territories 
such as Kosovo requires the undertaking of a challenging task of transforming 
relations from antagonistic to accommodative and creating a sense of community and 
belonging through addressing and reconciling past differences in the post-armed 
conflict period. To this end, since the early days after NATO’s intervention, 
members of the international community frequently repeated the need for building a 
multi-ethnic Kosovo society characterised by the recognition and exercise of equal 
political, economic, civil and cultural rights and opportunities, and inter-communal 
tolerance to establish long-lasting peace.  
In this regard, it is important to note that although the focus has so far been 
on the Serb-Albanian relations due to the fact that the roots of the Kosovo conflict lie 
in their competing sovereignty claims, shaped by conflicting national discourses, 
Kosovo hosts a number of other ethnic groups, albeit in smaller sizes. They have 
lived in the territory for centuries and share vital interests in the political future of the 
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province. Kosovo’s population of some two million includes not only Albanians 
(88%) and Serbs (7%) but also Muslim Slavs (Bosniacs or Torbeshi and Goranis) 
(1.9%), Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE) (1.7%), and Turks (1%).84 Wedged in 
the middle of a constant power struggle between the Serbs and Albanians in the past, 
these smaller groups have tried to find their place in the newly emerging political and 
social environment in the post-NATO-intervention, which has changed in favour of 
the Albanians, while also struggling to maintain their cultural, ethnic and religious 
existence and identity.  
It is also worth noting that the use of the terms RAE and Bosniac / Torbeshi 
as a form of ‘ethnic categorisation’ is a very recent phenomenon, which has come 
into existence following the establishment of UNMIK (United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo) in June 1999. Members of the Roma and Muslim 
Slav populations were targeted for revenge attacks by the Albanians following the 
withdrawal of the Serb military and police forces from the province. For many 
Kosovo Albanians, the Roma were the collaborators of the Milošević regime: 
“accused of carrying out the dirty work, such as disposing of bodies, they were 
tainted by association with the regime in Belgrade”.85 Muslim Slavs speaking the 
same language with the Serbs were also targeted and forced to leave Kosovo. This 
resentment of the Albanians towards the Roma and Muslim Slavs, accused of having 
sided with the Serb forces during their acts of destruction during the war in 1998-99,  
led the Albanian language speakers of the Roma population to distinguish themselves 
from the Roma-speakers and emphasise themselves as the Ashkali and Egyptians. In 
the same way, Bosniacs tended to stress their differences from Goranis and identify 
themselves as Bosniacs or Torbeshi. These acts of differentiation indicate the smaller 
 
84 Due to the absence of a recent official census in Kosovo, there are no reliable population figures in 
the province. The figures mentioned in the text are taken from Statistical Office of Kosovo, Kosovo 
and Its Population, (2003), pp. 2-3, available at  
http://www.ks-gov.net/esk/esk/pdf/english/population/Kosovo_population.pdf [accessed 13 March 
2007].  On the homepage of the Statistical Office of Kosovo (http://www.ks-gov.net/esk/  retrieved on 
13 March 2003), the population of Kosovo is estimated to be 2.1 million and its breakdown is shown 
in the following way: Albanians (92 %), Serbs (5.3%) and ‘others’ (2.7%). 
85 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, 
As Told, Vol. 2, 14 June – 31 October 1999, (5 November 1999), p. xi. See also, UNHCR / OSCE, 
Preliminary Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, (26 July 1999), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=3c3c552f4 [accessed 
15 February 2007]. This attitude towards the Roma still prevails among the Albanians. During my 
discussions with several Albanian university students in Pristina in September 2006, they said that 
“while the Serbian military chased, gypsies killed the Albanians during the NATO campaign”. 
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communities’ efforts to prevent their exclusion by the majority Albanians through 
distinguishing themselves from the ‘guilty’ and emphasising their ‘innocence’ as 
well as ‘victimhood’ under the repressive Milošević regime.  
This trend for ethnic differentiation was also paralleled by a dramatic decline 
in the number of non-Albanian populations. Although multi-ethnicity is not simply 
about the size of ethnic groups, the declining proportion of non-Albanian groups in 
the post-NATO intervention period suggests a trend towards a ‘mono-ethnic’ rather 
than a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Almost all of Kosovo’s Croats, most of whom had 
already left for Croatia during and after the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in the early-1990s,86 fled from the province due to the continued harassment and 
attacks of extremist Albanians following the establishment of the international 
administration. Of approximately 200,000 Serbs, some 130,000 Serbs stayed in 
Kosovo, living in northern municipalities and rural enclaves in the south.87 Members 
of the Roma who were driven out from Kosovo after the war in 1999 have been the 
most vulnerable group in the UN-run province. A majority of them live below the 
poverty line and have limited access to health and education facilities. The total 
number of the registered and unregistered internally displaced Roma residing in 
Serbia and Montenegro varies between 26,000 and 80,000 because many of them did 
not have legal documentation when they left Kosovo.88   
 
Ethnic Groups Number Percentage 
Albanians 1,596,072 81.6% 
Serbs 194,190 9.9% 
Muslims 66,189 3.4% 
Roma 45,745 2.3% 
Montenegrins 20,356 1.1% 
Turks 10,446 0.5% 
Croats 8,062 0.4% 
Others 15,136 0.8% 
Total 1,956,196 100% 
Table 6.1. Population Census in 1991 (Source: Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and 
Truths Started A War, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1999)  
                                                 
86 For example, approximately 2,200 Croats left Letnica in south-eastern Kosovo between May 1992 
and May 1993. Duijzings, 2000, p. 52.  
87 Coordination Centre of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and 
Metohija (CCK), Principles of the Program for Return of Internally Displaced Persons from Kosovo 
and Metohija, (Belgrade, 20 November 2002), 
http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/coordination_centre/index.html [accessed 5 March 2007]. 
88 Coordination Centre of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and 
Metohija (CCK), Principles of the Program for Return of Internally Displaced Persons from Kosovo. 
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Under these circumstances, it has become extremely difficult to instigate 
multi-ethnicity based on the notion of peaceful co-existence and interaction of ethnic 
groups. In fact, for many Albanians, the international community’s emphasis on 
multi-ethnicity, which Veton Surroi, one of the most influential moderate Albanian 
journalists, argued, was not much different from the socialist Yugoslav leadership’s 
attempt in the past to transform ethno-national identities through imposing a socialist 
identity from above:89  
 
I would advocate a tolerant Kosovo, but not necessarily a multi-ethnic one. This reminds us 
of “brotherhood and unity” in socialist Yugoslavia, which failed in flames as we have seen. 
There is a realistic life for Serbs here. Unfortunately it will be a longer process than we 
originally foresaw. It is also very painful because at the same time Serbs from Kosovo have 
to define their local identity. Before they were always defined as Milosevic’s Serbs. 
 
In addition to this perception of multi-ethnicity by the majority population, 
the persistence of a “political war”, which, Surroi suggested to have succeeded “the 
war with bombs”,90 further inhibited the prospect of creating a multi-ethnic society, 
based on the recognition of the diverse character of society and participation and 
inclusion of diverse groups in every aspect of life. It has remained a desirable but an 
unrealistic vision confined in the speeches of members of the international 
community. This “political war”, as will be discussed in the next chapter, was not 
only about the exercise of power and struggle for dominance within the Albanian 
nationalist leadership but also related to Kosovo’s future political status. Both Serbs 
and Albanians, motivated by a wish to maximise their interests and strengthen their 
political position in a climate of uncertainty arising from the lack of clarity over the 
issue of Kosovo’s political status, were influenced by zero-sum logic; ‘one’s gain is 
the other’s loss’.91 Focusing on securing independence, the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership failed to instigate a robust policy of sanctioning the rule of law and gain 
the confidence of the Serb community in the newly established provisional self-
governing institutions. The Serb leadership in Belgrade, which was in favour of 
restoring the Serbian control over Kosovo, supported ‘parallel’ administrative and 
 
89 “Interview: Still Building the New Kosovo”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) Balkan 
Crisis Report, 127, (24 March 2000), available at 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=247691&apc_state=henibcr2000 [accessed 24 March 2007]. 
90 Quoted in International Crisis Group, “Kosovo’s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for A Civic Contract”, 
Balkans Report No. 143, (Pristina / Brussels, 28 May 2003), p. 1.  
91 Ibid., pp. 2-4. 
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institutional structures in the UN-run province to secure territorial division in the 
event of the recognition of statehood to Kosovo. The Kosovo Serb political 
leadership, which fragmented between pro-Belgrade radicals and moderates, failed to 
emerge as a political actor with a clear strategy. This “political war” curtailed the 
whole process of post-conflict reconstruction and of generating a sense of 
community.  
With regards to the international community’s responsibility for the rise of 
this ‘zero-sum’ attitude, it is important to note that despite its strong emphasis on 
multi-ethnicity and integration, the international community failed to initiate 
institutional instruments and practical policies that would create incentives for this 
purpose; creating a sense of cohesion across diversity. The international community 
introduced a set of benchmarks to improve the capacity of Kosovo’s political 
institutions to effectively and democratically function and expected that this would 
promote the notion of multi-ethnicity in the UN-run province. The international 
community’s approach to multi-ethnicity, however, had serious flaws. First, there 
was no clearly identified implementation plan for the benchmarks. Secondly, they 
did not clarify the issues of how to ensure minority rights are respected and 
guaranteed by the provisional institutions. And lastly, they were imposed by the 
international community rather than voluntarily formulated and adopted by the 
majority Albanians.92  What Kosovo needed, the International Crisis Group 
suggested in this respect, was a “civic contract” that would create a “real institutional 
space with credible guarantees” and alleviate inter-ethnic tension through pursuing a 
system of incentives and sanctions to ensure the fair treatment of minorities and their 
participation in very aspect of life.93  
As noted in Chapter 2, the recognition of the diverse character of society, 
which entails the acceptance of differences in ethnicity, language, religion and 
culture through the codification and adoption of formal principles and rules, is a 
significant aspect of creating a sense of cohesion across diversity. As it was also 
noted, the development of a sense of social cohesion and belonging also requires 
meeting the diverse needs of members of these ethnic or other social groups and their 
inclusion and participation in every aspect of life. In the case of Kosovo, the majority 
 
92 Ibid., p. 22. 
93 Ibid, pp. 21-27. 
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Albanians, who have strived for independence, tended to see institutional and 
constitutional initiatives adopted to protect the rights of Serbs and other ethnic 
groups as concessions to secure the favour of the international community rather than 
something that minorities deserve. The Serbs, for their part, have not adopted their 
minority status within Kosovo and tended to see the Albanians as a minority within a 
majority Serb state. They did not engage in the international community-supervised 
institutions and believed that the province would be returned to Serbia or 
partitioned.94 The ambiguity on the issue of Kosovo’s political status further 
complicated the already fragile inter-ethnic relations and political stability. It 
encouraged extremist forces in both communities to exploit popular frustration with 
uncertainty and disappointment with the insufficient progress in the political and 
economic development of the province and to turn the situation to their benefit as 
much as they could. This, in turn, created a political impasse.  
Ethnic segregation fuelled by volatile conditions of security and restricted 
freedom of movement, has constituted the most serious challenge to achieving 
reconciliation and sustaining a multi-ethnic Kosovo in the post-NATO intervention 
period. The international community’s failure to prevent the acts of violence against 
members of non Albanian groups during the early stages of the UN mission deeply 
affected the prospect of the multi-ethnic vision. According to UNHCR figures, over 
200,000 people fled from Kosovo into Serbia proper and Montenegro to escape from 
the NATO bombing and the subsequent revenge attacks in the post-NATO 
intervention period following the withdrawal of Serb authorities.95 Those who stayed 
in Kosovo, as noted earlier, moved to northern municipalities or clustered together in 
rural enclaves in the south. Leading to the segregation of ethnic groups, the 
formation of these isolated, Serb-dominated areas fuelled a growing fear of territorial 
partition among the Albanians.96     
 
94 Ibid., pp. 16-21. 
95 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Situation, Protection and 
Assistance: Internally Displaced Persons, Humanitarian Risk Analysis No. 18, (Belgrade, 26 April 
2002), p. 8, citing UNHCR Registration (2000) and UNHCR Statistics, (January 2002). 
96 Juan Pekmez, “The Intervention by the International Community and the Rehabilitation of 
Kosovo”, The Rehabilitation of War-Torn Societies A Project Coordinated by the Centre for Applied 
Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN), (Geneva, January 2001), p. 10.  
 
Picture 6.2. The Ibar River in northern Kosovo, 
dividing the city of Mitrovicë / Mitrovica into two 
parts; the Serb-dominated north and Albanian-
dominated south (Photo taken by the author on 14 
September 2006). 
 
Picture 6.3. A Serb enclave in south-western 
Kosovo, Shtërpcë / Štrpce (Photo taken by the 
author on 11 September 2006). 
 
Picture 6.4. In Serb-dominated northern Mitrovicë / 
Mitrovica, Serbs use their Serbian vehicle plates and 
change it to a Kosovo one if they “have to” drive 
through Albanian-dominated areas (Photo taken by 
the author on 14 September 2006). 
 
Picture 6.5. Heavily armed French KFOR (NATO-
led Kosovo Force) troops positioned around the 
main bridge over the Ibar River responsible for 
maintaining peace and security in Mitrovicë / 
Mitrovica (Photo taken by the author on 14 
September 2006). 
 
As will be discussed further below, Kosovo’s experience of post-conflict 
reconstruction in the post-1999 period exemplifies the extent to which issues, arising 
from the interaction of the processes of state-building and nation-building that the 
territory has undergone in the post-war period, affect the prospects for building 
sustainable peace and stability. It indicates the impact of problems with enforcing 
law and order and executing the rule of law on creating a sense of community around 
shared values and concerns and reducing the strength of ethnic, religious or other 
differences. 
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Although the number of ethnically-motivated crimes including murders had 
rapidly declined,97 the international community failed to achieve a sustainable 
improvement in security conditions for the minority groups. Attacks on the buses 
used by the Serbs and Roma despite the KFOR escort were occasionally reported by 
international agencies.98 This situation, which reflects the restriction of the exercise 
of the fundamental right of freedom of movement and their access to public services, 
encouraged the Serbs to establish and sustain their separate systems. Setting up their 
own parallel structures of education and health funded by Belgrade, as the Albanians 
did in the 1990s, the Serbs developed a segregated social life.  
Attacks against the Serbs and Roma as well as religious sites and monasteries 
never ceased during the international administration of the territory, exacerbating in 
the violent riots in March 2004. The inability of international community and 
Kosovo’s security institutions to provide a sustainable improvement in peace and 
security, in turn, fed the feeling of insecurity among members of the minority groups. 
The international community’s and Albanian-dominated provisional institutions’ 
failure to bring those responsible for murders of Serbs to justice made the situation 
worse, creating an atmosphere of impunity for perpetrators. Regarding the capacity 
to set the rule of law as a basic principle to facilitate normalising inter-ethnic 
relations, a senior UN police officer said the following: 
“…inability and/or lack of enthusiasm of UNMIK and Kosovo’s provisional institutions to 
try and punish those who committed ethnically-motivated crimes in the past led many 
Albanians to conclude that that they would get away with whatever they do to the members 
of minority communities specifically the Serbs and Roma…UNMIK’s and the Albanian-
dominated institutions’ inability and lack of sufficient commitment to setting and 
implementing the rule of law as the ‘core’ political and social principle in the province, 
encouraged the persistence of complete indifference on the side of the Albanian people 
regarding crimes committed and violence directed against the Serbs or other minorities but 
too much concern with anything happens to an Albanian. They have a tendency to link any 
petty offence committed by a Roma or Serb with ethnicity or politics even if it has nothing to 
do with it and punish Serbs or Roma seen responsible for harming an Albanian without trial 
as witnessed during the March 2004 riots sparked by the drowning of three Albanian children 
allegedly being chased by a group of Serbs with a dog.”99  
 
 
97 According to NATO figures, the murder rate in Kosovo which was 50 persons per week in June 
1999 declined to five per week in March 2000. For further information, see Lord Robinson of Port 
Ellen, “Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge”, (21 March 2000), p. 16, available via 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/index.htm [accessed 25 March 2007]. 
98 See for example, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Update on the 
Kosovo Roma, Ashkaelia, Egyptian, Serb, Bosniak, Gorani and Albanian Communities in a Minority 
Situation, (Kosovo, June 2004). 
99 Interview with a senior UNMIK police officer, (Prishtina / Priština, 6 September 2006). 
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Encouraging the return of displaced persons has been a significant component 
of the international community’s agenda for promoting reconciliation and creating a 
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. However, despite gradual improvements in security, 
the international community and Kosovo’s provisional institutions failed to create a 
sustainable secure environment and charge those responsible for previous murders of 
Serbs. This not only discouraged the Serbs and other non-Albanian ‘refugees’ to 
return to the province but also was used by Belgrade to encourage the Serbs to keep 
their parallel structures in place and maintain their isolated life. This, in turn, led to 
the evaporation of hopes for building a peaceful, democratic and multi-ethnic society 
at least in the near future.  
In this respect, it is worthwhile noting the court decisions for the March 2004 
violence-related cases. According to the OSCE records, as of 18 November 2005, 
426 persons were charged with criminal offences related to the riots. Of the 316 
cases concluded, 209 resulted in convictions and 12 in acquittals. In a majority of the 
riot-related cases, the court sentences were “below the minimum” applicable penalty 
established by the law.100 The court decisions, which lacked “a proper justification” 
for mitigated punishment, “failed to send out a clear message of condemnation for 
such violent behaviour”,101 and contributed to the rise of a sense of impunity among 
the population regarding ethnically-motivated violence. 
The absence of an agreed settlement on the province’s political status and the 
security situation hindered the achievement of reconciliation in Kosovo. As will be 
discussed in the following section, fuelling the segregation and polarisation of ethnic 
groups, these two factors prevented the establishment of channels of inter-ethnic 
communication in the province. 
 
 
 
100 OSCE, The Response of the Justice System to the March 2004 Riots, (December 2005), 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17177_en.pdf [accessed 28 March 2007]. 
101 Ibid., p. 34. 
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6.3.2. Implications of the Lack of Social Communication for Building a Multi-Ethnic 
Kosovo  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, collective identities are not fixed or given but socially 
constructed and they link individuals, coming from diverse backgrounds, to a group 
of people on the basis of shared characteristics and differences from other groups of 
people.102 Social communication, which Deutsch defined in terms of the capacity of 
individuals to communicate effectively over a range of issues with each other, is a 
significant element of the construction of a sense of a shared identity and 
belonging.103 In the case of conflict-torn societies such as Kosovo establishing 
contacts and communication to facilitate reconciliation and promote the notion of 
peaceful co-existence of ethnic groups becomes a significant as well as challenging 
aspect of creating a sense of social cohesion. As discussed earlier, since the early-
1990s, Kosovo’s Serbs and Albanians already had limited contact and they were 
socially and politically segregated. These divisions accentuated during the course of 
the war in 1998/9 and were felt more strongly during the administration of the 
territory by the UN.  
Kosovo’s urban centres, mostly populated by the Albanians, have been far 
from having the conditions conducive to generating and encouraging a positive 
interaction between ethnic communities and promoting the notion of peaceful co-
existence. Excluding international staff members, except Prizren and ironically 
northern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, Kosovo’s towns, inhabited by some 40% of the 
population, do not present a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic character. As noted earlier, 
following the withdrawal of Serbian authorities from the province, tens of thousands 
of Serbs, living in the capital Prishtina / Priština and other major towns, either left the 
province for Serbia proper and Montenegro or moved to northern municipalities and 
ethnically segregated but safe enclaves in rural areas in northern and south-western 
municipalities, leaving the Serb-dominated northern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica as the 
only urban area where Serbs reside. Divided along the Ibar River, northern Mitrovicë 
/ Mitrovica ironically offers a picture of a multi-ethnic urban centre in Kosovo, at 
least in terms of the existence of members of different ethnic groups. According to 
 
102 Smith, 1991; Guibernau, 1996; Miller, 1995. 
103 Deutsch, 1953. 
data provided by OSCE, northern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica’s population of 
approximately 20,000 people is made up of 17,000 Serbs (of whom between 5,000 
and 7,000 are internally displaced) and 3,000 ‘others’ (Bosniacs, Goranis, Turks, 
Roma and Ashkali, and Albanians).104 
 
 
Picture 6.6. A scene from the KFOR-protected ‘multi-
ethnic marketplace’ located in the ‘confidence area’ in 
northern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica where Serbs, Albanians 
and Bosniacs trade (Photo taken by the author on 14 
September 2006). 
 
Picture 6.7. One of the three apartment blocks in 
northern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica where Albanians and 
Serbs continue to reside despite their “occasional 
involvement in verbal fights” (Photo taken by the 
author on 14 September 2006). 
 
 
Approximately 60% of Kosovo’s population of some 2 million, who live in 
rural areas with a high incidence of poverty, depend on subsistence agriculture.105 
The share of people living in extreme poverty (defined by percentage of those living 
on less than US$ 1 per day) and that of less extreme poverty (measured by 
unemployment rate and percentage of those living on US$ 2 or less a day) is much 
higher in rural areas than urban centres.106 With regard to the breakdown of level of 
extreme poverty among ethnic communities, it is recorded highest among the RAE 
community, which as elsewhere in south-eastern Europe is the most vulnerable 
community in Kosovo. The highest percentages of less extreme poverty are recorded 
among the Gorani, Bosniac and Turkish communities. The Serbian-dominated 
northern municipalities score the lowest rate of less extreme poverty. According to 
                                                 
104 OSCE, Municipal Profile Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, (June 2006), p. 2, available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/1191_en.pdf [accessed 12 May 2006]. 
105 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and 
Choices”, Human Development Report Kosovo 2004, (Pristina: UNDP, 2004), p. 7. 
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official data, unemployment rate throughout Kosovo reached 39.7 %, while some 
other sources estimate it at up to 44%.107 The youth unemployment level is 10% 
higher than the average unemployment rate.108 These poor conditions of economic 
and social development and few prospects for employment and education 
opportunities available in rural settlement encourage Kosovo’s youth to migrate to 
urban centres or abroad. However, suffering from poverty and a high unemployment 
rate, Kosovo’s towns, do not have much to offer to the incoming youth. According to 
official figures, as of early-2006 the number of unemployed totalled 324,000, of 
which 29% were young people numbering some 94,000.109 Demonstrating an inverse 
relationship with the increase in labour force resulting from the entrance of a number 
of young people to the market every year, the number of jobs offered has declined 
since 2003. While 7,848 and 8,400 jobs were offered respectively in 2003 and 2004, 
7,121 vacant positions were offered in 2005.110 
As noted earlier, Kosovo’s towns do not seem to present a multi-ethnic 
picture. Except for Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, which is a de facto divided city between 
the Serbs and Albanians, there is no other town in Kosovo where Serbs constitute a 
significant portion of the urban residents. A majority of the Serbs continue to live in 
isolated rural municipalities. Ethnic segregation, inhibiting the prospects of 
facilitating an inter-communal dialogue and social communication, in return, has 
served to evaporate the hopes for creating a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, making 
it perceived as a ‘dream’ of the international community. 
Since the establishment of UNMIK, the Kosovo Serbs and Albanians have 
had virtually no contact. Although some Albanians and Serbs, mostly the elderly, 
have some contacts, especially in business, they keep their contacts secret “in order 
not to be excluded by their communities”.111 As the below UNDP opinion poll 
results indicate, the Albanian community has the least contact with other ethnic 
groups. They are also the most distanced group to the notion of ‘living in the same 
street with the Serbs’. As also shown below, Kosovo Albanian youth, educated in 
 
107 UNDP, “Youth: A New Generation for A New Kosovo”, Human Development Report 2006, 
(Prishtina: 2006c), p. 61. 
108 Ibid., p. 63. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., p. 64.  
111 Interview with a 76-year old Serb businessman in northern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, (14 September 
2006). 
separated schools and influenced by the memories of ethnic discrimination by the 
Serbian state against their community in the 1990s and the violence and destruction 
during the war, are noticeably opposed to the notion of forming friendships or any 
other type of relationship with members of other ethnic groups compared with the 
Serbs. 
 
 Albanians Serbs Others 
On more than three occasions 11.0% 40.9% 59.2% 
One to two occasions 10.6% 33.5% 20.4% 
No contact 77.0% 25.1% 18.4% 
Deliberate avoidance of contact 1.4% 0.5% 2.0% 
Table 6.2. Frequency of inter-ethnic contacts in the last three months (Source: UNDP, “Early Warning 
Report Kosovo July-September 2006”, Report No. 14 (Prishtina, 2006e), p. 35, available via 
http://www.kosovo.undp.org/?cid=2,42 [accessed 15 May 2006]). 
 
 
 Dec 2002 Dec 2005 June 2006 Sep 2006 
 Albanians Others Albanians Others Albanians Others Albanians Others 
Agree 9.90% 42.00% 41.00% 64.50% 48.77% 61.20% 43.9% 83.2% 
Disagree 90.10% 58.00% 59.00% 35.5% 40.66% 26.78% 49.1% 7.1% 
Table 6.3. Readiness to live with the Serbs in the same street (UNDP, 2006e, p. 35). 
 
 
 
Inter-ethnic relations amongst Kosovo's young people
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Chart 6.1. Willingness to form relationships with members of other ethnic groups (Source: UNDP, 
“Youth: A New Generation for A New Kosovo”, Human Development Report 2006, (Prishtina: 
2006c), p. 25.) 
 
 
The lack of communication between the Serbs and Albanians, in turn, has led 
to the maintenance of prejudices in both communities and the persistence of an 
attitude of blaming each other responsible for insufficient progress in normalising 
inter-ethnic relations and of pessimism about the future of relations. Exacerbating the 
distance between the two communities, this situation has encouraged “nationalist 
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mythmakers” on both sides, who “only recalls the grievances suffered from the Mr. 
Hyde element in the other”, to fuel mutual distrust by demonising the “other” and 
portraying their own group as exclusive victim of domination by the “other”.112 
Rather than confronting and accepting their own responsibility, both sides have 
tended to blame each other for poor inter-ethnic relations during the administration 
of the territory by the UN. According to the results of an opinion survey by the 
UNDP shown below, while Kosovo Albanians view Belgrade’s influence and Serbs’ 
lack of readiness for integration into society as the two most important factors 
causing tense inter-ethnic relations, Serbs blame Albanian leaders’ attitude and 
insufficient efforts by the Albanians for societal integration. 
 
 Sep 2004 Dec 2005 June 2006 Sep 2006 
 Albanians Serbs Albanians Serbs Albanians Serbs Albanians Serbs 
Insufficient efforts by 
Albanians for integration 
of Serbs 
1.4% 51% 3.2% 33.3% 1.9% 29.6% 2.2% 37.6% 
Lack of readiness by Serbs 
for integration into 
Kosovo society 
42.5% 0% 32.8% 0% 20.7% 7.9% 27.6% 1.7% 
Attitude of Albanian 
leaders 
1.7% 42.5% 1.4% 60.9% 0.6% 36.1% 1.3% 47.5% 
Attitude of Serb leaders 11.9% 0% 9.7% 1.6% 5.2% 0.5% 7.8% 3.9% 
Belgrade’s influence 39.4% 0% 52.7% 0.5% 59.2% 15.3% 55.5% 2.2% 
Table 6.4. The factors causing tense relations between Albanians and Serbs (UNDP, 2006e, p. 33). 
 
 
In this context, it is worthwhile noting the role of the separate education 
systems and of the Serbian and Albanian media dominated by politics in the 
maintenance of this ‘culture of victimisation’, prejudices and stereotypes, and thus, 
ethnic and cultural distance. Parallel institutions of education in Kosovo are a legacy 
of the past. As mentioned earlier, the Albanians in the early 1990s, following the 
suspension of the province’s autonomy, formed their parallel schools, which became 
the centres of resistance to Serbian rule. As will be explained later in the language 
section, Kosovo Serbs, in the post-NATO intervention period, established their 
parallel structures of education, politically and financially supported by Belgrade. 
The maintenance of parallel schools in the Serbian enclaves, which frustrates the 
Albanians since it indicates the Serbs’ defiance to recognise the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
112 Duška Anastasijević, “Good Policies Needed Before Good Practices Can Thrive in Kosovo”, 
Nenad Dimitrijevic and Petra Kovács (eds.), Managing Hatred and Distrust: The Prognosis for Post-
Conflict Settlement: the Prognosis for Post-Conflict Settlement in Multiethnic Communities in the 
Former Yugoslavia (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2004), p. 105. 
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Kosovo’s provisional institutions, has served to keep ethnic antagonisms and hatred 
alive amongst the members of both communities, specifically the youth, in the post-
intervention period. As one of the prominent Albanian journalists, Baton Haxhiu, 
puts it, the schools in Kosovo were “built with wrong history, the wrong message, 
and a lot of poetry and music about heroes [producing] hate speech and hate 
diplomas”.113 This situation has contributed to the persistence of a climate of mutual 
distrust and prejudices in the last eight years. 
Dominated by politics and politicians, the media in Kosovo provide virtually 
no information on social issues such as health, education, technology and the 
environment.114 Until 1999, there was only one TV station in Kosovo, broadcasting 
in Serbian with a daily half-hour news programme in Albanian since 1990 when the 
Serbian Parliament adopted a series of decrees, resulting in the ban of the Albanian 
language newspaper and cessation of radio and TV broadcasts on Radio TV 
Priština.115 Operating under the regulation of the Independent Media Commission, 
there are a total of 116 licensed broadcasters in Kosovo,116 of which 73 broadcast 
mainly in Albanian, 35 mainly in Serbian, 3 in Bosnian, 3 in Turkish and 2 in 
Gorani.117 However, the existence of more broadcasters does not necessarily mean 
more communication and exchange of information between Kosovo’s ethnic 
communities. The Serb community in northern municipalities is mostly informed by 
the news broadcasted directly from Serbia (Radio Television of Serbia – RTS), often 
conveying inflammatory nationalist statements of Serbs officials118 or by the local 
Serbian language media with a pro-Belgrade line.119 Similar to the Albanian media, 
the Serbian media operates in a political context, providing virtually no information 
 
113 Quoted in International Crisis Group, “Collapse in Kosovo”, ICG Europe Report No. 155, 
(Pristina, Belgrade, Brussels, 22 April 2004), p. 32. 
114 US Agency for International Development (USAID), Kosovo Media Assessment, Final Report, 
(Burlington, Vermont, March 2004), p. 5.  
115 OSCE, Local Electronic Media in Kosovo, (August 2005), p. 11, available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/08/16222_en.pdf [accessed 12 May 2007]. 
116 The breakdown of broadcasters operating in Kosovo is as follows: 
3 Kosovo-wide TV channels (1 public and 2 private), 4 Kosovo-wide radio stations (2 public and 2 
private), 17 local TV channels, 74 radio stations, 2 low power televisions, and 16 low power radio 
stations. See, Independent Media Commission, Independent Media Commission Annual Report 2006, 
(28 February 2007), p. 13.   
117 Independent Media Commission, (2007), p. 14. 
118 UNDP, Early Warning Report: Kosovo July-September 2006”, No. 14 (Prishtina, 2006), p. 34; 
Arsic and Tanja Matic, “Belgrade Media”. 
119 USAID, 2004, p. 21. 
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on the daily life in the province. A report by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights 
(YIHR)120 analysing the media reporting in Serbia and Kosovo between December 
2003 and March 2005 shows that the Serbian print media were “often dominated by 
‘conspiracy theories’”,121 largely marked by hate speech, misinterpretation of facts, 
distorted information and a disregard of events, thereby, promoting Belgrade’s policy 
towards Kosovo and keeping alive a “truth about Kosovo” rooted in national 
myths.122  
Focusing on the issues of war crimes, missing persons, the Kosovo Serbs’ 
rejection of Prishtina / Priština’s authority during the period between 2003 and 
2005,123 and on the status talks between Prishtina / Priština and Belgrade and 
decentralisation in 2006,124 the Albanian printed media in Kosovo, similar to the 
Serbian media, operates in a political context. Portraying a positive picture of the 
returns process, the Kosovo Albanian media during the period 2003-2005 largely 
ignored the problems of minority communities, failing to develop a critical approach 
towards the problems with achieving inter-ethnic integration in the post-war period 
in general and the question of why the Kosovo Serbs still residing in Belgrade 
hesitate to return to Kosovo in particular.125 Although the adoption and 
implementation of the international community-led professional standards and legal 
framework had a positive impact on professionalism, the media in Kosovo operates 
in a sensationalistic style and provides “shallow information” on the position of 
minority communities and attitudes of local politicians.126 Partial treatment of 
sensitive political issues, ignorance of some facts, and the use of derogatory language 
mostly in editorials by some of the media outlets, which could be considered hate 
speech, still remain as the most serious hurdles to the development of a professional 
Kosovo Albanian media,127 thereby, impeding the creation of a positive atmosphere 
conducive to developing mutual understanding and social communication.  
 
120 Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR) is a regional NGO operating in Serbia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For detailed information, visit http://www.yihr.org/ [accessed 
25 March 2007].  
121 Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR), Journalists Can Do It, (Belgrade-Prishtina, 2005), p. 
457. 
122  Ibid., 447. 
123 Ibid., pp. 519-20. 
124 Idem, Serbian Print Media’s Reporting on Kosovo: March-June 2006, Report No. 17, (2006). 
125 YIHR, 2005, pp. 519-526. 
126 Ibid., p. 519. 
127 Ibid., p. 621; Idem, 2006, p. 11. 
 TV = 78.9%  RADIO = 10.3%  PRINT = 7.2%  
Chart 6.2. Main Source of Information in Kosovo (Source: Index Kosova, “Media Survey in 
Kosova”, (September 2006), available at 
http://www.indexkosova.com/Publications/Pub_sep2006.html [accessed 20 May 2007].    
 
With regard to the responsibility of the international community for the lack 
of progress in initiating social communication, it is worth mentioning here the 
international community’s insufficient capacity to generate incentives to bring the 
Serbs and Albanians together at least around shared problems. As the below table on 
the perceived paramount problems Kosovo faces indicates, there were several areas, 
which could have been treated as cross-cutting areas of convergence to develop 
sustainable channels of inter-communal dialogue and a common platform for 
cooperation. Although the Albanians and Serbs have had fundamental political 
differences such as the issue of who has the right to govern Kosovo, they had several 
issues in common such as poverty, growing unemployment problems and frequent 
power cuts. The existence of ‘parallel’ structures in northern municipalities, as will 
be discussed in the next chapter, hindered the capacity of the provisional institutions 
to exercise political authority and extend services to all communities throughout the 
entire territory of Kosovo. These parallel structures, which served as alternative 
sources for social services, provided employment and revenue opportunities for the 
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Serbs in a context where minority unemployment reached over 90%.128 Through 
creating some institutional and financial incentives, the international community 
could have encouraged the parties to cooperate for the benefit of all inhabitants of 
Kosovo. This may have helped to increase the capacity and effectiveness of the 
province’s provisional institutions and achieve public trust and satisfaction with the 
political structures and eliminating ‘parallel’ structures, contributing to the 
emergence of a sense of an overarching identity around institutions seen to be 
capable of responding to social needs. However, approaching the issue of inter-ethnic 
hostility and strong ethnic identities in Kosovo as a fixed phenomenon, the 
international community tended to focus on multi-ethnicity at the institutional level 
and failed to create channels of communication at the community level through 
generating cooperation at least around shared concerns and problems. 
 December 2002 August 2003 December 2004 
 Albanians Serbs   Others Albanians Serbs Others Albanians Serbs  Others 
Uncertainty over final status 20.4 16.4 10.9 36.3 19.0 10.5 33.8 2.5 15.5 
Unemployment 21.8 13.7 28.7 26.5 8.7 38.3 33.6 36.0 53.5 
Poverty 11.2 7.9 15.9 15.4 12.0 22.2 14.3 6.9 16.3 
Power supply 16.3 2.9 21.3 2.5 2.2 4.3 4.1 6.4 3.9 
 
 December 2005 September 2006 
 Albanians Serbs Others Albanians Serbs Others 
Uncertainty over final status 29.3 7.2 14.9 40.59 5.9 17.3 
Unemployment 30.7 8.2 52.5 34.3 19.79 42.0 
Poverty 15.6 4.8 14.9 14.7 4.4 22.9 
Power supply 5.0 0.5 2.8 - - - 
Table 6.5. Opinions on the biggest issues in Kosovo (%) (Data compiled from UNDP, “Early Warning Report 
Kosovo, September-December 2002”, Report No. 2, (2002), p. 31; Idem, Early Warning Report Kosovo, May – 
August 2003”, Report No. 4, (2003),  p. 28; Idem, “Early Warning Report Kosovo, September-December 2004”, 
Report No. 8, (2004), p 32; Idem, 2005b, p. 32; Idem, “Early Warning Report Kosovo July-September 2006”, 
Report No. 14 (2006e), p. 32). 
 
In this context, it is important to note that the personal and public security 
situation was always ranked as the paramount problem by the Kosovo Serb 
respondents in the UNDP “Early Warning” reports. Failing to provide a sustainable 
improvement in security conditions, the international community was unable to 
alleviate the feeling of insecurity among the Kosovo Serbs, encourage them to 
participate in the political process and turn the issues of common concern into areas 
of cooperation. Contributing to the persistence of a climate of ethnic segregation and 
social exclusion, the absence of inter-communal contact and communication 
hampered the achievement of reconciliation. 
                                                 
128 International Crisis Group, 2003, p. 5. 
6.3.3. Constructing a Civic ‘Kosovar’ Identity  
 
Following his party’s victory in the October 2000 local elections, the late 
President Rugova, who was the leader of the passive resistance campaign against the 
repressive Milošević regime in the early 1990s, proposed a national flag for an 
independent Kosovo. The flag, which came to be known as the “Rugova flag” or the 
“flag of Dardania”, bears the inscription “Dardania”, the ancient word for Kosovo, 
on a two-headed eagle and a yellow star on a blue background. Rugova’s proposal 
failed to generate support from other Albanian leaders and the general public. The 
day after his proposal, some municipal mayors put up the ‘new flag’ in streets but a 
group of former KLA veterans set fire to the flags they had collected in Phristina / 
Priština.129  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. The “Rugova flag” or the “flag of Dardania 
proposed by the late President Rugova in 2000.  
 
Although Rugova’s initiative was never recognised by the Kosovo Albanian 
leaders and the general public as a unique symbol representing Kosovo, a group of 
intellectuals started to openly discuss the issue of redefining the Kosovo identity 
separately from that of Albania.  Several intellectuals such as Migjen Kelmendi, 
editor of “Who is Kosovar?” and Nexhmedin Spahiu, author of “Towards the 
Kosovar Identity”, advocated the idea of the existence of a Kosovo identity distinct 
from Albania. Kelmendi suggests that in the past many Kosovo Albanians had the 
dream of unifying with Albania, but when they visited the country in the 1990s they 
had to accept the fact that they had a better life in Yugoslavia under Tito than the 
Albanians under Enver Hoxha and they had very little in common the impoverished 
people in Albania: “My father had told me about Albania as if it were a fairy tale 
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129 “Kosovo Television Debate: Kosovar Flags and Symbols”, Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network, (Prishtina, 21 December 2005), http://www.birn.eu.com/en/1/50/135/ [accessed 10 
November 2007]. 
homeland…[w]hen I finally saw the so-called mother country, all I saw was a 
nightmare”.130 In the same way, in a televised debate in November 2005, Spahiu who 
stated that “I was raised to think we were one nation…[b]ut when I went to Albania 
they told me I was a Kosovar”, argued for creating unique national symbols to avoid 
“ridiculous situations, especially in international meetings and affairs where both 
Kosovo and Albania are represented”.131  The initiatives of the intellectuals to 
discuss and develop an inclusive territorial identity and symbols that may be 
acceptable to all people in Kosovo did not find support from the Kosovo Albanian 
political leadership and Albanian community. The leader of the Democratic Party of 
Kosovo (PDK) and former political leader of the guerrilla army (KLA), for example, 
immediately reacted to these debates by saying that “A Kosovo identity does not 
exist”.132 The waving of the Albanian flag and the erection of a number of 
monuments commemorating the KLA guerrillas throughout the territory of Kosovo 
reflect the rising exclusive character of the collective identity that has gained strength 
among the Albanians in the post-1999 period. 
 
 
Picture 6.8. The Albanian flag flying over the monument of a KLA martyr in Prishtina / Priština 
(Photo taken by the author on 6 September 2006). 
                                                 
130 Quoted in Dan Bilefsky, “A Difficult Question for Kosovars: Who Are We?”, International Herald 
Tribune, (9 December 2007). 
131 “Kosovo Television Debate: The Kosovar Identity”, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 
(Prishtina, 9 November 2005), http://www.birn.eu.com/en/1/50/131 [accessed 18 January 2007]. 
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http://csees.net/?page=country_analyses&country_id=8&ca_id=2081 [accessed 21 January 2007]. 
In this respect, it is important to note that the KLA guerrillas are not the only 
‘heroes’ that been commemorated through a set of cultural and political symbols in 
the post-1999 period. The US, which initiated NATO’s military intervention to 
protect the Albanians from systematic human rights violations, has also been 
recognised with the naming of the main street after President Clinton and the erection 
of a replica of the Statue of Liberty on the rooftop of the Hotel Victory in Prishtina / 
Priština.   
 
 
Picture 6.9. Bill Clinton Boulevard in 
Prishtina / Priština (Photo taken by the author 
on 5 September 2006). 
 
 
Picture 6.10. Replica of the Statue of Liberty in 
Prishtina / Priština (Photo taken by the author on 5 
September 2006) 
 
Debates on the definition of the Kosovar identity have so far been confined to 
a small group of elites, failing to generate public support either among the Albanians 
or the Serbs, despite the fact that both Serbs and Albanians need to redefine their 
identity on the basis of new bonds and myths other than ethnicity with a view to 
safeguarding the prospect of a more peaceful and secure Kosovo. Instead, they 
continue to hold on to their exclusive group identities shaped by reference to the 
suffering and grievances of their ethnic group at the hands of the ‘other’ in the past 
and present. Given the persistence of parallel schools with separate curricula, it 
looks, at least in the near future, to be a ‘too ambitious’ project to develop a civic 
‘Kosovar’ identity that would bring the people of Kosovo around a shared territorial 
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identity. 
In the light of this information, in the next section, the ingredients of Serb and 
Albanian ethnic identities and their disintegrative and integrative aspects will be 
discussed. 
 
6.3.3.1. History 
As noted earlier, history is an important source of national identity for the 
Serbs and Albanians as well as other communities in the province and throughout 
south-eastern Europe. Both Serbs and Albanians construct their national identity in 
terms of their actual or perceived suffering in the past. Therefore, it would be fair to 
argue that, tied to competing narratives of myths, memories of victimisation and 
national discourses, history has rather disintegrative elements than integrative ones 
for the two communities.  
Viewing Kosovo as the ‘cradle’ of their national and cultural identity, both 
sides construct their national identity on the basis of a ‘glorious’ past interrupted by 
foreign invasion and competing claims for continued settlement in the region. For the 
Serbs, Kosovo, dotted by a number of Orthodox churches, monasteries and religious 
sites, is their ‘Jerusalem’.133 For the Albanians, Kosovo, where the League of Prizren 
was established in 1878 to unite and defend the Albanian-populated lands against the 
expansionist territorial claims of their Orthodox Christian neighbours, is the 
birthplace of their national movement.134 Expressing strong emotional, historical and 
cultural attachment to Kosovo, both sides stick to their own narratives of the past 
while treating the ‘other’ side’s story as incomplete or false.  
The question of “who came first” dominates both Serbian and Albanian 
historiography. Both sides argue that they are the ‘natives’ of Kosovo and treat each 
other as ‘late-comers’. Claiming themselves as the direct descendants of ancient 
Illyrians, Albanians argue that they are the original inhabitants of Kosovo and 
consider themselves as the rightful inheritors of the lands where the ancient Illyrians 
used to live.135 Since 1945, proving the continuity of Albanian settlement in modern 
                                                 
133 Vickers, 1998, p. xii. 
134 Ibid. xiii. 
135 Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History, (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p.1; 
 270
                                                                                                                                         
day-Albania and the disputed territory of Kosovo dating back to the sixth century BC 
through establishing the link between the ancient Illyrians and modern Albanians has 
become a policy of Albanian archaeologists.136 For the Albanians, the Serbs started 
to settle in Kosovo in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and Kosovo was essentially 
populated by Christian Albanians in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.137 In order 
to prove their claims for an unbroken settlement in the region, Albanian 
archaeologists also argue that the Dardanians, ancient inhabitants of Kosovo, western 
Macedonia and southern Serbia, were also an Illyrian people.138 
For the Serbs, who, together with other Slavic tribes, arrived in the Balkans in 
the sixth century AD, Albanians were ‘late-comers’, arriving in the Kosovo region 
during the eighth century.139 According to the Serbian theory, before they arrived in 
the region, Kosovo was almost an uninhabited territory. They argue that a few small 
Albanian communities that had lived in Kosovo and Macedonia until the fifth 
century AD retreated to the south into the mountains of the present-day Albania 
following the Slavic invasion in the sixth century.140 To strengthen their argument 
based on history and culture, Serbs stress the absence of a medieval Albanian state 
while glorifying their kingdom established by the Nemanjic dynasty that reached its 
peak during the reign of Tsar Dušan in the first half of the fourteenth century. The 
Serbs argue that the Albanians started to return to Kosovo in the fourteenth century 
following the Ottoman conquest of the region after the Battle of Kosovo, and explain 
the change in the demographic structure in favour of the Albanians in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries as a result of a migration of Islamised Albanians and the 
exodus of a great number of Serbs from the Kosovo region to the Habsburg lands in 
order to avoid reprisals by the Ottomans to punish their collaboration with the 
Austrians and Venetians.141 Viewing religious conversions during Ottoman rule in 
 
Idem, Between Serb and Albanian, p. xiii, 2; Arshi Pipa “The Other Albania: A Balkan Perspective”, 
Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), Studies on Kosovo, (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), 
p. 241; Židas Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination”, Florian Bieber 
and Židas Daskalovski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo, (London: Frank Cass Publisher, 
2003), p. 18, 23. 
136 Vickers, 1995, p.1. 
137 Pipa, 1984, p. 241; Daskalovski, 2003, p. 18. 
138 Vickers, 1998, p. 2; Wilkes, 1992, pp. 26-7; Pipa, 1984, p. 241. 
139 Vickers, 1998, p. 2. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Bojan Aleksov, “Perceptions of Islamisation in the Serbian National Discourse”, Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies, 5:1 (January 2005), p. 122; Zoltán Györe, “Serbian Historiography 
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terms of coercion and deception, Serbs tend to consider Albanians, like other Balkan 
peoples such as Bosniacs, as ‘renegades’ or ‘cowards’.142  
The only integrative element that history may generate to bring the Serbs and 
Albanians together is the myth of permanent struggle against foreign rule, 
specifically Turkish domination,143 although such an approach has the potential to 
alienate the small Turkish community in the province. Only this image of the 
‘Turkish yoke’ and the myth of continuous struggle against Turkish rule can be 
drawn from history to bring the Serbs and Albanians together around a perceived 
shared historical experience of centuries-old victimisation and exploitation.  
 
6.3.3.2. Language and Education 
Language rather than religion forms the basis of ethnic identities in Kosovo. 
Although the Turks, Goranis, Bosniacs, and almost half of the Roma population 
share the same faith with the majority of the Albanians, the identity of each 
community is based on language. The definition of collective ethnic identities on the 
basis of language rather than religion, was one of the things that, as in the words of 
an old Turk from Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, members of the international community 
“failed to understand the differences amongst the Turks, Albanians, Bosniacs and 
Goranis”.144 As noted earlier, members of the Egyptian and Ashkali communities, 
who speak the Albanian language and who are mostly Muslims, distinguish 
themselves from the Roma in terms of language.  
Under the 1974 Constitution, Serbo-Croat, Albanian and Turkish were 
recognised as the three official languages in Kosovo. Under the socialist education 
system in Yugoslavia, learning the language of the other ethnic group was 
compulsory and aimed to foster inter-ethnic tolerance between the Serbs and 
                                                                                                                                          
and the Modern State”, James S. Amelang and Siegfried Beer (eds.), Public Power in Europe Studies 
in Historical Transformations, (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2006), pp. 92-3; Dušan T. Bataković, 
Kosovo-Metohija: The Serbo-Albanian Conflict, (Belgrade, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1998);  Idem, 
The Kosovo Chronicles, (Belgrade: Plato Books 1992); Aleksov, 2005, p. 122; Vickers, 1998, pp. 22-
27. 
142 Aleksov, 2005, p. 51. 
143 Pipa, for example, point to the potential integrative role of foreign rule in burying cultural, 
linguistic and religious differences between the Serbs and Albanians. See, Pipa, 1984, p. 250. 
144 Author’s discussions with members of the Turkish community in Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, 14 
September 2004. 
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Albanians.145 As noted earlier, in response to the abolition of the province’s 
autonomy and the subsequent discriminatory measures and restrictions on education 
taken by the Milošević regime in the early 1990s, the Albanian community 
established their own ‘parallel’ education facilities. In these schools, the teaching of 
Serbo-Croat and Yugoslav history, society, literature and geography were removed 
from the curricula in order to “de-ideologise” the Albanians.146 Therefore, a majority 
of the Albanian youth educated in separated Albanian schools in the 1990s do not 
speak the Serbian language.  
The issue of education in Kosovo both in the pre- and post-NATO 
intervention period is entangled with politics. As mentioned earlier, the separation of 
education and adoption of a new nationalist curriculum by the Albanians in the early-
1990s gave momentum to the Albanian national political movement, reinforced unity 
among the Albanians and increased their confidence in their capacity to resist 
Serbian rule. The same thing can be said for the Serbian curriculum’s impact on the 
rise of Serbian nationalism amongst the youth. Furthering the already existing inter-
communal divide, the separated education systems based exclusive nationalist 
curricula, served to further the already-existing inter-communal divide. 
In the post-NATO intervention period, parallel schools, characteristic of the 
previous period, were re-established, this time by the Serbs. Although UNMIK 
continuously promoted the notion of multi-ethnicity in education and of a unified 
education system and sought to develop a single curriculum to implement in all 
schools, it failed to enforce its policy of a unified education system and to achieve 
the inclusion of the Albanian and Serb educators in the reconstruction of the 
education sector in the immediate post-conflict period.147 Coupled with the NATO-
led security forces’ incapacity to stop intimidation and harassment against Serb 
children and teenagers, this situation encouraged the Kosovo Serbs to establish and 
run their own parallel schools directly funded by Belgrade. As of September 1999, 
 
145 Kostovicova, 2002, p. 167. 
146 Ibid., 167-169.  
147 Information received from discussions with several Albanian school teachers in Prishtina / Priština 
and Prizren, September 2006. The teachers, who wanted to remain anonymous, expressed their 
frustration and disappointment with the international community’s approach in reforming the 
education system in Kosovo in the post-conflict period. One of them said that “although in the 
beginning there was some cooperation between the internationals and us [local educators], they 
behaved with arrogance, avoided consulting us and pursued their own agenda of reform to transform 
the education sector in Kosovo”.   
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although more than 400 schools were re-opened by UNMIK for over 400,000 
children, only two were ethnically mixed, and minority students and staff, mostly 
Serbs, were reported to have been denied access to some educational facilities.148 
The education system in Kosovo, which was officially administered and 
structured by UNMIK until the creation of the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology (MEST), and the consequent handover of responsibility and authority in 
the field of education to the Albanian-dominated Ministry in March 2002,149 is 
organised into three levels: preschool education (including kindergarten and pre-
primary class), primary education and secondary education.150 Restructuring the 
education sector has been one of the priorities of the international community and 
Kosovo’s provisional self-government institutions, although the percentage of public 
spending on education declined over the years. The principles of multi-ethnicity in 
education and a unified educational system based on a comprehensive reform 
programme with a new ‘national curriculum’ have been promoted to transform the 
education sector in accordance with ‘European Standards’. However, the education 
sector in Kosovo based on different systems and curricula still remains separated, 
posing a major impediment to promoting the notion of multi-culturalism and 
facilitating inter-communal communication in the province.  
Share of education from total government budget  Government budget  
(‘000 Euro) 
Amount (‘000 Euro) Percentage 
2000 285,600 56,681 20% 
2001 288,200 60,300 21% 
2002 374,100 74,200 20% 
2003 516,859 80,465 16% 
2004 619,000 92,620 15% 
2005 736,800 89,300 12% 
2006 700,000 106,290 15% 
Table 6.6. Government expenditure in education in Kosovo between 2000 and 2006 (Data compiled 
from Kosovo General Budget 2002, Ministry of Finance and Economics, The Kosovo General 
Government 2003 Budget, Idem, Government of Kosovo – Budget 2004, Idem, Budget 2005, Idem, 
Kosovo General Budget 2006, available at http://www.mfe-ks.org/English/index.html [accessed 5 
May 2007]) 
 
                                                 
148  United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/1999/987, (16 September 1999), para. 21. 
149 Although UNMIK handed over responsibility and control in a number of areas in education, it 
retained responsibility on Serb-related issues in education including the language of instruction and 
curriculum development due to its implications for the protection of the rights of minority 
communities in the province.  
150 Statistical Office of Kosovo, Statistics on Education in Kosovo 2004 / 2005, Series 5: Social 
Statistics, (March 2007), p. 5. 
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Albanian, Turkish and Bosniac students follow the 9-year compulsory 
national curriculum of Kosovo in their mother tongue.151 Following the Serbian 
system of 8-year compulsory curriculum in their segregated schools, Kosovo Serb 
students use textbooks and are educated by teachers’ whose salaries are paid by the 
Serbian government.152 Members of the Gorani community, who speak an ancient 
version of the Serbian language, and of the small Croat-speaking community, who 
are Roman Catholics, follow the Serbian curriculum. Roma, who are both Muslims 
and Orthodox Christians, learn their own language at home and attend Serbian 
schools. Egyptians and Ashkalis, who also learn their languages at home, depending 
on where they live, join the 9-year or 8-year systems, needing to learn either in 
Albanian or Serbian.153 
The new Kosovo curriculum framework which standardised teaching topics 
and learning objectives and results with a view to reflecting the pluralistic and 
multicultural characteristic of Kosovo was drafted by UNICEF in 2001. Although it 
has been implemented in schools attended by Albanian, Turkish and Bosniac 
students, the new curriculum framework has not been officially adopted by MEST 
yet.154 The implementation of a comprehensive reform programme aiming to 
transform the education system in Kosovo, suggested in the curriculum framework, 
has been delayed primarily due to unprepared teachers, and a lack of funds and of 
objectivity in subject selection.155 
Kosovo has the highest ratio of young population in Europe, with 61% 
between 15 and 65 years old and 33% under the age of 14 years old.156 As of the 
school year 2004/2005, a total of 444, 847 pupils and students were enrolled in pre-
school, primary and secondary education.  
 
 
 
 
151 Jagdish Gundara and Jack Peffers, “Quality Education for All in Kosovo”, UNICEF, (2005), p. 10 
http://www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/UnicefQualityEducationforAllinKosovofinal.pdf 
[accessed 21 March 2007]. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 UNDP, 2006c, p. 43. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Statistical Office of Kosovo, General Statistics: Kosovo in Figures in 2006, (December 2006), p. 
11.  
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Levels Albanian Bosniac Turkish Gorani Roma Ashkali Egyptian Croat Other Total Serb 
Kindergarten 7002 19 16 2 2 29 0 2 4 7076 - 
Pre-primary 17159 186 105 50 25 38 30 0 3 17596 2318 
Primary 315699 4363 2365 642 1008 2231 859 38 2 327207 14368 
Secondary 68500 666 465 19 33 68 8 0 1 69760 6492 
Total 408360 5234 2951 713 1068 2366 897 40 10 421639 23178 
 
Table 6.7. Number of students enrolled in pre-school, primary, secondary education levels – 
2004/2005 school year (Source: Jagdish Gundara and Jack Peffers, “Quality Education for All in 
Kosovo”, UNICEF, (2005), p. 12.). 
 
 
Attending separate schools and following separate curricula and textbooks, 
Serb, Roma and Gorani students, however, do not have any relationship or 
interaction with Albanian, Bosniac or Turkish students. Inhibiting the prospects of 
establishing social communication and facilitating inter-communal dialogue, this 
situation led to the maintenance of the already-deep inter-ethnic distance as well as 
stereotypes and prejudices amongst the youth. 
 
6.3.3.3. Religion 
As mentioned earlier, except for the Serbs, religion does not play a significant 
role in the construction of communal identities in Kosovo. Neither the Albanians nor 
other Muslim groups in the province base their identity on religion but language and 
culture. Although over 90% of the Kosovo Albanians identify themselves as 
Muslim,157 their faith is not the primary marker of Albanian national identity. 
Instead, they have a “relaxed” approach towards Islam and “little sympathy” for the 
inclusion of religion in politics.158 Islam played no central in political mobilisation 
and Catholic Albanians took an active part in the resistance to Serbian rule as their 
Muslim counterparts.159 
For the Albanians, a large majority of whom converted to Islam in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, religion remained as “a tenuous and fluid” 
phenomenon, as expressed by a popular saying “Ku eshte shpata eshte feja” meaning 
“Where the sword is, there lies religion”.160 As noted earlier, since religion had the 
potential to deepen the already existing socio-cultural and geographical divides 
                                                 
157 Corresponding to about 3% of the population, there are around 60,000 Albanian Catholics in 
Kosovo. International Crisis Group, “Religion in Kosovo”, ICG Balkans Report No. 105, (Pristina / 
Brussels, 31 January 2001), p. 7.  
158 International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 2.     
159 Duijzings, 2000, pp. 159-160. 
160 Vickers, 1998, p. 25. 
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among the Albanians, the nineteenth century ideologues of the Albanian national 
movement of Rilindja tried to bury religious differences. They propagated the 
principle of “the true religion of Albanians is Albanianism”, resulting in Albanian 
nationalism free from religious attachments. This attitude towards religion can be 
said to have led Albanian nationalism to have a more secular form than Serbian 
nationalism, which equates Serbian national identity with Orthodox Christianity and 
Turkish identity with Islam.  
Despite marking the primary dividing line between the Serbs and Albanians, 
due to the fact that the Ottoman administrative and social system of millet was based 
on religious affiliation, religious differences did not produce friction between the 
communities until the nineteenth century.161 Religion started to have a potential for 
conflict between the two communities following the transformation of the millet 
system by the Porte through Ottomanism in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Entailing the introduction of citizenship regardless of religious affiliation, the idea of 
Ottomanism aimed to counter-balance the effects of the rising nationalist aspirations 
on its Christian subjects. It failed to prevent the flourishing of Serbian and Albanian 
nationalisms and disintegration of the Empire. Serving as the primary basis of 
Serbian national identity, religion has become a major line of divide between the 
Serbs and Albanians.   
Suppressed for most of the communist period, religion, even though it 
marked a major divide between the Serbs and Albanians, did not play a central role 
in the rivalry between the two communities. The conflict was rather shaped by social 
and political factors. Despite the destruction of Islamic facilities including libraries 
and archives by the Serb forces during the war in 1998 and 1999 and the desecration 
of Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries by Albanian extremists in the post-
war period, it is hard to say that religious fanaticism was the primary motivation on 
either side. These acts of vandalism were, as the International Crisis Group point out, 
rather motivated by a desire to wipe out the cultural evidence and memory of “the 
other’s presence” in the province.162  
It is important to note that after the NATO-intervention, the two prominent 
religious figures in Kosovo, Bishop Artemije and Father Sava, assumed the 
 
161 Ibid. 
162 Duijzings, 2000; Malcolm, 1998; Vickers, 1998. 
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leadership of Kosovo Serbs who were willing to cooperate with the international 
community. Promoting reconciliation with the Albanians, these two religious leaders 
had considerable credibility among the Serbs,163 which the international community 
could have used to create a dialogue between the two communities. However, failing 
to provide a secure environment for the Serbs and formulate a strategy designed to 
initiate a process of inter-communal reconciliation, the international community 
missed an important opportunity for facilitating an inter-communal dialogue during 
the early stage of UNMIK. Instead, the weakening position of the Serbs in the post-
NATO intervention period caused by continued attacks, harassment and violence, 
which the international community failed to stop, helped to strengthen Belgrade’s 
influence while undermining that of the moderate Orthodox religious leaders. In 
other words, failing to provide a secure environment, thereby, failing to gain the 
confidence of the Kosovo Serbs in the post-conflict period, which changed to the 
benefit of the Albanians due to the withdrawal of the Serbian military and police 
forces and the suspension of Belgrade’s authority over the province, the international 
community missed a historic opportunity for turning the conditions in favour of 
initiating a reconciliation process led by Kosovo’s Serbian Orthodox religious 
leaders with a view to developing social communication between the Serbs and 
Albanians and heal the wounds of the past.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
Since Kosovo was placed under the UN interim administration in mid-1999, 
the creation of a peaceful and stable multi-ethnic society has frequently been 
reiterated by the international community as sine qua non for building sustainable 
peace in the post-conflict period even though its meaning and content remain 
unclear. After eight years of international administration when the territory was 
recognised independence by the international community in early 2007, one thing 
was clear: given the salience of ethnic segregation linked to ‘exclusive’ ethnic 
identities, creating a multi-ethnic society, defined in terms of the recognition of 
diversity and inclusion of all ethnic groups within the political and social processes, 
is an unrealistic goal to achieve at least in the near future. The international 
 
163 International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 12. 
 278
community failed to overcome the insecurities of minority groups, specifically the 
Serbs and Roma, and their confidence in the political process, and generate concrete 
policies towards multi-ethnicity and social cohesion, which involves the interaction 
of ethnic groups rather than their mere existence. This led the notion of creating a 
cohesive, multi-ethnic Kosovo society to being seen an illusion embedded in the 
statements of the members of the international community. 
The uncertainty over the issue of status, which has been the primary concern 
of all ethnic groups, has had a negative effect on the prospect of developing a sense 
of cohesive society and inter-communal communication in order to resolve the 
decades-old differences between the Serbs and Albanians. Engaged in a struggle to 
maximise the benefits of their own group, both sides avoided taking concrete positive 
steps to normalise inter-ethnic relations, which had inherited a legacy of mutual 
distrust and segregation from the previous period. Both Serbs and Albanians, which 
tended to blame each other for the poor progress in inter-ethnic relations, shared the 
responsibility for the maintenance of ethnic and cultural distance in the post-conflict 
period.   
During the eight years administration of the territory by the UN since 1999, 
Kosovo, along with Cyprus and Northern Ireland, remained one of the few 
ethnically-segregated societies in the whole of Europe. Having invested enormously 
in the political, institutional and economic development of the province, the 
international community failed to implant the notion of multi-ethnicity beyond the 
existence of ethnic groups living in segregation. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the international community, which prioritised the construction and 
strengthening of political institutions on the basis of a “standards before status” 
strategy, failed to create channels of communication at the community level least 
around issues of common concern. Despite its frequent emphasis on multi-ethnicity 
as the fundamental of Kosovo, the international community, in other words, achieved 
little in terms of building the foundations for turning the territory into a stable, 
democratic, multi-ethnic society. This situation raises serious questions on the 
prospect of inter-ethnic relations in the post-UNMIK period, not to mention the 
capacity of its already fragile political institutions.  
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Despite the existence of historical precedents of international territorial 
administrations established by the UN in West Papua New Guinea, Namibia, 
Cambodia and Eastern Slavonia to supervise a process of political transition within 
the context of decolonisation or implementing a peace agreement to end conflict and 
break with the violent past,1 the ambitious nature of the mandate and scope of 
administrative responsibilities and powers assumed in Kosovo and East Timor make 
the UN involvement in these two territories “unique”.2 United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999 after a series of diplomatic 
efforts held to find a solution to the conflict in Kosovo during NATO’s much 
debated unauthorised 78-day aerial bombing campaign against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia,3  authorised the deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
to provide a secure environment and the establishment of a civilian administration 
under the auspices of the UN.  
 
1 Although the UN was proposed and entrusted to administer the cities of Jerusalem and Trieste after 
the end of the Second World War, the two proposed projects were never implemented. 
2 Brahimi Report, 2000. 
3 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Serbia and Montenegro succeeded the 
dissolved Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in April 1992 following the secession of 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The FRY was transformed into a loose 
confederation in February 2003 when the governments of Serbia and Montenegro became parties to 
the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. As per Article 60 of the 
Constitutional Charter, both republics had the right to hold a referendum to secede from the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro three years after the Constitutional Charter entered into force. The 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro formally ceased to exist in June 2006 further to Montenegro’s 
declaration of independence on 3 June after a referendum was held in May. The Constitutional Charter 
of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro can be seen at 
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/const_scg.pdf [accessed 30 August 2006]. 
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Resolution 1244, which was written with careful diplomatic language to 
avoid the possibility of Russian and Chinese vetoes, was an attempt to “balance 
between the Scylla of Kosovo’s independence with Yugoslavia’s [now Serbia’s] 
sovereignty”.4 It created a sui generis administrative structure in Kosovo. Although 
the preamble re-affirmed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, the 
question of its possession was deferred for an indefinite period of time. The province 
was put under an international administration, known as the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was tasked with promoting 
substantial autonomy and democratic self-government and providing conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for the people of Kosovo. UNMIK’s mandate included 
filling the governmental and administrative vacuum caused by the withdrawal of 
Serbian authorities, overseeing the establishment of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions pending a political settlement of the future status of the 
province, and transferring administrative responsibilities once these provisional local 
institutions were developed. In a final stage, UNMIK would manage the transfer of 
authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to new institutions to be established 
under a political settlement.  
Resolution 1244, however, did not provide a clear political endpoint for the 
international administration. Unlike in East Timor where an international transitional 
administration with absolute powers was established to govern the territory until 
independence, in Kosovo the UN assumed sovereign powers for an unspecified 
period of time. Two explanations can be suggested to justify the decision of the 
international community to ‘freeze’ the Kosovo conflict by putting the province 
under an interim administration while postponing its final political status: (1) 
potential implications of an ‘early’ resolution of the question of the political status 
for regional peace and stability in the Balkans; and (2) absence of a consensus among 
the members of the international community on the future status of the province.  
Regarding the decision on finding a permanent solution to the issue of 
Kosovo’s final political status, Resolution 1244 mandated UNMIK to facilitate a 
political process that would determine the province’s status. Neither Resolution 1244 
nor the subsequent Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
 
4 Alexandros Yannis, “The UN as Government in Kosovo”, Global Governance, 10:1 (January-March 
2004), p. 68. 
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Administration in Kosovo, however, specified the terms of UNMIK’s engagement in 
resolving the question of ultimate status. The international community’s preference 
was rather focusing on constructing democratic institutions, developing the local 
capacity required to run these institutions, and promoting economic development of 
Kosovo before addressing the question of its political status. The prevalence of 
political uncertainty, caused by the lack of clarity over Kosovo’s status, not only had 
a negative impact on the development of political institutions, but also served for the 
purpose of Albanian and Serbian extremists when stirring local discontent. It also 
kept foreign investors away from the province, hindering economic development and 
new employment opportunities. It was not until the outbreak of large-scale violence 
in March 2004 that the UN reviewed its policies and took a more concrete step to 
address the issue of status.   
In the light of this information, this chapter, in accordance with the 
framework developed in Chapter 3, discusses the process of state-building in Kosovo 
in the post-armed conflict period: security-building, institution-building and 
capacity-building in the post-military intervention period. The chapter is divided into 
two parts. The first part reviews the historical background of the conflict. The second 
part discusses the aspects of the externally-led state-building process in Kosovo 
between June 1999 and February 2007 when the province was offered conditional 
independence supervised by the international community. 
 
 
7.2. Historical Background of the Kosovo Conflict 
 
Although the Kosovo conflict came on the international agenda in the late 
1990s with the increasing Serbian assaults on the ethnic Albanian civilian population 
and gross human rights abuses following the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or 
UÇK in Albanian) attacks on the security forces of Serbia, the origins of the conflict 
date back much earlier. This is not to suggest that the Kosovo conflict, in which 
ethnicity played a significant role in political mobilisation, evolved around ‘ancient’ 
ethnic animosities5 but to clarify the political and social processes that eventually led 
 
5 Although it is not a scholarly but a journalistic argument frequently cited in the Western media, the 
so-called ‘ancient hatred’ argument is based on the view that violence caused by ever-existing inter-
ethnic hostilities is inherent within the Balkan region. See for example, Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan 
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to the outbreak of violence in the 1990s, and point to the dangers of the ethnicisation 
of politics through the use of mutually exclusive historical narratives and myths.  
The end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans resulted in the creation of an 
independent Albanian state, and the incorporation of a predominantly Albanian-
populated province of Kosovo into Serbia in 1913. Since that time, Kosovo has been 
exposed to the conflicting sovereignty claims of both Serbs and Albanians. The 
Kosovo Albanians, who were left outside the borders of the newly created Albanian 
state, never felt themselves a natural part of the first and second Yugoslavia.6 As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the Serbs consequently failed to develop a functioning modus 
vivendi with the Albanians, always fearing the latter harboured a wish to secede and 
incorporate the province into a greater Albania.  
As noted in Chapter 6, after the Second World War Kosovo was recognised 
as part of the socialist Yugoslavia proclaimed by Marshall Tito.It was declared an 
“autonomous region” of Serbia under the name of the “Autonomous Region of 
Kosovo-Metohija”.7 Vojvodina, populated by a significant number of ethnic 
Hungarians and other minorities, was declared as an “autonomous province” of 
Serbia. The 1946 Constitution confirmed the federal structure of the Yugoslav state 
with six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina) and two autonomous units (Kosovo and Vojvodina) within Serbia. 
Although the difference between a region (oblast) and a province (pokrajina) was 
not legally defined, the status of Kosovo was lower than was recognised for the 
Hungarians in Vojvodina.8 Vojvodina’s government structure was similar to that of a 
republic while in Kosovo it resembled to local government. It had no independent 
legislature or supreme court as did Vojvodina.9 
The 1974 Constitution granted Kosovo a high degree of autonomy, enhancing 
its status to nearly the equivalent of that of the republics. Kosovo Albanians were 
 
Ghosts: A Journey through History, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993). 
6 The first Yugoslavia refers to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which came into being in 
December 1918 after the First World War ended. The country was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. The 
second Yugoslavia refers to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia proclaimed by Josip Broz 
Tito during the Second World War.  
7 Malcolm, 1998, p. 316; Vickers, 1998, p. 146.  
8 Malcolm, 1998, p. 316; Vickers, 1998, p. 146. 
9 Vickers, 1998, p. 146; Sami Repishti, “The Evolution of Kosova’s Autonomy within the Yugoslav 
Constitutional Framework”, Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), Studies on Kosova, (Boulder: East 
European Monographs, 1984), p. 211.  
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recognised as one of the constituent elements of Yugoslavia and were represented in 
the federal bodies, e.g. the Federal Parliament, the Presidency and the Federal 
Constitutional Court, as equal to the republics. As an autonomous province, Kosovo 
enjoyed the right to have its own constitution, government, school system, police, 
courts and economic institutions.10 In the areas of economic policy, taxation, 
education and culture, the Republic of Serbia was empowered to pass legislation 
valid for the entire republic only with the prior approval of the assembly of the 
province.11 The sovereign rights of the province were also extended outside Kosovo. 
Kosovo’s constitution authorised the province to develop economic relationships 
with foreign states and international organisations.12 In addition to these concessions, 
the amount of funds flowing to Kosovo from the federal budget was increased to 
promote the province’s economic development.  
Although a significant amount of funds from the federal budget13 was 
pumped into Kosovo, no significant improvement was achieved by 1981 due to the 
inability of local authorities to translate the federal funding into sustainable 
development. The failure to achieve success lay, in part, in the strategy of 
complimentarity in Yugoslav regional development planning, i.e. the role of the less 
developed regions as raw-material and semi-manufactured products suppliers,14 and, 
in part, in the inability of the provincial government to use the funds made available 
in the right way.15 Thus, investments in basic industry, i.e. extractive or raw 
 
10 Paul Shoup, “The Government and Constitutional Status of Kosova: Some Brief Remarks”, 
Constitution”, Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), Studies on Kosova, (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1984), p. 234; Carsten Stahn, “Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United 
Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 14:3 
(September 2001), p. 532. See also, Veton Surroi, “Kosova and the Constitutional Solutions”, Thanos 
Verernis and Evangelos Kofos (eds.), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War (Athens: Hellenic 
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998), pp. 145-72. 
11 Shoup, 1984, p. 235. 
12 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), p. 77; Repishti, 1984, pp. 218. 
13 The Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo 
(FADURK) was created in 1963 funded by taxes paid by all the republics to subsidise the economy 
and create new jobs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo. Kosovo received 
the largest share of FADURK funds. Its share which was 30 per cent between 1966 and 1970, 
increased to 33.3% in the period between 1971 and 1975, and to 37% between 1976 and 1980. Ramet, 
1992, pp. 150-157. 
14 Adi Schnytzer, “The Economic Situation in Albania and Kosova: Notes on a Comparison”, Arshi 
Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), Studies on Kosovo, (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), pp. 
173-4.  
15 Ibid., p. 174; Mark A. Cichock, “Reevaluating a Development Strategy: Policy Implications for 
Yugoslavia”, Comparative Politics, 17:2 (January 1985), p. 217. 
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materials industries, to the neglect of the other sectors in the economy, did not 
benefit Kosovo as much as the major recipients of the raw materials, namely the 
other regions of Yugoslavia.16 It is also important to note that rather than being used 
in the financing of investment projects that could have created permanent 
employment opportunities and that could have added more to the province’s 
productive capabilities, investment funds were used in unnecessary capital-intensive 
developmental projects that had high capital-output and capital-labour ratios such as 
the construction of stadiums and luxury conference centres.17 
While the development gap between the more developed and less developed 
parts of Yugoslavia continued to widen, by 1981 Kosovo lagged behind the less 
developed republics – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In 1947, 
the level of development in Yugoslavia as a whole was twice as high as that of 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1980, while the level 
of development for Yugoslavia was four times that of Kosovo, the level of 
development of Macedonia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had grown to two-
and-a-half times Kosovo’s economic and industrial development.18 According to the 
figures given in Table 7.1., in the year 1979, Kosovo was six and half times less 
developed than Slovenia, which was Yugoslavia’s most developed republic. The 
increasing number of university and other higher education institutions graduates 
poured annually into the labour market and could not be absorbed by the economy,19 
aggravating the unemployment problem. Kosovo’s unemployment rate, which rose to 
27.5% in 1981, was three times higher than the Yugoslav average.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Vickers, 1998, p. 184.  
17 Cichock, 1985, p. 217. 
18 Peter Prifti, “Kosova’s Economy: Problems and Prospects”, Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), 
Studies on Kosovo, (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 147. 
19 By the early 1980s, Kosovo had the highest ratio of students in Yugoslavia; one out of every three 
persons in the province was enrolled in some kind of educational programme. Prifti, “Kosova’s 
Economy”, p. 145. 
20 Mertus, 1999, p. 23; Magaš, 1993, p. 19.  
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Social Product Per Capita∗ 
(Amount in Yugoslav Dinars) 
Social Product Per Capita 
(Amount in Percentages) 
 
1969 1979 1969 1979 
Kosovo 3,472 4,648 34 28 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 7,030 10,924 69 65 
Montenegro 7,735 11,586 76 69 
Macedonia 7,014 11,202 69 67 
Serbia proper 9,998 16,625 98 99 
Vojvodina 11,467 19,324 112 115 
Croatia 12,408 21,276 122 127 
Slovenia 19,055 34,050 187 203 
Yugoslavia as a whole 10,210 16,758 100 100 
Table 7.1. Level of economic development in the Republics and Provinces 
(Source: Peter Prifti, “Kosova’s Economy: Problems and Prospects”, Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), Studies 
on Kosovo, (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 131). 
∗ Also known as gross material product, social product includes the value added by the productive sectors before 
deduction of depreciation. It excludes the value of services in the non-productive sectors such as defence, public 
administration, finance, education, health, and housing.  
 
Although the 1974 Constitution provided the Kosovo Albanians with 
extensive autonomous rights, they still felt they were unequally treated. For a 
majority of them, the lack of republic status was a deprivation and form of 
discrimination exercised by the Slavic nations. According to the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution, the main difference between republics and autonomous provinces was 
that the former had the right to secede from federal Yugoslavia. Like the Hungarians 
in Vojvodina, the Albanians were not recognised as the Yugoslav nations (narod) but 
nationalities or national minorities (narodnost) because they had their homeland in 
Albania. Yugoslav nationalities also included the Bulgarians, Czechs, Italians, 
Romanians, Slovaks and Turks. Under the 1974 Constitution, Slovenes, Serbs, 
Macedonians, Croats, Montenegrins and Muslims had the right to exercise a 
republican status. The term ‘Muslim’ referred to Bosnian Muslims, ethnic Slavs who 
converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. Muslim Albanians were not included in this 
group.  
Demographic changes played a critical role in the development of the Kosovo 
conflict. The ratio of the Serbs in Kosovo declined from 23.6% out of a population of 
963,988 in 1961 to 13.2% out of the province’s population of 1,584,441 in 1981 
while that of the Albanians rose to 77%.21 This decline in the Slav population in the 
province was caused by the high birth rate among the Albanians,22 migration of 
                                                 
21 Mertus, 1999, p. 316; Vickers, 1998, p. 195.  
22 In 1979, Kosovo had the highest birth rate in Yugoslavia and indeed in Europe, 26.1 per 1,000 
population, compared to 8.6 for the Yugoslav national average. Prifti, 1984, p. 127.  
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Albanians from Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia to Kosovo, and the 
outgoing migration of the Serbs and Montenegrins motivated by worsening 
economic conditions as well as discrimination and intimidation by the Albanians. 
Statistics for the number of Slav migrants vary. The Serbs claimed that over 100,000 
Serbs and Montenegrins left the province between 1971 and 1981 while the 
Albanians estimated the number for that period was 57-60,000.23 Disappointment 
with the denial of national status, unfavourable economic conditions, a high 
unemployment rate and a widening inter-regional development gap fuelled the 
discontent in Kosovo, and in March 1981 it exploded into riots.  Beginning with 
student protests in the cafeteria at the University of Prishtina / Priština against poor 
living conditions on campus, serious riots spread to Prishtina / Priština and other 
towns in a short span of time. The demand of the rioters was to transform the 
province into the seventh republic of Yugoslavia. However, this was considered by 
Serb authorities as a first step towards secession and the civil disturbance was 
harshly crushed.  
 Number Percentage 
Serbs 8,136,578 36.3 
Muslims 4,428,135 19.7 
Slovenes 2,000,034 8.9 
Albanians 1,753,605 7.8 
Macedonians 1,731,252 7.7 
“Yugoslavs” 1,341,420 6.0 
Montenegrins 1,216,463 5.4 
Hungarians 577,298 2.6 
Roma 426,865 1.9 
Turks 148,604 0.7 
Slovaks 101,328 0.5 
Romanians 80,300 0.4 
Bulgarians 54,721 0.2 
Vlahs 36,642 0.2 
Ruthenes 32,071 0.1 
Czechs 23,320 0.1 
Italians 19,609 0.1 
Ukranians 15,116 0.1 
Undeclared 46,716 0.2 
TOTAL (including other categories not 
listed above) 
22,418,331  
Table 7.2. Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnic Group in 1981 (Source: Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and 
Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 20).  
 
The unrest in Kosovo resulted in an alignment of the traditional centralisers 
in the Yugoslav political arena which included the unitarist wing in the Communist 
                                                 
23 Vickers, 1998, p. 195. Malcolm argues that a total of between 80,000 and 100,000 people migrated 
from Kosovo during that period. See, Malcolm, 1998, p. 330. 
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Party and Serbian nationalists.24 Those who always argued that political 
decentralisation and the increased national rights that had been granted to national 
minorities could weaken Yugoslav unity used the riots in Kosovo as a warning about 
“too much” regional independence.25 The rising nationalist current in Serbia, which 
included the Orthodox Church and intelligentsia, in other words, already gained 
strength before Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power. In January 1986, around two 
hundred Serbian intellectuals including the well-known novelist Dobrica Ćosić, who 
was dismissed from the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists in 
1968 following his condemnation of Tito’s decentralisation policy in Kosovo, 
submitted a petition to the Serb and Yugoslav Assemblies. Written with very 
nationalist language, the petition had charges of “genocide” against the Serbs in the 
province and demanded that “decisive measures…be mobilised to stop the Albanian 
aggression in Kosovo”.26 
In September in the same year, some parts of an unfinished ‘memorandum’ 
drafted by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) were published in the 
Belgrade daily Večernje novosti.27 The Memorandum fanned the story of 
‘victimisation’ of the Serbs within Yugoslavia and argued that the Serbs were denied 
their own state contrary to other nations.28 The existence of the two autonomous 
provinces within Serbia – Vojvodina and Kosovo – was argued to have been 
evidence for “the desire to keep the Serbian people constantly under control”.29 
Depicting the situation of the Serbs in Kosovo as “physical, political, legal and 
cultural genocide”,30 the Memorandum called for the revocation of the province’s 
autonomy. 
It was this political climate that helped Slobodan Milošević rise to power. 
Recently elected as the President of the Communist Party of Serbia, Milošević 
visited Kosovo in April 1987 to hear the charges of persecutions of Serbs, which led 
him to emerge as the long-awaited national hero of the Serbs. In the middle of a 
 
24 Magaš, 1993, p. 37.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Magaš, 1993, p. 52.  
27 Kosta Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts – 
Answers to Criticisms, (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1995), available at 
http://www.rastko.org.yu/istorija/iii/memorandum.pdf [accessed 25 October 2006]. 
28 Ibid., p. 118, 119, 127, 139.  
29 Ibid., p. 125.  
30 Mihailovic and Krestic, 1995, p. 128. 
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struggle between Serbs and the Albanian police in front of the building where he was 
going to make his speech, he told the crowd: “No one shall ever beat you!”. This 
particular sentence would soon “enthrone him as a Tsar”.31 In May 1989, he was 
elected as the President of Serbia. Speaking on 28 June 1989 at the 600th anniversary 
of the Battle of Kosovo, he once again agitated the Serb national sentiments over the 
province by telling an angry crowd that: “Six centuries later, again, we are in battles 
and quarrels. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded”.32 
In early 1989, the Serbian Parliament adopted a series of unilateral 
constitutional amendments allowing the establishment of a more direct control over 
Kosovo’s security, judiciary, social planning, educational policy, finance and the 
choice of official language.33 The Kosovo Parliament ratified these constitutional 
amendments,34 which curtailed the province’s autonomy granted by the 1974 
Constitution. Throughout 1989 and 1990, the Serbian Parliament adopted a number 
of discriminatory measures aiming to change the demography of Kosovo in favour of 
the Serbs. These included family planning programmes for Albanians, restrictions on 
property sales to Albanians, incentives for Serbs to return to Kosovo, encouraging 
Albanians to seek job in other parts of Yugoslavia, closure of the Albanian 
newspapers, and introduction of a new Serb-oriented curriculum in schools. 
Furthermore, tens of thousands of Albanians were dismissed from their positions in 
public administration and the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved by the Serbian regime 
in July 1990.35 
The Kosovo Albanians responded by declaring independence and initiating a 
Gandhian form of non-violent passive resistance, the movement led by Dr. Ibrahim 
Rugova, a moderate-minded professor of Albanian literature, with a view to 
 
31 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, (New Haven, 2000), p. 53.  
32 Quoted in Mertus, 1999, p. 185. The full text of his speech translated into English by the US 
Commerce Department can be found at http://www.tenc.net/milo/milosaid.html [accessed 27 October 
2006].  
33 Mertus, 1999, p. 179; Malcolm, 1998, p. 343. 
34 Surrounded with tanks and armoured vehicles positioned outside the Parliament building during the 
deliberation of the proposed amendments, the Kosovo Parliament had in fact no choice other than 
accepting constitutional changes.  
35 Malcolm, 1998, pp. 343-6; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: 
Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 41-2; Alex J. Bellamy, “Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-1999”, Ken Booth  (ed.), The 
Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, (London, Portland: Frank Cass Publishing, 2001) 
pp.114-6.  
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internationalising the Kosovo question and denying the legitimacy of Serbian rule. 
They established a ‘parallel’ system of government which included schooling, 
healthcare, tax collection, organisation of elections for the unilaterally declared and 
non-recognised “Republic of Kosovo”.36 Rugova’s non-violent resistance strategy, 
however, failed to generate international support. Pre-occupied with the wars in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early-1990s, members of the international 
community paid little attention to Kosovo. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which 
ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, ignored the Kosovo question partly 
due to the absence of an armed conflict in the province and partly due to the 
reluctance of the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb leaders to address the Kosovo issue. The 
disillusionment with Rugova’s non-violent strategy to attract international attention 
during the Dayton peace process led many Albanians to conclude that international 
recognition of independence could only be gained through violence.37 They proved 
to be right. It was only when a full scale war broke out in early 1998 after the KLA 
attacks on the Serbian police and armed forces met a harsh response by the latter 
with attacks against the KLA and civilian Albanians that the Kosovo conflict was 
internationalised. Following the failed negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians 
at Rambouillet in France, NATO launched its ‘humanitarian intervention’ on 24 
March 1999, resulting in the establishment of an international interim administration.  
NATO’s military involvement in Kosovo, known as Operation Allied Force, 
as noted earlier was not based on an explicit UN Security Council Resolution but 
justified in moral and political terms as a necessary action undertaken on the basis of 
the international community’s “responsibility to protect”38 ethnic Albanian civilians 
from a systematic killing and expulsion campaign and preventing instability 
spreading into neighbouring states. Influenced by the lessons of the failure to stop the 
humanitarian tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the genocide in Rwanda in the past, 
the intervening NATO governments tended to emphasise the potential humanitarian, 
 
36 It was recognised only by Albania. 
37 Even the leading moderate intellectual figures such as Adem Demaci, who is known as Kosovo’s 
Nelson Mandela for spending 28 years as a political prisoner, supported armed struggle to attract 
international attention and achieve independence. He announced his support by saying that “I will not 
condemn the tactics of the Kosovo Liberation Army because the path of nonviolence has gotten us 
nowhere. People who live under this kind of repression have the right to resist. The Kosovo Liberation 
Army is fighting for our freedom”. Chris Hedges, “Kosovo Leader Urges Resistance, but to 
Violence”, New York Times, (13 March 1998).     
38 ICISS, 2001. 
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political and geo-strategic consequences of a similar failure to rapidly act to save 
Albanian civilians and punish Slobodan Milošević. The legal justification of the 
intervention was left subject to a broad interpretation of international human rights 
law and relevant articles of the UN Charter in regards to the use of force and 
promotion of human rights as well as of prior UN Security Council Resolutions 
1160, 1199 and 1203, which had classified the deteriorating humanitarian situation in 
Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security. NATO’s breach of the non-
intervention principle was in general terms viewed as an ‘exceptional’ violation of 
international law, necessitated by a humanitarian crisis.39 Some commentators,40 in 
this respect, argued that NATO’s action in Kosovo represented the evolution of a 
new norm in customary international law and the establishment of a new precedent 
for future unauthorised use of military force for humanitarian ends, despite the fact 
that the intervening powers avoided defining the Kosovo intervention in those terms.  
While stressing the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Kosovo to obtain 
international support, President Clinton, for instance, presented political justifications 
to the domestic audience in order to secure popular support and mobilise the 
necessary military and political resources. In his address to the nation on 24 March 
1999, the day NATO launched the air campaign, Clinton outlined Slobodan 
Milošević’s refusal on 18 March 1999 to sign the Rambouillet Accords, which 
contained unacceptable elements for Serbia,41 as the main reason for the NATO 
decision.42 He also underlined the need to demonstrate NATO’s ‘credibility’ as the 
 
39 See for example, Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000; House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 4th Report of the House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, HC 28-I, ISBN 010 2331006, (June 2000); Danish Institute 
of International Affairs, 1999; Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects”, 
European Journal of International Relations, 10:1, (1999), pp. 1-22; Antonio Cassese, “Ex iniuria ius 
oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures 
in the World Community? Comment on Bruno Simma, NATO”, European Journal of International 
Relations, 10(1), 1999, pp. 23-30; Alex. J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002) pp. 105-126; United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Statement on 
NATO Military Action Against Yugoslavia”, UN Press Release, SG/SM/6938, (24 March 1999). 
40 Cassese, 1999; Christopher C. Joyner and Anthony Clark Arend, “Anticipatory Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Emerging Legal Norm?”, Journal of Legal Studies, 10 (1999-2000), pp. 27-59. 
41 Appendix B of the Rambouillet Accords, “Status of the Multi-National Military Implementation 
Force”, called for the stationing of some 28,000 NATO troops throughout the territory of Serbia and 
Montenegro that would be “immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal” 
(Section 6a). For further information, see “The Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace 
and Self-Government in Kosovo”, (23 February 1999).   
42 William J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation”, (24 March 1999), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/address_3-24.html [accessed 5 May 2007]. 
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guarantor of European security threatened by Milošević while pointing to the 
potential danger of lack of a determined action to stop the humanitarian catastrophe 
in Kosovo for provoking a regional war that could potentially involve two NATO 
allies – Greece and Turkey.43 In his efforts to justify Operation Allied Force, British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, who would argue for NATO’s military action as a “moral 
crusade”,44 emphasised NATO’s commitment to defending its “values” in his speech 
before the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999. Having outlined “five major 
considerations”, which included the question of whether or not NATO member states 
had a national interest in undertaking a military action in Kosovo,45 Blair asserted 
that NATO’s commitment to “spread[ing] the values of liberty, human rights, the 
rule of law and an open society” would make Europe a “safer” place.46 Like Clinton, 
in order to obtain domestic popular support for the British government’s involvement 
in Kosovo, he referred to the potential destabilising impact of the Kosovo conflict on 
peace and stability in the Balkan region and the whole of Europe “if Kosovo was left 
to the mercy of Serbian repression”.47 Similar to Clinton and Blair, NATO Secretary-
General Javier Solana emphasised the humanitarian, strategic and political objectives 
of the air campaign rather than offering a legal justification. In a press statement 
issued on the day of the air strikes were launched, Solana reiterated that NATO had 
acted to fulfil its “moral duty” to avert a “humanitarian catastrophe” and restore 
peace and political stability in the region.48   
The intervening powers defended the Kosovo intervention as an ad hoc 
deviation from international law, which forbids the use of military force except in 
self-defence or with Security Council approval, and suggested that it would not be 
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Tony Blair, “A New Moral Crusade”, Newsweek, 133(24), (14 June 1999), p. 35. 
45 The other four considerations included the following questions: “First, are we sure of our case?, 
Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options?, Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the 
situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we 
prepared for the long term?. Idem, “Doctrine of the International Community”, speech at the Chicago 
Economic Club, (24 April 1999), available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp [accessed 
26 June 2007]. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Quoted in Tim Youngs et al, “Kosovo: NATO and Military Action”, House of Commons Research 
Paper, 99/34, (24 March 1999), p. 33 http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-
034.pdf [accessed 5 March 2007]. 
48 Javier Solana, Press Statement, (23 March 1999), available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm [accessed 27 June 2007]. 
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repeated in the future.49 NATO’s intensive air campaign to end the humanitarian 
crisis in Kosovo lasted for 11 weeks and ended following Serbia’s acceptance of the 
Military Technical Agreement on the evening of 9 June 1999.50  The Agreement 
formed the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which called for the 
withdrawal of Serbian military and police forces from the province and authorised 
the deployment of a NATO-led international security force to provide security, law 
and order and the establishment of an interim international administration to build 
democratic self-government institutions. In the following section, the aspects of the 
international community’s engagement in constructing democratic self-government 
institutions in the post-NATO intervention period will be explored. 
 
7.3. The UN-Led State-Building Process in Kosovo in the Post-Conflict Period 
Security Council Resolution 1244, which suspended Serbia’s sovereignty 
over Kosovo, authorised the deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) to 
provide a secure environment (security-building) and the establishment of a civilian 
administration under United Nations auspices (UNMIK) mandated to: 
1. maintain civil law and order and assure the safe and unimpeded 
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in 
Kosovo (security-building); 
2. promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo, including the holding of elections 
(institution-building); 
3. organise and oversee the development of provisional institutions 
for democratic and autonomous self-government (capacity-
building). 
 
 
 
 
49 Catherine Guicherd, “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, Survival, 41:2 (Summer 1999), 
pp. 19-34; Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo”, Human 
Rights Quarterly, 22 (2000), pp. 57-89; Roberts, 1999; Bring, 1999. 
50 “Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia”, (9 June 1999), 
available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm [accessed 17 May 2007]. 
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Resolution 1244 requested the Secretary-General of the UN to appoint a 
special representative, who would manage the implementation of the international 
civil presence and coordinate closely with the NATO-led international security 
presence. Sergio Vieira de-Mello, who would later act as the transitional 
administrator in Kosovo, was appointed as Acting Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) on an interim basis on 11 June 1999 as the head of an 
advanced team deployed to oversee the organisation of the mission. On 2 July, Kofi 
Annan appointed Bernard Kouchner of France as his special representative.51 
Unlike in East Timor, where the UN had to assume most of the required 
responsibilities single-handedly, in Kosovo it shared the burden with regional 
organisations. The military component of the mission, KFOR, was not placed under 
UN command but run by the NATO, directly reporting to Brussels. The civilian 
component, UNMIK, was structured into “four pillars” each led by a different 
organisation and reporting to the SRSG: 
 
1. Civil administration, led by the UN, was tasked with performing public 
administration and civil affairs, providing law-enforcement and developing a 
professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service, and administering judicial 
affairs; 
2. Institution-building, directly by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was mandated to promote democracy and 
good governance and strengthen the capacity of local and central institutions, 
and develop the required mechanisms to strengthen the rule of law and 
respect for human rights;  
3. Humanitarian assistance, led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
was created to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts of various international 
organizations, assure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and 
respond to their immediate needs, and to set up an information management 
system for land mines and conduct mine action liaison with the international 
military presence – KFOR;  
 
51 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/1999/779, (12 July 1999a), para. 3.  
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4. Reconstruction and development led by the European Union (EU), was 
tasked with planning and monitoring the reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
key infrastructure and other economic and social systems, developing a viable 
market-based economy, coordinating international financial assistance, 
assessing the existing legal, financial and fiscal structures and developing 
policies regarding trade and commercial issues, currency and monetary issues 
and the banking system.52 
 
The humanitarian pillar was phased out in June 2000. Following the adoption 
of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo May 
2001, a new pillar “Police and Justice” responsible for law enforcement and justice 
was established under the leadership of the UN. As noted above, those functions 
were initially assumed by the Civil Administration pillar.  
As said earlier, unlike Resolution 1272, which entrusted UNTAET with all 
legislative and executive authority including the administration of justice to 
supervise East Timor’s transition to independence, Resolution 1244, which 
mandated, UNMIK to “provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which 
the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia [now Serbia] and to provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants of Kosovo”, did not provide a clear end-point. Similarly, the Report of 
the Secretary-General dated 12 July 1999, which vested UNMIK with “[a]ll 
legislative and executive powers, including the administration of the judiciary” to be 
exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, did not provide a 
set of guidelines to address the issue of status, which was the root cause of the 
conflict in the province. 
The mandate UNMIK assumed in Kosovo was based on a “wait and see” 
approach, adopted by the international community regarding the issue of future 
status.53 The view that any ‘premature’ attempt to determine the province’s future 
 
52 United Nations, 1999a, paras. 55-109.  
53 Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, “The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in Southeastern Europe”, Journal of 
Democracy, 16:1 (January 2005), pp. 40-53.  
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would have a potential to lead to instability within Kosovo and in the region, 
especially in neighbouring Macedonia, where the Albanians constitute 25% of the 
population, led to the adoption of this approach.54 The absence of a clear political 
end-point and the international community’s incapacity to formulate policy 
instruments to address the issue of status in a timely manner, however, led both the 
Albanians and Serbs to closely scrutinise every action undertaken by UNMIK and 
interpret its policies in two opposed meanings – either move towards an independent 
Kosovo or return to Belgrade’s rule. For example, for the Serbs, UNMIK’s decision 
to use the German mark (later the euro in January 2002) rather than the dinar as the 
currency in the province55 meant an action aimed at formally breaking Kosovo away 
from Belgrade. The adoption of Yugoslav laws in force prior to 24 March 1999, the 
day the NATO aerial bombing campaign was launched, as the applicable law in the 
province56 was seen by the Albanians as a move against independence. 
It was not until the March 2004 riots, which showed that it was no longer 
possible to postpone the issue of Kosovo’s future political status, that the UN 
adopted a more explicit and concrete approach to address the root cause of the 
conflict. However, having diametrically opposed positions regarding the future of the 
province, Belgrade and Phristina / Priština (restoration of Serbia’s rule or partition 
the territory versus full independence) failed to reach an agreement at the end of the 
UN-mediated status talks. The solution that the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Martti Ahtisaari proposed in early 2007, “supervised 
independence”, has not sufficed to end the conflict but led to a deadlock when Russia 
declared its intention to veto the proposed solution before the Security Council.  
In the light of this information, the three components of the post-conflict 
state-building process in Kosovo, security-building, institution-building and 
capacity-building, will be investigated in the following section. 
 
 
 
54 Interview with a senior UNMIK personnel, (Prishtina  / Priština, 5 September 2006). 
55 See, UNMIK/REG/1999/4, (2 September 1999), accessible via 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/index_reg_1999.htm [accessed 5 March 2006]. 
56 See, UNMIK/REG/1999/1, (25 July 1999), accessible via 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/index_reg_1999.htm [accessed 5 March 2006]. 
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7.3.1. Security-Building 
NATO’s 78-day air campaign left Kosovo not only with a damaged 
infrastructure and a crippled economy but also a tense and deeply divided society, 
and no functioning civil administration and law and order institutions. During the 
course of the NATO air campaign between March and June 1999, an estimated total 
of 10,000 people, most of whom were the Albanians, were killed by the Serbian 
forces, and 863,000 Albanians were driven out of Kosovo and an additional 590,000 
were displaced within the province.57 Therefore, the immediate task for the NATO-
led security force (KFOR) and for UNMIK was to prevent a security vacuum with a 
view to ensuring the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and deterring 
retribution of former victims. 
However, UN and NATO failed to prevent the emergence of an 
administrative and security vacuum. Before UNMIK established its presence, the 
KLA-self-proclaimed provisional government formed by Hashim Thaci in the second 
week of the NATO air campaign in April 1999, took over administrative power in 27 
of the 29 municipalities, where Albanians formed the majority.58 The KLA-
established administrative structures operated parallel to UNMIK until the local 
elections in October 2000. Benefiting from the power vacuum, KLA guerrillas 
collected taxes and were involved in ethnically and politically motivated crime and 
violent attacks on Serbs, Roma and other non-Albanians, as well as on moderate 
Albanians.59 During the first months of the mission, an estimated 1,000 Serbs and 
Roma were reported unaccounted for after abductions.60 
Exclusively focusing on the departure of the Serbian police and military 
forces and on consolidating control over the boundaries of Kosovo, the UN and 
NATO failed to prevent widespread revenge attacks on members of non-Albanian 
ethnic minorities and failed to provide a secure domestic environment.61 Although 
more than 770,000 Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo during the first months of 
 
57 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p. 2; United Nations, 1999a, para. 8.  
58 International Crisis Group, “Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo”, ICG Balkan 
Report, No. 79 (Prishtinë / Priština, 18 October 1999), p. i.  
59 OSCE, 1999; International Crisis Group, “What Happened to the KLA?”, ICG Balkan Report No. 
88 (Pristina, Washington, Brussels, 3 March 2000), pp. 14-18; Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: 
War Crimes in Kosovo, (New York, 2001). 
60 Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 454. 
61 Yannis, 2001, p. 37. 
the mission, approximately 150,000 non-Albanians, primarily Serbs and Roma, left 
the province for Serbia or Montenegro to escape from harassment, intimidation and 
attacks.62 
 
Picture 7.1. A scene from the Roma mahalla (quarter) in southern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica destroyed and 
deserted by Kosovo Albanians immediately after the withdrawal of Serbian forces (Photo taken by the 
author on 12 September 2006).  
 
The slow progress in the deployment of KFOR troops and UN civilian police 
officers, lack of coordination between UNMIK and KFOR, failure of the mission 
planners to anticipate revenge attacks and their lack of preparation for responding to 
potential threats to security, and the concern of NATO contingent nations for force 
protection were among the factors that led to this situation. During the first two 
months of the mission, when they were most needed, virtually none of the UN 
civilian police officers arrived in Kosovo and it took a year to deploy three-quarters 
of the authorised strength of 4,800.63 Although some 36,500 KFOR troops were 
                                                 
62 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/1999/987, (16 September 1999b), paras. 9-10. 
See also “Kosovo Crisis Update”, UNHCR Emergency Updates, (2 August 1999), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/3ae6b80f4c.html [accessed 9 October 2006]; Human Rights 
Watch, “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Abuses Against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo”, 
Human Rights Watch Report, 11:10 (August 1999), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kosov2  [accessed 12 October 2006].    
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Timor”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 17:3 (2004), p. 292; Alexandros Yannis, “Kosovo Under 
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that 1,100 civilian police officers were deployed from 25 countries. United Nations, “Report of the 
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deployed in Kosovo by late July 1999,64 in the first two months of their presence, 
few of the contingents were reported to shown “eagerness” to contain the KLA-
spearheaded revenge attacks on non-Albanians and Albanians, branded as 
collaborators of the Milošević regime.65  
 
 June-December 
1999 
January-December 
2000 
January-December 
2001 
January-December 
2002 
Murders 454 246 136 65 
Kidnapping  190 189 153 75 
Arson 1327 523 209 259 
Table 7.3. Crime Statistics for 1999 and 2000 (Source: UNMIK Police Statistics 1999, 2000, 
accessible via http://www.civpol.org/unmik/statistics.htm [accessed 18 November 2006], United 
Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2002/113 (29 January 2003), p. 7). 
 
The inadequate capacity of the UN and NATO to address the security 
problem and establish law and order during the early stage of the mission, in return, 
contributed to the segregation of the Serbs and Roma, who felt insecure and migrated 
to ethnically-homogenous enclaves. The town of Mitrovicë / Mitrovica in northern 
Kosovo was divided by the Ibar River into a Serb-dominated north and Albanian-
dominated south, becoming a symbol of a divided Kosovo. The security vacuum in 
the north was immediately filled by a ‘parallel’ security system formed by a group of 
young Serb extremists who call themselves ‘bridge watchers’.66 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
notes that as of September 1999, only 610 international policemen were stationed in Kosovo and an 
additional 78 were involved in border patrolling duties. 
64 King and Mason, 2006, p. 54. 
65 Hochschild, 2004, p. 290.  
66 Operating on the area surrounding the bridge on the Ibar River since the end of the NATO 
intervention, the bridge watchers act to prevent Kosovo Albanians from entering northern Mitrovicë / 
Mitrovica and collect information on KFOR and UNMIK police as well as on any Kosovo Albanian 
living in the north. They were paid from voluntary donations and out of the budget for the Belgrade-
run hospital in Mitrovicë / Mitrovica. For further information, see OSCE, Parallel Structures in 
Kosovo, (October 2003), pp. 12-15, available at www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/10/698_en.pdf 
[accessed 23 August 2006]. 
 299
7.3.1.1. Demilitarisation  
The NATO-led KFOR’s mandate of establishing a secure environment for the 
people of Kosovo and international civil presence included the demilitarisation of the 
KLA guerrillas,67 who fought on the ground against the Serbian forces during 
NATO’s 78-day air campaign against the Milošević regime. Due to its contribution 
during the war, the KLA gained considerable political influence and was treated by 
the international community accordingly after the war. The treatment of the KLA by 
NATO members of the KFOR force as “comrades in combat”, however, would lead 
to a limited disarmament process.68  
Due to its role during the war, NATO recognised the KLA-led ‘provisional 
government’, formed by Hashim Thaci during the NATO air campaign, as the 
legitimate political authority immediately after the war ended on 10 June 1999.69 As 
noted earlier, the Thaci government had already established local control in 27 
municipalities before UNMIK arrived. On 21 June 1999, Hashim Thaci and 
Lieutenant General Michael Jackson, the commander of KFOR, signed an 
“Undertaking on Demilitarisation and Transformation” under which the KLA would 
cease to exist as an armed organisation and be transformed into a civil emergency 
force. The agreement stipulated that KLA guerrillas would hand in their weapons and 
ammunition within 90 days.70 
The disarmament of KLA guerrillas was not carried out by the NATO-led 
KFOR force but left to the responsibility of KLA commanders. Indeed, disarmament 
of the KLA was not seen as a priority during the first year of the international 
mission.71 At the end of the demilitarisation stage, the KLA handed 10,000 weapons 
over to KFOR.72 After the completion of the demilitarisation, a large number of 
                                                 
67 UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), para. 9b.  
68 Hochschild, 2004, p. 297.  
69 Andreas Heinemann-Gruder and Wolf-Christian Paes, “Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and 
Demobilisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army”, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Brief 20 
(Bonn 2001), p. 17. 
70 “Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK” is available at 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/documents/uck.htm [accessed 10 November 2006]. 
71 Heinemann-Gruder and Paes, 2001, p. 19. 
72 These weapons included approximately 9,000 small arms, over 800 machine guns, 300 anti tank 
weapons and 178 mortars. Over 27,000 hand-grenades, 1,200 mines and over 1,000 kg of explosives 
were also handed in along with nearly 5-1/2 million rounds of assorted ammunition. See KFOR Press 
Statement, by Major Roland Lavoie, KFOR Spokesperson, (20 September 1999), 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/1999/k990920a.htm [accessed 12 November 2006]; United Nations, 
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hidden arms and ammunition were found and confiscated by KFOR. In June 2000, 
for example, KFOR troops seized 60 tons of arms and ammunition, which was 
sufficient “to fully outfit two heavy-infantry companies, eliminate the entire 
population of Pristina [Prishtina / Priština] and destroy 900-1,000 tanks”.73 Although 
it remains unclear how many weapon caches the KLA still had, it is believed that the 
bulk of the KLA arsenal was stored in Albania.74  
KFOR and UNMIK civilian police continued to search for weapons and were 
confiscating 10-15 weapons each week from members of all ethnic communities 
throughout Kosovo during that period.75 Between August and October 2001, 
UNMIK police and KFOR troops detained 1,000 individuals for possessing 
unauthorised weapons and seized 1,100 rifles and pistols, 1,700 grenades, 
approximately 1,100 anti-tank weapons and about 170,000 rounds of ammunition 
throughout the province.76 
The disarmament of the KLA was formally completed on 20 September 
2000. As will be discussed in the following section, it was followed by the 
establishment of a multi-ethnic civilian Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC or TMK in 
Albanian) to facilitate the reintegration of former KLA fighters into civilian life in 
the post-armed conflict period.  
 
 
“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo”, 
Security Council Document, S/2000/177, (3 March 2000), para. 26.  
73 Heinemann-Gruder and Paes, 2001, p. 20, citing Tim Ripley, “The UCK’s Arsenal”, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, (November 2000), p. 22. 
74 Heinemann-Gruder and Paes, 2001, pp. 20-1. 
75 United Nations, 2000, para. 26. 
76 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2001/926, (2 October 2001d), para. 8. 
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7.3.1.2. Transformation of the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) 
Modelled on the Security Civil of France, the KPC would consist of 5,000 
members, of whom 3,000 would be active forces and 2,000 reservists, to be largely 
recruited from the demilitarised KLA leadership and ranks.77 At least 10% of both 
active and reserve members would be filled from minority communities.78 The KPC 
operating under the authority of the SRSG would be provided day-to-day supervision 
by KFOR. Having no role in law enforcement or the maintenance of law and order, 
the KPC was charged with providing disaster response services and humanitarian 
assistance, carrying out search and rescue, assisting in demining and helping to 
rebuild infrastructure.79 Only 200 KPC members were authorised to carry weapons 
for guarding installations and for security when units are deployed.  
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was assigned to register 
KLA members and initiate information and training programmes for civilian 
employment. IOM registered 25,723 ex-combatants during the registration period 
between July and November 1999.80 More than 20,000 applications, including from 
more than 100 Bosniacs and 730 women, were received for employment with the 
KPC. No Serbs applied for a position in the KPC.81 Following the appointment of 46 
KPC leaders, the KPC was officially constituted on 21 July 2000. As of 25 February, 
the total strength of the KPC stood at 544 persons.82  
The creation of the KPC did not fully satisfy the Albanians, particularly ex-
KLA members, who were in favour of an army rather than a ‘civil emergency 
agency’. The Serbs, who were not content with the insertion of former KLA 
combatants into the KPC, were doubtful about its professionalism and neutrality.83 
                                                 
77 See UNMIK/REG/1999/8, (20 September 1999), available 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_08.pdf [accessed November 2006]; 
“Statement of Principles on the Kosovo Protection Corps”, (1999), 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kpc/stmt_principles.htm [accessed 14 November 2006]. 
78 UNMIK/REG/1999/8, (20 September 1999), Section 2.2. 
79 Ibid., Section 1. 
80 This number was higher than expected, raising doubts as to whether all the registered persons were 
in fact KLA combatants or the number was inflated by non-combatants looking for assistance. For a 
brief review of the registration period and reintegration efforts, see International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), “Kosovo Reintegration Efforts Are Bearing Fruits”, IOM Release, (16 March 
2000). 
81 UNMIK, “Kosovo Protection Corps”, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/1styear/kpcorps.htm 
[accessed 5 June 2006]. 
82 United Nations, 2000a, para. 28.  
83 Edward Rees, “Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: ‘Improvisation and 
Approximately 70% of the 3,052 active KPC personnel were selected from former 
KLA guerrillas.84 As noted earlier, the UNMIK Regulation on the establishment of 
the KPC stipulated that 10% of the KPC would be recruited from members of non-
Albanian ethnic groups. However, minority representation remained a major 
problem. As of May 2005, only 48 Serbs (of a total of some 3,000 officers, 
corresponding to 5.3%) participated in the KPC as active members.85   
 
 
Figure 7.1. KLA logo  Figure 7.2. KPC logo 
 
Although the KPC was not intended by KFOR and UNMIK to be a successor 
organisation to the KLA, its red and black logo is almost identical to the KLA 
emblem, and the corps, from the beginning, saw themselves as the members of the 
future army. The creation of the mostly unarmed KPC was in fact a compromise 
offered by UNMIK and KFOR with a view to achieving their mandate to demilitarise 
the KLA and convince KLA leaders to abandon their insistence on keeping some 
form of standing military force.86 Although UNMIK and KFOR tended to consider 
the KPC as a civilian emergency force and treated it accordingly, they never 
explicitly stated that the KPC, which has developed as a de facto “military-style 
organisation”,87 would not become a national army in the future. For a majority of 
the Albanians, KPC has been an “army in waiting”.88 In fact, the title of the KPC in 
Albanian, Trupat Mbrojtëse të Kosovës (TMK), can be translated as “Kosovo 
Defence Force”89 because the word “mbrojtje” can mean both “protection” and 
                                                                                                                                          
Confusion’ from the Field”, Peacekeeping Best Practices, (March 2006), p. 20. 
84 International Crisis Group, “An Army for Kosovo?”, Europe Report No. 174, (28 July 2006), p. 3. 
85 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2005/335, (23 May 2005a), para. 84. 
86 International Crisis Group, 2000, p. 1.  
87 Ibid., p. 6. 
88 Idem, 2006b, pp. 12-3; Rees, 2006, p. 17. 
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“defence”.90  For the Serbs, who feared and despised the KPC,91 its creation was a 
move towards an Albanian-dominated independent Kosovo.  
Minority ethnic groups, from the beginning, were concerned with the 
organisation and composition of the KPC. The alleged involvement of some 
members of KPC in illegal law enforcement and their participation in political rallies 
and incidents of ethnic intolerance remained a major issue of concern for the 
minority communities.92 According to classified NATO reports, some KPC members 
were alleged to have attacked Serbs and been involved in illegal trade in sex workers, 
cigarettes, fuel and weapons.93 Several KPC members were arrested by UNMIK 
police and NATO troops in 2000 and 2001. In February 2000, two KPC members 
were arrested by UNMIK police in connection with the killing of an ethnic Gorani.94 
Two other KPC officers were arrested by KFOR in March 2001 in connection with 
the bombing of a bus carrying Kosovo Serbs in February, which led to the death of 
eleven Serbs and forty passengers.95 These arrests caused suspicion in the 
international community about the KPC and negatively affected the relations 
between the KPC and KFOR. The KPC received less financial assistance from the 
international community and its size contracted. Its budged was kept to roughly €15 
million, and full-time salaries and the employment of the 2,000 designated reserves 
among its 5,000 members ceased in 2003.96 
 
 
 
 
 
90 International Crisis Group, 2000, p. 6.  
91 Idem, 2006b, p. 12. 
92 United Nations, 2000a, para. 32. 
93 King and Mason, 2006, p. 59; See also United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General”, (3 
March 2000), para. 62. 
94 John Sweeney and Jens Holsoe, “Kosovo ‘Disaster Response Service’ Stands Accused of Murder 
and Torture”, The Observer, (12 March 2000). 
95 Christian Jennings, “SAS Troops Seize Kosovo Bomb Suspects”, The Daily Telegraph, (28 March 
2001). One of the suspects held at the US-run detention facility later escaped in May 2001. See 
UNMIK- KFOR - UNMIK Police - UNHCR Press Briefing, (14 May 2001), 
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/trans/tr140501a.html [accessed 26 November 2006]; 
“Kosovo Bus Bombing Suspect Escapes”, Los Angeles Times, (15 May 2001). 
96 International Crisis Group, 2006b, p. 2. 
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7.3.1.3. Kosovo Police Service (KPS) 
Establishing a professional, multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which 
was initially planned to have 5,000 members and later increased to 7,000, was one of 
the mandates assumed by the international administration in Kosovo to ensure the 
rule of law. To this end, on 7 September 1999 a police school was established by 
OSCE, responsible for institution-building, in Vushtrri / Vučitrn in north central 
Kosovo, where the first group of 200 cadets, selected from more than 19,500 
applicants,97 were provided with a nine-week basic training course.98 This was 
followed by a 19-week field training programme administered by UNMIK police.99 
Upon the completion of field training, KPS cadets went through a six-week career 
rotation and one-week of proficiency examinations. The selection procedures were 
based on four criteria: minimum requirements, preferred qualifications, 
comprehensive written and oral examinations and psychological and physical fitness 
requirements.100 
Regarding the ethnic composition of the police service, it was agreed that 
15% of KPS cadets were chosen from minority communities. There were 8 Serbs and 
11 other minorities in the first class, 28 Serbs and 14 other minorities in the second 
class, and 18 Serbs and 5 minorities in the third class which began school training in 
February 2000.101 As of September 2000, a total of 1,692 local police officers 
representing all of Kosovo’s ethnic groups graduated from the KPS school and were 
deployed with UNMIK police field-training officers throughout the province.102  
As table 8.4. shows, contrary to the KPC, which has not been ‘owned’ by 
minority groups but seen as a ‘successor’ to the Albanian guerrilla force of the KLA, 
the Kosovo Police Service has so far seemed to be a functioning multi-ethnic 
institution in the province, despite the fact that approximately 25% of KPS officers 
are former KLA fighters. Often cited as the only functioning multi-ethnic public 
institution in Kosovo, the KPS is widely regarded as a success story for UNMIK.103 
                                                 
97 United Nations, 1999b, para. 30 
98 Idem, 2000a, para. 43. 
99 Ibid.  
100 United Nations, 2000a, para. 44. 
101 Ibid., para. 45. 
102 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2000/878, (18 September 2000b), para. 30. 
103 Heinemann-Gruder and Paes, 2001, p. 28; Soren Jessen-Petersen, “Challenges of Peacebuilding: 
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Ethnicity Female Male Total % Total 
Albanian 742 4017 4759 84.54% 
Ashkalia 0 18 18 0.32% 
Bosniac 31 158 189 3.36% 
Cerkezi 0 4 4 0.07% 
Croat 0 2 2 0.04% 
Egyptian 1 5 6 0.11% 
Gorani 0 23 23 0.41% 
Macedonian 1 0 1 0.02% 
Montenegrin 1 1 2 0.04% 
Roma 1 17 18 0.32% 
Serbian 60 470 530 9.42% 
Turkish 8 67 75 1.33% 
Others 0 2 2 0.04% 
TOTAL 845 4784 5629 100% 
Table 7.4. Ethnic and gender composition of the Kosovo Police Force as of 19 December 2003 
(Source: UNMIK Police and Justice Pillar website, http://www.unmikonline.org/justice/police.htm 
[accessed on 22 November 2006]. 
 
By mid-2005, 6,953 police officers, of whom 84% were Albanians, 10% were 
Serbs and 6% belonging to other minority groups, were trained at the KPS school.104 
The KPS, which has reached 7,400 in strength, is considered capable of doing the 
basic policing well and is seen as the least corrupt police force in the region by 
international observers.105 However, they also note that, suffering from low 
education levels and inexperience, the Albanian-dominated KPS in the post-UNMIK 
period is likely to be challenged in maintaining institutional standards and integrity, 
and encouraging the participation of minorities especially the Serbs.106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
The Example of Kosovo”, S+F Sicherheit und Frieden [Security and Peace], 24:1 (2006), p. 8.  
104 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), “Police Education and 
Development”, Fact Sheet, (15 April 2005), available at 
http://www.osce.org/publications/mik/2005/04/14272_323_en.pdf [accessed 22 November 2006]. 
105 International Crisis Group, “Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition”, Europe Report No. 170, (17 
February 2006a), p. 6. 
106 International Crisis Group, 2006a, p. 6.  
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7.3.2. Institution-Building 
 
 
Established to govern the war-devastated Kosovo for an indefinite period, 
UNMIK was explicitly mandated to oversee the development of democratic self-
governing institutions with a view to building sustainable peace. Until the adoption 
of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (“the 
Constitutional Framework” hereinafter) on 15 May 2001, which transferred some 
authority to the newly-created provisional self-government institutions, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) held all power in Kosovo. Like in 
East Timor, the international community’s initial approach to establishing 
democratic institutions and promoting ‘substantial autonomy’ in Kosovo was shaped 
by consolidating its authority and creating a consultative forum. The Kosovo 
Transitional Council (KTC) was established on 16 July 1999 to bring together 
leaders of major political parties, ethnic and religious communities, and 
representatives of civil society. Although it was said to have been established to give 
the people of Kosovo “a direct input into the UNMIK decision-making process”,107 it 
had no real authority and power; power was concentrated in the hands of Bernard 
Kouchner, the first SRSG.  
The KTC was also crippled by the fragmented political and social landscape 
in the province. As noted earlier, before UNMIK established its presence, the KLA-
proclaimed ‘provisional government’, formed by Hashim Thaci, during the NATO 
aerial bombing, held control in 27 municipalities where the Albanians formed the 
majority of the population. Meanwhile, Ibrahim Rugova, who was the leader of the 
passive resistance movement and the first President of the self-declared Republic of 
Kosovo, argued that his party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK), was the legitimate representative of the Albanian 
community in the province. The struggle between these two ‘parallel Albanian 
governments’ hampered UNMIK’s efforts to create a working relationship within the 
KTC.  
With regard to the Serb participation, although some moderate Kosovo Serbs 
participated in its first meeting on 16 July 1999, they withdrew from the KTC 
 
107 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/1999/987, (16 September 1999b), para. 2. 
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following the massacre of 14 Serb farmers on 23 July.108 The Kosovo Serb 
population, who gathered in isolated enclaves in central and southern Kosovo or 
moved to the Serb-dominated northern Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, established their own 
municipal assemblies where they were represented by their moderate leaders or 
Belgrade-oriented hard-liners. 
In order to dissolve all existing Albanian and Serbian parallel structures for 
revenue collection and provision of public service, UNMIK moved towards sharing 
some of its central and municipal administrative responsibilities with local 
representatives. On 12 December 1999, Kouchner issued a regulation, which 
stipulated that the law in force in Kosovo prior to the revoking of autonomy in 1989 
would be the applicable law,109 rather than the Yugoslav law that was in force before 
24 March 1999. His move facilitated the participation of the three big Albanian 
political entities led by Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Thaçi and Rexhep Qosja110 in the 
newly-created Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) to be headed by the 
Office of the SRSG.  
Established on 14 January 2000 to assist in administering Kosovo until the 
establishment of provisional government institutions, the joint administrative 
institutions included the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), a 36-member KTC, 
14 (later increased to 20) administrative departments, municipal councils and 
administrative boards at the local administration level.111 
 
108 “14 Serb Farmers Killed in Kosovo, NATO Reports”, CNN World, (23 July 1999).  
109 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2000/878, (18 September 2000b), para. 2 
110 These three Albanian figures were the signatories to the Rambouillet Accords, proposed by the 
international community to end the armed conflict in Kosovo in March 1999. 
111 UNMIK/REG/2000/1, (14 January 2000), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/re2000_01.htm [accessed 3 December 2006]. 
Figure 7.3. Joint Interim Administrative Structure (Source: UNMIK-EU Department of Reconstruction, Kosovo: 
Reconstruction 2000, (April 2000), available at 
http://www.seerecon.org/kosovo/documents/reconstruction2000/recon2000.pdf [accessed 28 November 2006]. 
 
 308
Headed by the SRSG, the IAC was envisioned as a preliminary executive 
body, consisting of eight members to be appointed by the SRSG. Its membership 
included three Albanian leaders, Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Thaçi and Rexhep Qosja, 
one Serb representative, as well as the heads of the three UNMIK pillars (Civil 
Administration led by the UN, Economic Reconstruction directed by the EU and 
Democratisation and Institution-Building led by the OSCE) and one observer 
representing Kosovo’s civil society. The IAC was tasked with making 
recommendations to the SRSG for amendments to the applicable law and for framing 
new regulations and proposing policy guidelines for administrative departments in 
applying the law. The KTC whose membership was enlarged to better mirror the 
ethnic composition of Kosovo’s population was defined as the highest consultative 
body of JIAS. Administrative departments tasked with undertaking provisional 
administrative duties to implement the policy guidelines formulated by the IAC were 
also created within JIAS. These departments would jointly be headed by a Kosovo 
and UNMIK Co-Head of Department. The said regulation stipulated that all other 
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parallel structures of an executive, legislative or judicial nature would be dissolved 
by 31 January 2000 when the JIAS would be operational.  
Although the creation of the above-mentioned bodies increased the level of 
involvement of local actors in the process of Kosovo’s governance, the SRSG held 
the ultimate executive and legislative authority while other members of the 
international civilian administration and security presence enjoyed legal immunity. 
Cases involving KFOR personnel and disputes between UNMIK and its staff, for 
example, were excluded from investigations by the Ombudsperson’s Institution, 
established by the OSCE in late-2000 to address complaints from any person or 
entity in Kosovo regarding human rights violations and actions constituting an abuse 
of authority by UNMIK and the newly emerging public institutions.112 The 
jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson was restricted to providing advice and making 
recommendations.113 In his annual and special reports issued in 2001 and 2002, the 
Ombudsperson repeatedly criticised UNMIK’s practice of holding arrested 
individuals in detention for extended periods of time before being brought before a 
judicial authority and of continuing to hold several individuals under arrest despite a 
release order by a judicial authority.114 In response to these criticisms, UNMIK 
officials argued that after two years the mission was established, Kosovo still ranked 
as an “internationally-recognised emergency” that required “special measures 
that…allow authorities to respond to the findings of intelligence that are not able to 
be presented to the court system”.115 The continued critics and comments of the 
international Ombudsperson Marek Nowicki on the inadequacy of human rights 
protection mechanisms and lack of systems of checks and balances on the 
international civilian and military presence116 were later met with counter actions by 
UNMIK. In fact, according to UNMIK, his criticisms did not take into account some 
“political imperatives” and the Ombudsperson’s Institution “did not behave like team 
 
112 UNMIK/REG/2000/38 (30 June 2000). On the legal status of KFOR and UNMIK personnel and 
their exemption from jurisdiction before courts in Kosovo, see UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (18 August 
2000).  
113 Ibid. 
114 Chesterman, 2005, p. 148. 
115 Ibid., p. 149. 
116 See for example, Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Fourth Annual Report, 2003-2004, (12 July 
2004), pp. 14-18. 
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players”.117 His mandate, which expired in mid-2005, was not extended and he was 
replaced with a Kosovo Albanian jurist, Hilmi Jashari, in January 2006. As per 
UNMIK Regulation 2006/06, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson was restricted to 
receiving and investigating complaints concerning human rights violations and acts 
of abuse of authority by the local institutions only.118 The exclusion of oversight of 
UNMIK from the Ombudsperson’s jurisdiction not only represented an inconsistency 
between the promoted principles of democratic governance such as accountability 
and the rule of law and the way they were practised by the international community 
but also further complicated the already strained relations between UNMIK and the 
local population.  
UNMIK’s “authoritarian state-building” model aimed to prevent the 
resumption of armed conflict and political instability that may be caused by 
unilateral attempts by the Kosovo Albanians to assert statehood in defiance of the 
international community’s “wait and see” approach regarding the issue of future 
status.119 In fact, according to the members of the international community, given the 
erosion of national sovereignty within the context of European integration, the issues 
of sovereignty and statehood were “symbolic rather than substantive” matters with 
no impact on the day-to-day governance of Kosovo.120 However, this represented an 
unrealistic evaluation of the political and social situation in Kosovo because this was 
the root cause of the Kosovo conflict: that is, who has the right to rule Kosovo; 
Albanians or Serbs? UNMIK’s failure to address the issue of status and its reluctance 
to devolve authority to the newly established institutions fuelled a growing sense of 
local discontent. In addition to this, frequent boycotts of the joint institutions by the 
Serb and Albanian leaders further limited the capacity and legitimacy of the 
international community-supervised provisional institutions.  
In May 2000, the moderate Serb representatives suspended their participation 
in the joint administrative bodies following the outbreak of a wave of violence 
against Kosovo Serbs. It was only after the SRSG, Bernard Kouchner, guaranteed the 
taking of a series measures to improve the security of the Serb population in late June 
 
117 Slaven Kranjc, “Corruption and Ad Hoc Solutions: Interview with Marek Antoni Nowicki, Former 
International Ombudsman of Kosovo”, Vreme Magazine, (14 September 2006). 
118 UNMIK/REG/2006/06 (16 February 2006). 
119 Knaus and Cox, 2005, p. 48. 
120 International Crisis Group, 2003, p. 2. 
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2000 that the moderate Serb leaders agreed to return to JIAS.121 Shortly after the 
Serbs agreed to return to the joint institutions, provisions of a draft regulation on the 
structure and functions of municipal administrations led Hashim Thaci and members 
of his newly established political party (Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo / 
PPDK)122 to freeze their participation in the IAC and KTC. Following intensive 
efforts by UNMIK, the draft regulation was subsequently endorsed by IAC on 11 
July 2000 and PDK resumed its participation in the two joint administrative 
structures.123 
Under these circumstances, the first municipal elections were held in 30 
municipalities on 28 October 2000. The election results could not be certified in the 
three northern municipalities (Leposaviq / Leposavić, Zubin Potok and Zveçan / 
Zvečan) where the Serb community established and maintained their parallel 
institutions funded by Belgrade and voter turnout was negligible. A total of 34 
political parties and 15 independent candidates contested in the elections, which was 
boycotted by the Kosovo Serb parties. Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK) received 58% of the votes cast while Thaçi’s Democratic Party of 
Kosovo (PDK) 27%. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), which emerged 
as the second KLA-rooted political party in Kosovo’s politics, became the third 
leading party with 8% of the vote.124 In 21 municipalities, moderate Albanian leader 
Rugova’s LDK won a majority of votes and dominated the municipal administrative 
bodies. In the three northern municipalities, the SRSG appointed the presidents and 
members of municipal assemblies, drawing from various Serb parties associated with 
opposition to Milošević’s Socialist Party.125 
In March 2001, UNMIK established a 14-member joint working group with 
seven representatives from Kosovo’s political parties and civil society and seven 
from the international administration to draft a “legal framework” for the province’s 
provisional self-government institutions. Although a general agreement on the 
 
121 “Joint UNMIK-SNC Understanding on Serbs’ Return to JIAS Signed”, Press Release, 
UNMIK/PR/282, (29 June 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/press/pr282.html 
[accessed 4 December 2006]. 
122 It was later renamed the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK).  
123 United Nations, 2000b, para. 5.  
124 Election results can be seen at http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2000/11/20458_en.pdf 
[accessed 5 December 2006]. 
125 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2000/1196, (15 December 2000c), para.8 
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institutions to be created was reached between the international and local members of 
the joint working group, a series of disputes on certain points arose. These included 
the name of the legal document, the extent to which Serbia’s sovereignty would be 
explicitly stressed, scope of responsibilities to be transferred to the new institutions, 
time-frame for the international administration, establishment of a constitutional 
court and organisation of a referendum on Kosovo’s future status.126  
After weeks of intensive negotiations, the document was finally completed by 
the newly appointed SRSG, Hans Haekkerup of Denmark, who termed the document 
as the “constitutional framework” rather than the “legal framework”, which was 
initially suggested by UNMIK, or the “constitution”, which Albanian leaders 
demanded. The document, which contained no provision on the issues of Serbia’s 
sovereignty, on organisation of a referendum for independence, or on setting a time-
frame for the completion of UNMIK’s mandate and establishing a constitutional 
court, listed a range of areas where the SRSG would continue to exclusively exercise 
extensive powers and responsibilities. The SRSG’s “reserved powers and 
responsibilities” included dissolving the assembly and calling for new elections, 
controlling the budget and monetary policy, administering public, state and socially-
owned property, exercising final authority regarding the appointment, removal from 
office and disciplining of judges and prosecutors, and exercising authority over law 
enforcement institutions and the correctional service.127 The retention of executive 
powers and responsibilities in a range of significant issue areas by one single, 
foreign, non-elected individual, however, represented a serious contradiction with 
implementing the mandate in Resolution 1244: promoting “sustainable autonomy” 
and “meaningful self-government” through restricting the local capacity to self-
govern.  
The Constitutional Framework, which envisioned the creation of provisional 
self-government institutions, was promulgated in May 2001. The provisional 
political institutions included a 120-member Parliament with a seven-member 
Presidency and a government. In the Parliament, 100 of the 120 seats would be 
 
126 Blerim Reka, UNMIK as an International Governance with Post-War Kosova; Nato’s 
Intervention; UN Administration and Kosovar Aspirations, (Logos A, Skopje, 2003), p. 244. 
127 “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government”, UNMIK/REG/2001/9, (15 May 
2001), Chapter 8, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm [accessed 9 
December 2006]. 
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distributed in proportion to votes gained. 20 seats were set aside for minority 
representation – ten for the Serbs, four for the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian 
communities, three for the Bosniacs, 2 for the Turkish community, and one for the 
Goranis.128 The seven-member Presidency would consist of two representatives from 
the two biggest party, one from the third largest party, one Serb and one non-Serb 
minority representative. Regarding the formation of the executive branch, the 
Constitutional Framework stipulated that at all times at least two ministers would be 
from minority communities. Of the two, one would be from the Serb community. In 
the event that there are more than twelve ministers, a third minister would be from a 
non-majority community.129 
The first general elections were held on 17 November 2001. Unlike the 
municipal elections, the Serb parties contested in the elections through Return 
Coalition (“Povratak”).  A total of 22 political parties and 3 independent candidates 
ran in the elections. The turnout was 64.3%. None of the parties won enough seats 
(61) in the 120-member Assembly to form the government. 
As the results of the elections shown in Table 7.5. suggest, political parties 
that ran in the elections were ethnicity-based parties and voting behaviour followed 
ethnic lines. In other words, the notion of political representation in Kosovo is based 
on ethnicity or ethnic group participation rather than individual preferences. 
Although the institutional design of the Kosovo Assembly aimed to reflect the 
pluralistic view of the province and prevent the exclusion of non-Albanian minority 
communities from the political process, it contributed to the further ethnicisation of 
Kosovo’s politics and strengthening of ethnic cleavages in the post-1999 period.  
 
 
128 Constitutional Framework, Section 1. 
129 UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/19 adopted on 13 September 2001 stipulated the establishment of  
the office of the prime minister and nine ministries: (1) Ministry of Finance and Economy, (2) 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, (3) Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, (4) Ministry of 
Culture, Youth and Sports, (5) Ministry of Health, Environment and Spatial Planning, (6) Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare, (7) Ministry of Transport and Communications, (8) Ministry of Public 
Services, and (9) Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development. The said Regulation 
confirmed the power of the SRSG to “take such measures as may be required to enhance the 
effectiveness” of the ministries. The Ministry of Health, Environment and Spatial Planning was later 
split into two as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning. For 
functions and responsibilities of each ministry, see UNMIK/REG/2001/19, (13 September 2001), 
available at  
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg19-01.pdf [accessed 5 December 2006].   
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Parties and Coalitions % of Votes Seats 
LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo -  Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) 45.65 47 
PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo - Partia Demokratike e Kosovës) 25.70 26 
Coalition “Return” (Koalicija “Povratak”) 11.34 22 (12+10) 
AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo - Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës) 7.83 8 
Coalition VATAN (Bosniac and Gorani Coalition) 1.15 4 (1+3) 
KDTP (Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo - Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi) 1.00 3 (1+2) 
IRDK (New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo - Iniciativa e re Demokrarike e 
Kosovës) 
0.5 2 (1+1) 
PDASHK (Democratic Party of Ashkali Albanians – Partia Demokratike 
Ashkanli Shqiptare e Kosovës) 
0.43 2 (0+2)  
LKÇK (National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo – Lëvizja Kombërate për 
Çlirimin e Kosovës) 
1.11 1 
PSHDK (Albanian Christian Democratic Party – Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane 
e Kosovës)  
0.98 1 
PD (Party of Justice - Partia e Drejtësisë) 0.57 1 
LPK (People’s Movement of Kosovo – Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës) 0.56 1 
PREBK (United Roma Party of Kosovo – Partia Rome e Bashkuar e Kosovës) 0.34 1 (0+1) 
BSDAK (Bosniac Party of Democratic Action – Bošnjačka Stranka 
Demokratske Akcije Kosova) 
0.37 1 
Total  120 
 
Table 7.5. Results of the 2001 Kosovo Assembly election results (Source: OSCE, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2001/11/20460_en.pdf [accessed 7 December 2006] 
 
After three months of intense negotiations between the three biggest Albanian 
parties, LDK, PDK and AAK, a coalition government was finally formed in March 
2002. Although the government was put in place and some powers were transferred 
to local institutions, the lack of progress over the issue of status fuelled local 
discontent. To revitalise the stagnating relations between UNMIK and local 
stakeholders, the new SRSG, Michael Steiner of Germany, who replaced Hans 
Haekkerup in January 2002, outlined a set of objectives to the Security Council that 
Kosovo’s institutions were expected to satisfy by May 2005 to address the issue of 
final status. This policy, which came to be known as “standards before status”, 
included a set of benchmarks in eight specific areas relating to democratic 
governance and treatment of ethnic minorities that would be used to measure 
Kosovo’s political and social development. These areas included functioning 
democratic institutions; the rule of law; freedom of movement; returns and 
integration; the economy; respect for property rights; dialogue with Belgrade; and 
building of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as a civilian emergency force in line 
with its mandate.130 
                                                 
130 “Michael Steiner’s Address to the Security Council”, UNMIK Press Release, (24 April 2002), 
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The standards were formally launched by the new SRSG, Harri Holkeri and 
Prime Minister Bajram Rexhebi on 10 December 2003.131 Endorsed by the Security 
Council on 12 December, this new mechanism envisioned a substantive review in 
mid-2005 of Kosovo’s provisional institutions’ progress in satisfying the standards 
on governance and inclusion of ethnic communities in order to decide whether or not 
to proceed to the next stage – the beginning of a process to determine Kosovo’s 
future status.  
The “standards before status” policy, which linked the issue of status to 
Kosovo’s provisional institutions’ ability to fulfil a set of objectives in democratic 
governance, became the basis of UNMIK’s approach to strengthening the capacity of 
local governmental and institutional structures and promoting inter-ethnic 
cooperation. The “standards”, which also became UNMIK’s ‘exit strategy’, however, 
did not include an implementation plan and clearly-defined indicators to measure to 
what extent these externally-devised benchmarks were fulfilled. In fact, for many 
Albanians, the “standards” approach meant that it was adopted by the international 
community to block their aspirations for independence for indefinitely.132 The lack 
of clarity over what would be awaiting in mid-2005 and UNMIK’s slow progress in 
devolving authority to local provisional institutions, in return, removed incentives 
and leverage from the standards process,133 fuelling the already growing frustration 
within the Albanian population that would explode in mid-March 2004.  
 
 
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr719.htm [accessed 12 December 2002]. 
131 “Standards for Kosovo”, UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK/PR/1078, (10 December 2003) available 
at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/pressr/pr1078.pdf [accessed 16 December 2006]. 
132 Steven C. Woehrel and Julie Kim, Kosovo and US Policy, Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Report for Congress, RL31053, (24 January 2005), p. 8.  
133 International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 5.  
 316
                                                
7.3.3. Capacity-Building 
As suggested in the introduction chapter, developing governmental capacity 
is essential to achieving democratic transition and consolidation. This entails 
empowering central government structures with the capability to exercise political 
authority and enforce the rule of law throughout the entire territory and perform their 
roles and responsibilities.  
With the intention of strengthening the capacity of Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions to execute democratic governance through creating a functioning 
bureaucracy, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was 
specifically mandated to “identify the needs of local civil administrators and provide 
them with the required training as quickly as possible”.134 Although OSCE was 
designated as the lead agency responsible for coordinating capacity-building 
programmes and developing an integrated approach to the strengthening of 
governance structures in Kosovo, in practice, it did not act so. A number of 
international development partners, including UNMIK, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), European Union 
(EU), World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
acted as independent capacity-development providers. This situation, as happened in 
East Timor, led to the duplication of efforts and overlapping of roles and 
responsibilities. All agencies carried out their own skills and needs assessment and, 
depending on the outcome, organised their own capacity-building programmes in the 
form of mentoring, in-service technical training and education.135  
During the first phase of the international administration from mid-1999 to 
early-2000, the focus of work was mainly on moving from emergency and 
humanitarian management to the day-to-day performance of civil service 
functions.136 Most of the training programmes organised during this period focused 
on developing the capacity of international staff and building the skills of local 
 
134 United Nations, 1999a, para. 80  
135 Knut G. Kirste, “Administrative Capacity Building in Kosovo: An Assessment of UNMIK / 
OSCE’s Civil Administration Policy”, Council for Asia Europe Co-operation (CAEC), draft version, 
(13 December 2001), p. 25. 
136 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Public Administration in Kosovo: 
Situational Analysis and Strategy”, Draft Discussion Paper, (25 July 2003), p. 24. 
 317
                                                
employees in basic administrative functions.137 By late 2001, a total of 3,500 civil 
servants participated in the OSCE-run public management training programmes.138 
However, it became rather difficult to measure the impact of these training 
programmes on the day-to-day performance of trainees given the fact that some of 
the early trained senior managers lost their positions after the first municipal 
elections held in October 2000 and some others transferred into more paid-jobs in the 
private sector.139  
Like in other post-conflict situations such as East Timor, training activities, 
carried out by international development partners for Kosovar civil servants, were 
often supply-driven, organised with a top-down approach and constrained by 
uncoordinated donor assistance.140 Motivated to achieve quick results in the short-
term, international state-builders in Kosovo, in other words, were far from pursuing a 
participatory approach with a view to creating a sense of ownership of programmes 
and policies introduced by them and ensuring their sustainability in the post-
international administration period.  
As noted earlier, the international community’s approach to building the 
capacity of Kosovo’s provisional institutions was based on the implementation of the 
“standards before status” policy, formally adopted in December 2003. The March 
2004 violent riots, during which Kosovo’s provisional government institutions, 
particularly the security structures, failed to perform their basic roles and 
responsibilities, however, showed the impossibility of implementing vaguely-
defined, open-ended ‘standards’ to empower the governance structures in Kosovo. 
The riots were triggered by the shooting of a Kosovo Serb teenager in the 
ethnically Serb-dominated village of Caglavica / Čaglavica, near the capital Prishtina 
/ Priština, on 15 March 2004, and the drowning of three Albanian children near 
ethnically divided town of Mitrovicë / Mitrovica on the following day, which was 
covered by the Albanian media in an inflammatory way.141 Rapidly spreading 
 
137 Ibid. 
138 Kirste, 2001, p. 21. 
139 Ibid., p 21. 
140 UNDP, “Capacity Development Facility for Kosovo”, Project Document, (2004), p. 5; Kirste, 
2001, p. 26. 
141 Based on a story of a 13-year old boy, the drowning of the three Albanian children in the River 
Ibar was reported to have been caused by a group of Serbs who were chasing the boys with a dog. 
This allegation was later disproved by international experts. In a report investigating the events into 
throughout Kosovo in a short span of time, the riots became a test case for both the 
international community represented by UNMIK and KFOR and for Kosovo’s 
provisional institutions to demonstrate their capacity and commitment to the rule of 
law, to law enforcement and to maintaining a multi-ethnic society.  
 
Picture 7.2. Properties belonging to minority communities were set on fire during the riots which 
involved more than 50,000 ethnic Albanians. (Photo courtesy of a member of the KFOR-Turkish 
brigade based in Prizren).  
 
During the 17-19 March riots, which Kofi Annan described as “an organised, 
widespread and targeted campaign” led by Kosovo Albanian extremists against the 
members of Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities,142 there were 19 deaths, of whom 
11 were Albanians and 8 were Serbs, injuries to more than 900 persons,143 and 
displacement of over 4,000 minority community members.144 Approximately 730 
houses belonging to Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, and 36 Orthodox churches and 
monasteries were burned down, and dozens of UNMIK and KFOR vehicles were set 
on fire.145 
                                                                                                                                          
the riots, OSCE criticised Kosovo’s media for promoting “reckless and sensationalist” reporting that 
fanned the deadly clashes between 17 and 19 March 2004. For further information, see OSCE, The 
Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo, (Vienna: Office of the Representative on 
Freedom of the Media, 2004), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2004/04/2695_en.pdf 
[accessed 27 December 2006]. 
142 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2004/348, (30 April 2004d), para. 2. 
143 Ibid., para. 3. 
144 Ibid., para. 22. 
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Picture 7.3. Unable to prevent the spread of riots into Prizren, UNMIK police watch the angry crowd 
destroying a police vehicle. (Photo courtesy of a member of the KFOR-Turkish brigade based in 
Prizren). 
 
 
 
 
The violent events, which the international security organisations – KFOR 
troops and UNMIK civilian police – and Kosovo’s police officers and protection 
corps failed to control, highlighted two important problems: (1) five years into the 
administration of the province, the international community had failed to bring 
sustainable peace and security to Kosovo, and to lay the foundation of multi-ethnic 
co-existence, and (2) Kosovo’s provisional institutions were suffering from lack of 
competency, professionalism and democratic political culture.  
KFOR and UNMIK police were primarily responsible for providing security 
and restoring law and order because while in many areas such as education, health, 
environment and social affairs, UNMIK had transferred responsibilities to the 
Kosovo government, it had retained full authority in security, foreign policy and 
justice. As of December 2003, there were 3,735 international police officers from 48 
countries in Kosovo.146 The size of the UNMIK police was reduced to 3,248 in 
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March 2004.147 Prior to the clashes, KFOR’s total strength was at approximately 
18,500 troops.148 Failing to take measures to contain the events in the two ignition 
points (Caglavica / Čaglavica and Mitrovicë / Mitrovica), the international security 
organisations were also unable to prevent the spread of violence to other parts of 
Kosovo and protect the Serbs and other minorities,149 despite the intelligence that 
some extremist Albanian groups were travelling across Kosovo to agitate the people 
against the Serbs and join the rioters.150 In Vushtrri / Vučitrn in north central 
Kosovo, for example, 69 houses belonging to the Ashkalis were burned down with 
no response from either French KFOR or UNMIK police, and in Prizren in the south, 
German KFOR failed to respond to requests by UNMIK police to provide assistance 
in stopping the destruction of Serbian religious and cultural buildings dating back to 
the fourteenth century and the burning of Serb homes.151  
In the absence of KFOR and UNMIK, the dire security situation was left to 
the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)152 whose performance was mixed.153 While some 
KPS officers worked with professionalism and courage during the riots, some were 
reported to have acted passively or joined the rioters.154 With regard to the 
controversial KPC, it played a minimal role during the violent events, largely 
confining itself to its barracks. In some regions, it was used by US KFOR to calm 
crowds and allowed to mount joint patrols.155 Some KPC personnel performed well, 
some were reported to have departed or participated in burning the houses of the 
Serbs in Ferizaj / Uroševac in southern Kosovo.156 
The response of Kosovo’s Albanian-dominated Assembly and government to 
the violent riots was ambivalent. Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi appealed for calm 
and an end to the violence while some other members of the provisional institutions, 
 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2004/71, (26 January 2004c), p. 18. 
147 Idem, 2004d, p. 17. 
148 “KFOR Provides Test Bed for NATO Transformation”, KFOR Chronicle, (2 March 2004), 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2004/chronicle_02/16.htm [accessed 22 May 2007]. 
149 Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, 16:4 
(July 2004), pp. 20-22; International Crisis Group, 2004, pp. 19-20. 
150 Interview with Dr. Ismail Yilmaz, UNMIK Municipal Representative, (Prishtina / Priština, 8 
September 2006). 
151 Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 21. 
152 At the time of the clashes, KPS had 5,704 officers. United Nations, 2004d, p. 17.  
153 Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 22. 
154 Ibid., p. 22; International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 20. 
155 Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 23; International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 23. 
156 International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 50. 
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instead of focusing on stopping the violence, appeared to have blamed the events on 
the continued existence of Belgrade-sponsored Serbian parallel structures, the death 
of the Albanian children, the division of Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, and UNMIK.157 An 
Albanian member of the Kosovo Assembly, for example, in an interview broadcast 
on TV, described the riots as “a legitimate revolt by the Albanian population…[and] 
a lesson for the international community”.158 It was only after the international 
community condemned the violent riots that Kosovo Albanian leaders turned their 
attention from justifying or making explanations for the violence to the violence 
itself.  
In response to the violent events, Kosovo’s Serb political leaders withdrew 
from the province’s provisional institutions. The Serb community boycotted the 23 
October 2004 parliamentary elections. Only around 2,000 Serbs voted in the 
elections, corresponding to less than 1% of the potential Kosovo Serb electorate.159 
Rejecting the legitimacy of the Albanian-dominated provisional institutions, they 
relied on the Belgrade-sponsored parallel structures in education and health. The 
October 2004 elections, boycotted by the Serbs, also reflected the falling confidence 
of the Albanian population in the province’s externally-built provisional institutions. 
The turnout, which was around 64% in the first general elections held in November 
2001, fell to 53.57%.160 
The UN, which tended to treat the absence of a violent armed conflict 
between the ethnic groups as a criteria for stability and “beguiled itself into believing 
that the patchy half-promises” to review Kosovo’s final status by mid-2005 
represented a working policy,161 responded to the March 2004 violence by asking 
Kai Eide, Norway’s Ambassador to NATO, to conduct a detailed assessment of the 
situation in Kosovo in order to clarify what went wrong in the province and 
recommend how the UN mission and its weakening credibility could be improved. 
Having pointed to the international community’s failure to “read the mood in the 
 
157 United Nations, 2004d, para. 12; International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 25-6; King and Mason, 2006, 
p. 209. 
158 OSCE, 2004, p. 12. 
159 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo”, Security Council Document, S/2004/907, (17 November 2004e), para. 7. 
160 The certified election results can be seen at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2004/11/3775_en.pdf [accessed 7 October 2006].  
161 International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 1.  
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population and to understand the depth of the dissatisfaction of the majority and the 
vulnerability of the minorities”,162 Eide recommended (1) the adoption of a more 
integrated strategy, (2) replacement of the “unrealistically ambitious and 
unachievable” set of standards with an “achievable” set of priorities reflecting the 
most urgent requirements such as an improvement in security, return of displaced 
persons, improving decentralisation and local government, and promoting economic 
reconstruction, and (3) accelerating the devolution of competencies to local 
institutions to restore UNMIK’s credibility and increase the capacity of local 
institutions.163   
In Kosovo, government capacity has been undermined by a lack of qualified 
human resources and differences within the civil service. The capacity-development 
programme adopted by UNMIK and Kosovo’s provisional government institutions in 
April 2001 required the recruitment or appointment of Kosovars to all senior and 
middle-level posts in the civil services and a systematic transfer of substantive 
responsibilities and authorities to them from international staff.164 However, the 
limited availability of experienced and qualified senior civil servants to assume 
managerial positions became a major obstacle to creating an effective civil service in 
the province.  
The civil service in Kosovo can be said to be comprised two kinds of staff: 
while there is one small group of young highly qualified educated officials with little 
or no relevant work experience and limited managerial leadership skills, there is 
another big group of experienced officials equipped with outdated, old style socialist 
approaches to management.165  Coupled with a lack of sufficient resources and a 
deficit in experienced staff in government departments, the age problem also had an 
undermining effect on the capacity of Kosovo’s provisional institutions to formulate 
and execute policies. Insufficiently staffed with experienced and qualified personnel, 
the Assembly and almost all departments in the Office of the Prime Minister suffer 
 
162 United Nations, “Letter Dated 17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council”, Security Council Document, S/2004/932, (30 November 2004f), p. 
3. 
163 Ibid., pp. 15-18. 
164 UNDP, 2004, p. 23. 
165 Discussion with an UNMIK staff member, (Prishtina / Priština Municipality, 7 September 2006). 
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from weaknesses in developing policies and drafting legislation.166 
In his comprehensive report evaluating the March 2004 riots and its 
consequences on the prospects of establishing long-lasting peace in Kosovo, UN 
Special Envoy Kai Eide concluded that capacity-building efforts undertaken by a 
number of external actors in Kosovo have been “sporadic, uncoordinated and of 
limited duration”, yielding limited impact on strengthening the capacity of the 
province’s provisional institutions.167 The absence of an overall road-map regarding 
the future status of the province further aggravated problems with capacity-building, 
resulting in a little or no sense of ‘ownership’ of programmes introduced and 
implemented by external agents. The slow progress in the transfer of competencies to 
local institutions resulting from the reluctance of international state-builders to share 
authority and responsibility in decision-making with local stakeholders not only 
fuelled a growing political and social frustration but also contributed to the rise of a 
“culture of dependency” on external assistance, solutions, policies and guidelines, 
rather than empowering the institutions with the necessary competence to produce 
solutions in response to social and political demands.168  
The slow progress in the devolution of competencies, on the other hand, was 
not the only factor that constrained the capacity of Kosovo’s provisional institutions. 
Like in East Timor, the Kosovo police and justice system have remained “fragile”.169 
Corruption and organised crime are the two biggest challenges Kosovo faces.170 The 
Kosovo government failed to take and implement necessary administrative and 
legislative measures to effectively fight and prevent corruption in the provisional 
institutions.171 The judiciary faces the challenge of processing cases effectively. The 
increasing backlog of cases, especially in property-related disputes, negatively 
 
166 Michal Ben-Gera et ai., “Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo”, Prepared for the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (April 2005), 
http://mirror.undp.org/kosovo/Projects/KCAP/KCAP_report_final_20050525_english.pdf [accessed 
25 September 2006]. 
167 United Nations, 2004d, p. 18. 
168 Discussions with an international staff member, (Mitrovicë / Mitrovica, 13 September 2006). 
169 United Nations, “Letter Dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council - A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo”, Security 
Council Document, S/2005/635, (7 October 2005b), para. 39. 
170 Bertram I. Spector, Svetlana Winbourne and Laurence D. Beck, “Corruption in Kosovo: 
Observations and Implications for USAID”, Management Systems International Final Report, 
(Washington DC: 10 July 2003). 
171 United Nations, 2005b, para. 38. 
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affects the people’s respect for implementing the rule of law, contributing to the 
emergence of a sense of impunity.172 By failing to effectively respond to the crimes 
committed during the March 2004 riots, the court decisions, which were below the 
minimum” applicable penalty established by the law, further contributed to the rise 
of a climate of impunity.173 
In addition to the lack of sufficient domestic capacity and will to implement 
and enforce policies, the absence of social unity has further undermined Kosovo’s 
provisional institutions’ ability to effectively perform their functions. The differences 
of opinion between the Serbs and Albanians regarding the future status of the 
province reflect the absence of a sense of social cohesion, which weakens the 
capacity of Kosovo’s provisional institutions. According to the results of a UNDP 
opinion survey, for example, 93.4% of Albanian respondents said independence was 
the best solution for the future status while 89.5% of the Serbs thought autonomy 
within Serbia was the best option.174 In other words, the former, which strives for 
independence, does not accept to be part of the Serbian political community. The 
latter, which is in favour of restoring Serbia’s sovereignty, does not wish to be an 
Albanian-dominated political community. This could be seen in the continued 
presence of ‘parallel’ institutions, which were set up by Belgrade in the 
predominantly Serb-inhabited areas in the north of the Ibar River with the aim of 
partitioning the province along ethnic lines if Serbian rule cannot be restored. These 
‘parallel’ structures, which demonstrate a high degree of “mistrust” between the 
Serbs and Albanians,175 include courts, healthcare and education facilities and 
security guards, i.e. the so-called ‘bridge watchers’ and police of the Serbian 
Ministry of Interior Affairs.176 These parallel structures crippled the ability of 
Kosovo’s provisional government institutions to exercise political authority and 
deliver public services throughout the entire territory. 
 
172 Ibid., paras. 35, 49. 
173 OSCE, The Response of the Justice System to the March 2004 Riots, (December 2005), 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17177_en.pdf [accessed 28 March 2007]; Human Rights 
Watch, Not on the Agenda The Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 
2004, 18:4(D) (May 2006), available via  http://hrw.org/reports/2006/kosovo0506/index.htm 
[accessed 28 March 2007].   
174 UNDP, “Early Warning Report Kosovo”, Report No. 12, (October-December 2005b), p. 8, 
available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/?cid=2,22 [accessed 16 December 2006]. 
175 UNDP, 2005, para. 23. 
176 OSCE, Parallel Structures in Kosovo 2006-2007, (4 April 2007), available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/04/23925_en.pdf [accessed 25 May 2007].  
 325
                                                
Despite the “uneven” progress in the standards implementation especially in 
establishing the rule of law, Kai Eide recommended the opening of status talks. 
Eide’s recommendation was based on his conviction that although Kosovo’s 
institutions’ performance in meeting the standards was “mixed”, postponing the 
question of future status would not necessarily yield “further and tangible results in 
the implementation of standards”.177  
The status talks between the Albanian and Serbian delegations, mediated by 
the Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, were opened in February 
2006 and yielded no result. While Kosovo Albanian leaders representing the 90 per 
cent of the province’s estimated population of 2 million wanted nothing short of full 
independence, Belgrade insisted on substantial autonomy within Serbia. In February 
2007, Ahtisaari unveiled his “compromise solution proposal”, which envisioned 
bringing Kosovo to independence through international supervision. 
The proposed solution for the future status of Kosovo endorsed the Albanian 
position regarding its secession from Serbia while rejecting the Serbian preference 
for partitioning the province if Belgrade’s rule is not restored. The plan affirmed the 
promotion and protection of minority rights and their participation in public life and 
recognised the implementation of wide-ranging decentralisation measures in the 
Serb-dominated settlements.178 Ahtisaari’s proposal also foresaw a prolonged 
international military presence for an unspecified length of time and an international 
civilian office to be led by the EU whose representative would take over from the 
UN.179 Ahtisaari’s proposal, which was not fully satisfying for Kosovo Albanians, 
was welcomed by the Kosovo Albanian political leadership. It was immediately 
rejected by Belgrade. Bringing Kosovo to independence under EU supervision also 
failed to generate Russian support in the Security Council, creating a deadlock 
situation. The Ahtisaari plan also raised concerns about the international precedence 
that recognition of statehood to Kosovo may create for other separatist movements.  
 
 
 
179 Ibid. 
177 United Nations, 2005b, para. 64. 
178 United Nations, “Letter Dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council”, Security Council Document, S/2007/168 Add.1, (26 March 2007). 
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7.4. Conclusion 
Since it was temporarily placed under the UN administration in June 1999, 
Kosovo has gone through an externally-led liberal democratic state-building process. 
During the international administration of the territory, a constitutional framework, 
which provided the basis of the governmental and institutional restructuring, was 
adopted, municipal and parliamentary elections were held, and provisional self-
government institutions were formed. However, the unresolved issue of status, 
limited international and domestic capacity to maintain security and implement the 
rule of law and the reluctance of the Serbs to recognise the authority of the 
provisional institutions undermined the prospects for creating a functioning 
government system in Kosovo. These issues became the major obstacles to 
undertaking a successful state-building process based on security-building, 
institution-building and capacity-building. Fragile conditions of peace and security 
fuelled a growing feeling of insecurity amongst Serbs and led them to leave the 
province or cluster together in ethnically-homogenous areas in northern Kosovo, 
resulting in ethnic segregation. Relying on Belgrade-funded parallel structures, 
which have existed as alternative centres of political power, the Kosovo Serbs 
rejected the legitimacy of UNMIK and Kosovo’s UNMIK-built provisional 
institutions by suspending their already limited participation in the provisional 
institutions and boycotting the elections. 
The Albanians, who were initially comfortable with the establishment of an 
international administration in Kosovo, were later frustrated with the delays in 
devolving competencies to local institutions and in the resolution of the root cause of 
the Kosovo conflict – the political status of the province. For the Albanians, the slow 
progress in the transfer of responsibilities to local institutions meant the international 
community’s reluctance to recognise an independent Kosovo, which was already 
declared in the early-1990s. UNMIK’s lack of accountability to the local institutions 
it created and its limited progress in devolving competencies to these institutions 
undermined the Albanian population’s belief in the capacity of the province’s 
provisional institutions. The falling turnout in the 2004 election, which was 
boycotted by the Serbs, in this context, can be read as an indication of weakening 
legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions in the eyes of the majority Albanians. Following 
the decision to open status talks in October 2005, the relations between UNMIK and 
Kosovo’s ethnic groups entered a new stage. However, due to the absence of a consensus 
on the issue of the province’s political future, negotiations between Belgrade and 
Prishtina / Priština ended in a deadlock. In early 2007, the Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari, proposed a deal offering “supervised independence” 
to Kosovo. The Ahtisaari plan, which was agreed by the Albanian leadership, met strong 
opposition from Serbia and Russia. The Ahtisaari plan, which represented the resolution 
of the issue of Kosovo’s status for some members of the international community, 
however, did not necessarily mean the end of uncertainties and the resolution of the 
Kosovo question for the parties involved in conflict. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
 
Can sustainable peace be established by external actors through promoting 
democratic government structures in societies emerging from violent conflict? Does 
the UN have the institutional capacity to build effectively functioning democratic 
government institutions in post-conflict societies? What has been the outcome of the 
transitional / interim administrations set up in East Timor and Kosovo in terms of the 
establishment of long-lasting democratic peace? To what extent have the 
international administrations established in these two war-devastated territories 
contributed to laying the foundations for democratic rule and sustainable peace? 
These were among the research questions that this study has sought to explore. 
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The establishment of international territorial administrations under the 
auspices of the UN in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 following military 
interventions with humanitarian objectives, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
represents a shift in the international community’s approach to conflict and its 
resolution: from achieving the short-term goal of providing humanitarian assistance 
to civilians and ending armed conflict between warring parties to the long-term goal 
of building sustainable peace through assuming the responsibility of government and 
undertaking a post-conflict reconstruction process following a military intervention 
justified in humanitarian terms. The aim of such an undertaking was to prevent the 
recurrence of violent conflict, seen to be arising from the weakness or absence of 
effective and legitimate democratic public institutions and peaceful conflict 
resolution mechanisms. This new strategy was characterised by the exercise of 
extensive interventionist roles and powers in governmental affairs following military 
action undertaken to stop human rights violations and address the implications of 
violent internal conflict for regional and international security and stability. It was 
first tested in Kosovo and East Timor, which were temporarily placed under the 
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administration of the UN with a view to building sustainable democratic peace. 
The UN’s engagement in democratic peace-building in Kosovo and East 
Timor was influenced by the view that the weakness or absence of democratic 
government structures underlies violent internal conflicts. The introduction of 
democracy from the outside was seen as a practical policy instrument to enable 
marginalised individuals and communal groups to have access to the political 
decision-making process. In fact, it was considered as falling under the international 
community’s responsibility to save ‘failed’ states. Democracy was expected to 
contribute to solving and/or preventing governance problems and thus ensure long-
term domestic peace in conflict-devastated places. The solution to internal conflict, 
in other words, was transforming conflict-torn societies into democratic polities. 
Kosovo and East Timor, in this context, became experimental laboratories to test 
whether or not sustainable peace can be established after years of political, economic 
and social instability through introducing democratic government institutions and 
transferring institutional skills and competencies from the outside in the aftermath of 
military interventions. 
Kosovo and East Timor also represented the two cases where the UN was 
least restricted in initiating and supervising a reconstruction process in the post-
armed conflict period. This was not only the result of the availability of resources 
and the wide-ranging powers the UN was entrusted but it was also related to the fact 
that despite the large scale physical destruction and the legacy of armed conflict, the 
UN had relatively favourable conditions in Kosovo and East Timor compared to 
other post-conflict situations such as Afghanistan and Iraq. There was no insurgency 
or organised opposition against the presence of the UN and other members of the 
international community involved in the post-conflict reconstruction process. 
NATO’s use of military force against Serbia, which was not based on an explicit UN 
Security Council Resolution, was justified in humanitarian terms, i.e., a necessary 
action to stop systematic human rights violations committed by the Milosevic 
regime. A large NATO-led international security force was deployed by the UN 
Security Council in the aftermath of the military intervention to provide a secure 
environment throughout the province. The establishment of the UN interim 
administration, mandated to govern the war-devastated territory and supervise the 
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development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-
government pending a political settlement of the issue of Kosovo’s future political 
status, was welcomed by the majority Albanians. In the case of East Timor, as noted 
in Chapter 5, the establishment of the UN administration in 1999 was seen by the 
majority of the population as an interim administrative arrangement necessary to 
stabilise the humanitarian and political situation and prepare the territory for 
independence. By establishing two large missions at the same time, the UN showed 
its willingness to undertake such a complex mandate of post-conflict reconstruction 
in two war-devastated territories. By endorsing the establishment of UNTAET and 
UNMIK in 1999, members of the international community demonstrated their 
commitment to the post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo and East Timor. 
The UN’s engagement in democratic state-building in East Timor and 
Kosovo, which represents a contradiction between the goal and the means to achieve 
it (democratisation in a non-democratic way i.e., promoting political participation, 
representation, accountability and transparency through centralising all powers in the 
hands of a single, non-elected, external agent), can be evaluated in the following 
way. 
As shown in Table 8.1., although UNTAET was able to put basic government 
institutions in place and write down basic formal rules and procedures for democratic 
statehood, it failed to develop routines and local capacities needed to run these 
institutions and implement rules and policies after its departure in May 2002. Public 
institutions, which have remained dependent on external assistance in the post-
independence period, were further undermined by power struggles within the 
Timorese leadership, incomplete reconciliation at the elite and society level, and 
limited achievement in developing a shared sense of national cohesion on the basis of 
common historical, cultural and political bonds and a collective identity.  
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UNTAET Achievements Shortcomings 
Security-building • Provision of a secure and 
peaceful domestic 
environment and delivery of 
humanitarian aid in the 
aftermath of the post-
referendum militia violence; 
• Repatriation of over 202,000  
of the 250,000 refugees from 
West Timor by April 2002; 
• Prevention of an organised 
revenge campaign against the 
returnees suspected of being 
militia members and their 
families; 
• Cantonment of former 
FALINTIL troops and 
conclusion of a disarmament, 
demobilisation and 
reintegration programme; 
• Creation of a defence force 
and police service. 
• Inadequate and incomplete 
disarmament of former 
militias and FALINTIL 
guerrillas; 
• Dissatisfaction and growing 
resentment within the veteran 
community caused by 
problems with the selection of 
former guerrillas into F-
FDTL and identification of 
FALINTIL Reinsertion 
Assistance Programme 
beneficiaries; 
• Politicisation of F-FDTL and 
PNTL, aggravating 
weaknesses within the 
security institutions and 
contributing to their 
competitive development. 
 
Institution-building • Formation of political parties 
and organisation of a 
constituent assembly and 
presidential elections 
• Drafting and adoption of a 
constitution 
• Creation of key institutions of 
democratic government, 
including a parliament, 
government and judiciary; 
• Supervision of political 
independence and transfer of 
sovereign powers to Timorese 
authorities. 
• Incomplete consolidation  of 
formal institutions of 
democracy; 
• Fragile government 
institutions, dependent on 
external assistance and 
solutions to respond to social 
demands; 
• Strong executive but weak 
legislative and judicial 
branches. 
 
Capacity-building • Recruitment of 11,000 
Timorese civil servants; 
• Provision of on-the-job 
training programmes to 
strengthen a professional civil 
service.  
• Insufficient engagement in 
identifying and building upon 
existing local skills; 
• Slow progress in 
“Timorisation” and 
UNTAET’s reluctance to 
share administrative authority 
with local stakeholders; 
• Reliance on international 
staff; 
• Limited ability to develop 
institutional procedures and 
frameworks; 
• Limited skills transfer and 
insufficient achievement in 
creating a sense of 
‘ownership’. 
Table 8.1. UNTAET’s engagement in building a democratic state in East Timor (1999-2002) 
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UNMIK Achievements Shortcomings 
Security-building • Supervision of the withdrawal of 
Serbian armed and police forces; 
• Conclusion of a demilitarisation 
agreement with the KLA; 
• Reintegration of former KLA 
guerrillas into civilian life 
through recruitment into a civil 
security and emergency force 
(KPC) and Kosovo Police 
Service (KPS); 
• Repatriation of Albanian refugees 
and displaced persons; 
• Creation of a multi-ethnic 
Kosovo police force (85% 
Albanians, 8% Serbs and 7% 
other minorities); 
• Provision of a minimum stability 
(absence of violent armed 
conflict between ethnic groups). 
• Slow deployment of international 
security forces and their inability to 
prevent organised revenge attacks 
against non-Albanian minority 
communities following the 
withdrawal of Serbian authorities; 
• Departure of tens of thousands of 
members of non-Albanian minority 
communities; 
• Incomplete demilitarisation of 
KLA guerrillas; 
• Despite a progress in domestic 
peace and security, incapacity of 
international and local security 
institutions to maintain a 
sustainable improvement in 
security and peace; 
• Insufficient capacity to fight 
against organised crime; 
• Failure to eradicate the structural 
causes of violence (inability to 
build positive-peace). 
Institution-building • Dissolution of Albanian parallel 
institutions; 
• Drafting and adoption of a 
constitutional framework; 
• Formation of political parties; 
• Organisation of local and general 
elections; 
• Construction of provisional 
democratic institutions including 
a parliament, government and 
judiciary; 
• Allocation of quotas to ethnic 
communities in government 
institutions with a view to 
preventing their marginalisation 
or exclusion from the political 
process. 
 
• Establishment and maintenance of 
Serbian parallel institutions in 
northern municipalities; 
• Rise of ethnic-based parties; 
• Notion of representation based on 
ethnicity and ethnic group 
participation and competition; 
• Institutionalisation of divisions of 
power along ethnic lines; 
• Incapacity of the Kosovo judiciary 
and police to establish the rule of 
law and eliminate the rising sense 
of impunity; 
• Incapacity of government 
institutions to gain the trust and 
ensure the participation of the 
Serbs in the provisional 
institutions. 
Capacity-building • Local civil servants were 
employed at central and 
municipal levels; 
• Seminars and training 
programmes were offered to 
strengthen governmental 
capacity; 
• A set of objectives and 
benchmarks developed to 
strengthen administrative 
capacity; 
• A political process designed to 
determine Kosovo’s status was 
initiated. 
• Minority employment in the civil 
service remained unsatisfactory; 
• Slow progress in the devolution of 
competence to local institutions; 
• Delays in addressing the issue of 
status undermined the leverage of 
standards process; 
• Limited capacity of government 
institutions to set the rule of law, 
enforce law and maintain multi-
ethnic society; 
• Limited outreach capacity of 
government institutions to exercise 
political authority throughout the 
entire territory of Kosovo due to 
the continued existence of Serbian 
‘parallel’ structures; 
• Insufficient achievement in 
generating a sense of ‘ownership’ 
of policy initiatives. 
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Table 8..2. UNMIK’s engagement in democratic state-building in Kosovo (1999-2007) 
As summarised in Table 8.2., under UNMIK, provisional self-government 
institutions were formed, general and local elections were held and local civil 
servants were recruited into the newly established civilian administration in Kosovo 
in the post-1999 period. Although the provisional government institutions were put 
in place, the lack of clarity over the province’s political status, absence of social 
unity, continued existence of ‘parallel’ structures in northern municipalities, 
international and local security institutions’ limited progress in alleviating the feeling 
of insecurity amongst members of non-Albanian minority groups specifically the 
Serbs had an undermining effect on the capacity of government institutions to fulfil 
their functions. 
The inability of the UN and other members of the international community to 
turn the relatively favourable conditions available in the immediate post-armed 
conflict period into a constructive, sustainable reconstruction process can be said to 
have led to the above-noted mixed results in these two-post-conflict territories. The 
international community failed to create a new type of intra-societal relations based 
on inter-ethnic cooperation and dialogue despite their frequent reference to the need 
to build a stable, unified, multi-ethnic Kosovo for establishing long-lasting domestic 
and regional peace. They were unable to guarantee the security and freedom of 
movement of non-Albanian groups and prevent their departure in the immediate 
post-NATO intervention period. This “original sin”1 of the international 
administrators and security providers in Kosovo in preventing violent attacks on 
Serbs undermined the already fragile perceived impartiality of international 
administration in the eyes of the Kosovo Serbs. In this respect, Alexandros Yannis, 
who served as a political advisor to the first Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General in Kosovo between July 1999 and December 2000, suggests that 
this particular failure of the international community during the early stage of the 
mission led many Kosovo Serbs to see the establishment of the UN administration as 
part of the “Kosovo Albanian plan” for achieving independence and expelling them 
from the territory.2  
 
 
1 Pekmez, 2001, p. 7. 
2 Yannis, 2001, pp. 40-41.  
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The international community also had limited success in responding to local 
socio-economic demands and needs such as unemployment and economic 
development and failed to initiate a political process to find a mutually acceptable 
solution to the issue of status in a timely manner. UNMIK’s reluctance to delegate 
authority to the newly created Albanian-dominated provisional institutions further 
complicated the relations between the UN and the local populations, characterised by 
a growing sense of frustration with the international administration. This, in turn, had 
an undermining effect on the capacity and functioning of the provisional institutions 
to ensure political stability and economic prosperity. According to the UNDP 
opinion polls, popular satisfaction with UNMIK declined from 57.8% during the 
period of September-December 20023 to 28.4% in September-December 2003, and 
to 24.7% in January-April 2004.4 Unemployment, poverty, lack of progress in the 
issue of Kosovo’s future political status, social problems, and personal and public 
security were among the main areas of dissatisfaction reported by members of 
various ethnic groups.5 The international community’s inability to “read the mood in 
the population and to understand the depth of the dissatisfaction of the majority and 
the vulnerability of the minorities”, as Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide emphasised 
in his report to the UN Secretary General in 2004, prepared the ground for the March 
2004 riots, which undermined the already fragile peace process in the UN-run 
province. As discussed in Chapter 7, the attacks on UNMIK and KFOR vehicles 
during the March 2004 riots indicated the growing dissatisfaction with the 
international administration.  
As shown in Chart 8.1. below, although there was a significant increase in 
levels of satisfaction with the performance of the main governing institutions of 
Kosovo in late-2004 and early-2005 following the formulation of new policies 
regarding the issue of status and economic development, popular satisfaction with 
UNMIK and other public institutions continued to drop. As of March 2007, just after 
Martti Ahtisaari, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, presented his proposed 
solution of the international community-supervised independence for resolving 
 
3 UNDP, 2002b. 
4 UNDP, 2004c. 
5 Ibid. 
Kosovo’s political status, UNMIK, which was rated at 26%, had the lowest popular 
approval rating.6 In the same way, the provisional institutions of self-government, 
which enjoyed high satisfaction levels of around 70% in 2003 and 2004, were rated 
at only 30%, while only 31% of Kosovars indicated their satisfaction with the 
performance of the Kosovo Assembly.7  
 
Chart 8.1. Levels of satisfaction with the performance of main institutions in Kosovo between 
November 2002 and March 2007 (Source: UNDP, 2007, p. 15). 
 
In the case of East Timor, as noted in Chapter 5, the establishment of the UN 
transitional administration in 1999 was seen by the majority of the population as a 
necessary interim process to stabilise the humanitarian and political situation and 
prepare the territory for independence.8 In addition to this, the deployment of the 
Australian-led multi-national security force (INTERFET) to restore law and order in 
September 1999 led to the departure of pro-Indonesian militias.9 By the time 
UNTAET was established, INTERFET was already in control of the territory. The 
East Timorese elites were more or less united within the CNRT, the pro-
independence umbrella organisation. However, UNTAET’s limited understanding of 
the nature of the conflict and local political, social and cultural conditions, its failure 
to initiate a systematic and sustainable demobilisation and reintegration process for 
                                                 
6 Idem, “Early Warning Report: Kosovo January-April 2007”, No. 16 (Prishtina, 2007). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Goldstone, 2004. 
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9 Ibid.; Shurke, 2001. 
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former guerrillas and its reluctance to recognise the CNRT as a legitimate local 
interlocutor not only accelerated the CNRT’s disintegration and contributed to the 
intensification of political and societal competition, but also led to the stagnation of 
relations with Timorese political figures.10 In other words, as in Kosovo, the UN 
failed to take advantage of the relatively favourable conditions available in East 
Timor in the immediate post-armed conflict period. In both territories, the capacity of 
newly established administrative and institutional structures to ensure political 
stability and economic prosperity was dependent on the perception of the local 
populations that the international community-supervised institutions had the ability 
to provide solutions to local problems. In other words, the prospect of the democratic 
state-building process was dependent on creating a strong sense of domestic 
ownership. It is however impossible to generate a sense of ownership, as Kai Eide 
points to, “if the owners do not know what they own and what they are intended to 
govern”.11 
In addition to these problems, it is important to note that although the UN and 
other members of the international community emphasised their long-term goal of 
building sustainable peace through creating functioning, democratic institutional and 
societal structures in East Timor and Kosovo, they still approached the 
reconstruction of these two territories from a peacekeeping perspective12 and 
continued to rely on their short-term objectives and achievements as a benchmark for 
evaluating their performance. That is, the absence of armed conflict (or negative 
peace) has often been treated as the criteria for measuring political stability and 
democratic peace in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. As investigated in the previous 
chapters, it was not until the outbreak of violent riots in Kosovo in March 2004 and 
in Timor-Leste in April 2006 following the disintegration of security institutions that 
the UN reviewed its policies and adopted a more integrative approach to addressing 
governance and institutional problems in these two places.   
The UN’s and other international actors’ involvement in promoting 
democratic governance in Kosovo and East Timor in the post-1999 period once more 
demonstrates that democratisation of conflict-affected societies is a process that is 
 
10 Chopra, 2002; Soares, 2001. 
11 United Nations, 2004d, para. 14. 
12 Shurke, 2001; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005. 
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affected by the interplay of a number of domestic and external factors. Domestic 
factors that affect the direction of transition, which is characterised by uncertainty,13 
are not limited to but include prior political systems and their legacy, the nature of 
intra-societal relations, the choice of governmental and institutional designs, and the 
commitment of local political elites to the process of political reconstruction and 
institutionalisation in the post-armed conflict period. External factors include the 
international community’s interest in addressing conflict and its domestic and trans-
national effects, good knowledge of historical background of the conflict and actors 
involved, availability of political, financial and military resources for post-conflict 
reconstruction, and development of context-sensitive policies aiming to achieve the 
participation of relevant local populations in the reconstruction process and address 
short term and long-term political, economic and social development goals.  
In this respect, it would be fair to suggest that the UN has gained considerable 
institutional experience in ending conflict and establishing peace through promoting 
democratic governance since its first engagement in democratic peace-building in 
Namibia where it organised the first multi-party elections in 1989 to supervise the 
territory’s political transition to independence. The world body has developed a 
number of policies to address challenges specific to post-conflict settings. These 
policies included the integration of military and civilian agencies into post-conflict 
reconstruction and the undertaking of a comprehensive peace-building process 
through demobilising and disarming former combatants, undertaking security sector 
reform, establishing institutional and bureaucratic organisational structures and 
providing civic education with a view to building the basis of an effectively 
functioning, democratic state system. Despite its experience in dealing with 
governance problems and its ability to develop multi-dimensional policy instruments 
to meet security and humanitarian needs specific to post-conflict-settings, the UN’s 
capacity to respond to post-conflict reconstruction has been undermined by its 
tendency to pursue the ‘best practice’ approach. That is, regardless of the specific 
local political, social and cultural factors and dynamics arising in each post-conflict 
situation, the UN and other members of the international community tended to apply 
the same model of democratic peace-building strategy to every society. Furthermore, 
 
13 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986. 
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the UN’s capacity to establish the institutional and societal basis of sustainable peace 
is also weakened by insufficient coordination within and between the UN and other 
international agencies.  
These problems, in turn, limited the prospect of laying the foundations for 
self-sufficient, stable, democratic government institutions in Kosovo and East Timor. 
As discussed earlier, there were significant differences between the two cases 
although both territories had recent experience of violent conflict. They differed in 
terms of the nature and historical background of the conflict, its root cause and the 
type of prior political regimes as well as socio-economic structures and intra-societal 
relations prior to and after the international intervention. The UN, however, failed to 
see these differences and adopt context-sensitive policies to address the specific 
problems and issues that arose in each case. Instead, the East Timor mission was 
designed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN on the 
basis of the Kosovo mission established in June 1999. This, in turn, constrained 
UNTAET’s capacity to address specific challenges and difficulties encountered in 
East Timor and led to tensions between international state-builders and local political 
actors.14  
As suggested throughout this thesis, the construction of efficient government 
institutions is not the only factor that affects the prospect of peaceful and democratic 
development of conflict-affected societies. As discussed in the first three chapters, 
state ‘strength’ is not only about the capacity of government institutions to fulfil their 
regulatory and extractive functions but also about the ideas or attitudes of individuals 
and social groups within the polity towards the state and its institutions as well as 
towards each other. The reconstruction of conflict-torn societies as self-sufficient, 
peaceful entities, in other words, requires the tackling of the question of “nationness” 
or issues related to creating a sense of a shared “imagined community”. The 
development of a sense of unity in post-conflict societies can be addressed through 
the recognition of the plural character of the society and the inclusion of diverse 
ethnic or cultural groups in political and societal life. An overarching collective 
identity binding these diverse groups can be promoted through institutions seen to be 
representing common values and made up of individuals from different groups. The 
 
14 Goldstone, 2004; Beauvais, 2001; Traub, 2000. 
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construction of efficient government institutions and bureaucratic structures (state-
building) and the development of a sense of national unity (nation-building), which 
refer to the end-results of the two complementary and interacting processes that 
conflict-affected societies pass through in the post-armed conflict period, in other 
words, affect the prospect of the international community-supervised democratic 
development of post-conflict societies.  
The achievement of unity entails the creation of a sense of cohesion within 
the political elite and society. The notion of national unity in post-conflict societies 
can be developed through undertaking a reconciliation process, promoting social 
communication and developing an overarching collective identity across diversity. 
Reconciliation aims to transform relations between individuals and groups from 
antagonistic to accommodative. Social communication, which is about the 
transmission of information within the society, helps to bind a group of people as a 
nation, made up of individuals who are willing to continue living together within the 
same political community. National identity, which can be created in different ways, 
is about the institutionalisation of a collective identity constructed upon cultural, 
linguistic, religious, political, legal and territorial ties.  
In the case of East Timor, the ending of the 24 years of brutal Indonesian 
occupation in 1999 provided the politically and socially divided East Timorese 
people with a historic opportunity to discuss the painful aspects of the territory’s 
turbulent history, and resolve and heal the past divisions. To this end, a 
comprehensive community reconciliation programme, endorsed by the UN, was put 
into practice. With a view to clarifying the truth of what happened in the past, a truth 
commission was established by the UN. A serious crimes process to investigate 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other human rights violations committed 
between 1974 and 1999 was also initiated by the UN to endorse the reconciliation 
process. The holding of public hearings, where victims shared their experiences and 
stories, in this context, was an important step for generating social communication, 
clarifying the question of what happened in the past, preventing social amnesia and 
creating accountability for the perpetrators of past crimes.  
The achievement of independence, which enabled the East Timorese people 
to freely communicate with each other, also meant the recognition and 
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institutionalisation of an inclusive East Timorese national identity. As discussed 
earlier, the idea of East Timorese nation during the years of resistance was based on 
a sense of collective victimhood at the hands of the Indonesian military. The ending 
of Indonesian rule, in this context, marked the beginning of a new process resulting 
in the construction of a new sense of national unity around shared characteristics. 
History narrated as a continuous struggle against foreign domination, Catholicism, 
which became an expression of Timorese national identity in the struggle against 
Indonesia, and Tetum, spoken and understood by the majority of the population, 
were among the unifying elements of such an inclusive collective identity.  
Several factors, however, impeded the development of a new sense of 
national unity based on shared characteristics in the post-Indonesian period. The 
limited capacity of the Timorese government to hold the perpetrators of human rights 
abuses in the past accountable and bring justice to victims’ families posed a serious 
challenge to achieving national integration. The senior Timorese leadership has 
pursued a pragmatist policy and been less supportive of the notion of pushing for the 
establishment of an international tribunal. The reasons for the insufficient progress in 
achieving reconciliation in the country included the Timorese government’s concern 
with normalising relations with Indonesia and the limited availability of international 
political and financial support for the delivery of justice. Understandably, this created 
a sense of frustration among the individuals who had lost members of their family in 
the struggle for independence.  
The promotion of social communication, which affects the integration of 
diverse linguistic, cultural or other social groups at the national level, has been 
constrained by several factors including underdeveloped communications and 
transportation systems and language policies. Timor-Leste’s insufficient 
communications and transportation infrastructure resulting from damaged roads and 
bridges, geographic challenges, underdeveloped telecommunications networks 
outside the major urban centres, and limited access to electricity in rural areas have 
undermined (1) inter-regional communication, (2) links between the government in 
the capital and remote areas, and (3) the capacity to disseminate information and 
access to reliable information. Limited availability of electricity supplies and 
telecommunications and the poor strength of radio signal in rural areas have 
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constrained access to accurate and reliable information. In addition to these 
problems, social communication in the country is also hampered by the limited 
circulation of newspapers and low literacy levels. This is not to suggest that there is 
no flow or exchange of information within the East Timorese society but to point to 
communication problems arising from the lack of formal and accurate information 
channels available to the East Timorese people and the insufficient connection 
between them and the government. Uninformed or insufficiently informed about 
government policies and social and political developments at the local and national 
level, many people have become susceptible to rumours and speculation, which 
spread extremely fast especially during times of crises such as during the 2006 riots.  
The decision of the senior East Timorese leadership to designate Portuguese 
as the primary official language neither facilitated communication and connection 
between the majority of the population and government nor encouraged a sense of 
unity and inclusion. It was spoken by fewer than 10% of the population at the time of 
independence. The choice of Portuguese tended to reinforce divisions which emerged 
just after the withdrawal of the Indonesians. Immediate divisions emerged between 
non-Portuguese speaking ordinary Timorese and well-educated Portuguese-speaking 
returned diaspora, who dominated government institutions. The definition of the East 
Timorese “high culture” by the elites to implement the principle of nation-state 
congruence and facilitate ‘context-free communication’ for upward social mobility15 
did not serve to achieve a general level of consensus on the character of the East 
Timorese nation, which is necessary for undertaking a successful democratisation 
process. This can be seen in the divergence of opinions between the Portuguese-
educated senior Timorese leaders and Indonesian-educated younger Timorese. While 
the former argued that the Portuguese language was an essential element of Timorese 
national identity, for the country’s Indonesian-educated youth the adoption of 
Portuguese was far from representing their idea of the East Timorese nation. 
According to the results of an opinion survey of 320 tertiary students in August 2002, 
an overwhelming majority of the respondents (83 %) indicated the “ability to speak 
Tetum” rather than Portuguese as “very important to being truly East Timorese”. 16 
The creation of East Timorese “high culture” in terms of the Portuguese language, in 
 
15 Gellner, 1983. 
16 Leach, 2003, p. 147.  
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this respect, can be seen as a political measure to facilitate the social or occupational 
mobility of those educated in Portuguese. 
In addition to the language issue, regionalism emerged as another source of 
fragmentation in the country in the absence of a common enemy in the post-
Indonesian period. The April and May 2006 riots sparked by the dismissal of 
approximately 600 soldiers, mostly from Western provinces of the country, from the 
national defence force further aggravated problems with achieving reconciliation and 
developing a sense of unity. The violent events in which the country’s security 
institutions were involved resulted in the intensification of the regional differences-
based division. The 2006 crisis also demonstrated the link between the way in which 
the state institutions are created and the way they are perceived and ‘owned’ by local 
populations. In other words, it showed the interacting characteristics of the processes 
of state-building and nation-building that the country has passed through in the post-
Indonesian period. The recruitment process, resulting in the exclusion of some ex-
guerrillas from the newly-created defence force and the selection of former Polri 
officers into the police service, fuelled a sense of alienation within the veteran 
community. The manipulation of this discontent by some opportunistic political 
figures for political gains had an undermining effect on the legitimacy of the 
country’s security institutions. Resulting in the intensification of political rifts and 
intra-societal competition, this situation paved the way for the violent riots in the 
spring of 2006.  
In the same vein, in the case of Kosovo, the efforts to create a unified multi-
ethnic society in the post-1999 period through achieving reconciliation, promoting 
social communication and creating an overarching collective identity have been 
hampered by the persistence of a climate of distrust, lack of security and freedom of 
movement and the isolation of the Serbs and Roma. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
development of a sense of unity across diversity requires the recognition of the plural 
character of the society, inclusion of ethnic, cultural or other groups in political and 
social life, and the creation of a unifying, overarching collective identity. Although 
the ‘plural’ character of the Kosovo society was formally recognised and the 
inclusion and representation of all ethnic groups in the provisional institutions was 
guaranteed by the Constitutional Framework, the idea or a sense of unified, multi-
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ethnic society could not be created. Despite the efforts of moderate Albanian 
politicians and intellectuals to start a debate on a civic Kosovar identity to embrace 
all ethnic groups, ethnic identities tied to mutually exclusive narration of the 
territory’s past have persisted in the post-1999 period.  The Serbs who stayed inside 
Kosovo in the post-NATO intervention period clustered together in northern 
municipalities and ethnically-homogenous enclaves in central and southern Kosovo. 
They established their own ‘parallel’ institutions of education, security and health 
funded by Belgrade. The lack of social cohesion characterised by ethnic segregation, 
in turn, weakened the capacity of the provisional institutions to exercise authority 
and fulfil their regulatory and extractive functions throughout the territory.  
The presence of ‘parallel’ institutions in Kosovo is a legacy of the past. They 
were first created by moderate Kosovo Albanian leaders in the early-1990s to 
weaken Belgrade’s its claim to control the province. Following the withdrawal of the 
Serbian authorities in the post-NATO intervention period, the Serbs established their 
own ‘parallel’ political and social institutions in the post-NATO intervention period 
with a view to weakening the capacity and legitimacy of the international 
community-built provisional institutions. Educated in separated schools, the 
Albanian and Serb children and youth have had virtually no contact and 
communication in the last two decades. Relying on the nationalist media circulating 
one-sided, politics-dominated news and information, the Serbs and Albanians have 
had no exchange of information or views. Fuelling the already-existing prejudices 
and the sense of victimhood at the hands each other, this situation has reinforced the 
divisions between the two groups. The lack of contact and communication between 
the members of the two groups has hindered the opportunity for discussing the past 
and establishing a common ground for finding a mutually acceptable solution to the 
conflict.  
Based on the above, the main problems related to creating a sense of unified 
community in Kosovo and Timor-Leste in the post-1999 period can be summarised 
in the following way: 
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 Process of nation-building in Timor-
Leste 
Process of nation-building in Kosovo 
Social communication: transmission 
of information and contact within the 
society 
a) Constrained by the choice of 
Portuguese spoken by a small elite; 
b) Poor communications and 
transportation facilities leading to 
limited or no communication and 
connection between the centre and 
remote areas; 
c) Limited circulation of newspapers 
and limited access to mass 
communications. 
a) Virtually non-existent at the elite 
and community level; 
b) Segregation and polarisation of 
ethnic groups; 
c) Separation of schools; 
d) Reliance on competing sources of 
information. 
Reconciliation: transforming 
antagonistic relations into 
accommodative interaction 
a) Incomplete reconciliation at the 
community level due to limited 
progress in balancing reconciliation 
with justice; 
b) Limited progress in settling old 
ideological and personal differences 
at the elite level; 
 
c) Prevalence of the question of who 
fought for and who betrayed the 
national resistance in the post-
independence period. 
a) persistence of intolerance, mistrust 
and feeling of insecurity; 
b) continued prejudices and 
stereotypes; 
c( no reconciliation achieved at all. 
Creation of a collective identity: 
recognition of the multi-ethnic / 
cultural character of the nation, 
inclusion of all groups in the political 
and social life, construction of a 
unifying, overarching collective 
identity 
a) Weak definition of national 
identity in the absence of the 
‘enemy’; 
b) Divisions between ‘insider’ East 
Timorese and returned diaspora; 
c) Emergence of regional differences; 
d) Choice of Portuguese to form the 
East Timorese “high culture”. 
a) Non-existent, inclusive, civic 
identity unifying all ethnic groups; 
b) Strong ethnic identities; 
c) Growing sense of victimisation at 
the hands of the ‘other’; 
d) Conflicting narrations of history 
tied to myths. 
Table 8.3. Problems with creating a sense of cohesive “imagined community” in East Timor and Kosovo in the 
post-1999 period. 
 
This thesis highlights the following points regarding the UN’s engagement in 
building sustainable peace in Kosovo and East Timor through establishing 
democratic government structures in the post-1999 period. It is important to note that 
the discussion of the below points is not to produce a template and suggest that if a 
set of conditions are met, democratic peace can easily be established by the 
international community in conflict-affected societies but to point to certain aspects 
of the international community’s engagement in democratic peace-building in these 
two conflict-affected societies which constrained its capacity to achieve the goal of 
building peace and security that does not require external involvement.  
 
1. Sequencing of tasks in promoting democratic government in conflict-affected 
societies: Divided along political and ethnic lines, societies emerging from violent 
internal conflict have the least favourable conditions for undertaking a process of 
transition to democracy. Based on inclusiveness and public contestation, democracy, 
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as discussed earlier, involves two opposing elements.17 While the former entails 
encouraging peaceful resolution of differences through participation and inclusion in 
the political decision-making process, the latter refers to opposition and mobilisation. 
This however potentially involves the risk of violence in post-conflict situations 
where political institutions are weak or polarised and the society is divided along 
ethnic or other lines. Democratisation of post-conflict societies, therefore, requires 
the sequencing of efforts: creation of functioning government structures with the 
capacity to provide security and respond to socio-economic needs (state-building) 
and a sense of unified national community (nation-building) before democratisation 
(democracy-building).  
Providing personal and collective security, in this context, stands out as the 
most crucial aspect of the international community-led post-conflict reconstruction 
process. The creation of a secure environment entails implementing all necessary 
measures to end hostilities and eradicate structural factors that may derail the peace 
process. These measures include the disarmament and demobilisation of former 
combatants and their integration into civilian life process through creating 
employment opportunities and providing vocational training. It also includes the 
establishment of security institutions, seen to be legitimate and capable of 
maintaining security, law and order and representing all groups in society. This may 
facilitate gaining and reinforcing public trust and confidence in the state-building 
process. Providing security in post-conflict societies, in other words, entails the 
removal of all political, social, economic, environmental and physical barriers 
threatening the existence and identity of individuals and social groups.  
The international security forces’ initial inability in Kosovo to fill the security 
vacuum, enforce law and order, canton and disarm the KLA guerrillas and provide 
the security of non-Albanian minority groups following the withdrawal of Serbian 
authorities and their failure to protect members of non-Albanian groups during the 
violent events in March 2004 seriously hindered efforts to bring sustainable peace to 
the province and undermined the already weak hopes for creating a stable multi-
ethnic society in Kosovo. Similarly, politicisation of the police service and national 
defence force and their rivalry undermined the capacity to enforce the rule of law and 
 
17 Dahl, 1971. 
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consolidate an effective democratic rule in Timor-Leste in the post-independence 
period.   
Another significant aspect of this sequentialist approach is related to creating 
a sense of belonging to a shared “imagined community” shaped around common or 
similar values, interests, stakes and bonds that reflect a collective wish for living 
together within the same polity. In the case of conflict-affected societies, this can be 
facilitated through promoting and implementing participatory and inclusive aspects 
of democracy while postponing the implementation of its competitive components in 
the immediate post-conflict era. This entails promoting channels of social 
communication and ensuring the participation and inclusion of individuals in 
political and social processes. As noted in Chapter 1, ensuring the “strength” of 
states, which forms the underlying goal of the international community’s engagement 
in rebuilding war-torn societies, is not simply about building instrumental capacities 
of statehood such as providing coercive and non-coercive public services, extracting 
resources and exercising autonomy but is determined by the ideas and attitudes of 
individuals within the society.18 State strength involves the ideas and emotions of 
individuals about the state and the rightfulness of its claim to rule.19 Furthermore, the 
attitudes and practices of individuals and groups toward each other, their acceptance 
and understanding of diversity and inclusion of diverse individuals and groups in 
social and political processes also contribute to the “strength” of states.20 As 
discussed in Chapter 2, collective identities can be created around institutions seen as 
capable, responsive, representative and inclusive by the society. 
In the case of East Timor and Kosovo, these could not be achieved. The East 
Timorese defence force and police service, for example, suffered from a legitimacy 
crisis arising from the way they were created.21 The recruitment process caused a 
rising sense of frustration and alienation within the veteran community and the 
society as a whole.22 The intensifying power struggle in the political sphere and the 
choice of Portuguese as the primary national language further complicated the 
situation, fuelling intra-societal competition and the alienation from the newly 
 
18 Holsti, 1991, pp. 82-84. 
19 Ibid., pp. 87-87. 
20 Ibid., pp. 87-90. 
21 UN Inquiry Commission, 2006, p. 18. 
22 Rees 2003, 2004; Wainwright, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2006. 
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created government institutions of non-Portuguese speaking Timorese, educated 
under the Indonesians. Increasing intra-societal competition was also manifested by 
the emergence of regional differences and social polarisation over the question of 
“who contributed to the resistance more”.  
Similarly, in Kosovo the international community-supervised provisional 
institutions had legitimacy issues. The continued presence of ‘parallel’ institutions in 
northern enclaves, which openly demonstrated the non-recognition of their authority 
by the Serbs, contributed to the undermining of their capacity in the eyes of the 
majority Albanians. The aforementioned steadily falling satisfaction ratings for 
UNMIK and Kosovo’s provisional institutions and decreasing levels of participation 
in governmental and institutional structures illustrate this situation. As noted in 
Chapter 7, while the participation of the Serbs in the general elections in both 
November 2001 and October 2004 was negligible, the overall turnout declined from 
64% in 2001 to 53% in 2004.  
The lack of social cohesion in Kosovo and the weak sense of national unity in 
East Timor in the post-Indonesian period, in other words, contributed to the 
undermining of the capacity of government institutions to exercise authority and 
carry out their functions, inhibiting the prospect of democratic development of these 
two territories.  
 
2. Accurate knowledge of the nature and historical background of conflict: In both 
Kosovo and East Timor, members of the international community focused on the 
final stage of conflict, i.e., outbreak of violence and physical destruction of the 
territories. Failing to grasp the historical background and root causes of conflict, the 
missions established in these two territories demonstrated limited cultural sensitivity 
and insufficient understanding of local dynamics of power structures. The missions, 
in other words, were not equipped with the right ‘toolkit’ and capacity to respond to 
specific difficulties and challenges both those inherited from the previous period as 
well as those that newly emerged in the post-armed conflict period. The root cause of 
the conflict in East Timor was the Indonesian occupation and the division in the 
society was between pro-independence and pro-Indonesian groups. Following the 
departure of the Indonesian authorities and pro-Indonesian militias, discredited by 
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the post-popular consultation violence, the armed conflict ended. Thus, the mandate 
of the transitional administration in East Timor was to supervise and complete a 
decolonisation process in cooperation with local actors rather than prevent the 
eruption of hostilities and violence between competing groups as in Kosovo. 
In Kosovo, systematic human rights violations and assaults of the Serbian 
military and paramilitary forces against ethnic Albanians constituted the last stage of 
the Kosovo conflict, resulting from opposing sovereignty claims of the Serbs and 
Albanians. The two ethnic groups were living in segregation since the early 1990s 
when the province’s autonomy was unilaterally abolished by Belgrade but the 
violence did not break out until the late-1990s. Hostilities between various factions 
did not cease to exist following the deployment of international civilian and military 
presence in the aftermath of the NATO intervention. The KLA-proclaimed 
‘provisional government’ and Ibrahim Rugova’s government were struggling for 
power when UNMIK was deployed and members of non-Albanian communities 
were targeted for revenge and forced to flee the province.  
The international community, however, failed to take the appropriate 
approach and actions in both Kosovo and East Timor. Although UNTAET was 
mandated to supervise East Timor’s transition to political independent statehood 
through building functioning, democratic state structures, it was designed as a 
peacekeeping mission aiming to end hostilities between warring parties. The mission, 
as noted earlier, modelled on the mission established in Kosovo where the nature of 
conflict was different. UNTAET did not treat the pro-independence umbrella 
organisation, CNRT, as a legitimate partner. In Kosovo, the international community, 
focused on the withdrawal of Serb authorities, recognised the KLA-government as a 
legitimate local actor and failed to prevent revenge attacks on the Serbs and their 
departure from the province. This, in return, undermined the UN’s capacity to 
develop and implement policies in response to social needs, create a functioning 
cooperative relationship with local political actors and populations and achieve 
public trust in the externally-guided post-conflict peace-building and political 
reconstruction process. 
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3. Choice of local interlocutors and the development of consultation and 
accountability mechanisms encouraging local participation in decision-making: The 
collapse of formal administrative institutions does not necessarily mean that there is 
a political vacuum. Therefore, neither Kosovo nor East Timor, where formal 
administrative institutions fell apart following the withdrawal of the nominal 
governments, was a tabula rasa, a place where there was nothing or no political 
concepts or informal social institutions that everything had to be introduced or 
brought from the outside. The point was to identify existing local political actors and 
administrative skills, build on existing capabilities and develop accountability and 
participatory mechanisms with a view to preventing the alienation of groups from the 
political process, giving local stakeholders a voice in transitional governing 
structures composed of representatives of all groups, encouraging them to perform 
democratic tasks and roles and improve their capacity.   
 As discussed earlier, the missions established in Kosovo and East Timor were 
designed and detailed in the UN headquarters in New York without the participation 
of relevant local actors. As it was also noted, the establishment of the UN interim 
administration and deployment of the NATO-led international security force to 
Kosovo was realised following the acceptance of the Military Technical Agreement 
by Slobodan Milosevic after 11 weeks of intensive air strikes. In the case of East 
Timor, the Habibie administration agreed to the deployment of the Australian-led 
multinational force to restore law and order and the subsequent establishment of the 
UN transitional administration following the US threat to suspend military 
cooperation programmes with Indonesia and the World Bank and IMF threat of 
freezing international financial aid to the country, suffering from a serious financial 
crisis since the year 1997. The authority and legitimacy of these two missions, which 
derived from the UN Security Council Resolutions of 1244 and 1272, was based on 
military occupation.23 Vested with all legislative and executive powers including the 
administration of the judiciary, the special representative of the UN Secretary-
General acted as the transitional administrator to facilitate the democratic self-
government of these two conflict-torn territories. This, in turn, made the 
establishment of participation, consultation and accountability mechanisms 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 152. 
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extremely important to alleviate the effects of the exercise of what the late Sergio 
Vieira de Mello called “benevolent despotism”.24  
Several important institutional mechanisms such as the Interim 
Administrative Council and the Transitional Council in Kosovo and the National 
Council in East Timor were set up to create a sustainable connection between the 
international administration and local populations and bring local insights into the 
post-conflict reconstruction process. Despite the establishment of these institutional 
structures, the transitional administrator, who continued to exercise extensive 
executive and regulatory powers, remained accountable to the UN Security Council 
and the donor community while other members of the international civilian 
administration and security presence enjoyed legal immunity. Cases involving KFOR 
and UNMIK personnel, for example, were excluded from investigations by the 
Office of Ombudsperson,25 established in Kosovo in late-2000 to address complaints 
from any person or entity in Kosovo regarding human rights violations and abuses of 
authority by UNMIK and emerging public institutions.26 In addition to this, it is 
important to note that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson was restricted to 
providing advice and making recommendations.27 In several reports issued in 2001 
and 2002, Marek Antoni Nowicki, who served as the international Ombudsperson 
until 2006, criticised UNMIK’s practice of holding arrested individuals in detention 
for extended periods of time before being brought before a judicial authority and of 
continuing to hold several individuals under arrest despite a release order by a 
judicial authority.28 UNMIK officials responded to his criticisms by arguing that 
despite the two years into the mission, Kosovo still ranked as an “internationally-
recognised emergency” that required “special measures that…allow authorities to 
respond to the findings of intelligence that are not able to be presented to the court 
system”.29  
The persistence of a ‘top-down’ state-building approach and the absence of 
real accountability, consultation and participation mechanisms in transitional 
 
24 Cited in Beauvais, 2001. 
25 UNTAET/REG/2000/47 (18 August 2000). 
26 UNMIK/REG/2000/38 (30 June 2000). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Chesterman, 2005, p. 148. 
29 Ibid., p. 149. 
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administrations established in Kosovo and East Timor, which represented an 
inconsistency between the principles introduced such as the rule of law and respect 
for human rights and the way they were practised, not only led to the stagnation of 
relations between the local populations and international state-builders but also set a 
negative model for democratic governance in these two places. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to observe authoritarian tendencies in the FRETILIN dominated-
government and Parliament in Timor-Leste in the post-independence period.30 In the 
same way, as Kai Eide pointed out the provisional institutions in Kosovo were 
undermined by politicians who “see themselves accountable to their political parties 
rather than to the public they serve”.31 
 Implementation of the principles and values promoted and inclusion of local 
actors in the transitional government structures and thus in planning and 
implementation of institution and capacity-building initiatives and policies affect the 
capacity to respond to short, medium and long-term local needs, priorities and 
interests.  Such an approach, which encourages local actors to produce solutions to 
social problems and needs, gives them a responsibility in implementing policies that 
they initiate and allows them to make mistakes from which they can learn, is more 
likely to increase local ownership and capacity than projects designed and 
undertaken by external actors with limited understanding of local conditions.  
 
4. Identification of a clear end-point and achievable, realistic targets, time-frames 
and benchmarks: Mandated to supervise the political transition of the East Timorese 
people to independence, UNTAET was expected to achieve a liberal democratic 
transformation in ‘two to three years’. This time-frame, as noted in Chapter 5, was 
set by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the basis of donor countries’ 
willingness and commitment to provide financial and political support for the 
reconstruction of East Timor. Given the scale of physical destruction and emergency 
of humanitarian needs, caused by the post-ballot militia violence, and complexity and 
difficulty of the task at hand, developing self-sufficient, democratic government 
structures and generating a sense of national cohesion in such a short span of time 
                                                 
30 Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the 
Need for Inclusive Governance”, Asian Survey, 46:4 (July / August 2006), pp. 575-596. See also, 
International Crisis Group, 2006c; Hohe, 2004. 
31 United Nations, 2005b, para. 19. 
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was an unrealistic target. Thus, although the presence of a clearly-defined end-point, 
i.e., preparing the Timorese for independence, facilitated the undertaking of a smooth 
institution and capacity-building process, the short time-frame created anxiety on the 
side of international actors to produce quick results and led them to concentrate on 
short-term achievements. 
The interim administration in Kosovo, on the other hand, was established for 
an indefinite period. Although this may be interpreted as the international 
community’s enthusiasm to provide a long term political and economic assistance in 
building and consolidating functioning democratic government institutions in 
Kosovo, the absence of a time-frame for UNMIK’s mandate and UNMIK’s inability 
to initiate a political process to resolve the root cause of the conflict created tensions 
between the Albanian political leaders and international state-builders. While the 
Albanian stakeholders were frustrated with the maintenance of Serbian ‘parallel’ 
institutions in northern municipalities and Belgrade’s uncompromising position and 
were impatient to assume the responsibility of government, UNMIK was reluctant to 
devolve competence and authority to the local structures before they proved fully 
capable of managing domestic affairs. In order to overcome these tensions, which 
stagnated relations between the international community and local actors, UNMIK 
initiated the policy of “standards before status” but it failed to revitalise the political 
process because it was seen by the Albanians as a temporary measure to keep them 
busy and by the Serbs as the road to independence. The lack of progress over the 
issue of final status, resulting from delays in clarifying the content of a set of “highly 
ambitious”32 benchmarks and UNMIK’s reluctance to delegate competencies and 
authority to local institutions, fuelled frustration amongst the Albanians, for whom 
the immediate achievement and recognition of independence was the only solution to 
the province’s political and economic problems. Uncertainty over final political 
status, in return, hindered efforts to undertake a sustainable democratic peace-
building process in Kosovo and undermined the capacity of the international 
community-led provisional institutions. Thus, the identification of (1) a clear end-
point, (2) achievable targets developed on the basis of local needs, dynamics and 
contexts rather than against a set of externally-designed criteria, and (3) realistic 
 
32 Eide, 2004, p. 4. 
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time-frames is the key to establishing functioning government structures with a view 
to establishing the institutional background of a successful transitional process in 
post-conflict societies. This also entails the inclusion and participation of relevant 
local actors in the process. That is,  as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the 
reconstruction of post-conflict societies requires taking into account local political, 
social and cultural factors and processes while evaluating the progress in developing 
local governmental and institutional capacities rather than relying on a set of 
externally-defined, ‘ideal’ criteria for state ‘success / strength’. 
 
5. Developing local administrative and institutional capacity and the capacity of 
international capacity-builders: The departure of Indonesian and Serbian 
administrative staff in East Timor and Kosovo and the absence of faith in the 
technical and managerial skills and capacity of the local population led UNMIK and 
UNTAET to recruit and rely on expatriate staff to facilitate policy-making and 
deliver basic services. While performing public services, international staff was 
expected to advise their separately recruited local counterparts and transfer skills and 
competencies to them. Focusing on individual skills transfer through mentoring and 
coaching rather than on institutional procedures, training programmes resulted in 
limited achievement in building the local capacity. Many of the international staff 
with varying levels of skills and expertise recruited in East Timor and Kosovo 
carried out daily administrative tasks and had little time for on-the-job training. In 
addition to the lack of time, limited training and coaching skills of international 
consultants resulted in an insufficient transfer of technical knowledge and skills. 
Therefore, the recruitment of international personnel with relevant professional 
experience as well as training, teaching and communications skills denotes another 
significant aspect of the post-conflict reconstruction process; achieving the best 
results expected from training and mentoring programmes.  
This thesis concludes that establishing sustainable peace through promoting 
democratic governance in conflict-affected societies such as Kosovo and East Timor 
requires not only the presence of efficiently functioning government structures but 
also the resolution of the question of “nationness” in the first place. The lack of or a 
weak sense of social cohesion tends to increase political and social competition and 
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undermine the capacity of government institutions built by the international 
community. The presence of a functioning governance system and a sense of national 
cohesion, which denotes the end-results of the two complementary and interacting 
processes (state-building and nation-building) that post-conflict societies go through, 
in other words, determines whether an international community-led post-conflict 
reconstruction can be successful.  
Promoting communication and reconciliation at individual and group level 
and developing an inclusive collective identity signify the crucial aspects of the 
process of generating a sense of cohesion and peaceful co-existence in the post-
armed conflict period. The pursuit of an inclusive and participatory approach, in this 
context, becomes extremely important to create a sense of intra-societal cohesion and 
loyalty to the newly established government structures as well as to implant 
democratic principles and norms such as political representation, participation and 
accountability. It may help to achieve a sense of ownership of the post-conflict 
reconstruction process and ensure the sustainability of institutions seen as being 
designed in response to local needs.  
Given the fact that it took centuries for contemporary Western democracies to 
evolve and reach today’s level at the end of wars, uprisings, internal struggles and 
frictions, it seems unrealistic to expect societies emerging from violent conflict to 
achieve a liberal democratic transformation in a short span of time. This is not to 
suggest that democracy, which, in the words of Winston Churchill, is “the worst 
form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time 
to time”, should be sacrificed or neglected but to say that it should follow state-
building and nation-building, which interact with each other and affect the prospects 
for democratic transition and consolidation. Again, this is not to suggest that 
democratic consolidation in societies with little or no prior democratic experience is 
expected to take centuries but to emphasise that democratisation of conflict-affected 
societies is affected by the interplay of internal and external factors and it requires 
time and long-term commitment of local and international actors to addressing 
political, social and economic processes and contexts that led to the outbreak of 
violent conflict in the past and creating conditions conducive to sustainable peaceful 
development. 
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